

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO

The International Relations of Sub-State Governments in Mexico:

A Comparative Analysis with Ten Federal Systems

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree

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by

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Chair

University of California, San Diego

2016

## DEDICATION

To Cris, Nat, Lu, Papo and Be.

## EPIGRAPH

No es perfecta, mas se acerca,  
a lo que yo, simplemente soñé...

*Pablo Milanés*

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFEPA	Assessoria Especial de Assuntos Federativos e Parlamentares
AMAIE	Asociación de Oficinas de Asuntos Internacionales de los Estados
AWEPA	Africa West European Parliamentary Association
COFECEX	Consejo Federal de Comercio Exterior (Argentina)
CONAGO	Conferencia Nacional de Gobernadores (México)
CPA	Commonwealth Parliamentary Union
DPLG	Department of Provincial and Local Government (South Africa)
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ENCORE	Environmental Conference of the European Regions
ENP	Effective number of parties
EU	European Union
EZLN	Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional
DF	Distrito Federal (Mexico)
FD	Federal District
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FITA	Feria Internacional del Turismo de las Américas
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GFS	Government Finance Statistics
ICFP	Inter-ministerial Committee on Foreign Policy (Belgium)

ICLEI	Local Governments for Sustainability (previously International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives)
IDC	International Decentralized Cooperation
IIA	Inter-Institutional Agreements
ILO	International Labor Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INEGI	Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (Mexico)
IR	International Relations
IRSSG	International Relations of sub-State Governments
ISI	Import Substitution Industrialization
MERCOSUR	Mercado Común del Sur
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MFRA	Ministry of Foreign and Religious Affairs (Argentina)
MI-IRSSG	Mexican Index on IR of sub-State Governments
MNC	Multinational corporations
MRQ	Multiple response questionnaire
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NCG	Non-central governments
NCOP	National Council of Provinces (South Africa)
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PAN	Partido Acción Nacional (Mexico)

PLQ	Parti Libéral du Quebec (Canada)
PNWER	Pacific Northwest Economic Region
PQ	Parti Québécois (Canada)
PR	Proportional Representation
PRD	Partido de la Revolución Democrática (Mexico)
PRI	Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Mexico)
REGLEG	Conference of European Regions with Legislative Power
RIIA	Register of Inter-Institutional Agreements
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SRE	Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (Mexico)
SSG	Sub-State governments
UCCI	Union of Ibero-American Capital Cities
UCLG	United Cities and Local Governments
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	UN Educational Conference on Trade and Development
UNICEF	UN International Children's Emergency Fund
UNESCO	UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFCCC	UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
USTR	Office of the United States Trade Representative
WB	World Bank
WDI	World Development Indicators
WHO	World Health Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization

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Finally, parts of chapter 9 were published as: Jorge A. Schiavon, “La diplomacia local del Distrito Federal (2000-2010)”, Manuel Martínez Justo (coord.), *Estudios Comparados de Diplomacia Local en las Entidades Federativas del Centro de México*, Mexico, UNAM-FES Acatlán, 2011, pp. 29-64. The author of this dissertation is the single author of this publication.

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## TEACHING

Taught 60+ courses (Lower Division, Upper Division, Graduate, Specialization, Diploma and Highschool) at Universities, Research Centers and Diplomatic Academies in Mexico, the United States, Canada, Sweden, Spain, and Azerbaijan, on:

- Mexican Foreign Policy
- Contemporary Latin America
- Introduction to International Relations
- International Relations Seminar
- Theory of International Relations
- International Political Economy
- International Relations of Substate Governments
- Regional Integration
- U.S.-Mexico Relations
- Mexican Political System
- Migration
- Honors Thesis Seminar
- Spanish (Grammar and Conversation)

## LECTURES, CONFERENCES, SEMINARS AND PRESENTATIONS

Delivered and participated in 250+ conferences, lectures, keynotes, congresses, seminars, and book presentations, in over 30 countries (Canada, Mexico, and the United States; Argentina, Belice, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama, Peru, Venezuela, and Uruguay; France, Germany, Great Britain, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden; Azerbaijan, China, India, Jordan, South Korea, and Turkey; on academic and professional areas of expertise.

## MEMBERSHIP TO PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

- Asociación Mexicana de Estudios Internacionales (AMEI): President (2011-2013) and Vice-President (2009-2011), Member 2000-.
- Consejo Mexicano de Asuntos Internacionales (COMEXI): 2004-.
- International Studies Association (ISA): 1999-.
- World International Studies Committee (WISC): 2005-.
- Latin American Studies Association (LASA): 2000-2012.
- International Political Science Association (IPSA): 2009-2014.
- International American Studies Association (IASA): 2009-2010.
- Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO): 2007-2009.
- American Political Science Association (APSA): 1999-2005.

## FIELDS OF STUDY

Major field: International Relations

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Substantive interests:

- Sub-State diplomacy (paradiplomacy)
- Mexican foreign policy
- History of Mexican international relations
- Migration
- Public opinion and foreign policy
- Regional integration in Latin America and North America
- Institutions, decentralization, and federalism in Latin America and North America
- U.S.-Mexico-Canada relations and hemispheric Latin American relations
- Mexican, North American, and Latin American political systems and foreign policies.

## ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

The International Relations of Sub-State Governments in Mexico:  
A Comparative Analysis with Ten Federal Systems

by

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Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and International Affairs

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This dissertation seeks to explain and understand why and how sub-State governments conduct their international relations with external actors, and how federal authorities and local governments coordinate or not in the definition and implementation of the national foreign policy.

It conducts a comprehensive and comparative study of the international relations of sub-State governments (IRSSG) in ten federal systems which are representative of all the regions of the world, stages of economic development

and degree of consolidation of their democratic institutions (South Africa (Africa), India and Russia (Asia), Belgium and Germany (Europe), Canada, Mexico, and the United States (North America), Brazil and Argentina (South America), and Australia (Oceania)). It constructs a typology to measure and explain the IRSSG based on the domestic political institutions, especially the constitutional provisions relating foreign affairs and the intergovernmental mechanisms for foreign policy decision making and implementation. Based on the comparative analysis of the ten federations, an in-depth analysis of the Mexican case is done, explaining the variation in the IRSSG of its 32 federal units using economic, political and geographic variables to understand the amount and type of international activities and cooperation mechanisms. This analysis is complemented with the study of the 668 inter-institutional agreements signed by Mexican SSG, a survey applied to the public officials responsible of IRSSG in Mexico, and a case study of Mexico City's international activities, in order to better understand the preferences, perceptions, capacities, and motivations of Mexican SSG in their internationalization.

There are ten main findings. First, there is a very important variation in the IRSSG and central-local coordination in foreign affairs worldwide. Second, there has been change in the types of central-local coordination during the last decades. Third, the most important causes to conduct IRSSG are globalization, regionalization, and decentralization. Fourth, the democratization variable is a relevant cause for increasing IRSSG in all countries with democracies in process of consolidation; however, it is not as important in the cases of consolidated

democracies. Fifth, the predominant motive to conduct IRSSG is to promote local economic development; another important reason is the management border issues; cultural motivation is only relevant in cases where there is cultural variation between SSG. Sixth, institutional creation and building is the norm between SSG to coordinate their international relations; SSG have created ministries or agencies to conduct their international affairs, however, the size, resources, activities and level of consolidation varies considerably between cases. Seventh, there is considerable variation in the international activities conducted by SSG. Eighth, a rationalization of national foreign policy is observed, as the federal government allows SSG to conduct international affairs in those areas where they have powers. Ninth, all countries make a difference between foreign policy (considered an exclusive power and responsibility of the federal government, which includes high politics issues), and international relations or affairs (which include those areas in which SSG have powers, mostly low politics issues). Tenth, all inclusive cases are developed and consolidated parliamentary democracies; all the complementary cases are presidential systems with developing democracies in consolidation (with the exception of the United States); and, the exclusive types have federal systems constitutionally; however, in reality, they function in a very centralized way, practically nullifying federal institutions.

## INTRODUCTION

Paradiplomacy or the international relations of sub-State governments (IRSSG) is a worldwide phenomenon. Many sub-State governments (SSG) are conducting international relations, and this activity is rapidly growing and discreetly impacting States' interactions in the international system. The gross domestic product (GDP) of some SSG is larger than that of some G-20 countries: New York state's GDP is larger than that of Australia, Mexico, South Africa, South Korea, Spain or Turkey, while Sao Paulo's is larger than the GDP of all South American countries. However, the IRSSG appear to be the elephant in the room in the discipline of International Relations: it is there, it is growing, and very little attention has been given to explain its causes and consequences. This dissertation seeks to explain and understand why and how SSG conduct their international relations, and how federal authorities and local governments coordinate or not in the definition and implementation of the national foreign policy. In brief, it seeks to better understand some of the causes and consequences of the IRSSG, in particular, in federal countries.

It is relevant to study the IRSSG because it can affect the decision making and implementation of national foreign policy. Even if this will not be the central topic of the dissertation, it is necessary to provide evidence that the phenomenon exists, that the relations between federal and SSG shape it, and that there is important variation within the phenomenon. A SSG, like Wallonia, can block the negotiation and implementation of a regional international agreement, like the

Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the European Union and Canada. Also, if a SSG establishes an international agreement that goes beyond its powers and does not fulfill its commitments, the central government would be responsible according to current international law. On the brighter side, the IRSSG has an impact on local development and welfare. Development not only depends on national policies, but more importantly it is related to local policies. In a globalized world with increasingly open and competitive national and regional economies, SSG with higher levels of international activity attract more foreign direct investment (FDI), open markets for their products and increase exports, and receive more international decentralized cooperation (IDC), generating local welfare (McMillan 2012, Grau 2013). SSG are members of international organizations and agencies; there are more than 125 multilateral arrangements of SSG. Also, some SSG formally participate in multilateral organizations of nation States, like Flanders in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and Hong Kong and Macao in the World Trade Organization (WTO).

To understand better this phenomenon, the central questions to be addressed in this dissertation are: First, what explains increasing IRSSG in federal systems in the last decades, changing from a limited to an extensive amount of international activities? Second, what explains the variation in the level, type and activities in the IRSSG conducted in federal countries? Third, what explains the delay in the initiation of the IRSSG in Mexico (and other consolidating democracies) compared to other developed federal democracies?

Fourth, what explains the substantive variation in level and type of IR conducted by the 32 Mexican SSG? Finally, fifth, *ceteris paribus*, to what extent are individual federal unit executives (Governors) relevant in the internationalization of their SSG?

Historically, foreign policy has been controlled exclusively by nation-States, and its main objective has been to protect their sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity (Berridge and James 2001). The bureaucracy in charge of international affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), is responsible for defining and conducting this policy, in order to maximize the national interest, reduce the costs and increase the benefits of the participation of the State in the international system (Rosenau, 1974).

To attain this goal, States have to maintain a unified position toward the exterior. As a result, the implementation of foreign policy has been a prerogative of the central government, generally the Executive, even in federal systems.<sup>1</sup> As a matter of fact, Article 7.2.a. of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties establishes that Heads of State or Government and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs are considered as representing their States and, therefore, conducting foreign policy. However, in the last decades, the total control of the federal Executive in foreign affairs has been increasingly challenged. Worldwide, the number of internal actors that participate in international issues has increased

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<sup>1</sup> Riker defines federalism as “a political organization where the governmental powers are divided between central and regional governments, in such a way that each government order has certain areas of competence where it has the faculty of the final decision”, see Riker 1975.



considerably, even though the federal Executives maintain the constitutional power to direct foreign policy and conclude international treaties.

These challenges to federal monopoly over international affairs have taken effect through four important developments. First, ministries or offices of the federal Executive other than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have direct relations with their bureaucratic or administrative counterparts abroad; this has been referred as administrative diplomacy. Also, the vast majority of the federal ministries have specialized international affairs areas or sections whose main objective is to coordinate these activities. Second, other branches of the federal government, particularly the Legislature, and occasionally the Judiciary, have substantially increased their contact with their international counterparts; this has been called parliamentary diplomacy. In general, the participation of the Legislature in international affairs is circumscribed to the revision of the foreign policy conducted by the Executive, the domestic approval of treaties and the ratification of Ambassador and Consular appointments. However, they also have their own international activities in the areas and issues in which they have attributions.

Third, SSG, both at state and local level, have significantly increased their international relations. These external activities have been denominated as sub-State, local or federative diplomacy, IRSSG or paradiplomacy (Aldecoa and Keating 2000; Michelmann and Soldatos 1990; Hocking 1993; Kincaid 1984; among others), and will be the main focus of analysis in this dissertation, specifically at the state or provincial level. Finally, fourth, non-State actors such

as multinational corporations (MNC), non-governmental organizations (NGO) and diverse interest groups (academia, business associations, unions and political parties, among many others) have also increased their participation and incidence in external affairs; this has been called citizen or social diplomacy.

In every country, the MFA is the bureaucratic agency in charge of conducting foreign policy. In order to do so, it must serve two essential functions: coordinating and representing the diverse interests of all national actors with interests or incidence in external affairs. Thus, the main challenge that a MFA faces is to coordinate the growing number of interests, some of which may oppose, in order to conduct a foreign policy that is unified and coherent toward the exterior, but that is representative of the aggregation of the different national interests. Summing up this arrangement, Swiss statesman Alfred Escher famously quipped that in federal systems, foreign policy should be characterized as “external unity, internal diversity” (Ehrenzeller *et al* 2003). The main focus of this dissertation will be analyzing why and how sub-State governments conduct their external affairs with international actors, the causes and consequences of these IRSSG, and how federal State and SSG coordinate or not in foreign policy making and implementation.

In order to systematize the analysis and explain the variations and changes in the IRSSG in the last decades, both between countries and within them, the information will be organized by identifying the relevant variables at the systemic, domestic or individual levels, but emphasizing the interactions between them. As it will be discussed, there is no theory of paradiplomacy or IRSSG used

or accepted by the majority of the researchers in the field, so in this dissertation, in an eclectic way, the theories of IR and comparative politics will be sequentially integrated from the more general to the more specific, to explain the more general variations between countries, and then the more specific within countries. Special emphasis will be placed in analyzing the interaction of variables between systemic, domestic and individual factors in both directions, from higher to lower levels and vice versa.

Thus, the central objective is to systematically analyze and explain the IRSSG between and within federal systems, focusing on five relevant changes or variations in the IRSSG that have taken place in the last decades and that have not been fully explained and understood academically. The first couple of questions tackle the variation between countries, while the remaining three seek to explain the variation between federal units within a country, using the Mexican case. The empirical relevance of analyzing these questions is that it allows a comprehensive understanding of the IRSSG in federal countries in a comparative way at two levels: internationally between federations and nationally between federal units in a country. Theoretically, its importance lies in testing some of the hypotheses discussed in the literature on paradiplomacy in a comparative way, both between and within nation-States, since the vast majority of the information currently available takes the form of case studies of a single country or sub-State unit. Also, it will assess the relative importance of the majority of the theoretical explanations available in the literature, systematically organized and summarized by Kuznetsov's "eleven dimensions of paradiplomacy" (2015: 50-51):

constitutional, federalist or intergovernmental relations, nationalism, International Relations, border studies, security or geopolitical, global economy, environmental, diplomacy, and separatist dimensions.

In sum, this dissertation tries to better understand and explain an understudied but extremely relevant worldwide phenomena that has been taking place for over five decades and that has an important and direct impact not only in the foreign policies of the countries where it is taking place and in the international system, but also in the welfare of people at the local level. It will conduct a comprehensive and comparative study of the IRSSG in ten federal systems which are representative of all the regions of the world, stages of economic development and degree of consolidation of their democratic institutions. It will construct a typology to measure and explain the IRSSG based on the domestic political institutions, especially the constitutional provisions relating foreign affairs and the intergovernmental mechanism for foreign policy decision making and implementation. Then, based on this comparative analysis, after understanding the causes and consequences of the IRSSG worldwide, the Mexican case will be used as a replicable example to explain the variation in the IRSSG within a country. It will measure and explain the IR of its 32 federal units using economic, political and geographic variables to understand the amount and type of international activities and legally binding cooperation mechanisms. This analysis will be contrasted with the results of a replicable survey applied to the public officials responsible of IRSSG in Mexico to better understand their preferences, perceptions, capacities, and motivations. Finally, a case study of

one Mexican SSG, the Federal District, is elaborated to understand when and how local executives (governors) can impact the IR of their SSG.

## CHAPTER 1: CONCEPTS, DEFINITIONS, QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESIS ON THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF SUB-STATE GOVERNMENTS

### Introduction

This first chapter of the dissertation is dedicated to clarifying the concepts and definitions that will be used throughout the document. Based on these concepts, the central research questions and hypothesis are presented, as well as the strategies proposed to submit them to empirical testing.

The chapter is divided in two sections. The first one introduces the terminology coined and used in the literature on paradiplomacy and IRSSG. It briefly presents the most important concepts and ideas that have been developed in the field of International Relations to analyze this phenomenon, providing some basic information on their scope and limitations. It organizes the literature in two big paradigms: one that considers that the IRSSG can be complementary to the State's foreign policy, and the other that proposes that these international activities can jeopardize a unified and coherent national foreign policy. The second section, building upon the previous discussion, presents the five central research questions to be answered in this dissertation, providing tentative and testable answers, or hypothesis, to each of them. It is argued that these hypothesis can be systematically organized, presented and tested organizing them from the more general and parsimonious explanations (systemic) and then, in order to explain variations between and within countries, it is necessary to use domestic factors; finally, to be able to provide answers in

some specific outlier cases, explanations on the behavior of individuals are required. Special emphasis will be placed on analyzing the interactions between systemic, domestic and individual variables, since as a result of growing interdependence and globalization in the course of the last decades, domestic and international politics are increasingly merged, and interactive approaches that integrate internal and external variables offer better and richer understanding of foreign policy and the IRSSG (Gourevitch 1978, Putnam 1988, Haggard 1990, Moravcsik 1993, Risse-Kappen 1995, Milner 1997, Hale and Held 2011).

At the end of the chapter, the central ideas that will be further developed in the rest of the dissertation are underscored, especially in terms of which theories of IR and other disciplines will be used to systematically present the arguments in order to submit them to empirical testing.

### 1.1. Concepts and definitions

When reviewing the literature on the IRSSG, it appears that there are three basic consensuses: first, that this is a growing phenomenon (both in specific activities and geographic spread around the world); second, that scholars have not agreed on the concepts, definitions, and methodologies to analyze it; and, therefore, third, that there is no such thing as a paradiplomacy theory, so the scholars interested in studying the phenomenon borrow theories from other disciplines to analyze it. These international relations or activities of SSG include the actions of regions, states, provinces, cities and local

governments, and have been called in several different ways in the literature over the years. Some of the most widely used concepts are paradiplomacy; sub-State, constituent, multilayered, local or federative diplomacy; international affairs or relations of sub-State or subnational governments; among many others.

The first authors to coin a specific term to define this phenomenon were Ivo Duchacek (1990) and Panayotis Soldatos (1990). The concept of “parallel diplomacy” or “paradiplomacy” was introduced to describe the international relations of sub-State governments in federal and centralized systems, where local governments became increasingly active internationally during the 1970s and 1980s. Due to the fact that, until very recently and practically everywhere around the world, central governments have had the legal monopoly over foreign policy, the international activities of SSG started to create frictions with the national governments, especially in those issues that were not considered of the exclusive responsibility of the local governments. When these frictions became apparent, the academic interest in explaining them and the institutional mechanisms to coordinate the activities of different orders of government thrived.

For Duchacek and Soldatos, paradiplomacy was understood as the external contacts, activities, relations and actions of non-central governments (federal units, provinces, cantons, *länder*, etc.) with other international actors, such as nation States, other local governments, transnational enterprises, international organizations, civil society organizations, among others (Duchacek, 1990; and Soldatos, 1990). These activities were not seen as part of the foreign policy of a State; however, since they were international relations of government



units, even if from the non-central order, they were defined as paradiplomatic, using the prefix “para” to mean, parallel, next to, or associated with the traditional diplomacy of the State (Soldatos, 1990). They both believed that these international activities could conform, run parallel to, or even conflict with the foreign policy of the national government. Duchacek also used the term “protodiplomacy” to define the actions conducted by sub-State governments to gain international support in their separatist or independence objectives. In this vein, Lecours and Moreno (2003) analyzed sub-State nationalisms, and argued that paradiplomacy could be a purposeful projection of these governments to seek greater autonomy or the recognition of their cultural distinctiveness both nationally and internationally, thus being of conflictive nature with national foreign policy.

To describe the different forms of participation of non-central governments, Duchacek (1990: 15-27) proposed a typology of three different types of international relations of regions based on their geopolitical dimensions: “transborder paradiplomacy”, which includes the international activities of sub-State governments along national borders (i.e., California and Baja California); “transregional and paradiplomatic contacts”, which the international actions of sub-State governments whose jurisdictions are not contiguous territorially, but whose national states are neighbors (i.e., Jalisco and Texas); and “global diplomacy”, which refers to the sub-State government links with foreign national and sub-State governments (i.e., Distrito Federal and Buenos Aires).

To refer to the same phenomenon, Hocking (1993) coined the term “multilayered diplomacy”, arguing that sub-State governments participated in a wide and complex diplomatic network with several levels or layers of governments and other actors both inside and outside of their domestic system. Therefore, instead of conducting government centered relations exclusively, SSG participate in this wide diplomatic array of relations or multilayered diplomacy. Kincaid (1990, 2001) preferred using the term “constituent diplomacy”, arguing that concepts like paradiplomacy or subnational diplomacy imply that the external activities of SSG are inferior or supplemental to the national diplomacy; since SSG legitimately represent the interests of their constituents and have powers to conduct international activities in the areas where they are competent, their external actions are to be labeled as constituent diplomacy. Both Kincaid and Hocking (McMillan 2012: 19) believe that it is in the best interest of national democratic governments to support SSG to actively participate internationally, since they are in direct contact with the people and represent more accurately their interests.

During these first decades of academic analysis of the phenomenon, the debate has been centered on whether these international activities of SSG could strengthen (Hocking and Kincaid) or threaten (Soldatos and Duchacek) the national conduction of foreign policy. Another ingredient was added to the debate by Aldecoa (1999), when he coined the concept of “plurinational diplomacy” to explain the evolution of the international activities of SSG in multicultural or plurinational states, especially in the context of regional integration in the case of

the European Union. These SSG not only perform international activities, but also desire to influence the foreign policies of their own States and the creation and implementation of European legislation.

Cornago (2010) went a step further, arguing that the IRSSG had an innovative process that had produced its own institutions and practices, and that this could challenge the traditional diplomacy of national States. Following this same line, Crikemans (2010) analyzed how the international actions of SSG that had considerable constitutional powers (like in Belgium, Canada, and Spain), could be so similar to those of the national states, that it could sometimes be difficult to differentiate one from the other.

The literature has found that there is an important variation in the objectives or goals that SSG seek to achieve through their international actions, including a set of economic, political, social and cultural goals. As will be discussed in the chapters of this dissertation, different types of goals pursued by the SSG generate differentiated reactions from the central governments. First and foremost, SSG are interested in promoting local development, and therefore the most basic activities conducted are of external economic promotion, like securing markets for their products, attracting foreign direct investment and tourism, promoting technological transfers, and receiving international cooperation and development assistance. Other times, the objective is to promote socio-cultural exchanges to project the sub-State unit's distinct culture, values or language or to promote cooperation and exchanges in the areas of education, science, technology, culture, or sports. These two types of activities

are most of the time accepted by central governments. The motivations can also be of political nature, like advancing local autonomy or even preparing for national secession or independence; this type of activities are the most sensitive ones for the central State. In other cases, SSG want to influence regional or global policy debates in areas or issues in which they are particularly interested, like regional integration, climate change, sustainable development, human rights, among others; this is particularly true of SSG whose countries actively participate in regional integration processes, like the European Union. Depending on the issue and the distribution of competences between central and local governments, these areas of international activity can be more or less harmoniously conducted between them. Finally, the goals can also be very pragmatic, like addressing common border or regional issues, like infrastructure, trade, investment, migration, development and the environment (Nganje, 2013).

The literature has also analyzed the instruments of the internationalization of SSG, which are also diverse and evolving over time. They range from concluding non-binding, sisterhood and inter-institutional agreements, to participating in local, regional and international networks and organizations. Local executives conduct public diplomacy, receive visitors from around the world, and organize international events; they also travel to foreign countries in trade and investment missions, to strengthen relations with their diaspora, to conclude cooperation agreements or to participate in regional or global meetings. Some even establish offices of representation of interests abroad.

One of the most important and recent contributions to the literature on paradiplomacy is Kuznetsov's book, *Theory and Practice of Paradiplomacy. Subnational governments in international affairs* (2015). This book is the first comprehensive volume that seeks to organize and summarize the different theories that have been used to study this phenomenon. Based on a vast review of the questions and explanations available in the literature, Kuznetsov constructs an "explanatory framework of paradiplomacy" (116) that can be used as a supplementary tool to analyze and compare cases of IRSSG around the world.

It is important to summarize Kuznetsov's approach to the study of paradiplomacy, since parts of its explanatory framework will be used to organize the information presented in the case studies of this dissertation. Also, it is an excellent summary of the state of the art in the study of paradiplomacy using different disciplinary approaches, ranging all the way from legal studies, to comparative politics, international relations, public policy, sociology, and economics.

As a first step, he analyzes the two central concepts in the study of paradiplomacy: on one hand, the sub-State, subnational or regional actor; on the other, the international action of this actor, called paradiplomacy, micro-diplomacy, and constituent diplomacy, among many others as it was previously discussed. For the actor, he prefers the concept of region, defined as the "territorial and administrative unit on the first level of authority after the central government in both federal and unitary state systems, like Ontario in Canada or

Hokkaido in Japan” (22) or the Mexican states. He discusses other terms used in the literature, such as non-central governments (NCG), introduced by Duchacek (1990), Hocking (1993), Aguirre (1999) and Cornago (2010), subnational governments/actors used by Aldecoa and Keating, who refer to them as “public authorities at the regional level, below the sovereign state, in the full knowledge that many of these regard themselves as national, if not fully sovereign actors” (Aldecoa and Keating 1999: 2), and federated units, favored by Soldatos (1990).

The second concept is paradiplomacy. He argues that several authors have used similar terms to refer to the same idea. He recalls, as it was previously argued, for instance, that Duchacek (1988) prefers to use the term “paradiplomacy” instead of “microdiplomacy” based on Soldatos’ definition of the former term. Kincaid (1985) used the term “constituent diplomacy” because it “captures the idea that states, provinces, cantons, Länder, and the like are constituent units of federal systems”. In the United States, for example, “the states are co-sovereign constitutional polities with the federal government, not sub-national governments” (Kincaid 2001). Hocking (1993) introduced the term of multi-layered diplomacy and described it as a “densely textured web”. Based on these and other definitions, Kuznetsov defines paradiplomacy as “a form of political communication for reaching economic, cultural, political, or any other types of benefits, the core of which consists in self-sustained actions of regional governments with foreign governmental and non-governmental actors” (30-31).

Also, he argues that the terms paradiplomacy, constituent diplomacy, subnational governments’ diplomacy, sub-State diplomacy, IRSSG, and regional

diplomacy can be used in an interchangeable way. In this dissertation, as it will be argued in the next section, the term IRSSG is preferred; however, there is agreement with Kuznetsov that all these terms refer to the same phenomenon, and therefore, can be used interchangeably.

After analyzing the various concepts related to paradiplomacy, Kuznetsov summarizes the historical path in the study of this phenomenon and underscores the main scholars that have contributed to this field, such as Duchacek, Kincaid, Soldatos, Michelmann, Fry, and others, as was previously discussed. He states that the 1970s was the period of “genesis of paradiplomacy studies” (43), whereas the 1980s witnessed the real progress in the quality of paradiplomacy. The 1990s was a decade of changes in the international system that contributed to the proliferation of paradiplomatic activities, mainly in Europe and the United States, but also in other regions. Finally, the 2000s can be defined “as a period when the study of subnational authorities’ activities in the international arena is decisively crystallized in a sustainable subdiscipline in contemporary political science” (44).

His most important contribution is that he systematically organizes the different analysis and explanations of paradiplomacy that exist in the literature in what he calls the “eleven dimensions of paradiplomacy” (50): 1) The constitutional dimension researches “paradiplomacy from the position of legal expertise”, where scholars analyze constitutions and other legal documents to identify the competences that sub-State governments have in foreign affairs. 2) The federalist or intergovernmental relations dimension seeks to understand the

IRSSG as an important variable for the development of intergovernmental relations and the federal system, as well as how the federal arrangement explains paradiplomatic actions and activities. 3) The nationalism dimension tries to explain the IRSSG as an important variable in the study of nationalist aspirations at the sub-State level in multinational countries. 4) The International Relations dimension looks at paradiplomacy from the perspective of the great changes in international system in the recent decades, specially the proliferation of non-State or sub-State actors that challenge the monopoly of States as the only relevant actors in foreign policy making. 5) The border studies dimension, studies paradiplomacy to better understand the political, economic and social transformations that take place in geographical border regions. 6) The globalization dimension, analyzes the IRSSG as a manifestation of regionalization and globalization. 7) The security or geopolitical dimension, studies primary the security and the geopolitical consequences of sub-State governments' activities in international affairs. 8) The global economy dimension, analyzes paradiplomacy through its relation with the development of contemporary global economics and world trade. 9) The environmental dimension focuses on the IRSSG impact on international environmental regimes and standards. 10) The diplomacy dimension studies how sub-State diplomacy may affect the domain of the diplomacy of the central State and the consequences of the decentralization of diplomacy. Finally, 11) the separatist dimension, analyzes non-recognized states and their international relations activities in their search for international recognition (50-51). This dissertation will



discuss all of these dimensions in the case studies analyzed, some in general terms (nationalism, border, security, environmental, and separatist), but others in depth (constitutional, federalist, International Relations, globalization, global economy, and diplomacy).

Based on his careful analysis of the various dimensions of the IRSSG, Kuznetsov argues that the most important challenge in the study of paradiplomacy is its multidimensional character. In order to incorporate the eleven dimensions in a single explanatory framework, he uses a multiple response questionnaire (MRQ). He argues that it is necessary to answer six questions in order to systematically analyze cases of paradiplomacy. These questions are: 1) What are the causes of the growing IRSSG in the country studied? 2) What are the legal bases of the IRSSG in the country analyzed? 3) What is the predominant motive of the SSGs of an examined country to be involved in international affairs? 4) How has the IRSSG been institutionalized in the case studies? 5) What is the attitude of the central government towards the international activities of its SSG? Finally, 6) what are the consequences of the IRSSG in the development of the whole nation? (100-101). These questions are all taken into account in the central questions to be answered in this dissertation, as it will be presented in the next section.

He recommends that several elements are taken into account when answering these questions. For the first question, Kuznetsov argues that some of the variables that could be considered to explain the external causes of paradiplomacy are globalization, regionalization, democratization, and the

domestication of foreign policy and the internalization of domestic politics. To explain its domestic causes, some explanatory variable could be federalization and decentralization, nation-building problems, insufficient effectiveness of the central government's foreign policy, asymmetries between SSG, the role of sub-State leaders, and the role of borders (102-108).

To tackle the second question, he argues that two variables have to be considered: the level of legal powers of treaty-making granted by the national constitutions and laws, and the constitutional requirements for consultations with SSG on foreign affairs issues (108-109). When answering the third question, he contends that there are three sets of motives for SSG to engage in international relations (economic, cultural, and political), and that the three of them need to be assessed (109-111).

To attend the fourth question, he recommends to look for some of the more widely used mechanisms of institutionalizing paradiplomatic activities, like: 1) establishment of a special ministry, department or office responsible for the IRSSG, 2) opening of SSG offices of representation in foreign countries, 3) making official visits of SSG authorities to other countries, 4) participating in international events like conferences, exhibitions and forums, 5) establishing and participating in international networks and working groups to attend specific problems like sustainable development, the environment, energy, transportation, among others, and 6) SSG participating in international events within the official delegation of their central government (111-113).

When answering the fifth question, he argues that the researcher has to analyze whether the IRSSG are a challenge or an opportunity for the whole nation, and the pattern of intergovernmental relations that exist: 1) cooperative-coordinated (the IRSSG takes place under a formal or informal coordination with the central government); 2) cooperative-joint (the IRSSG is formally or informally included within national foreign policy); 3) parallel-harmony (the IRSSG are independent from the central government in their areas of competency, conducted in a harmonious and non-contradictory to national foreign policy; and 4) parallel-disharmony (the IRSSG oppose the national government's foreign affairs or the central government has no power mechanisms to control the paradiplomatic activities) (113-115).

Finally, while attending the final question, he recommends that both positive and negative consequences of the IRSSG are examined. There are two potential positive consequences: rationalization and democratization of the decision-making process in foreign policy. The only possible negative consequence or risk is the potential of the IRSSG to generate a centrifugal process in particular countries, even facilitating secessionist threats in extreme cases (115).

All these recommendations on the variables to be taken into consideration will be used to systematically organize the analysis in the case studies. Thus, this dissertation uses Kuznetsov's model, but improves its systematization by organizing the research questions from general to specific, using systemic, domestic and individual variables, and most important, emphasizing the

interactions between them. It also develops a new typology of intergovernmental relations in order to better understand the type of relations established between central and local governments with the increasing IRSSG. This typology is constructed by analyzing how inclusive or exclusive are the constitutional and legal provisions in terms of allowing SSG to conduct international relations in the areas where they have powers, and in terms of participating in the decision making process and implementation of national foreign policy.

In sum, there is a wide academic debate about the best concepts, methodologies, and impact of this phenomenon, and there appears to be an evolving pattern of conflict and cooperation between sub-State and national institutions and governments as the phenomenon grows, especially when SSG conduct international activities of political nature (in particular if the objective is seeking statehood) or in areas where they do not have exclusive policy powers or capacities. The truth is that reality is too complex and constantly changing in order to be able to explain all the variations in the international activities of SSG, their objectives and motivations, and the instruments they use. After reviewing the variety of concepts, definitions, methodologies, objectives, and instruments used in the analysis of the IRSSG, it is clear that no single concept or methodology can contain and explain the complexity and totality of the phenomenon.

However, it is possible to systematically summarize some specific parts of this complex and evolving reality, though at the expense of empirical detail. To do so, it is first necessary to clarify the basic concepts and definitions that will be

used in this dissertation, and then clearly establish the limitations of this research. In terms of concepts and definitions, instead of using the myriad of concepts coined in the literature indistinctively, the most comprehensive one will be used: international relations of sub-State governments (IRSSG). The IRSSG is defined as all the international actions and activities (economic, political, social or cultural) conducted by non-central governments (at all sub-State tiers, including second —provinces, states, regions, cantons, lander— and third or local —counties, municipalities, cities— levels of government). It includes the formal and informal actions and activities undertaken by their official government representatives, and excludes those of non-state actors. By using international relations instead of other concepts previously discussed, all normative biases are avoided; using sub-State instead of sub-national excludes any possible bias derived from autonomous nationality or sovereignty claims of these governments or their communities.

The most important limitation of this study is that it will only analyze the IRSSG in federal countries, even if the phenomenon also takes place in quasi-federal and centralized systems. Within federal countries, it will only do a comparative analysis of the most important countries in every region of the world based on their territory, population and economic power. An in depth study will only be conducted in one case, Mexico, including its 32 second tier federal units. Finally, the vast majority of the time, it will concentrate on the international relations of second tier governments, occasionally comparing or including third tier or local governments.

## 1.2. Research questions and hypothesis

Due to the state-centric nature of International Relations theory, few theories have concentrated their efforts to systematically explain the international affairs of SSG. Classic idealism and realism had practically nothing to say on the subject, since sub-State governments were of little relevance in the international system. However, one of their methodological tools can be extremely useful to organize the possible explanations of the international activities of sub-State governments, even though it was originally thought to explain the origins of war and conflict in the international system: the three levels of analysis or images (systemic or third image, domestic or second image, and individual or first image). These levels of analysis or images explain the actions of States based on the characteristics of the international system (systemic), of the states (domestic), and of their leaders or policy-makers (individual). This same methodology was later appropriated by foreign policy theorists (Allison, 1971; Rosenau, 1974), and can also be extremely useful to explain the IRSSG.

In this dissertation, it will be argued that, it is possible to systematize the systemic, domestic and individual explanations about the variations and changes that can be observed in the IRSSG, both between countries and within them, paying particular attention to the interactions that take place between them. Due to the fact that there is no grand theory of paradiplomacy or IRSSG, several theories of IR and comparative politics will be used, in order to explain the

various changes that have been taking place in the international activities of local governments in the course of the last decades. However, it is of paramount importance to organize the theoretical arguments logically in order to avoid contradictions between them. It will be argued that different IR theories help to better explain and understand different moments and variations in the internationalization of local governments, and that the instrument to systematically order these theoretical explanations and examine their impact is the levels of analysis, emphasizing an interactive approach (Gourevitch 1978, Putnam 1988, Haggard 1990, Moravcsik 1993, Risse-Kappen 1995, Milner 1997, Hale and Held 2011).

First and foremost, it is important to clearly specify the central research questions that this dissertation seeks to answer, in order to propose the best possible theoretical explanation to do so. The central objective of this dissertation is to provide systematic information in order to analyze, better understand, and explain the recent and growing IRSSG between and within federal systems. In the course of the last decades, there are, at least, four relevant changes or variations in the IRSSG that need to be explained.

First, similar to Kuznetsov's first question, it seeks to answer what explains the recent and dramatic increase in the international relations of sub-State government in federal systems in the last three decades. That is, what explains that sub-State governments changed from conducting limited to extensive international activities in the last decades? It will be argued that systemic international variables created the incentives for a more active external

participation of local government worldwide, that is, systemic changes have produced important domestic policy changes, not only at the central level, but also at the sub-State level. Using neoliberal theories (complex interdependence, regimes, and neo-institutional theories), the increased IRSSG is a consequence of the growing interdependence and globalization of the system in the international arena, which reduces the powers of central governments to control sub-State actors domestically and decreases the costs of these governments to participate in world affairs to advance their interests, thus generating incentives for federal units to participate more actively in international issues (Keohane and Nye 1977, Fry 1988, Risse-Kappen 1995, Hale and Held 2011, McMillan 2012, Nganje 2013, Kuznetsov 2015).

Being so, systemic international variables can be used to explain with parsimony the dramatic increase in the IRSSG worldwide. However, these variables do not explain the variation in the type and level of international activities between federal countries. Therefore, the second question to be tackled will be: what explains the variation in the level and type of IRSSG in federal countries? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to do an in depth analysis of national institutions, and thus, step down a level to the domestic institutional system (or second image) to explain this variation. More specifically, it will be argued, using the literature on federalism and a veto points and players model, that the constitutional rules and domestic institutions in federal systems determine the capacities and limits of the international activities of sub-State governments. These capacities vary in two dimensions: level of participation in



national foreign policy decision making and implementation (exclusive to inclusive), and constitutional powers to conduct IRSSG (exclusive to inclusive). The higher the constitutional powers and the level of participation in foreign affairs, the more active the sub-State governments will be in the international realm, and the more cooperative the IRSSG will be with the national foreign policy. This question includes Kuznetsov's second, fifth and sixth questions.

In order to test this hypothesis, a representative sample of federal countries around the world will be analyzed. Using 2010's GDP (World Development Indicators of the World Bank, 2015), the federations with the highest GDP of their regions will be included. Apart from the Mexican case, which will be used to conduct a very in depth analysis of the variation in the IRSSG between the federal units within a country, the two federations with the higher GDP of their regions (Asia, Europe, North America, and South America), and the most important in Africa and Oceania, are included. Thus, the cases selected were: South Africa (Africa), India and Russia (Asia), Belgium and Germany (Europe), Canada, Mexico, and the United States (North America), Brazil and Argentina (South America), and Australia (Oceania). These countries are not only representative of all the regions of the world, but also of countries with different levels of development and of consolidation of their democratic institutions.

The variation between countries is not the only relevant variation that is taking place in the IRSSG. Several researchers around the world have conducted in depth case studies in which they find a huge variation in the amount

and type of international activities that the local governments within a specific country are conducting. Since these sub-State actors are bounded by the same constitutional rules and institutions, then it is necessary to provide an alternative explanation to the variation in the IRSSG within a federal country. Taking advantage of over a decade of research on the IRSSG in Mexico, the third question that this dissertation will seek to answer is: what explains the huge variation in the international activities of Mexican sub-State governments? This question takes into considerations Kuznetsov's third and fourth questions.

It is extremely important to academically justify why the Mexican case was chosen and why it is relevant to analyze it. First, Mexico is one of the most important countries in the world; just using a few basic indicators, the country is among the 10 to 15 largest in the world in terms of territory, population, GDP, imports and exports. Second, it is a relevant international and regional player; it is member of practically every global and multilateral international organization, and a regional power in Latin America, with a direct area of influence in Central America (Mares 1996); it is also part of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the United States and Canada, and one of the most important partners of the world's most powerful country, the United States (Mares, 2003). Third, the Mexican federation has 32 federal units (31 states and a Federal District); this relatively large number of federal units allows to perform a wide comparative study, and even to conduct statistical analysis.

Fourth, in the course of the last three decades, the country has experienced two parallel processes of liberalization, economic and political

(Edmonds-Poli and Shirk 2012). During the 1980s and 1990s, Mexico conducted a profound neoliberal structural reform process, changing its development strategy from an import substitution industrialization and closed economy model, to an open economy and export promotion alternative (Haggard and Kaufman 1995). Then, in 2000, the country completed its transition to democracy, when the 71 years of authoritarian rule of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) ended when it lost the Presidency to the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) opposition party. Thus, it can be analyzed if a dual process of domestic political and economic liberalization (Haggard and Kaufman 1995) has an effect on the IRSSG, especially since approximately half of the federations around the world have experienced these same processes in the course of the last decades.

Fifth, and probably most important, a significant contribution to the literature on IRSSG can be done if a case study is conducted taking into consideration as much as possible available evidence there is, so such an analysis can be replicated in other countries where local researchers have significant access to otherwise restricted or limited information. Having worked on the IRSSG in Mexico over the last decade has enabled me to accumulate a wide array of information and direct contacts with public official at the federal, state, and local levels over the years. This has facilitated access to otherwise difficult to obtain information, since the availability of quality information at the sub-State level is problematic practically everywhere, but specially in developing countries in the process of democratic consolidation. This access has permitted the integration of three different data bases that systematically integrate

information on: 1) the specific international activities conducted by Mexican sub-State governments in the last decade (since 2004); 2) the totality of the legally binding instruments (Inter-Institutional Agreements, or IIA) signed by Mexican sub-State governments and registered before the SRE; and, 3) the perceptions, preferences, and information on the IRSSG from the perspective of highest public officials in charge of international affairs in the Mexican federal units with a very high level of response (84.37%). This wide array of information allows an in-depth analysis, from a variety of angles, of the Mexican case. This permits hypothesis testing from the paradiplomacy and IRSSG literature, providing tentative explanations that can be replicated and tested in other latitudes.

Returning to the third question that seeks to understand what explains variation in the degree of IRSSG between Mexican federal units, it will be argued, based on the previous comparative analysis that, in strict legal terms, Mexican sub-State units do not have a direct participation in the definition or implementation of Mexican foreign policy, but they do have powers to conduct international relations in those areas that are not constitutionally defined as exclusive powers of the federal Executive. Therefore, based on the powers to conduct international relations in the policy areas in which they have legal attributions according to the Mexican Constitution and the Law for the Conclusion of Treaties of 1992, the international activities of Mexican sub-State governments have grown exponentially in the course of the last two decades.

However, Mexican local governments are relatively latecomers compared to other federations in the world, especially in the cases of industrialized

countries with consolidated democracies. The international relations of Mexican sub-State governments began in the late 1990s (like in the cases of Argentina, Brazil, India, Russia and South Africa), several decades after their Australian, Belgian, Canadian, German, or US counterparts. It will be argued that, just as in the case of the other federations, in Mexico the increasing IRSSG was a consequence of the growing globalization and interdependence in the international system; however, the reason why these local governments started some decades later the IRSSG, is that it was necessary for the country to insert itself more intensely in the world economy, and this was only a reality after the neoliberal structural reform process of the 1980s and 1990s (Haggard and Kaufman 1992). Thus, economic liberalization generated incentives for greater competition between sub-State units in the global market, to place their exports, attract foreign direct investment and tourism, and benefit from international cooperation. Facing a more open and competitive global market, the external activities of Mexican sub-State governments increased in order to find markets for their exports and sources of foreign investment and international cooperation to boost local development.

Parallel to the economic incentives, the democratic change in 2000 and the growing decentralization of powers also provided incentives for Mexican sub-State governments to participate in areas that used to be monopolized by the central government, including international affairs. Democratization opened the political space for a more ample and diverse representation of the local

governments, while administrative decentralization gave these actors powers and resources to conduct public policies which are closer to the local preferences.

In sum, the growing internationalization of Mexican sub-State governments in the 1990s is explained by the combination of systemic international variables (growing interdependence and globalization), and domestic economic and political variables (neoliberal structural reform, democratization, and decentralization). However, these variables, once again, do not explain the variation between Mexican federal units in their degree of internationalization. In order to explain the variation in the IRSSG in Mexico, a deeper immersion has to be made into Mexican politics and economics. In order to quantify the level of international activities of the federal units, first an index (that will serve as dependent variable) is constructed. This index, the Mexican Index on IRSSG (MI-IRSSG) captures the actual international activities of these sub-State governments, in terms of the institutionalization of these actions locally, and the economic and political activities conducted abroad. The index can be replicated in any other country if the appropriate information is available. Then it will be argued that three domestic variables, at the sub-State level, explain the variation in the MI-IRSSG: gross state income, juxtaposed government, and proximity to the border region. This means that the larger the economic resources, the political juxtaposition with the federal government, and the geographical border location (specially the Northern border), sub-State governments will conduct more international relations.

Once the variation in the amount of IRSSG is explained, the next two chapters analyze the types of international activities, the areas in which these actions take place, and instruments used by sub-State governments. This is done by the analysis of legally concluded and registered IIA and the direct answers of the public officials responsible of the internationalization of their states.

After conducting this analysis from three different angles or perspectives (international activities, legal instruments, and survey questions), the vast majority of the variation in the actions, areas, and instruments of the IRSSG in Mexico are accounted for. However, there is a specific case, the Distrito Federal,<sup>2</sup> that appears to be an outlier during the first half of the decade of 2000: it was the federal unit with the highest state income, juxtaposed government (where the local Executive was confronted directly with the federal Executive), and with one of the largest arrays of IIA; however, it had a very limited international agenda and activities. In order to explain this atypical case, the domestic and sub-State economic, political, and institutional variables appeared to be insufficient.

Therefore, a deeper incision in the local politics of the Distrito Federal, particularly in its leadership and the figure of the local Executive (first image or

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<sup>2</sup> On January 29, 2016, a constitutional reform was published, where the Distrito Federal becomes a federal unit called Ciudad de México (CDMX), with practically the same constitutional powers as the other 31 Mexican states (especially in terms of budget and debt). Some of the most important changes are that it will be the 32<sup>nd</sup> federal unit (not a state), seat of the federal powers, and capital city of Mexico. It will have its own local constitution (to be enacted by January 1, 2017) and local unicameral Congress. In this dissertation, the name Distrito Federal will be used since all of the issued discussed about it took place before January 29, 2016.

individual level), was necessary to explain why this unit changed from conducting very limited international relations in the first half of the decade (being an outlier during the Andrés Manuel López Obrador and Alejandro Encinas administrations), to having the largest and most complete IRSSG during the second half of the decade (during the Marcelo Ebrard government, 2006-2012) and that has even increased with Miguel Ángel Mancera (2012-2018), as would be expected theoretically. It will be argued that, in specific cases, even when international, domestic and sub-State structural and institutional variables are present and an active internationalization of sub-State governments should be observed, the personal characteristics of the local leadership may be a relevant variable to delay the full enactment of IRSSG, since the local Executive heads the local administration, including the international affairs area: the academic formation, preferences, priorities, and political vision of the local Executive and his staff can explain the changes in the IRSSG.

Recapitulating, the central questions and testable hypothesis of this dissertation are as follows:

Q1: What explains the increasing IRSSG in federal systems in the last decades?

H1: The growing interdependence and globalization of the international system generates the incentives for federal units to participate more actively in international affairs, thus the higher the globalization and interdependence, the higher the level of IRSSG will be.



Q2: What explains the variation in the level and type of IRSSG in federal countries?

H2: The constitutional rules and domestic institutions in federal systems determine the capacities and limits of sub-State governments to conduct international actions, therefore the higher the constitutional powers and the level of participation in foreign affairs decision making and implementation, the more active the sub-State governments will be in the international realm.

Q3: What explains the increasing IRSSG in Mexico in the last two decades, a couple of decades after other developed and democratically consolidated federal countries?

H3: The growing internationalization of Mexican sub-State governments in the 1990s is explained by the combination of systemic international variables (growing interdependence and globalization), which impacted domestic economic and political variables (neoliberal structural reform, democratization, and decentralization).

Q4: What explains the variation in the level and type of IRSSG in Mexico?

H4: Economic, political, and geographic domestic variables, at the sub-State level (gross state income, juxtaposed government, and geographic border location), explain the variation in the IRSSG in Mexico; the larger the

economic resources, the political juxtaposition with the federal government, and the geographical border location, the higher the IRSSG in Mexico.

Q5: In specific cases, when international, domestic and sub-State structural and institutional variables do not generate the expected internationalization of sub-State governments, what explains the passivity and then activity of these units in a very brief period of time?

H5: Personal characteristics of the local leadership may be a relevant variable to explain the IRSSG. The more/less internationally oriented the academic formation, preferences, priorities, and political vision of the local Executive, the more/less IRSSG that will be conducted.

## Conclusions

Based on the literature review on paradiplomacy and IRSSG, this chapter presented the central concepts and definitions that will be used in the dissertation. It argued that the academic work on the phenomenon has opposing views on the impact of the IRSSG, whether it complements or competes with national foreign policy. In order to systematically analyze the phenomenon and its consequences, the central research questions and hypothesis were presented, organized using the levels of analysis, but emphasizing interactions between levels.

Then, each of the questions and hypothesis were discussed, arguing that this dissertation will be the first comprehensive and comparative study of sub-State diplomacy in federal systems that develops a typology to measure and explain the intergovernmental relations in foreign policy decision making and implementation, and the external activity of sub-State governments around the world. It will also be the first in-depth analysis of sub-State diplomacy within a federal country, Mexico, that measures and explains comparatively the international relations of its 32 federal units, analyzing the economic, political and geographic causes that explain the wide variation in regards to the units' international actions and mechanisms of decentralized international cooperation (through inter-institutional agreements), as well as providing a replicable survey to better understand the preferences, perceptions, and interests of the public officials responsible of the internationalization of their sub-State governments.

## CHAPTER 2: THEORETICALLY ANALYZING THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF SUB-STATE GOVERNMENTS

### Introduction

The second chapter is dedicated to presenting the theories and methodologies of IR and comparative politics that will be used to systematically organize the arguments, provide research questions and hypothesis, and submit them to empirical testing, in order to better understand the IRSSG and its impact on national foreign policy and the functioning of the international system. Since there is no grand theory of paradiplomacy or IRSSG, theories from IR and other disciplines are borrowed and integrated, in order to be able to shed light on the causes and consequences of the international actions of local governments; as it was discussed in the previous chapter, these theories will be logically organized from general to specific using the levels of analysis, highlighting at all times the interactions between levels. The chapter is divided in four sections, providing each of them the theoretical underpinnings that will be used in the dissertation.

The first section presents the theories of IR that will be used to explain the growing IRSSG in the last decades, mostly borrowing systemic neoliberal theories (interdependence, globalization, regimes and institutionalism), arguing that as the international system has become more globalized and interdependent, there are more incentives (easier access due lower costs of transaction and decreasing State controls) for sub-State governments to actively

participate in international affairs. The second section introduces the literature on federalism, explaining its origins and institutional characteristics (legal, political, and economic level of centralization or decentralization). Based on the latter, the central-local division of power variable is constructed.

The third section develops a veto gate and players model using comparative politics institutional theories, which integrate the most important institutional variables of the political system, as well as the central actors and their preferences. The central-local division of power is presented as one of the institutional variables in this model.

The fourth section presents a typology of the intergovernmental relations in international policy in federal systems by using a bi-dimensional continuum (inclusion or exclusion of sub-State governments in national foreign policy decision making and implementation, and inclusive or exclusive constitutional powers granted to sub-State governments to conduct international relations). Based on this analysis, four possible types of international relations coordination and international relations of sub-State governments are described: exclusive, consultative, complementary, and inclusive. As it will be discussed, the more inclusive the type, more IRSSG, in more areas, with more institutionalization and participation in foreign policy decision making and implementation will be observed.

Finally, the different theoretical pieces are integrated in the conclusions, explaining how each of them will be used in the next chapters to explain the causes or consequences of the IRSSG in different moments in time, as well as

between countries (chapters 3, 4, and 5), within them (chapters 6, 7, and 8), and in specific outlier cases (chapter 9).

## 2.1. Theories and Methodologies of IR to explain the IRSSG

First, in order to explain the change in why sub-State governments passed from conducting none or very limited international activities to a growing and increasing amount of IRSSG, systemic theories of IR, especially from the neoliberal perspective, are extremely useful. However, these theories have a limited explanatory power to account for the considerable variation in the type and amount of IRSSG that can be observed between countries.

Very simply put, it is the anarchic nature of the international system (understood as the non-existence of a supranational actor to guarantee the survival of the units in the system, the States, and to solve controversies among them), that explains states' actions. According to realists, the consequence of anarchy in the system is that States seek their own survival, since no overarching authority exists to solve the conflicts between them; this generates a self-help system where cooperation under anarchy is very difficult. Neoliberal systemic analysts agree that anarchy exists, but disagree with realists over its necessary consequences. Neoliberals argue that certain features can be developed within the anarchic structure to significantly alter the implications of anarchy, and thus produce cooperation under anarchy (Keohane 1986). The consequences of anarchy can be reduced if systemic mechanisms are created to reduce the

uncertainty in the international system, generating the incentives for States to change their preferred course of action from conflict to cooperation, to reap the benefits from international interactions. Such mechanisms to tame the consequences of anarchy are growing interdependence, globalization, and regimes.

As the presence and importance of sub-State governments in world affairs increased, internationalists started to study their activities in the late 1970s. The first IR theory that was used to explain the external actions of local governments was Keohane and Nye's complex interdependence theory (1977). This theory explained the increasing activities of sub-State governments as a result of the increasing interdependence in the international system, which opened the door for a multiplication of actors, instruments, agendas, and communication channels in world affairs, changing from a system dominated by the nation-State, concentrated in security issues and the use of military force, where international regimes are irrelevant, to a system where multiple actors (governmental, both at the central and sub-State levels, and non-governmental, like transnational enterprises and civil society organizations), participate in multiple agendas (not only security, but economic, cultural, and, diplomatic, among others), using multiple instruments (since the use of military force is not very efficient, other instruments, like financial, trade, diplomatic and cultural are implemented), under a network of international regimes (Keohane and Nye 1977).

Just considering the systemic level, an increased international participation of sub-State governments could be explained by the growing

globalization and interdependence in the international system. Since the fall of Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, the international system experienced enormous changes in its structure, institutions and operation; this transition had a huge impact on all the countries in the world, by modifying in a substantial way their domestic public policies, among them the foreign policy (Gourevitch 1978, Risse-Kappen 1995, González and Chabat 1996, Milner 1997, Mares 1999, Hale and Held 2011).

On the one hand, growing globalization —defined as the multiplication of international interactions as a result of the growing flows of information, goods, services, capital and persons made possible by the reduction in the transaction costs of information, currency exchange, movement and transportation— has significantly increased the costs of isolation for States in the international system. It has also reduced the control of the State over its territory and population, eroding the traditional concept of sovereignty (Schiavon et al. 2006). This process has generated a substantial increase in the number and nature of actors with interests in international affairs (Slaughter 2004).

On the other hand, the increasing number of international institutions created in the last decades has favored a substantial boost in interdependence and international cooperation (González 2001; Mares 2004a). This fact runs parallel to the growth in the number and depth of issues addressed by them; these issues no longer concentrate exclusively on security matters, the highest priority of States in an anarchic international system, but also on the economic arena and the topics of the new international agenda (Haggard et al 1993,



Castañeda 2001). As a result, globalization is more intense and, therefore, the costs for States and sub-State governments to remain isolated are much higher. New actors with international incidence have decreasing costs of participation in external affairs, generating incentives for sub-State and non-State players to participate more actively in international issues (Slaughter 2004).

## 2.2. Federalism

Federalism is defined as “a political organization in which the activities of governments are divided between regional governments and a central government in such a way that each kind of government has some activities on which it makes final decisions” (Riker 1975, 93). As a consequence of the third wave of transitions to democracy experienced around the world since the mid-1970s, comparative analysis of institutions and their effect on the economic and political systems in the countries and their effect in domestic and international policies has grown exponentially. What started as a general discussion over which constitutional system —presidential or parliamentary— was more effective for political stability and economic growth in these recent democracies, developed into a more detailed analysis of the extreme importance of the different institutional configurations (including not only the constitutional system, but also the electoral and party systems, and the distribution of power between the executive and the legislature and the judiciary, or within the legislature itself) for understanding the way in which these systems operate (Lijphart and Waisman 1996). Within this logic, federalism and the central-local division of

power and its effect on domestic and foreign policies is one of the institutional variables which has been less studied; to the present day, no systematic and comprehensive analysis of the central-local division of power and its effect on international relations exists, especially on the external affairs of sub-State governments. This dissertation is a preliminary effort to fill this very important gap in the literature.

The institutional configuration of the system —understood as the set of formal and informal rules that constrain the actions and strategies of political actors which are immersed in a strategic environment by molding, through incentives, or by their preferences, beliefs, and interests— is central to understand and explain the workings and operation of political systems and the provision of public policies, both domestic and external, in them (Lijphart and Waisman 1996, Haggard and McCubbins 2001). The central-local division of power is one of the key elements that form the institutional system. Therefore, it follows logically that the central-local division of power is an important variable in understanding the way in which political systems function and generate public policies, including the IRSSG.

The analysis is divided in four parts. The first discusses some of the theoretical and historical origins of the central-local division of power variable. The second presents a classification of the different types of central-local division of power, based on two specific characteristics that differentiate them (type of constitutional distribution of powers and type of decentralization). The third is dedicated to discussing the relevance of the central-local dimension within the

institutional and the party configuration of the system. The fourth presents a veto gates and veto players model in which the central-local dimension is placed. Finally, the contribution of this dissertation to the literature on institutions, constitutional analysis, paradiplomacy and IRSSG is presented in the conclusions.

### 2.2.1. The Origins of the Central-Local Division of Power

Federalism is a common form of political organization; at the beginning of the XXI century, 24 countries had federal system, and 20 more used federal principles in their political system. The 24 federal countries had a total population of almost 2 billion inhabitants, that is, approximately 40% of the global population at that time (Watts, 2001).

The central objective of this dissertation is to provide systematic information in order to analyze, better understand, and explain the recent and growing international relations of sub-State governments between and within federal systems, comparing the Mexican case with other 10 federations. These ten federations are among the most important in the world, and were selected by using the GDP for 2010 according to the World Development Indicators of the World Bank, including the two federations with the higher GDP of their regions (Asia, Europe, North America, and South America), and the most important in Africa and Oceania, in order to provide regional variation in the selection of cases. Thus, the cases selected were: South Africa (Africa), Russia and India

(Asia), Germany and Belgium (Europe), the United States and Canada (North America), Brazil and Argentina (South America), and Australia (Oceania).

### 2.2.2. Types of Central-Local Division of Power

The central-local division of power is not a homogeneous category; on the contrary, there are different types depending on their specific institutional characteristics. This section will present and discuss the most important characteristics that differentiate one type of central-local division of power from the others. There are two fundamental characteristics that determine the type of central-local division of power: the existence (or not) of a formal federal constitution, and the degree of centralization or decentralization of power between the levels of government (Lijphart, 1999). Based on these two characteristics, Lijphart proposes two concepts to classify the different types of central-local division of power: federal-unitary, and centralized-decentralized. On one hand, federal systems are those which have a formal constitution that divides power between central and local governments —federalism is defined as “a political organization in which the activities of governments are divided between regional governments and a central government in such a way that each kind of government has some activities on which it makes final decisions” (Riker 1975, 93)—; on the contrary, unitary systems are those in which the constitution establishes a formal fusion between central and local governments. On the other hand, centralized systems are those where the political and

economic power is concentrated by the central government; inversely, decentralized systems are those where economic and political power is shared between central and local governments (Lijphart and Waisman 1996, Lijphart 1999).

Table 2.1. Share of sub-State (state and local) Expenditures (% of Total Expenditures) in selected federal countries (1990-2014)

Country	Average 1990- 1999	Average 2000- 2009	Average 2010- 2014	Average 1990- 2014	% Change 1990s/ 2000s	% Change 2000s/ 2010s	% Change 1990s/ 2010s
Argentina	46.30%	48.21%	43.96%	46.16%	3.96%	-9.67%	-5.32%
Australia	40.16%	38.33%	38.16%	38.88%	-4.77%	-0.45%	-5.24%
Belgium	35.90%	33.33%	33.98%	34.40%	-7.73%	1.93%	-5.65%
Brazil	28.66%	33.94%	33.26%	31.95%	15.56%	-2.06%	13.82%
Canada	57.97%	58.17%	60.34%	58.83%	0.34%	3.59%	3.92%
Germany	39.16%	40.32%	41.66%	40.38%	2.89%	3.20%	6.00%
India	43.08%	42.92%	43.87%	43.29%	-0.37%	2.15%	1.78%
Mexico	30.98%	33.98%	35.86%	33.61%	8.84%	5.23%	13.60%
Russia	35.59%	40.07%	44.67%	40.11%	11.17%	10.29%	20.31%
South Africa	30.45%	37.11%	36.02%	34.52%	17.96%	-3.02%	15.48%
United States	44.77%	43.46%	40.46%	42.89%	-3.02%	-7.40%	-10.65%
<b>AVERAGE</b>	<b>39.37%</b>	<b>40.90%</b>	<b>41.11%</b>	<b>40.46%</b>	<b>4.08%</b>	<b>0.34%</b>	<b>4.37%</b>

Source: IMF's GFS (Government Finance Statistics)<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> All the data, with the exception of Mexico, was taken from the IMF-GFS database (<http://data.imf.org/?sk=3C005430-5FDC-4A07-9474-64D64F1FB3DC>). The Mexican data was not available in this data base, so it was taken from INEGI (<http://www3.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/cni/escenario.aspx?idOrden=1.1&ind=6200011554&gen=630&d=n>). Most of the averages reported are for the entire period; however, due to missing data, some averages were calculated with the data available for the period.

A very good proxy to measure the degree of centralization-decentralization of the system is the share of subnational public expenditures of the total government expenditures in the country since control of these resources implies political and economic power (Lane et al 1997; Garrett and Rodden 2003). If local governments control 1/3 or more (or the central government concentrates 2/3 or less) of the total public expenditures in the country, then the system can be considered decentralized; otherwise, it is considered centralized. This indicator will be used (see Table 2.1) as the proxy to establish whether the country is centralized or decentralized; the value reported is the average share of sub-State government expenditures as a percentage of total government expenditures (SSGEx/TGEx) reported in over a twenty five year period, from 1990 to 2014.

As it can be observed in Table 2.1, all the federal countries analyzed (with the exception of Brazil, Mexico and South Africa in the 1990s) can be considered decentralized since, on average, their SSG spend more than a third of the total government expenditures. Also, on average, we can observe a modest increase in decentralization in the sample of federal countries included, passing from 39.37% (1990s) to 40.90% (2000s) to 41.11% (2010-2014), with an average increase in the period of 4.37%. However, there are important variations between periods, in the rates of change, and between countries.

First, the level of decentralization varies, on average in the 1990-2014 period, from 31.95% in Brazil to 58.83% in Canada, with an average in the sample of 40.46%. This means that even if all the countries can be considered

decentralized since the 2000s, there are considerable variations in the expenditure power of SSG among them.

Second, the majority of the countries in the sample (7/11) increased their level of decentralization between the 1990s and 2010-2014, some of them with rates of over 10% (Brazil, Mexico, Russia and South Africa); however, four countries reduced their SSGEx/TGEx in the same period (Argentina, Australia, Belgium, and the United States), the first three in approximately 5% and the latter in 10%. The same is true for the level of decentralization between the 1990s and 2000s, and between the 2000s and 2010-2014: the majority of the countries (7/11 and 6/11) increased their level of decentralization, but four and five of them reduced it (Australia and the United States in both periods, Belgium and India in the first, and Argentina, Brazil and South Africa in the second), all of them with rates under 10%. This means that the trend in decentralization is not homogeneous between countries: while on average it increases, the SSGEx/TGEx in some countries grows and in others decreases.

In sum, all the cases included in this dissertation are federal and decentralized, even if there is variation in the level of decentralization between them. Now that the central-local division of power has been described, the next step will be to insert this variable with the institutional configuration of the system, using a veto points and players model. This is important because it will be argued that the debate in the literature on whether IRSSG are intrinsically cooperative or conflictive *vis à vis* national foreign policy depends, in essence, on the institutional and legal characteristics of the domestic systems. If constitutional

powers of the federal and SSG, and intergovernmental mechanisms of cooperation between levels of government are clearly defined, the IRSSG will be more cooperative and complementary with national foreign policy.

### 2.3. The Central-Local Division of Power: Institutional Configuration and Partisan Composition

Having described the different types of central-local division of power, it is necessary now to explore how this variable is part of the institutional configuration of the system. To do so, a veto gates and players model will be presented (Immergut, 1992; Tsebelis, 1995 and 2002) which includes as variables the institutional veto gates, the veto players, and the nature of the latter. The veto gates are the institutional points established in the constitution through which a legislative initiative has to pass in order to become law. The veto players are individual or collective actors, which are positioned at the institutional veto gates, and decide whether a legislative initiative or public policy action passes through their veto gate or not. Finally, the nature of the veto players refers to the existence or not of a common purpose or interest between these actors, between veto gates (union or division of purpose), or within the veto gate (discipline or indiscipline).

Based on the previous definitions, the veto gates and players model can be constructed by answering, sequentially, the following questions:



Regarding the institutional configuration which establishes the number of veto gates: a) is there a division of power between executive and legislature? (no = parliamentary; yes = presidential); b) is there a division of power in the legislature? (no = unicameralism; yes = bicameralism); and, c) is there a central-local division of power? (no = centralized; yes = federal). In terms of the veto players: d) what is the level of party fragmentation or number of relevant veto players positioned at the veto gates? (low to high party system fragmentation).<sup>4</sup>

Finally, regarding the nature of the veto players: e) is there a division of purpose between the executive and the veto players that control a majority in the legislature? (no = unified government; yes = divided government); f) is there a division of purpose between the veto players that control a majority in each of the legislative chambers? (no = unified legislature; yes = divided legislature); g) is there a division of purpose between the federal executive and the majority of state executives? (no = unitary government; yes = juxtaposed government); and, h) is there a division of purpose within the veto players in the legislature (no = disciplined parties; yes = undisciplined parties). The veto gates and veto players model can be illustrated in the following manner (see Figure 2.1)

In this dissertation, the central variable in this model to be analyzed is the central-local division of power, especially regarding the institutional capacities

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<sup>4</sup> This can be measured using the effective number of parties (ENP) which is a measure that weighs the relevance of each party based on the number of seats they control in each of the chambers; it is calculated using the following formula:  $ENP = 1/[\sum(p_i^2)]$ , where  $p_i$  is the percentage of seats that party  $i$  has in the chamber (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997). If  $ENP \leq 3.5$ , then there is low party fragmentation, and if  $ENP > 3.5$ , then there is high party fragmentation.

and powers of central and SSG in international affairs. However, the other variables in the model will also be discussed in the case studies.




Figure 2.1. Veto gates and players model

#### 2.4. Constitutional powers in international affairs and participation in foreign policy

Now, regarding the powers established in the constitution in the area of external affairs, a typology of the intergovernmental relations in international policy in federal systems can be constructed. The institutional variation can be systematized using a bi-dimensional continuum, measuring two variables in each country: the degree of inclusion or exclusion of sub-State governments in national foreign policy decision making and implementation, and the degree of powers granted to sub-State governments to conduct international relations (inclusive or exclusive of sub-State governments). The first variable will measure the level of cooperation between orders of government in foreign policy and the second the level of power of sub-State governments to relate internationally. Four possible types of international relations coordination and international relations of sub-State governments are possible (see Table 2.2).

The four possible types of IRSSG are, from more restrictive to more open:

- 1) exclusive, when the federal government controls foreign policy making and implementation and SSG have no constitutional powers to conduct international relations;
- 2) consultative, when SSG are consulted by the federal government in foreign policy making and implementation, even if they have no explicit constitutional powers in the area;
- 3) complementary, when the federal government controls foreign policy making and implementation, but the SSG have constitutional powers to conduct international relations in some policy

areas; and, 4) inclusive, when not only do the SSG have constitutional powers in the area of international relations, but they also participate in national foreign policy making and implementation.

Table 2.2. Types of central-local coordination in foreign affairs

		<b>Sub-State governments participation in national foreign policy decision making and implementation</b>	
		<b>Exclusive</b>	<b>Inclusive</b>
<b>Constitutional powers to conduct international relations for sub-State governments</b>	<b>Exclusive</b>	<b>Exclusive:</b> federal control of foreign policy making and implementation, and no constitutional powers for international relations of sub-State governments).	<b>Consultative:</b> participation in foreign policy making and implementation, with no constitutional powers for international relations of sub-State governments).
	<b>Inclusive</b>	<b>Complementary:</b> federal control of foreign policy making and implementation, with constitutional powers for international relations of sub-State governments).	<b>Inclusive:</b> participation in foreign policy making and implementation, with constitutional powers for international relations of sub-State governments).

Having described the central-local division of power, and inserting it within the veto points and players model, we can analyze its impact in terms of the IRSSG, in order to better understand how the variations in the institutions have an effect on the type and breath of international activities conducted by sub-State

governments. The cases of ten federations, the larger in terms of their GDP of their regions (Africa, Asia, Europe, North America, Oceania, and South America), including Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Germany, India, Russia, South Africa, and the United States, will be analyzed, in order to better understand the variation in the IRSSG.

Using the typology on foreign policy coordination and international relations powers of sub-State governments, based on the model presented in this chapter, the ten federal countries could be positioned as follows (see Table 2.3):

Table 2.3. Classification by types of foreign policy coordination and international relations powers of sub-State governments

		<b>Sub-State governments participation in national foreign policy decision making and implementation</b>	
		<b>Exclusive</b>	<b>Inclusive</b>
<b>Constitutional powers to conduct international relations for sub-State governments</b>	<b>Exclusive</b>	<b>Exclusive:</b> India, Russia (post 2000)	<b>Consultative:</b> Belgium (pre-1993).
	<b>Inclusive</b>	<b>Complementary:</b> Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Russia (1990s), South Africa, United States	<b>Inclusive:</b> Australia, Belgium (post-1993), Canada, Germany.

Based on the previous discussion, this information can be integrated with the veto point and players model, which in turn integrates the central-local division of power within the institutional and partisan system. When the

functioning of the institutional, political, economic, and partisan variables is taken into consideration, we can see that the central-local division of power acquires its true impact in terms of the IRSSG. However, the type of international activities of the sub-State governments depends on the constitutionally established powers of these governments to conduct them, as well as the inter-governmental mechanisms to facilitate the communication and negotiation in the international policy realm between the levels of government.

Therefore, it will be argued in this dissertation that, contrary to the division in the literature on whether IRSSG are intrinsically cooperative or conflictive *vis à vis* national foreign policy, in essence, this depends on the institutional and legal characteristics of the domestic systems. The more clearly defined the constitutional powers of the SSG and the more developed the intergovernmental mechanisms of cooperation between levels of government in international affairs, the more inclusive the internationalization strategy of the country, and thus, the more cooperative the IRSSG will be to the national foreign policy.

It is interesting to see that even if all the countries are federal and decentralized, and thus share the same central-local division of power, due to the functioning of their economic, political, social, and legal systems, they are different in terms of their IRSSG. All the current inclusive cases (some changing from consultative like Belgium in the last decades) are industrialized countries with consolidated democracies. With the exception of the United States, all the complementary cases are developing economies in a process of democratic consolidation, while the exclusive cases are those where due to political or

historical reasons, federalism has been more formal than real, and centralization forces have dominated these systems (with the exception of Russia in the 1990s).

Table 2.4. Types of central-local division of power in international affairs in federal countries

Number	Country	Central / local division of power	Economic and political system	Type of IRSSG
1	Argentina	Federal and decentralized	Developing economy and democracy in consolidation	Complementary
2	Australia	Federal and decentralized	Developed economy and consolidated democracy	Inclusive
3	Belgium	Federal and decentralized	Developed economy and consolidated democracy	Consultative (pre-1993) Inclusive (post-1993)
4	Brazil	Federal and decentralized	Developing economy and democracy in consolidation	Complementary
5	Canada	Federal and decentralized	Developed economy and consolidated democracy	Inclusive
6	Germany	Federal and decentralized	Developed economy and consolidated democracy	Inclusive
7	India	Federal and decentralized	Developing economy and democracy in consolidation	Exclusive
8	Mexico	Federal and decentralized	Developing economy and democracy in consolidation	Complementary
9	Russia	Federal and decentralized	Developed economy and democracy in consolidation	Complementary (1990s) Exclusive (post 2000)
10	South Africa	Federal and decentralized	Developing economy and democracy in consolidation	Complementary
11	United States	Federal and decentralized	Developed economy and consolidated democracy	Complementary

The next three chapters are dedicated to the comparative analysis of the IRSSG in these ten federations. Chapter 3 will study the currently inclusive cases, from more to less inclusive: Belgium (which was consultative before

1993), Germany, Canada and Australia. Then Chapter 4 will analyze the complementary cases (with the exception of Mexico, which will be profoundly discussed in chapters 6 through 9): Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, and the United States. Finally, Chapter 5 will examine the exclusive cases: India and Russia (which was complementary in the 1990s).

## Conclusions

This chapter systematically organized and presented the theories and methodologies of IR and other disciplines used to explain the variation in the IRSSG between and within countries. Starting with systemic neoliberal theories to explain the growing IRSSG in the current international system, it continued with domestic theories on federalism and institutional theories on veto points and players. It then developed a typology of the intergovernmental relations in international policy realm in federal systems, which was used to classify the ten federal cases to be analyzed in the next chapters. This typology, which is part of the central-local division of power, inserted into the institutional and partisan veto points and players model, will be used as the structure to analyze the cases of the ten regionally representative federations included in chapters three through five.

The analysis of each of the cases will follow the same logic, organizing the information using the variables that integrate the veto point and players model which includes the central-local division of power variable. The cases will



describe, first, the constitutional and institutional settings, including the major institutions of government (constitutional, legislative and federal divisions of power), as well as the constitutional powers and participation of SSG in international policy. Then, the social and economic structures will be described in terms of ethnicity, religion, language, and culture, as well as the political system and the functioning of democracy. After this, foreign policy priorities and the foreign policy decision making process will be discussed, to detect the most relevant actors in the foreign policy making and implementation process at the central and local levels. Based on all the previous information, the institutions and intergovernmental relations in international affairs will be analyzed, explaining the legal powers and restrictions that SSG have in international affairs, as well as the intergovernmental coordination mechanisms between the different levels of government and other social actors.

In those cases where sufficient information is available, the international priorities and decision making process at the sub-State will be discussed, including the most important actors and any relevant variation among SSG within the country. Then, the actual implementation of the international relations at the sub-State level will be presented, to finally analyze the degree of conflict or cooperation between levels of government and its impact in the implementation of the national foreign policy.

Table 2.5. Summary of X Country's SSG International Relations

Relevant reasons to conduct IRSSG	Globalization, and/or Regionalization, and/or Democratization, and/or Foreign policy domestication and internationalization of domestic politics, and/or Decentralization, and/or Problems with the national building process, and/or Central governments inefficiency in conduction of foreign policy, and/or Asymmetry of federal units, and/or Promotion by SSG leaders or political parties, and/or Managing border issues
Legal bases of the IRSSG	Inclusive or Exclusive constitutional powers to conduct international relations for SSG. Residual powers (not explicitly granted to federal government) are reserved to SSG or federal government. Inclusive or Exclusive SSG consultation or participation in national foreign policy decision making and implementation
Predominant motive of the SSGs to conduct IR	Political, and/or Economic, and/or Cultural, and/or Cross-border issues
Institutionalization of the IRSSG	SSG Ministries of Foreign Affairs, and/or Permanent diplomatic representations abroad, and/or Official visits abroad, and/or International exhibitions and forums, and/or Global and transborder SSG networks, and/or Participation in official central government delegations abroad
Consequences of the IRSSG in the development of nation	Rationalization of national foreign policy, and/or Democratization of the decision making process in national foreign policy, and/or Disintegration of the state
Type of central-local coordination in foreign affairs	Exclusive, or Consultative, or Complementary, or Inclusive

Adapted from Kuznetsov's explanatory framework of paradiplomacy (2015: 116)

Ordering the information of the case studies using the veto points and players model allows to analyze the relevant reasons of the growing IRSSG in the country, the legal bases of the IRSSG, the predominant motive of the SSGs to conduct international affairs, the mechanisms of institutionalization of the IRSSG, the attitude of the central government towards the international activities of its SSG, and the consequences of the IRSSG in the development of the whole nation.

At the end of each section, a table similar to Table 2.5 will present a summary of the most important findings. By ordering the cases in this way we can provide tentative answers to the first two research questions and hypotheses of this dissertation: 1) what explains the increasing IRSSG in federal systems in the last decades; and 2) what explains the variation in the level and type of IRSSG in federal countries? Evidence will be provided to sustain the first two hypotheses. 1) Growing interdependence and globalization in the international system generates the incentives for SSG to participate more actively in international affairs; therefore, with increasing globalization, more IRSSG should be observed. 2) Constitutional rules and domestic institutions in federal systems determine the capacities and limits of SSG to conduct IR, and thus with more constitutional powers and permission to participate in foreign affairs decision making and implementation, more IRSSG will be observed.

In particular, in each case study, empirical evidence will be provided to sustain the following ten observable points in terms of the IRSSG in the ten federal countries under scrutiny:

1. In terms of the IRSSG, important variation in the IRSSG and central-local coordination is foreseen.
2. Changes in the types of central-local coordination are expected.
3. Regarding the most important reasons to conduct IRSSG, globalization, regionalization, decentralization, and border management are anticipated.
4. The democratization variable is expected to be a relevant variable for increasing IRSSG in countries with democracies in process of consolidation, but not in consolidated democracies. International activism due to perceived problems in the national building process, central government inefficiency, and promotion by SSG leaders and parties will only be observed in countries with cultural or linguistic cleavages in their societies (Belgium and Canada).
5. In terms of the predominant motive to conduct IRSSG, promoting local economic development is expected, while other secondary motives, like management of border issues, can also be present. Cultural motivations will only be observed in cases with cultural variation between SSG (Belgium, Canada, Germany and Russia), while the political motive is expected where political cleavages between cultural communities are present (Belgium and Canada).
6. With regards to institutional building, it is anticipated that all countries will create SSG agencies to conduct their international affairs, and these will vary considerably in their size, resources, activities, and level of

consolidation depending of the type of IRSSG. Their level of importance will be minor in exclusive cases, limited in consultative cases, growing in complementary cases, and substantive in inclusive cases.

7. Considerable variation in the international activities conducted by SSG is anticipated. All countries should conduct the simplest actions of internationalization, but only complementary and inclusive countries are expected to open permanent diplomatic representations abroad, and only inclusive cases are foreseen to participate in official federal government delegations abroad.
8. Regarding the consequences of the IRSSG, a rationalization of national foreign policy is expected in all cases; the federal government should allow SSG to conduct international affairs in those areas where they have powers. This rationalization is anticipated to be very small in exclusive cases (India and Russia post-2000), small but growing in consultative (Belgium pre-1993), and complementary cases (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Russia in the 1990s, South Africa and the United States), and increasingly important in inclusive cases (Australia, Canada, Germany and Belgium post-1993).
9. It is expected that all countries make a difference between foreign policy (exclusive power of the federal government, including high politics issues), and IRSSG (including areas where SSG have powers, mostly low politics issues). In inclusive cases, SSG should be allowed to participate in the

foreign policy decision making process and implementation, under the coordination of the federal MFA.

10. It is likely that developed and consolidated parliamentary democracies will be inclusive cases, while developing presidential systems with democracies in consolidation will be complementary cases; exclusive cases may have federal systems constitutionally, but they are expected to function in a centralized way, practically nullifying federal institutions.

Chapters 3 through 5 will analyze the cases of the ten federal countries seeking empirical evidence to support these ten points. Then, based on these findings, an in-depth study of the Mexican case, which falls within the complementary category as will be described in length, will be conducted in the chapters 6 through 9 from four different perspectives: the international activities, the legal cooperation instruments, the perceptions and preferences of SSG in terms of their internationalization, and a case study of the internationalization of its Federal District.

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## CHAPTER 3: THE IRSSG IN INCLUSIVE FEDERAL COUNTRIES

### Introduction

This chapter is dedicated to the comparative analysis of the IRSSG in four inclusive federal countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, and Germany. Apart from this introduction and the conclusions, the chapter is integrated by four sections, one for each case under revision.

As it was discussed previously, each of the cases will follow the same logic, organizing the information using the veto point and players model which includes the central-local division of power variable. Special emphasis will be placed on providing evidence to answer the research questions discussed in the previous chapter, (relevant reasons to conduct IRSSG, legal bases of the IRSSG, predominant motives conduct IRSSG, mechanisms of institutionalization of the IRSSG, central government's attitude towards the international activities of its SSG, and consequences of the IRSSG in the development of the nation). At the end of each section, a table similar to Table 2.5 will present a summary of the most important findings, in order to provide empirical evidence to sustain or not the ten hypotheses presented in Chapter 2. The conclusions will summarize the most important findings about the IRSSG in inclusive federal countries.

### 3.1. Belgium

Belgium is the most inclusive case in terms of IRSSG. It is a parliamentary democracy in a constitutional monarchy. The Constitution (articles 36 and 37) states that the federal legislative power is exercised jointly by the Monarch, the House of Representatives and the Senate, while the federal executive power is vested on the Monarch. The Prime Minister, who is the head of government, is responsible of leading the government and chairing the Council of Ministers. Also, he represents the government at the international level.

Specifically, regarding the Legislative branch of government, the constitution (article 42) specifies that members of Parliament are elected directly by citizens and represent the Nation, and not only those who elected them. This is very important given the geo-linguistic divisions in the country. The members of the House of Representatives are elected every four years using a proportional representation electoral system (articles 62 and 63). The Senate is composed of seventy-one senators (article 67), and there is a complex election system that seeks to maintain the cultural and linguistic diversity of the country, as well as the proportionality of this diversity among the population.

Belgium's legislative system is incongruent, because the lower House represents the people and the upper House represents the communities (Flemish, French, and German). With respect to the powers of each House, the Constitution states that the Monarch and both houses have the right to propose legislation, and all bills submitted by the Monarch are tabled with the House of



Representatives and then are sent to the Senate. The approval of treaties are first sent to the Senate and then to the House of Representatives (article 75). Since all bills, except those related to treaties, are sent first to the lower House and then to the upper House, the House of Representatives is the chamber of origin and the Senate is the revising chamber. Article 77 establishes the issues on which both Houses are equally competent. Therefore, the system is symmetric because both chambers have similar powers.

Belgium is characterized by socio-linguistic cleavages, as well as by differences that run along regional and community lines. Belgium has six different constituent units: French Community, German Community, Flemish Community, the Walloon Region, Flemish Region, and the Capital Region of Brussels. The Regions were created because of economic reasons. Also, they demanded competencies linked to territorial space, such as transport, roads, environment, etc. While the Communities were created because linguistic and cultural reasons, these are responsible for education, culture, media and use of language (Bursens and Massart-Piérard 2009, 93).

With the fourth state reform of 1993, Belgium became a federation where “sovereignty is formally divided among three authorities –the federal government, the regions, and the communities- which each have their own exclusive powers and which, in principle, must not encroach on the prerogatives of the others” (Hendriks 2001, 290). Bursens and Deforche analyze the Belgian federalism saying that the constituent units are completely sovereign within the limits of their competences, and that “they are under no form of political tutelage by the federal

government in jurisdictions belonging to them alone” (Bursens and Deforche 2010, 160).

Article 35 of the Constitution establishes that “The federal authority only has competences in the matters that are formally assigned to it by the Constitution and the laws passed by virtue of the Constitution itself. The Communities and the Regions, each in its own field of concern, have competences for the other matters.” Thus, in Belgium exists the idea of “fundamental equality among all the governments in Belgium, i.e. the federal government as well as the federated ones (no hierarchy of norms). In practice this means that the internal legislation generated by the federated entities has power which is equal to that of the federal level” (Criekemans 2010, 3).

The exact figures on the languages used in Belgium are unavailable because this question is not asked in the census. However, estimates are that, approximately, “60% of Belgians are Dutch<sup>5</sup>-speaking and 40% are French-speaking, while over 90% of inhabitants of the Capital Region are French-speaking. In addition, about 1% of Belgians speak German as their mother tongue. German speakers are concentrated in the country’s east near the German border” (Bursens and Massart-Piérard 2009, 93). The political background of Belgium and its democratic consolidation are closely related to its social and linguistic diversity. This is portrayed well in its transition from a unitary system to a federal one.

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<sup>5</sup> Flemish, also called Flemish Dutch, Belgian Dutch or Southern Dutch, refers to any of the varieties of the Dutch language spoken in Flanders.

Belgium was created in 1830 as a unitary state when the southern part of the United Kingdom of the Low Countries seceded from the north. Substantial federalization began only in 1970 and culminated in 1993 Constitution, which officially declared Belgium a federal state. The country's short federal history means that foreign policy up to 1993 was almost exclusively a policy of the national government (Bursens and Massart-Piérard 2009, 92). Therefore, "Belgium has been reformed from a centralized, unitary state into a fully-fledged federal state by means of five constitutional reforms over the last 35 years (in 1970, 1981, 1988, 1993 and 2001)" (Bursens and Deforche 2010, 162).

As well as in legislative issues, the Crown plays a major role in foreign affairs' matters. However, Regions and Communities are also at the forefront of foreign policy implementation. The article 167 of the Constitution establishes that "The King directs international relations, notwithstanding the competence of Communities and Regions to regulate international cooperation, including the concluding of treaties, for those matters that fall within their competences in pursuance of or by virtue of the Constitution". This means that although the Monarch is the main actor that has control over foreign policy, the great powers bestowed to the sub-State entities make evident that his powers are not exclusive.

With respect to the government, the Prime Minister's most important tasks are leading the government and representing Belgium abroad. He devotes a lot of time and attention to contacts with other governments and heads of government, especially in the framework of the European Union and United

Nations. He also attends the half-yearly summits of heads of state and government of the European Union. Although the Monarch and the Prime Minister are the key actors who have control over Belgium's foreign policy, the ministry responsible for its implementation is the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation. The ministries are also called "Federal Public Services" (FPS). The mission assigned to this ministry is to handle Belgium's foreign relations. Its network encompasses some 130 embassies, consulates and representations in foreign countries. With respect to its organization, there are six General Directions: Bilateral Affairs, Consular Affairs, Cooperation and Development, Coordination and European Affairs, Legal Affairs, and Multilateral and Globalization Affairs.

The Legislative branch of government, both at the federal and at the sub-State levels, plays an important role in the negotiation of international treaties and other foreign policy issues. Article 168 of the Constitution states that: from the beginning, the Houses are to be informed of the negotiations concerning any revision of the treaties establishing the European Community and they should receive the draft treaty before its signature. Section II of the Constitution on the responsibilities of the Communities states that the Parliaments of the Flemish, German and French Communities can regulate cooperation between the Communities, international cooperation and the conclusion of treaties in the areas of culture and education (Art.127 and 130).

Therefore, Belgian SSG are very strong international actors and have extensive specific powers related to matters of foreign policy. In conformity with

article 127 of the Constitution, “Belgian sub-state actors possess a true international personality” (Paquin 2010, 185). Since the constitutional reform of 1993, Belgium is a federal state in which the regions are “not just entitled but even compelled by the constitution to manage their own external relations” (Criekemans 2010, 2–3). There are two guiding principles in terms of the division of powers between the federal and SSG: the *in foro interno, in foro externo* principle and the absence of a hierarchy between the federal and the regional levels. (Criekemans 2010, 2–3) The *in foro interno, in foro externo* principle establishes that if a Belgian regional government is competent internally in an issue area, then it is also competent externally. Following this rationale, Belgian SSGs have the right to send their own diplomatic representatives, and to conclude international treaties with third parties. Second, there is fundamental equality among all the governments in Belgium; “this means that all Belgian governments are responsible for determining the federation’s foreign policy” (Criekemans 2010, 2–3).

The Belgian SSG have the power to conclude or make treaties with third parties, and therefore, foreign states or third parties can no longer conclude treaties with the Belgian federal government on matters which fall within the exclusive powers of the Belgian Regions and Communities (Criekemans 2010, 6). The Belgian federated entities also have the right to send their own representatives to other countries and international organizations. Given that Belgian regions conduct their own external relations and possess the power to

negotiate and conclude international treaties with other states, the federal government deals with many different foreign policies at the same time.

The Inter-ministerial Committee on Foreign Policy (ICFP) was created to avoid conflicts and ensure coherence in Belgian foreign policy. It seeks to bring together representatives of different authorities at the highest political and administrative levels and serve as an institution of permanent dialogue to avoid conflicts (Paquin 2010, 187). The Committee has 15 sectorial inter-ministerial conferences, and it takes its decisions on a case-by-case basis. It is an organism for the exchange of information and dialogue, and decisions are taken by consensus. "If consensus is not achieved, Belgium abstains from taking a position" (Paquin 2010, 187). This Committee does not meet on a regular basis, and since its creation, it has met, on average, twice a year. This system also relies on informal meetings between Cabinet-level personnel and civil servants of all levels of government (Paquin 2010, 188). The General Direction of Legal Affairs has a Direction for Treaties which is in charge of coordinating the mixed treaties between the federal government, the regions, and the communities. Nevertheless, there is no specific Direction or Office within the ICFP that is in charge of coordinating the international activities of the sub-State governments.

In terms of Belgium's participation in international organizations, in June of 1994, a Cooperation Agreement was promulgated to coordinate the participation of Belgium and its sub-State actors in international organizations. Working groups were created to coordinate the participation of Belgium in different multilateral organizations within the framework of the ICFP and, in practice, the

common external policy of the Belgian federation is defined in these working groups (Paquin 2010, 187).

The Prime Minister is responsible for the country's foreign policy. The same is true for sub-State governments: both in Flanders and Wallonia the Minister Presidents also act as the regional Ministers for Foreign Affairs (Criekemans 2010, 10). It is important to note that whereas the Walloon government uses the term "international relations", the Flemish government refers to these actions as a matter of "foreign policy". Although this might be a mere conceptual issue, it might have implications for the way the two main regions see and implement their international actions.

Sub-State heads of government —or Minister President— are also aided by offices within their governments to deal with external relations. For example, in 1980 Flanders installed a Committee-General for International Cultural Relations, which became operational in 1982; since then, the concept of "culture" has been interpreted more broadly, including education, sports, among other activities. In 1986 the local government changed the name of the Committee-General for International Cooperation. In 1991 a new Administration for External Relations was created; it coordinated all the external activities of the internal administrative policy domains. The acquisition of the international treaty-making power and external representation in 1993, led to its renaming in 1994 as the Administration for Foreign Policy (Criekemans 2010, 10–11). On April 1, 2006, the new Flemish Department of Foreign Affairs was declared operational.

The organizational support structure of the foreign affairs departments of the French-speaking Community and the Walloon Region was still composed of two parts, but they have been integrated since the mid-200s. Originally, there was a Commissariat Général des Relations Internationales and a Division des Relations Internationales, but both entities were integrated and the new foreign service is called Wallonie-Bruxelles International (Crikemans 2010, 13). This fusion is a unique development in the Walloon political landscape, since “in all other policy matters, the French-speaking and the Walloon Region remain separated” (Crikemans 2010, 14).

Although sub-State governments have been important international actors for decades, it was until 1993 when their legal rights and duties officially established. During the last decades, the Belgian federal diplomatic apparatus has adapted itself to the new situation; before, the central had a monopoly in the management of the international affairs of the country, and now it is only one of the players (Crikemans 2010, 19).

The constitutional revision of 1993 allowed the regions and communities to become real international actors, with the power of representation and right to sign treaties with sovereign states (Paquin 2010, 184). Flanders, for example, after the fall of the Berlin wall concluded treaties with the Baltic States, Poland and Hungary. Between 1993 and 2008, Flanders concluded 33 exclusive treaties (27 bilateral and 6 multilateral), the Walloon Region 67 treaties, and the French-speaking Community 51 treaties (David Crikemans 2010, 20).



In the Saint Michaels Agreement of 1993, the external activities of the Belgian regions were broadened to comprise all of their external competences, including hard competences such as economy and environment, and soft policy areas such as youth policy and preventive health care. (Criekemans 2010, 39). Thus, the Saint Michaels Agreement made possible for the regions to engage in broader and more specific international relations' and foreign policy activities almost simultaneously. Although they had previously undertaken some activities in the international field, this agreement and the constitutional powers allowed them to become more active.

The objectives of Flanders and Wallonia's international activism are very similar: develop their own identity and image, via public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy; promote tourism, develop their own foreign trade and attract foreign direct investments, and contribute to international solidarity through development cooperation (Criekemans 2010, 24). In Wallonia, economic aspects have been underlined for years, while the new Flemish foreign affairs strategy for 2009-2014 states that Flanders has to develop its economic diplomacy (Criekemans 2010, 24-25).

Given that regions are responsible for conducting their own foreign policy, several issues and topics have motivated these sub-State actors to develop a broad international agenda. In Flanders and Wallonia, the economic network is considerably larger than the political, and for Flanders, cultural representation abroad is rather limited. Flanders foreign policy is focused on its neighboring countries, and also in Central and Eastern Europe; it also collaborates in the area

of development coordination non-European countries like South Africa, Morocco and Chile. However, the Netherlands is the most important priority for Flemish foreign policy, mostly for cultural, economic and logistical reasons. Flanders has political representatives in The Hague, Paris, Berlin, London, Geneva, Brussels (EU), Madrid, Warsaw, Pretoria, Vienna and New York.

On the other hand, Wallonia's external policies are mostly embedded within the Francophonie, and thus, it has very different geopolitical priorities: many of its activities are developed in Francophone Africa, but also in Asia, in countries like Vietnam (Criekemans 2010, 25). Wallonia has representatives abroad who foster cooperation and exchange programs in the area of education. Wallonia has political representatives in Quebec, Paris, Berlin, Brussels (EU), Warsaw, Geneva, Bucharest, Prague, Baton Rouge, Hanoi, Tunis, Rabat, Dakar, Kinshasa, Algiers and Santiago. What is unique about Flanders and Wallonia compared to other regions is that "their political representatives abroad have an official diplomatic statute" (Criekemans 2010, 17).

In terms of inter-governmental relations, the central government has successfully become a coordination center of all external contacts; the federal government has well-articulated and functional mechanisms to actively work together on an institutionalized daily basis with sub-State governments. However, several problems remain, "mostly as a result of unclear delineations of material competency areas, or because international politics has sometimes become a real-time event, so that it has become much more difficult for governments to coordinate" (Criekemans 2010, 19). Belgium's position in the EU Council of

Ministers is defined in a special coordinating section within the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs between all the levels of government, and sometimes there have been some minor disagreements (Paquin 2010, 189). For example, Flanders opposed the Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities, since it could endanger Belgium's Flemish-language regime. Because of Flemish pressure, Belgium had to abstain from signing the Convention (Paquin 2010, 190).

There have also been conflicts about mixed treaties. Some of them were declared mixed after the signature or sometimes ratification by the central government. The problem is mostly of coordination and communication, but there is also a lack of resources at the sub-State level. Given that some problems or conflicts have existed as a result of a divergence between the federal and the various sub-State foreign policies, the 1993 Constitution established a solution for possible coordination problems: "if a Region or a Community does not live up to an international or EU commitment and is convicted by an international court such as the European Court of Justice, the federal government can act as a substitute for the constituent unit (but not the other way around) in order to comply with that commitment" (Bursens and Massart-Piérard 2009, 97–98). However, this mechanism has never been used.

The preferences and positions of the sub-State governments in Belgium are regularly taken into account when it comes to concluding treaties and dealing with the EU. If the content of international treaties is considered to touch competences of the subnational entities, then the treaty has to be ratified by the

regions (Criekemans 2010b, 20). A cooperation agreement signed in 1994 included the representation of Belgium within the Council of Ministers of the European Union. In education, sports, and culture issues, Belgium is represented as a whole by a Minister from Communities or Regions. However, in more mixed policy domains, “the team leader will be someone from the federal government, accompanied by a representative of the Region/Community, or vice versa” (David Criekemans 2010, 26). Also, when a treaty project is brought to the attention of the federal government, it has to inform the other levels of government. Thus, the regions and communities can request to be a party to the treaty if it affects their fields of jurisdiction. Finally, when an agreement involves federal powers and community or regional powers at the same time, the treaty “is concluded according to a special procedure convened among the different orders of government” (Paquin 2010, 185).

On October 14, 2016, the Parliament of Wallonia voted to block the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), between the European Union and Canada. This has prevented Belgium’s federal government from having full powers to sign the agreement. As it has been discussed, under Belgian laws, the SSG must approve trade deals like CETA before the federal government can give its consent. This is an extreme case about how SSG directly participate in foreign economic policy, even preventing the signing of a comprehensive FTA between the European Union and other countries.

Finally, regarding the participation in international organizations, the sub-State governments have increased their presence and participation in the last

years. Flanders participates in several organizations, including the International Labor Organization (ILO), UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the WTO, especially in terms of the negotiations in the liberalization of services (Criekemans 2010, 23). Wallonia is also active multilaterally, particularly in the Francophonie. In terms of becoming an associate member of a multilateral organization, only Flanders has done so in the World Tourism Organization (Criekemans 2010, 23). Both Flanders and Wallonia participate in the Conference of European Regions with Legislative Power (REGLEG), the Group of EU regions that have legislative powers. They also have initiated many informal and formal policy networks. For example, in 1993 the Walloon government started ENCORE, the Environmental Conference of the European Regions, so European regions could discuss the implementation of EU environmental law (Criekemans 2010, 24). Also, arrangements for representation in international organization such as UNESCO, the OECD, and the Council of Europe have been established by the federal and SSG. The latter take part in the work of the WTO in the fields of agriculture and services (Bursens and Massart-Piérard 2009, 103).

Table 3.1. Summary of Belgium's SSG International Relations

Relevant reasons to conduct IRSSG	Globalization Regionalization Foreign policy domestication and internationalization of domestic politics Decentralization Problems with national building process Central government inefficiency in conduction of foreign policy Promotion by SSG leaders and political parties Managing border issues
Legal bases of the IRSSG	Exclusive (pre-1993) to very inclusive (post-1993) constitutional powers to conduct international relations for SSG. No hierarchy between federation, regions and communities (each with powers in specific issue areas). Inclusive (pre-1993) to very inclusive (post-1993) SSG consultation and participation in national foreign policy decision making and implementation
Predominant motive of the SSGs to conduct IR	Political Economic Cultural Cross-border issues
Institutionalization of the IRSSG	SSG Ministries of Foreign Affairs Permanent diplomatic representations abroad Official visits abroad International exhibitions and forums Global and transborder SSG networks Participation in official central government delegations abroad
Consequences of the IRSSG in the development of nation	Rationalization of national foreign policy Democratization of the decision making process in national foreign policy Could lead, if not well managed, to disintegration of the State
Type of central-local coordination in foreign affairs	Consultative (pre-1993) Very inclusive (post-1993)

In sum, currently, Belgium is the most inclusive country in the world in terms of its foreign policy decision making and implementation. The most relevant reasons to conduct its IRSSG are globalization, regionalization, foreign

policy domestication and internationalization of domestic politics, decentralization, problems with national building process, central government inefficiency in conduction of foreign policy, the promotion by SSG leaders and political parties, and managing border issues. In this case all the motives of the SSGs to conduct IR are present: political, economic, cultural, and cross-border issues. The institutionalization of the IRSSG is very developed, including the creation of SSG Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the establishment of permanent diplomatic representations abroad, the organization of official visits abroad and international exhibitions and forums, the participation in global and transborder SSG networks, and the participation in official central government delegations abroad. The consequences of the IRSSG in terms of the development of nation have been positive because of the rationalization of national foreign policy and allowing the SSG to be active in areas where they have powers, and the democratization of the decision making process in national foreign policy; however, if not managed appropriately, they could lead to the disintegration of the State.

After several constitutional reforms, the country changed from a centralized to a full-fledged federal system, and in terms of IRSSG it changed from a consultative case (with no constitutional powers to conduct international relations but to some extent consulted by the central government in foreign policy decision making), to a very inclusive IRSSG, where local governments participate actively not only in international relations, but due to the fact that they have extensive constitutional power to conduct foreign affairs and the inter-

governmental mechanisms to coordinate between the federal and sub-State governments is extremely well developed. Thus, SSG are active actors in the definition, negotiation and enactment of foreign policy including treaty completion and implementation, and regional and international organization participation. In few words, the IRSSG in Belgium are an intrinsic part of the nations' foreign policy.

### 3.2. Germany

Germany is a parliamentary republic, composed of the Federal Government and the Länder, which are the subnational units. Most Länder include several cities, and other Länder are cities themselves (like Hamburg). Article 20 (1) of the Constitution (also known as Basic Law) states that the Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state. In terms of the Executive power, article 54 establishes that the Federal President is elected by the Federal Convention, which consists of the Members of the Bundestag and an equal number of members elected by the parliaments of the Länder on the basis of proportional representation, while the Federal Chancellor is elected by the Bundestag on the proposal of the Federal President (article 63).

With respect to the Legislative branch of government, Germany is a bicameral system. The upper House is the Bundesrat and the lower House is the Bundestag. The members of the German Bundestag are elected in general, direct, free, equal and secret elections, and they are representatives of the whole



people (article 38). The Bundesrat consists of the members of the Länder governments, which appoint and recall them (article 51). Each Länder appoints as many members as it has votes. Thus, Germany has an incongruent bicameral system, because the Bundestag is made up of representatives of the people, and the Bundesrat represents the Länder. It is symmetrical because both Houses can propose legislation and have relatively similar powers. Nevertheless, the Bundestag has preeminence on internal affairs, such as electing the Chancellor, defining taxation policies and overseeing the work of the government, whereas the Bundesrat has the lead on external affairs, such as dealing with issues related to the European Union.

Germany is a federal system that establishes a clear division of powers between the federal and the SSG. Article 70 establishes the division of powers. The section 1 states that Länder have the right to legislate insofar as the Basic Law does not confer legislative power on the Federation. This is the residuary clause: any matter that does not fall within the exclusive competence of the Federal government is vested upon the Länder. Section 2 declares that the division of authority between the Federation and the Länder is governed by the Basic Law concerning exclusive and concurrent legislative powers.

Germany is integrated by 16 states, which together are referred as the Länder. Also, it is divided in 403 districts at the municipal level. Each Länder has its own constitution. Hrbek argues that an essential feature of German federalism has been horizontal cooperation and coordination between the Länder through regular meetings of the heads of governments (*Ministerpräsidenten-*

*Konferenzen*) and regular meetings of Länder ministers responsible of specific policy areas, including the EU affairs (*Europaminister-Konferenz*), and that this network of institutions serves as a framework for the participation of the *Länder* in foreign relations (Hrbek 2009, 152).

In terms of social cleavages and differences among regions within the country, Germany it is a homogeneous society (Michelmann 1986, 540). The largest non-German ethnic group comes from Turkey (close to 2 million). Linguistically, German is the only official language, and even if there are small minorities with distinct cultures and languages, there are no separatist or ethnic nationalists (Hrbek 2009, 142).

There are some important disparities among the Länder regarding economic power and performance. The most important disparities in economic strength and prosperity are between the East (the five so-called New Länder) and West, but there are also differences between the North and South, being in the latter the most prosperous Länder, Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, and Hessen (Hrbek 2009, 143).

After 1989, Germany faced the challenge of reunification. However, nowadays, many decades after the end of the World War II and 25+ years after reunification, Germany has become a solid democratic state. During the Cold War, the Federal Republic in the West and the German Democratic Republic were adversaries. Nevertheless, the political system in the united Germany has been legitimated by many years of democratic development and the establishment of a civil society (Glaessner 2005, 5).

According to Hrbek, in order to understand the character and features of the German federal system it is important to remember that the reestablishment of the German state after the World War II was initiated from below. The Allied Powers established *Länder* as territorial entities in their respective occupation zones; each of them had its own constitution, directly elected parliament, executive accountable to the parliament, and court system. When the three Western Allies decided to establish the West German state on the territory of the three zones they administered in 1948, they called upon the German authorities in the existing *Länder* to prepare a federal structure. Thus, the founding fathers of the federal German state came from the *Länder* (Hrbek 2009, 146). This is why the Basic Law, which entered into force in May 1949, stipulates that the exercise of state powers is a matter for the *Länder* but the exception of those issues otherwise provided or permitted by the Basic Law (Article 30) (Hrbek 2009, 146).

In terms of the control and implementation of Germany's foreign policy, article 32 of the German Basic Law clearly establishes that relations with foreign states are conducted by the Federation. The same article specifies that in those areas where the *Länder* have power to legislate, they may conclude treaties with foreign states with the consent of the Federal Government, and that that *Länder* must be consulted in timely fashion before the conclusion of any treaty affecting its areas of jurisdiction. This means that there is interdependency between the Federal government and the *Länder*, because if any of them concludes a treaty with a foreign country, the latter must be informed.

Also, article 73 (1) states the exclusive legislative power of the Federation with respect to “foreign affairs and defense; [...] immigration, emigration and extradition; [...] exchange of goods and payments with foreign countries, including customs and border protection”. Additionally, article 87 (1) states that the Foreign Service shall be conducted by federal administrative authorities. The Federal Foreign Office “represents Germany’s interests to the world. It promotes international exchange and offers protection and assistance to Germans abroad. The responsibilities, tasks and organization of the Foreign Service are regulated in the Foreign Service Act of August 30, 1990. With regard to the bureaucratic constitution of the Federal Foreign Office, the head is the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is a member of the Federal Cabinet and appointed by the Chancellor upon the approval of the Federal President.

Besides the Federal Foreign Office, other actors in the federal government also play a major role in foreign policy implementation. The article 59 (1) establishes that the Federal President represents the Federation for the purposes of international law, and has the power to conclude treaties with foreign states on behalf of the Federation. It also specifies that the treaties that regulate the political relations of the Federation or relate to subjects of federal legislation require the consent or participation of the bodies responsible for the enactment of federal law. Based on this, Michelmann argues that this article ensures that on the important issues of international affairs regulated by treaties, representatives of the people and, through the Bundesrat, representatives of Länder governments, participate in the decision-making process (Michelmann 1986,

544). In terms of the competencies exercised by the federal and SSG in the area of foreign policy, the federation is not the only level of government that works on issues related to this policy area. Article 59 states that the participation of the Länder occurs through the Bundesrat, because it is involved in the process of ratification of treaties that affect the political relations between the federation and the Länder, or of federal legislation over which the Bundesrat has absolute veto powers.

Also, the Länder has to be involved in all treaties concluded by the federal government, if those treaties affect their exclusive powers; this rule applies to treaties related to cultural affairs or other areas in which the Länder have powers (Nass 1989, 166). Additionally, the Basic Law grants the Länder the right to conclude treaties with foreign states and international organizations. This right implies granting the Länder a limited treaty-making capacity in those areas in where they have exclusive or concurrent legislative powers (Nass 1989, 166).

In many cases the Länder have agreements that are not strictly treaties as defined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Therefore, it is not necessary for the Länder to obtain the formal consent of the federal government for these agreements, even if they could influence the foreign relations of the Federal Republic” (Nass 1989, 169). In practice, the number of Land treaties is quite small, mostly dealing with local matters.

The senior representative of each Länder is the Premier. Ambassadors to Germany pay inaugural visits to all Länder premiers as an indication of both the Länder’s constitutional status and their status as actors in foreign relations. There

are no foreign ministries in the Länder and their external affairs are managed by the central offices of premiers (Hrbek 2009, 157).

In terms of coordination of these international activities by the Federal Foreign Office, Hrbek points out based on the Lindauer agreement, the Länder have established a permanent body of Land representatives to communicate with the Federal Foreign Office, and there has always been an intense exchange of views when treaties are negotiated. Furthermore, the organization and management of the interaction between Länder and the federation is done by the Federal Foreign Office. When sectorial fields are at stake, the respective federal ministry participates, but the Federal Foreign Office always coordinates the meetings (Hrbek 2009, 151). Thus the Federal Foreign Office is regularly informed about the actions undertaken by the SSG and is aware of the consequences and impact of such activities.

The national institution that oversees the IRSSG is the Permanent Treaty Commission of the Länder. It meets monthly and consists of civil servants from the Länder Missions to the federation. Their function is to communicate their concerns concerning draft treaties to the federal government and to coordinate within and between the Länder (Leonardy 1993, 241). Under the Lindau Agreement, the participation of the Länder in the preparation of treaties touching upon any of their exclusive competences has to be sought by the federation as early as possible, always before a final agreement is reached, because the consent of all the Länder “must be secured before obligations created by the treaty achieve validity under international law” (Leonardy 1993, 241).

The Länder have modified their bureaucratic organizations in order to better address the issues related to external relations. During the 1990's some Länder of the East established special ministries for European Affairs, and others established those branches inside ministries that already existed, like the Ministry of Justice. Other ministries of the states, like Ministry of Economy, opened special departments for international affairs with qualified personnel in European matters (Krämer 1996, 112). Berlin has an online English version of the International Relations division that is part of the Governing Mayor and Senate Chancellery.

The Länder also participate in large number of cross-border and interregional cooperation projects. Some of them are very well developed and started in the 1960s and 1970s (Upper-Rhine-Valley cooperation project, which includes Swiss cantons, the German Länder of Baden Württemberg, and French regions; and Baltic Sea Cooperation, whose members are German coastal Länder and the SSG of countries around the Baltic Sea, like Sweden, Finland, the Baltic states, and Poland) (Hrbek 2009, 145).

After reunification, the Länder began to demand new rights of participation in the international relations of Germany. The Länder wanted to clarify the constitutional position concerning the rights to conclude international treaties. On March 1991, the Bundesrat made a Commission on Constitutional Reform and presented recommendations in the strengthening of the rights of participation of the Länder in international discussions, which affect their interests and areas of competence (Jeffery and Sturm 1993, 14-16). Starting in the 1990's, the Länder

started to open offices of representation abroad (Baden-Württemberg in Japan and China; Rhineland- Palatine in Houston, Texas and Yokohoma; and Hamburg in Tokyo and New York). The federal government was strongly opposed to such Länder activities, but it finally accepted that they did not represent a threat to German foreign policy, since they concentrated on economic promotion (Michelmann 1990, 235).

The Länder have increased the number of issues on their international agendas and many policy areas are now included, like culture and education. The Länder have developed scientific contacts between Germany and foreign universities. Also, the Länder support a foreign economic policy and the development of new industries in their territories, by the promotion of exports and the searching of foreign direct investment. Additionally, the development aid is an important part of the relations between certain countries; all German Länder also spend budget funds for the Third World and execute some projects in developing countries through NGO (Otto Nass 1989, 169-172).

Conflict and cooperation between the federal government and the Länder have arisen as a consequence of the increasing role of the latter in international affairs. Therefore, some steps have been taken to solve the conflicts and improve the relations between both levels of government. The Lindau Convention procedures have been effective in institutionalizing relations between the two levels of government on matters falling under joint or exclusively Länder jurisdiction (Michelmann 1990, 240). In respect to the EU policy, the Länder authorities had to confront the federal government to create a mechanism which



enables them to participate formally in EU policy making. In 1993, the change in article 23 of the Basic Law represented an important step, because it consolidated this state practice (Suszycka-Jasch and Jasch 2009, 1252).

As part of a state that belongs to the European Union, the Länder have expressed their interest to participate in international forums and organization in order to further advance their goals and their respective agendas. The article 50 of the Constitution states that the Länder can participate, through the Bundesrat, in matters concerning the European Union. Hrbek presents the relation with the EU as an intermestic issue. Although EU policy is not foreign policy in the traditional sense, it is not domestic policy either, since it involves both the federation and the Länder, and requires provisions that take into account their respective rights and regulate their cooperation (Hrbek 2009, 148). There are provisions that allow Länder representatives to participate directly in the negotiations of the EU Council of Ministers and its committees. To this end, the Bundesrat nominates Länder representatives who, on a case-by-case basis, serve as part of the German delegation in the EU negotiations (Hrbek 2009, 149). Also, an agreement between the federation and the Länder can authorize the latter to set up their own representative offices in Brussels with the official label of “representation” (Hrbek 2009, 149). It is also worth noting that the committee for EU matters of the Bundesrat represents the concerns and interests of the Länder in European Union issues. The Länder also participate in other regional and international organizations, like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the delegation of Germany to the IMF; Länder

were also included in the language-promotion framework of UNESCO (Hrbek 2009, 152).

Besides conflict and cooperation, it is important to determine whether the preferences of the Länder are taken into account by the federal government when designing and implementing its foreign policy. The representation of the Länder in the Bundesrat facilitates their influence upon the foreign relations of the federal government, and exercises an important veto power over federal legislation, including the ratification of treaties. (Trone 2001, 54). Thus, it is indirectly inclusive, through the Bundesrat. Its views have to be taken into account if the EU measure falls within Länder competence and, in case of disagreement, the two sides have to reach a compromise. If no agreement is reached, the Bundesrat has to confirm its position by a two-thirds majority vote and the federal government must comply with the Bundesrat's view (Hrbek 2009, 149).

The legislative process of ratification of a treaty concerning Länder jurisdiction does not start before the federal government has asked for the consent of the Länder to be given. The position of the Länder is very strong in this field. The Lindau procedure ensures that any demand made by the Länder for the alteration or amendment of a treaty text has to be taken into account at a sufficiently early stage in the negotiations (Leonardy 1993, 241-242).

In sum, in the case of Germany, the most relevant reasons to conduct IRSSG are globalization, regionalization, foreign policy domestication and internationalization of domestic politics due to the European integration process,

decentralization, asymmetry of federal units, and managing border issues. The predominant motives of the SSGs to conduct IR are economic, cultural, and to attend cross-border issues. The institutionalization of the IRSSG has taken place through all existing mechanisms: the creation of SSG offices to conduct foreign affairs, the establishment of permanent diplomatic representations abroad (especially in Brussels), the organization of official visits abroad and international exhibitions and forums, the participation in global and transborder SSG networks, and the participation in official central government delegations abroad.

The consequence of the IRSSG have been positive in the development of nation, due to the rationalization of national foreign policy by allowing provinces to be active in areas where they have powers, and the democratization of the decision making process in national foreign policy. In terms of the legal bases of the IRSSG, Germany is a very inclusive federal country in terms of the IRSSG, both in its constitutional framework, as well as in the participation of the federal units in the country's foreign policy, indirectly through the Bundesrat, and directly through the Lindau procedure. As such, it can be classified as an inclusive case of IRSSG.

Table 3.2. Summary of Germany's SSG International Relations

Relevant reasons to conduct IRSSG	Globalization Regionalization (European Union) Foreign policy domestication and internationalization of domestic politics Decentralization Asymmetry of federal units Managing border issues
Legal bases of the IRSSG	Inclusive constitutional powers to conduct international relations for SSG. Residual powers (not explicitly granted to federal government) are reserved to SSG. Inclusive SSG consultation or participation in national foreign policy decision making and implementation
Predominant motive of the SSGs to conduct IR	Economic Cultural Cross-border issues
Institutionalization of the IRSSG	SSG offices to conduct foreign affairs Permanent diplomatic representations abroad Official visits abroad International exhibitions and forums Global and transborder SSG networks Participation in official central government delegations abroad
Consequences of the IRSSG in the development of nation	Rationalization of national foreign policy Democratization of the decision making process in national foreign policy
Type of central-local coordination in foreign affairs	Inclusive

### 3.3. Canada

According to the Constitution Act of 1867, the Executive Government and Authority of and over Canada is vested in the Queen, and there is a Governor General who acts as the representative of the Monarch. Thus, Canada is a democratic constitutional monarchy, with a Sovereign as head of State, and an

elected Prime Minister as head of Government; it has a federal parliamentary system, and government responsibilities and functions are shared between federal, provincial and territorial governments. Federal responsibilities are carried out by the Monarchy and the Executive, Legislative and Judicial branches of Government.

As for the Legislative branch of government, Canada is a bicameral system. The Senate consists of one hundred and five members (Constitution Act, 1867, s. 21), and the House of Commons consists of three hundred and eight members (Constitution Act, 1867, s. 37). The Senators are appointed by the Governor General upon the Prime Minister's recommendation (Constitution Act 1867, s. 24), while the House of Commons is integrated by elected members (Constitution Act 1867, s. 37).

Canada has an incongruent bicameralism, because the Senate is made up of the representatives of the provinces or appointed members, and the lower house comprises the representatives of the people. It is also an asymmetrical bicameral system, because the vast majority of the bills are defined in the House of Representatives and the Senate serves mostly as a revising chamber. The only exclusive power of the lower House in terms of legislation is on bills for appropriating public revenue or for imposing taxes, which have to originate in the House of Commons.

Canada is one of the strongest federalist countries in the world. It has two orders of government: national and provincial. Ss. 91 and 92 (10) of the Constitution Act 1867 enumerate the powers of the Parliament (public debt,

taxation, trade/commerce regulation, defense, among others), while Ss. 92, 92(A) and 93 enumerate the exclusive powers of the Provincial legislatures (lands, prisons, hospitals, municipalities, education, among others). In terms of residuary power, the Constitution Acts confer the Federal Parliament the power to make laws in relation to all matters "not coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces". This power is residuary since any matter that does not come within the power of provincial legislatures comes within the power of the federal Parliament; this residuary power ensures that every area of legislation comes under one or both of Canada's two orders of government.

Canadian federalism was the result of a compromise, to integrate the two units of the Province of Canada (Canada East and Canada West), as well as New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. On one side, French Canadians advocated a federal model because they thought that it provided the political autonomy to preserve their distinct culture, language, and social structure. On the other, English Canadians favored a unitary state, which they thought was stronger and more resilient. In the end, Canada was created as a federation in 1867, and it was originally a fairly centralized one (Lecours 2009, 20).

Canada is a democratic country and there is a strong democratic culture. In 1867, the British Parliament passed the Constitution Act (formerly called British North America Act), and after the elections of 1867, Canada became a democratic constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary federal system. The consolidation process was smooth and swift, because elections have been held

on a regular basis since then. Finally, in 1982, the Canada Act was passed by the British parliament and the Constitution Act was passed by the Canadian parliament, thus creating the Constitution of Canada.

In terms of social cleavages, linguistic and cultural diversity has always been a defining trait of Canadian society. The country is officially bilingual since 1969, and it is composed of approximately 3/4 English speakers and 1/4 French speakers. Historically, the Catholicism of Francophones clashed with the Protestantism of most Anglophones. However, a decline in religious practice, especially in Quebec, where francophones are concentrated, has considerably lessened the importance of the religious division (Lecours 2009, 115). It is important to note that, specifically in Quebec, there is a strong nationalist movement since the 1960s, which has demanded more autonomy and independence. Also, Canada has an Aboriginal population of approximately 3% of the total population, comprising many different groups that call themselves nations, and are recognized as such by the federal government. Diversity in Canada is also noticeable in its multiple communities stemming from immigration (Italian, Greek, and Chinese), and these communities are formally acknowledged through a multiculturalism policy (Lecours 2009, 116).

Economically speaking, all the Canadian provinces are highly dependent on international trade. Until 2006, the most active provinces have been Alberta, Ontario, and Québec (Vengroff and Rich 2006, 117). These same provinces are the ones that have more international activities, which include investment and international trade missions, associations with foreign actors, agreements with

national or sub-State governments, and having their own representation abroad (Vengroff and Rich 2006, 117).

The Constitution Act of 1867 does not explicitly assign a federal or provincial authority with respect to the conduction of international affairs (Barnett 2008, 1). However, section 132 of the Constitution Act of 1867 states that the federal government has the power to conduct foreign policy. Also, even if the authority over international relations is not explicitly conferred on the executive branch of the federal government under any constitutional provision, “it is broadly recognized that this power has devolved upon it” (Barnett 2008, 2).

The Governor General promotes Canadian sovereignty domestically and represents Canada abroad. At the request of the Prime Minister, the Governor General hosts visiting Heads of State, conducts visits abroad, receives foreign heads of mission (ambassadors and high commissioners); and concludes diplomatic agreements (The Governor General of Canada website <http://www.gg.ca/events.aspx?sc=2&lan=eng>). Nevertheless, the negotiation, signature and ratification of international treaties are controlled by the executive branch of the federal government, and Parliament is responsible for the implementation of such treaties at the federal level (Barnett 2008, 1).

The Prime Minister is responsible for executing and implementing the country's foreign policy. Within the Cabinet, the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada is the main actor that has control over foreign policy. According to the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Act, the Minister has powers to conduct foreign policy in all matters over which



Parliament has jurisdiction which are not assigned by law to any other department, board or agency. These include international trade, commerce and international development; all diplomatic and consular relations on behalf of Canada; all official communication between Canada and foreign governments and international organizations; all international negotiations as they relate to Canada; and, the coordination of Canada's international economic relations (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Act s. 10(1-2)). There are several ministerial positions under the same institution: Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of International Trade, and Minister of International Development and for La Francophonie, Minister of State (Foreign Affairs and Consular), Minister of the Environment, Minister of the Canadian Northern Economic Development Agency, and Minister for the Arctic Council.

As stated before, Canada is a strong federal system in which the provinces possess many powers. In terms of foreign affairs, S. 92 of the Canadian constitution establishes the specific powers entrusted to the Provincial Legislatures. The residual clause establishes that the Provinces and the Provincial Legislatures can only act and make laws in relation to matters that are specified in the Constitution. This clause is opposite to that in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Germany, Mexico, and the United States, which establishes that all matters that are not exclusive of the federal government are reserved to the states. In s. 92, there is no subject related to international or foreign affairs, but sub-section 16 states "Generally all Matters of a merely local or private Nature in the Province" (Constitution Act of Canada s. 92).

Vengroff and Rich contend that in Canada there is a federal state with lack of constitutional clarity regarding the distribution of authority over foreign policy (Vengroff and Rich 2006, 110). They argue that even when the federal responsibilities are defined in section 91 of the Constitutional Act of 1982, and the section 92 determines what falls under provincial jurisdiction, these provisions do not clearly assign competence in foreign issues to either provincial or federal level (Vengroff and Rich 2006, 110). Nevertheless, divisions in key areas between the federal level and the provincial power exist. For example, in Canada the power to impose custom tariffs lay solely with the federal government. However, other issues like investment and trade in services fall within provincial jurisdiction (McIlroy 1997, 432–33).

The Gérin-Lojoe doctrine (1965) in Québec establishes that the province has the right to get involved internationally whenever issues fall under its jurisdiction (Vengroff and Rich 2006, 112). Regarding the capacity to implement treaties, if the treaty is related to a matter of provincial competence, then the federal government does not have the power to implement the treaty. Also, there has been controversy about the constitutional powers of the provinces on international relations. Canada's primary constituent documents are not clear on this issue. Some Quebecois authors have argued that "the capacity to entering into treaties must be regarded as concurrent with the power to implement those treaties; thus the responsibility for entering into international agreements is divided in Canada between the central government and the provinces (Craven

1993, 14). This position has been rejected by the central government who argued that provinces have a most limited capacity on foreign issues (Craven 1993, 14).

The Labor Conventions in 1937 was the first case that created a precedent, generating jurisprudence on treaty implementation in Canada. The Privy Council, speaking through Lord Aktin, “judged that the federal government alone could not enact the labor conventions stemming from Canada’s membership in the International Labour Organization (ILO)” (Lecours 2009, 121). The conclusion was that if a treaty falls into a subject under the section 92 of the Constitution, that is, the legislative authority of the provinces, then, it could be enacted only by the provincial legislatures. This case set a precedent and following jurisprudence on treaty implementation in Canada, provinces, particularly Quebec, still refer to this case to defend the constitutionality of their role in treaty implementation of treaties (Lecours 2009, 121).

The various Canadian provinces have a system of government that mimics that of the federation. At the local level, the Lieutenant Governor is the representative of the Monarch to the province, while the Premier is the local head of government. The Lieutenant Governor is entrusted with the ceremonial and protocol duties. For example, he is responsible for welcoming and hosting the Heads of State who visit the province, and represent the province abroad. However, the SSG’s international actions are part of the Premier and his government officials.

The more active provinces (Alberta, Ontario, Québec and New Brunswick) have the large bureaucratic agencies, like ministries, departments or offices, to

manage their international activities (Vengroff and Rich 2006, 117). For example, Québec has a Ministry of International Relations (Ministère des Relations Internationales), whose functions (chapter II) are to plan, organize and head the foreign actions of the government, and those of his ministries and organizations. It also coordinates their activities in Québec in international relations' issues. The minister can establish a delegation (délégation generale) of Quebec abroad and appoint the delegate (délégué général) (s. 28). The Ministry is composed of five main sections: Francophone and multilateral policies and affairs, Bilateral affairs, External trade, Protocol and missions, and Administration (<http://www.mrifce.gouv.qc.ca/en/ministere/organigramme>).

The province of Ontario has the Office of International Relations and Protocol, which is part of the Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs, while British Columbia has the Intergovernmental Relations Secretariat with a special section for intergovernmental and international relations and another for Protocol. New Brunswick also has a Department of Intergovernmental and International Relations. This unit focuses on subjects such as international integration, innovation and education, international development, environment, image and reputation, and foreign investment (Lecours 2009, 131).

The other provinces have very small international relations administrative agencies. For example, Manitoba has a small unit for Canada-US and International Relations within the Department of Intergovernmental Affairs and Trade. Saskatchewan has an International Relations Branch within the

Department of Government Relations. The institutional situation of the other provinces reflects the minor importance of foreign affairs (Lecours 2009, 132).

Besides the offices in charge specifically of implementing the foreign policy, other agencies of the provinces also deal with foreign affairs issues. Ontario has, besides the Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs, the Ministry of International Trade and Responsible for Asia Pacific Strategy and Multiculturalism, which provides integrated trade and investment programs and services to help British Columbia increase its exports and attract investment and company head offices (Ministry's Service Plan 2013/14-1015/16, 6).

Canadian foreign policy has changed through time, allowing provinces to play a role in this policy field. The IRSSG developed parallel to federalism. During the first decades of independence, local governments wanted to decentralize the federal system. During that time, Quebec sent its first representative to Paris, and offices were subsequently opened in Belgium, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Lecours 2009, 126). After the Great Depression, the federal government sought to consolidate its dominant role. In this period, Quebec virtually stopped its international activities, while other provinces had not started their international actions. However, in the 1960s, during the Quiet Revolution in Quebec, the Parti Libéral du Québec (PLQ) governments pressured to decentralize Canadian federalism and secure the formal recognition of the province's distinctiveness. A few years later, the Parti Québécois (PQ), created in 1968, included in its political platform Quebec's independence, and the provincial government developed clear international

ambitions. During this decade, representatives were sent to Paris, London, Brussels, New York, Tokyo, and Mexico City, and in 1967 they legally established a department of intergovernmental affairs whose activities included coordination of the province's international activities (Lecours 2009, 126). Other provinces developed their international activities some years later. For example, Ontario began in the late 1970s and early 1980s to advance its interests on trade and environmental issues. Alberta, began its international activities in the late 1970s, due to its interests on energy sector (Lecours 2009, 127).

The goals of the provinces in terms of external relations are very different. The provinces that are more dependent of the international market have more incentives to be more active. For example, Ontario has undertaken 56 international missions to some 20 countries, including Germany, Italy, South Africa, and South Korea, to better position itself in global market (Vengroff and Rich 2006, 117). Quebec is the most active province in the international field. It has established the most developed international relations of any sub-State unit in the world (Lecours 2009, 116). Quebec has goals related to language and culture. In 2006, this province negotiated a formal participation in UNESCO (Kukucha 2008, 3). Also, this province has been the most active in terms of IRSSG. It has a fully staffed ministry solely dedicated to international relations, and since 1964, it has signed more than 550 international agreements with 79 different countries, of which more than 300 are still in effect. It also has a network of 28 separate offices abroad in 17 countries (Vengroff and Rich 2006, 119). Quebec is the only province that seeks, among other things, status and

recognition. This attitude of dissociation from Canadian foreign policy explains the high volume of international agreements and relationships involving Quebec and foreign governments (Lecours 2009, 129).

Another example is Alberta, which focuses its international activities in having good relations with the United States, which is the destination of more than 80% of its exports. On the other hand, New Brunswick has promoted cultural activities about Acadian culture and French language, and has negotiated bilateral agreements of language promotion with the Department of Vienne in France and the State of Louisiana, U.S. (Vengroff and Rich 2006, 118-121).

In such a strong federation, it is important to determine to what extent the federal and the subnational governments cooperate or experience conflict in the area of foreign policy implementation. Although the federal government maintains the right to negotiate treaties and trade relations, its ability to implement these agreements is circumscribed because the provinces legally and politically maintain the right and the power to implement treaties and other international agreements in those areas in which they have constitutional competence (Vengroff and Rich 2006, 125). Provincial governments do not participate in policymaking within the federal institutions. In theory, the Senate should serve as the house for territorial representation; however, since its members are appointed by the federal government and not elected by provincial governments, it does not perform this function. Therefore, provinces play no formal role in the definition of Canadian foreign policy (Lecours 2009, 121–22).

The central government and the SSG do not meet regularly to discuss and negotiate international issues. Instead, when specific subjects of provincial jurisdiction are the focus of international negotiations, the federal government consults provincial authorities. However, when deciding on the structure of its diplomatic relations with foreign states or its stance on traditional issues of war and peace, security, and defense, SSG are not consulted. These matters are considered as part of the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government (Lecours 2009, 122).

The various Canadian provinces have expressed an increasing interest in participating in regional and international organizations. One example is the organization of the Pacific Northwest Economic Region (PNWER), which was created in November of 2001 and includes the states of Alaska, Washington, Idaho, Montana, and Oregon and the Provinces of Alberta and British Columbia and the Yukon Territory. The PNWER treats regional international security issues. These discussions take place without any direct intervention by the government of the United States or the government of Canada. Québec is member of the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, and it plays a similar role than that a sovereign country (Vengroff and Rich 2006, 106-119). Canadian SSG have interests in a wide array of international organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Health Organization (WHO), and various UN agencies, such as the United Nations Educational Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (Lecours 2009, 117).



Based on the previous discussion, the most relevant reasons to conduct IRSSG in Canada are globalization, regionalization, decentralization, asymmetry of federal units, managing border issues, and from Quebec's perspective, especially during the 1970s and 80s, problems with the national building process, central governments inefficiency in conduction of foreign policy, and promotion by SSG leaders and political parties. The predominant motives of the SSGs to conduct IR are economic and cross-border issues, and in the case of Quebec, also cultural and political. The institutionalization of the IRSSG has taken place through the creation of SSG Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the establishment of permanent diplomatic representations abroad, the organization of official visits abroad and international exhibitions and forums, the participation in global and transborder SSG networks, and the participation in official central government delegations abroad. Its consequences have been the rationalization of foreign policy, and the democratization of the decision making process in national foreign policy. In terms of the legal bases of the IRSSG, constitutionally speaking, Canada has one of the strongest federal arrangements in the world, where all the powers not directly conferred to the provinces are given to the federation, that is, an inverse residual federalism compared to one in other countries of the Americas, like Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and the United States, where states have the residual powers not granted to the federation; thus, the legal framework for the IRSSG is very inclusive.

Table 3.3. Summary of Canada's SSG International Relations

Relevant reasons to conduct IRSSG	Globalization Regionalization Decentralization Problems with the national building process (Quebec in the 1970s) Central governments inefficiency in conduction of foreign policy (Quebec's view in the 1970s) Asymmetry of federal units Promotion by SSG leaders and political parties (Quebec) Managing border issues
Legal bases of the IRSSG	Inclusive constitutional powers to conduct international relations for SSG. Residual powers (not explicitly granted to provinces) are reserved to federal government. Inclusive SSG consultation or participation in national foreign policy decision making and implementation
Predominant motive of the SSGs to conduct IR	Political (only Quebec) Economic Cultural (specially Quebec) Cross-border issues
Institutionalization of the IRSSG	SSG Ministries of Foreign Affairs Permanent diplomatic representations abroad Official visits abroad International exhibitions and forums Global and transborder SSG networks Participation in official central government delegations abroad
Consequences of the IRSSG in the development of nation	Rationalization of national foreign policy Democratization of the decision making process in national foreign policy
Type of central-local coordination in foreign affairs	Inclusive

Due to the fact that several areas of policy are concurrent between the federation and the provinces, especially for the implementation of international treaties, intergovernmental coordination and negotiation takes place between the levels of government to define Canada's position in these areas of concurrent

responsibility, being very inclusive. However, in the traditional high politics foreign policy areas, which are an exclusive responsibility of the federal government, the participation of the provinces is not permitted. Thus, in terms of IRSSG, Canada would be an inclusive case, particularly in areas where it has concurrent powers with the federation.

### 3.4. Australia

The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act sets forth the basic aspects that define the type of State and government that this country has. It also defines the government actors and their basic powers. Chapter II of the Act states that the executive power is vested in the Queen and is exercised by the Governor-General as the Queen's representative. Australia is a federation, a constitutional monarchy and a parliamentary democracy. It has eight states and territory parliaments. The head of government is the Prime Minister, and it has a two-chamber Commonwealth Parliament to make laws. The Prime Minister is elected following the provisions of the Westminster system: the leader of the party or coalition of parties that holds the majority in the House of Representatives is invited to form a government. Australia and each of the states and territories has a Westminster-style parliament, and all parliamentarians are elected democratically (Sanson 2009, 9).

Regarding the Legislative branch of government, Chapter 1 of the Constitution Act establishes that the legislative power is vested in a Federal

Parliament, which shall consist of the Queen, a Senate, and a House of Representatives. The Constitution establishes that the Senate is composed of senators for each state directly chosen by the people of the state as a unit, while the House of Representatives is composed of members directly chosen by the people, and the number of such members shall be twice the number of the senators (Part III, 24). The members of each House are elected through a single-transferable-vote system, also called preferential voting (the voters number the candidates in the order of their preference).

Australia has an incongruent legislative system because the upper House represents the States and the territories, whereas the lower House represents the constituents or the people. As for their powers, it is a symmetric legislature, because their powers differ only with respect to laws appropriating revenue and imposing taxation; in this case, all bills must originate in the lower House. Nevertheless, according to Article 53, the Senate has equal power with the House of Representatives in respect of all proposed laws.

As for the composition of Australia's constituent units, the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act defines "states" as the colonies of New South Wales, New Zealand, Queensland, Tasmania, Victoria, Western Australia, and South Australia. The Australian Constitution enumerates the powers of the federal government, leaving the residual powers with the states. The High Court of Australia, through its power of judicial review, has more often permitted the expansion of federal powers (Leach 1982, 6).

The cultural diversity is not regionally defined. The federalism in Australia has been more a matter of geography and history than of culture (Ravenhill 1999, 134). The heterogeneity increased after the Second World War, because of the large migration from Southern and Eastern Europe, and then an influx of migrants from Asia and the Middle East (Ravenhill 1999, 135). Nevertheless, though there is some regional variation, the population is considered as remarkably homogeneous, and almost all the citizens have a high literate and educational level (Leach 1982, 3). The indigenous population of Aborigines comprises only 2.4% of the total (Sanson 2009, 9).

Australia has a very long history in terms of democratic institutions. In the 1890s the Australian colonies embarked on a process of federation that was uniquely democratic for its time. The delegates were elected to the Constitutional Convention of 1897-1898 by popular vote in each colony, and the resulting Constitution was then submitted to popular referenda. The new Commonwealth of Australia came into existence in January 1901 and the first elections to the new federal parliament were held that year (Sawer, Abjorensen, and Larkin 2009, 7). However, the process of separation from Great Britain took place gradually, and the formal adoption of the *Statute of Westminster* in 1942 and the *Australia Act* of 1986 removed any remaining powers from Great Britain in terms of Australian legislation.

There is a somewhat ambivalent legal framework regarding foreign affairs in Australia. The Constitution does not explicitly assign the exclusive power in foreign affairs to the Commonwealth, but the High Court has consistently

declared that only the Commonwealth can speak for Australia in international affairs (Ravenhill 1999, 142; Ravenhill 1990, 82). The power to make treaties is exclusive of the federal government. Despite this, in practice, the local governments are allowed to enter into agreements with foreign nations or other sub-State governments, exclusively in those areas where they have powers, for example, sisterhood arrangements (Trone 2001, 32). A difference is made between foreign policy, which is an exclusive power of Australia's federal government, and international relations, which includes the external actions of SSG in issues where they have powers.

The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) is responsible to advance the interests of Australians internationally and provide foreign and trade policy advice to the government. The Department has four main branches: 1) Office of Trade Negotiation; 2) South and West Asia and Middle East Division; 3) South-East Asia Division; and 4) North Asia Division. There are two Ministers (for Foreign Affairs and for Trade and Investment) and one Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry.

However, the Executive is not the only branch of government that deals with foreign affairs. Part V (art. 51) of the Constitution Act states that the Parliament shall have the power to make laws with respect to: trade and commerce with other countries, and among the States; immigration and emigration; relations with islands of the Pacific; external affairs. However, this section does not grant the Commonwealth exclusive competence in those fields (Ravenhill 1990, 80).

Sub-State governments do not have international personality in strict legal terms. The High Court has continuously asserted that the states have no international personality and has indicated their lack of competence in external affairs (Ravenhill 1990, 82). The denial of any foreign affairs role has not been accepted by the states, and they have asserted their right to enter into intergovernmental arrangements in the commercial fields, this being justified by reference to their constitutional responsibility for their own welfare (Ravenhill 1990, 83).

Australia has an important body that coordinates the various activities undertaken by sub-State governments. The Council of Australian Government (COAG) is an intergovernmental forum on international affairs in Australia. The members are the Prime Minister, State and Territory Premiers and Chief Ministers and the President of the Australian Local Government Association (<http://www.coag.gov.au/>). Painter argues that the COAG exists because there was a perception on the part of the Commonwealth that coordinated action was required with and among the states to achieve the Commonwealth's economic reform objectives (Painter 1996, 103).

The objective of cooperation is stated in a communiqué of May of 1992, the purpose was to increase cooperation among governments in the national interest; to achieve an integrated, efficient national economy and single national market; and to consult on other major international issues (Painter 1996, 104). This coordination in domestic affairs opened the door for the federal and SSG to include international activities as a space of cooperation, allowing SSG to

implement international actions in those areas where they had constitutional domestic powers.

Australia has a long history of SSG involvement in international affairs, particularly with offices abroad. The overseas representation of the states began with the separation of the other colonies from New South Wales and their acquisition of responsible government in the middle of the nineteenth century (Ravenhill 1990, 95). The first representation of the states was in London; it was established to maintain a connection with the Imperial government and to promote their commercial interests. Later on, other interests became more important with other European countries and with the United Kingdom. Then, states began to establish representations outside of Europe; the first one was opened in 1958 in New York; another office was opened in Tokyo in 1968 (Ravenhill 1999, 136-38). At the beginning, the role of the overseas offices in London was to promote trade and industrial development and the attraction of investment, promotion of tourism. However, as the imperial connection became less important, the states started to represent their interests in other countries, inside and outside Europe (Ravenhill 1990, 97).

In all the SSG of Australia, the Premier is the actor responsible for undertaking and executing the international relations' activities of the province. Within their office, a specific area is responsible for foreign affairs and relations overseas. This is true in Western Australia, South Australia and Victoria states.

In Western Australia, the Department of the Premier and Cabinet is involved in the promotion of Western Australia's interests overseas



(<http://www.dpc.wa.gov.au/AboutTheDepartment/WhatWeDo/Pages/Default.aspx>). As such, it is also responsible for providing services related to management of State occasions and official visits. The Head of the Department is the Premier. Beneath him is the Director General, who is in charge of its own office, the Ministerial Offices and the Overseas Offices in London, Tokyo and Dubai. Also, within the Cabinet and Policy Division, there is an office that deals with international agreements.

The Government of Western Australia has a European Office. It promotes the state as an attractive destination for investment, visitors, migrants and students. It also monitors current and emerging issues throughout the world to identify prime opportunities for attracting investment in Western Australia and promoting trade. The head of the Office is the Agent General: The role of Western Australia's Agent General is to represent the interests of the Government of Western Australia abroad (<http://www.wago.co.uk/index.php/role-of-the-agent-general.html>). The Premier of the State is the actor who has control over international relations.

In South Australia, the Department of the Premier and Cabinet is the area responsible for international relations implementation. The Department of the Premier and Cabinet (DPC) provides central agency leadership on key issues that affect South Australia's prosperity. This includes the provision of economic and policy advice to support the government's strategic priorities, to attract innovation and investment (<http://www.dpc.sa.gov.au/node/16>). The Agent-General of South Australia maintains a UK and European office, which is located

in London, and this office promotes South Australia as a destination for foreign investment, migrants, students, tourists and as a producer of premium food and wine (<http://www.dpc.sa.gov.au/agent-general-south-australia>). As in the other two examples, in the Province of Victoria, the Department of Premier and Cabinet is the office responsible for international relations implementation. They promote Victoria's interests nationally and internationally (<http://www.dpc.vic.gov.au/index.php/about/department>).

Based on the information presented above, it can be concluded that the various offices abroad are responsible for all the economic, political and cultural areas that link the state governments with foreign countries. All the other ministries or offices of the state governments act through these representations to advance their international relations' and foreign affairs objectives. All matters related to investment, trade, education, immigration, and culture are dealt with by the offices abroad and the office of the Premier. Furthermore, after looking at the main functions of other state ministries and offices, a common finding was that they were responsible for issues where the states have powers.

Traditionally, Australian states had been seeking foreign markets and sources of investment (Ravenhill 1999, 139). To seek international cooperation, all the states have established overseas representations. The most active has been Western Australia, who by 1977 had more than thirteen Asian offices. Other states also focus in Asia, for example, New South Wales, Northern Territory, and South Australia. On the other hand, Queensland and Victoria have been more

diversified, opening, in addition to their Asian offices, delegations in Los Angeles and Frankfurt (Ravenhill 1999, 137).

With respect to foreign policy implementation and the activities undertaken by SSG in the realm of international relations, the transnational activities of the states have been about commerce and trade. Occasionally, they have entered into matters of diplomacy and defense, causing some conflict with the federal government. For example, in 1982 the Labor government of Victoria declared its intention to forbid nuclear warships from entering the ports; this statement was criticized by the United States and repudiated by the central government. In general, however, the inconvenience caused to the Commonwealth government by the state intervention in matters of diplomacy and defense has been minor (Ravenhill 1990, 103).

There is also an increasing involvement of sub-State actors in federal-led international relations' issues, which has been translated in the latter taking into account the preferences and viewpoints of the former. The adoption of the Guidelines on Treaty Cooperation in 1977, subsequently revised in 1983, was seen as a way of meeting state government wishes to have early notice of treaty negotiations, and to be involved in discussions on foreign policy questions where state interests were concerned, and to have state representation on international delegations (Harris 1993, 100). Representatives of local governments are often included on Australian delegations to international conferences engaged in the negotiation of international treaties. Also, there are formal principles and procedures regarding consultation with state governments in the process of

treaty-making; and most importantly, sometimes the central government leaves the enactment of implementing legislation to the states and territories (Trone 2001, 32-33). The implementation of treaties by sub-State legislation has been a regular practice.

There is no clear information regarding the official participation of subnational governments in international organizations, particularly as an independent voice. Many states give money to international non-government associations such as Freedom from Hunger and the Red Cross, but no state has a central register of the activities of its individual departments in this field (Ravenhill 1990, 101).

In summary, in the case of Australia, the most relevant reasons to conduct IRSSG in are globalization, regionalization (in the Pacific region), decentralization and the asymmetry of federal units, while the predominant motives of the SSGs to conduct IR are economic. The institutionalization of the IRSSG has taken place through practically all available mechanisms: the creation of SSG Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the establishment of permanent diplomatic representations abroad, the organization of official visits abroad and international exhibitions and forums, the participation in global and transborder SSG networks, while the consequence of the IRSSG in the development of nation has been the rationalization of national foreign policy, allowing provinces to be active in areas where they have powers, and the democratization of the decision making process in national foreign policy.

Table 3.4. Summary of Australia's SSG International Relations

Relevant reasons to conduct IRSSG	Globalization Regionalization Decentralization Asymmetry of federal units
Legal bases of the IRSSG	Inclusive constitutional powers to conduct international relations for SSG. Residual powers (not explicitly granted to federal government) are reserved to SSG. Inclusive SSG consultation or participation in national foreign policy decision making and implementation
Predominant motive of the SSGs to conduct IR	Economic
Institutionalization of the IRSSG	SSG Ministries of Foreign Affairs Permanent diplomatic representations abroad Official visits abroad International exhibitions and forums Global and transborder SSG networks
Consequences of the IRSSG in the development of nation	Rationalization of national foreign policy Democratization of the decision making process in national foreign policy
Type of central-local coordination in foreign affairs	Inclusive

In terms of the legal bases of the IRSSG, on one hand, Australia has inclusive constitutional powers to conduct international relations for SSG, where residual powers (those not explicitly granted to federal government) are reserved to SSG; on the other, it has an inclusive SSG consultation or participation in national foreign policy decision making and implementation. For these reasons, the type of central-local coordination in foreign affairs is inclusive IRSSG.

## Conclusions

The summary of the most relevant variables in the four cases previously analyzed can be observed in Table 3.5. Instead of presenting the cases alphabetically, they are organized depending of their type of central-local coordination in foreign affairs, from most to least inclusive. Several conclusions can be derived from the analysis of the case studies. First, there is an important variation in the central-local coordination in foreign affairs even within inclusive cases, being the most inclusive case Belgium after the constitutional reform of 1993, followed by Germany, Canada and Australia. Also one of the cases changed its type: Belgium passed from consultative to inclusive in 1993 with its constitutional reform.

Table 3.5. Summary of the IRSSG in complementary countries

Variable / Country	Belgium	Germany	Canada	Australia
<b>Relevant reasons to conduct IRSSG</b>				
Globalization	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regionalization	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Democratization	No	No	No	No
Foreign policy domestication and internationalization of domestic politics	Yes	Yes	No	No
Decentralization	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Problems with the national building process	No	No	Yes (Quebec)	No
Central governments inefficiency in conduction of foreign policy	No	No	Yes (Quebec)	No
Asymmetry of federal units	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Promotion by SSG leaders or political parties	Yes	No	Yes (Quebec)	No
Managing border issues	Yes	Yes	Yes	No

Table 3.5. Summary of the IRSSG in complementary countries, continued

<b>Legal bases of the IRSSG</b>				
Inclusive constitutional powers to conduct international relations for SSG.	Yes (post-1993)	Yes	Yes	Yes
Exclusive constitutional powers to conduct international relations for SSG.	Yes (pre-1993)	No	No	No
Inclusive SSG consultation or participation in national foreign policy decision making and implementation	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Exclusive SSG consultation or participation in national foreign policy decision making and implementation	No	No	No	No
<b>Predominant motive of the SSGs to conduct IR</b>				
Political	Yes	No	Yes (Quebec)	No
Economic	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cultural	Yes	Yes	Yes (Quebec)	Yes
Cross-border issues	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
<b>Institutionalization of the IRSSG</b>				
SSG Ministries of Foreign Affairs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Permanent diplomatic representations abroad	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Official visits abroad	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
International exhibitions and forums	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Global and transborder SSG networks	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Participation in official central government delegations abroad	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
<b>Consequences of the IRSSG in the development of nation</b>				
Rationalization of national foreign policy	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Democratization of the decision making process in national foreign policy	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Disintegration of the state	Possible	No	No	No
<b>Type of central-local coordination in foreign affairs</b>				
Consultative	Yes (pre-1993)	No	No	No
Inclusive	Yes (post-1993)	Yes	Yes	Yes

Second, all inclusive countries have the same relevant causes to conduct IRSSG: globalization, regionalization, and decentralization. With the exception of Australia (which has no land borders), all of them conduct IRSSG to manage border issues. Two of them (Belgium and Germany) observe foreign policy domestication and internationalization of domestic politics, due to their participation in the integration process of the European Union. Since all the cases are consolidated democracies, democratization was not a relevant cause for IRSSG. Finally, the causes related with problems with the national building process, perceived central government inefficiency in the representation of their interests in foreign policy, and the promotion of external activism by SSG leaders and parties was only present in two cases (Belgium and Canada), mostly due to the cultural and linguistic cleavages in their societies.

Third, the predominant motive to conduct IRSSG in all countries was economic. Also, all the countries that have land borders (Australia was the exception), also use the IRSSG to manage border issues. In three cases (Belgium, Canada, and Germany), where there is cultural variation between SSG, the cultural variable was also relevant. Finally, only in the cases of Canada (mostly Quebec) and Belgium was there a political motivation for the IRSSG.

Fourth, all SSG have created SSG ministries or agencies to coordinate their international affairs, with variation in their size and importance. All the inclusive cases not only conduct the most simple actions of internationalization (official visits abroad, international exhibitions and forums, global and transborder SSG networks), but also have opened permanent diplomatic representations



abroad. Three of them (Belgium, Canada and Australia), participate in official central government delegations abroad, generating a positive effect in the development of the nation through the democratization in the decision making process in national foreign policy. In terms of other consequences of the IRSSG, in all inclusive cases, there is a rationalization of national foreign policy, by allowing SSG to conduct international affairs in those areas where they have powers. The only case in which a negative effect could take place is Belgium, where the equal participation of SSG with the federal government in foreign policy could lead to the disintegration of the State.

Fifth, all countries make a difference between foreign policy, which is an exclusive power and responsibility of the federal government and includes the high politics issues, and international relations or affairs, which include the areas in which SSG have powers, mostly low politics issues. These inclusive federal countries allow SSG to participate in the foreign policy decision making process, coordinated by the federal MFA; only in Belgium does this participation take place in equal terms between the federal and local levels of government in those areas where the latter have constitutional powers.

Finally, sixth, in terms of the type of central-local coordination in foreign affairs, the four inclusive cases (Australia, Germany, Canada and Belgium after 1993) are developed and consolidated parliamentary countries.

## CHAPTER 4: THE IRSSG IN COMPLEMENTARY FEDERAL COUNTRIES

### Introduction

This chapter is dedicated to the comparative analysis of the IRSSG in four complementary federal countries: Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, and the United States. The chapter, other than this introduction and the conclusions, is divided in four sections, each analyzing one of the cases.

The four cases will be studied following the same logic of the previous chapter. Replicating the structure of Chapter 3, a table will present a summary of the most important findings at the end of each section, to provide empirical evidence to support the hypotheses presented in Chapter 2. The conclusions summarize the most relevant findings about the IRSSG in complementary federal systems.

#### 4.1. Argentina

Argentina has a presidential system of government. The three powers of the federal Union are the Legislative, Executive and Judicial powers, according to the Constitution of the country. Article 87 of the Constitution establishes that the Executive Power is vested in the President of the Argentine Nation (article 44).

Regarding the Legislative branch of government, Argentina has a bicameral type of legislature: the Chamber of Deputies (Cámara de Diputados)

and the Senate (Senado). It is incongruent because the Chamber of Deputies is constituted by representatives from the diverse electoral districts of the 23 provinces and the autonomous city of Buenos Aires (National Constitution of Argentina 1994; article 45), while the Senate is integrated by representatives from the provinces and from the city of Buenos Aires (article 54). The members of both chambers can be re-elected indefinitely. The legislature is also symmetrical, because both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate have relatively the same constitutional and legislative powers.

Argentina is a federal state. Chapter I of the Constitution states that the Argentina is a federal, republican, and representative country (section 1). Historically, there has been an overrepresentation of smaller regions; the Argentine system tends to strongly over-represent the smaller provinces, through a floor of five deputies, and until the 1994 Constitutional reform, all the provinces were represented by two senators (Tommasi 2002, 4). There are 23 provinces and the autonomous city of Buenos Aires. These constituent units are used for the election of the deputies and the senators, although for the lower chamber the electoral districts are defined by a maximum and minimum number of citizens in them.

Argentina's national state building began in the early 19th century, after it became independent from Spain. The first four decades after independence were characterized by violent struggles with regards to the constitution of a national government. This process led to the Constitution of 1853, which established a federal republic. The Constitution suffered some important modifications in 1860,

with the Province of Buenos Aires finally endorsing the Constitution. The provinces were recognized precedence over the Nation, and were granted autonomy in the administration of their territories (Waisman 1987, Tommasi 2002, 3). With the return to democracy in 1983, federalism progressed from 'dual' or 'competitive' federalism to a more cooperative, consensus-based federal arrangement (Iglesias, Merke, and Iglesias 2009, 10).

The economic structure of Argentina has impacted the social dynamics and the configuration of the various provinces (Waisman 1987). The economic liberalization and reform process after democratization raised the inequalities between regions (Waisman 1998). National exports are highly concentrated in three provinces. In 2001 and 2002 the exports of Buenos Aires, Santa Fe and Cordoba represented between 66% and 68% of the total exports of the country. (Tussie 2004, 74). The majority of Argentina's population and economic activity is concentrated in less than one-fifth of its territory, an area including the federal district of Buenos Aires and the provinces of Buenos Aires, Córdoba, and Santa Fe (Iglesias, Merke, and Iglesias 2009, 12). Thus, the economic activities between provinces have remarkable differences.

Foreign policy is one of the main powers of the President of Argentina. According to article 99, the president has the power to appoint and remove Argentina's ambassadors in foreign representations. The president can also negotiate, conclude and sign international treaties with foreign countries and international organizations; he also receives the diplomatic credentials of foreign representatives (s. 11). These powers are exclusive, but Congress can ratify or

reject the international treaties concluded by the president, while the Senate has the power to ratify or not the appointment of ambassadors (s. 7).

The *Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto* (Ministry of Foreign and Religious Affairs, MFRA) is the federal ministry responsible for foreign policy making and implementation. It is in charge of defining foreign policy objectives, plans, programs, and projects. According to the Decree n° 2028 of December 7, 2011, this ministry is in charge of assisting the President with all issues related to the foreign relations of the nation and their representations abroad. This decree enumerates its various responsibilities, competencies and duties, such as participating in the completion of treaties, covenants, agreements and arrangements with foreign countries (s. 5), being involved in the relations with the foreign representatives to Argentina (s. 4), and working in favor of the protection of Argentineans living abroad (s. 7). Argentina has a “Ministries’ Act” (Ley de Ministerios) which establishes the competencies of all the ministries of the federal government (Ley 22520 de Ministerios; 12 March 1992).

The MFRA is the traditional gatekeeper of Argentinean foreign policy, with a professional body of bureaucrats, and it has not only implemented the president’s vision on foreign policy but has also helped to shape his perceptions and orientation in world affairs (Iglesias, Merke, and Iglesias 2009, 14). With respect to its bureaucratic organization, the MFRA has four departments or *Secretarías*: International Economic Relations, International Coordination and Cooperation, Foreign Affairs, and Religious Affairs.

Although the MFRA is the main actor within the Executive branch responsible for implementing Argentina's foreign policy, other ministries and federal agencies also deal with foreign affairs. The Ministry for Economics (*Ministerio de Economía*), for instance, is responsible of executing the foreign investment policy according to article 19, s. 17 (Ley 22520 de Ministerios of March 12, 1992). Section 25 of that same law establishes that this Ministry is also in charge of international economic and trade negotiations. Section 26 provides this Ministry with the responsibility of being part of international negotiations regarding currency and financial issues, and to participate in the permanent relations with international financial institutions.

The Congress also has some constitutional powers related with foreign affairs. In terms of trade, Congress has the power to establish the tariffs (article 9). Congress is also empowered to lay import and exports duties (article 75, 1). As it was previously mentioned, Congress also has the power to approve or reject treaties concluded with other nations and international organizations (article 75, XXII).

As stated before, the federal government is the main actor —or group of actors— responsible for defining and implementing Argentina's foreign policy. However, sub-State governments also play an important role in foreign affairs activities, which are regulated by the Constitution and other legal frameworks. According to Article 121 of the Constitution, in a residuary way, the Provinces have all the powers that are not explicitly granted by the Constitution to the Federal government. Also, Article 124 establishes that the Provinces can

conclude international agreements as long as they are compatible with the Nation's foreign policy and do not affect the activities and responsibilities of the Federal government. The constitutional reform of Article 124 in 1994 gave the provinces the opportunity to conclude international agreements that do not affect the national interests (E. Iglesias *et al.* 2008, 7). This constitutional reform recognized SSG powers to conclude international agreements, but also put some limits to safeguard the federal faculties (Carbajales and Gasol 2008, 77).

Article 126 of the Constitution establishes the activities and powers not delegated or prohibited to Provinces. For example, they cannot issue laws or acts regarding foreign commerce or create customs. Furthermore, governors cannot welcome or appoint foreign agents and representatives. With these exclusions, the provinces conduct their international relations based on articles 124 and 125 of the Constitution (Zubelú 2008, 42). Article 124 states that the provinces are empowered to set up regions for the economic and social development, and they are also "empowered, with the knowledge of Congress, to enter into international agreements provided they are consistent with the national foreign policy and do not affect the powers delegated to the Federal Government or the public credit of the Nation".

It is important to note that every international treaty approved by Congress subsequently becomes part of federal law. Contrary to the Canadian model, which gives each province the power to decide whether to apply an international treaty affecting its areas of jurisdiction, Argentine provinces must both respect and implement international treaties (Iglesias *et al.* 2008, 15).

The MFRA is in charge of coordinating the international activities of the SSG; Decree 878/2008 “National Public Administration” changed some of the mandates, organization chart and duties of the several offices that are part of the MFRA (Decree 357 of February 21, 2002) to perform these duties. This decree states the creation of the Sub-secretariat of Institutional Relations (*Subsecretaría de Relaciones Institucionales*), which is part of the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs. Also, in accordance with the Annex (s. XIII), the Sub-secretariat of Institutional Relations has the following objectives: to be involved in the institutional coordination between the MFRA and other federal ministries and the organizations and authorities of the diverse branches of the State in the National, Provincial and Municipal levels, as well as with regional entities and intermediate institutions.

Now then, some provincial governments have included explicitly in their constitutions their powers in terms of international activities (Río Negro, Tierra del Fuego, Córdoba, San Luis, Formosa, Salta, Chubut, Jujuy, La Rioja, Catamarca, La Pampa, San Juan, Chaco, Santiago del Estero, and Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires). The other subnational governments do not have the international powers included in their constitutions, but these rules have been established through practice (Carbajales and Gasol 2008, 65).

For example, in Ciudad de Buenos Aires, the Chief of Government (Jefe de Gobierno) is the actor responsible for international relations’ activities. The Secretariat-General of the Government of Buenos Aires assists the Chief of Government in all matters regarding his competencies. This office assists the



local executive in the management of the international relations of the local government (Decree 660/11). In the Provincia de Córdoba, the Governor is responsible for the international relations of the Province. The Constitution of Córdoba also allows the SSG to conduct international activities and international agreements without affecting federal faculties. Article 144 of this Constitution gives the local executive the faculty to conclude international agreements with the federal government and other sub-State actors, but the local legislature has to approve them, and the local government has to communicate these actions to the National Congress (Carbajales and Gasol 2008, 67).

In other provinces, the Constitution of Río Negro expressly establishes that the highest local authority, the Governor, has the power to conclude international agreements with the Nation and the other provinces; it also establishes that the local government also has the faculty to conclude international agreements for its own interest but without affecting the national faculties; it also clarifies that the local legislature has the power to ratify these agreements. The Constitution of Salta also gives the Governor the power to conclude treaties with the Nation and other provinces, and also gives him the faculty to conclude international agreements that do not have impact in the national foreign policy. The Constitutions of Tierra del Fuego and Chaco also grant these powers to their governors (Carbajales and Gasol 2008, 67).

The SSG have modified their structures and duties in order to meet their responsibilities on matters related to international affairs. For instance, the provinces have created areas responsible of the international activities; these

areas are mainly dependent of secretariats, under-secretariats, such as the Ministry of Economy or the Ministry of Trade (Tussie 2004, 74). Some of them have created offices responsible of promoting international cooperation and to provide support to the local exporters.

For example, the Government of the Provincia de Córdoba has a Secretariat of Regional Integration and International Relations (*Secretaría de Integración Regional y Relaciones Internacionales*). This Secretariat assists the Executive Branch in all related to the Integration and Regional Development processes undertaken by the Government of the Province. This office is responsible of representing the Province before the regional and international organizations and forums (MERCOSUR; UNASUR; UN, etc.). It also coordinates the initiatives, covenants and common agreements between national and international organizations. Finally, it manages the resources aimed at supporting regional and international programs. Another example is the Mendoza province. In 1996, it created the ProMendoza Foundation. The main objective was to promote the provincial exports by increasing the participation of the national companies in the international market. The Foundation gives information services and technical assistance (Tussie 2004, 75).

According to Zubelú, there are four types of institutional organizations in other provinces. First, those that have established an area responsible of foreign affairs inside the Ministry of Production (Buenos Aires, Chaco, Santa Fe and La Pampa). Second, those that have a specific area of international relations (Secretariat of External Trade and International Relations (Chaco), Secretariat of

Coordination of International Relations and Trade (Salta 1996-2006), Secretariat of International Relations and Special Programs (Tierra del Fuego until 2004), the Sub-secretariat of International Relations and the Direction of International Relations (Buenos Aires), Sub-secretariat of International Economic Relations, International Cooperation and Integration and the Secretariat of International Relations (Buenos Aires), and the Direction of International Relations (Corrientes); other provinces have a Direction of International Trade as the area responsible of international affairs, but none of these areas have had important powers in the local governments. Third, a few provinces have specific agencies with some degree of autonomy, which are responsible of promoting exports (ProCórdoba Agency, ProMendoza, ProRío Negro, and BAexporta). Finally, fourth, some provinces do not have any specific institutional organism responsible of international issues (San Luis, Santa Cruz, Formosa, Río Negro and Tucumán), even though these sub-State units do have international activities (Zubelú 2008, 89).

Since the return of democracy in 1983, and with the economic reforms and liberalization, the Argentinian provinces started to become active internationally in those areas in which they had domestic powers (Tussie 2004, 69). Before the constitutional reform of 1994 that explicitly allows sub-State governments to conduct international affairs, the provinces began to negotiate international agreements. As a first response, in 1992, legal and administrative measures were adopted in order to maintain the growing internationalization of the provinces under control (Iglesias, 2008, cited by Crieckemans 2010, 22),

clearly establishing that the international activities had to be limited to those issues where they had powers. Finally, the main objective of the 1994 reform was to modify the centralization by explicitly empowering the provinces to conduct international relations in those areas where they had constitutional powers (Carbajales and Gasol 2008, 50-51).

Several reasons might be behind a SSG's decision to deal with foreign affairs issues: economic promotion, trade, and finances have been the strongest and most common ones. The richest provinces have a higher exports flow and they also participate more in the international context. These provinces have established trade offices abroad and have signed agreements with other sub-State actors. Also, they have created institutions to stimulate their export growth. Finally, as it was previously discussed, they have created areas responsible of the international activities; these areas are mainly dependent of secretariats, under-secretariats, such as the Ministry of Economy or the Ministry of Trade (Tussie 2004, 74).

The promotion of international trade is the most relevant activity among provinces, but also there are other important issues. Sometimes the geographic location defines the priorities of the provinces (migration, infrastructure, security, natural recourses). Sixteen of the twenty four provinces (including Buenos Aires) share border with some foreign country. If a sub-State unit shares border with a foreign country and also has a high capacity of production, it is more likely that it diversifies its international contacts and actions, such as Mendoza and Salta (Zubelú 2008, 101–02).

With respect to inter-governmental cooperation, the federal and subnational governments generally work separately when it comes to foreign affairs and international relations activities. The central government has considered foreign policy as a matter of “high politics”. Therefore, the federal authorities have been skeptical of decentralizing aspects of national foreign policy. However, there has been a decentralization process, because the provinces are increasing their need to be more active regarding international affairs (Iglesias 2008, 18). However, there is also a tendency to a federal-unitary government dimension regarding international relations with some countries such as Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile and Bolivia. Thus, in Argentina, the usual way to solve border issues is to look to the national government to deal with its unitary neighbors (Iglesias, Merke, and Iglesias 2009, 13).

Given that the central and the various SSG are interested in international affairs-related issues, it is important to determine whether the former takes into account the views, concerns and proposals of the latter. The Integration Committees (dependent of the Secretariat of Latin-American Policy of the MFRA) are responsible of coordinating the actions related to bordering issues between local and federal governments. Through these committees, the provinces can express their particular interests during the definition of the national position. Nevertheless, these organisms have not been very effective in including the preferences of the SSG (V. Iglesias 2008, 122–26). Therefore, the provinces only have a limited participation during the international trade policy-making processes and implementation. First, many governors do not know the real

impact of the international negotiations of the country in their local economies. Second, they do not have explicit strategies to influence the national decisions regarding commerce (V. Iglesias 2008, 139). Despite this, there have been efforts to participate in the federal trade policies. In 1988, some provinces (Buenos Aires, Chaco, Chubut, Entre Ríos, Formosa, La Pampa, Misiones, Neuquén, Río Negro, Salta, Santa Fe and Santa Cruz) created the “Consejo Federal de Comercio Exterior” (COFECEX). The main objective of Council was to establish a dialogue with the central government, and set their principal interests regarding international trade (V. Iglesias 2008, 140).

Sub-State actors have claimed that they need to be heard and to participate in international and regional organizations in order to further advance their projects and policies related to foreign affairs. Because sometimes the decisions of MERCOSUR have a direct impact on subnational affairs, the SSG demanded a more institutionalized participation. The Consultative Forum of Municipalities, Federal States, Provinces, and Departments was established in December 2004. This forum complemented an older structure, the “Red de Mercociudades”. The forum seeks to stimulate dialogue and cooperation among authorities at the municipal, state, provincial, and departmental level of MERCOSUR’s member states. It is mandated to promote measures to coordinate policies that improve the quality of life of people living in the municipalities, federal states, provinces, and departments of the region (Iglesias, Merke, and Iglesias 2009, 13).

Argentina has made some commitments in various international forums, such as the negotiations of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which have affected the whole country. Despite this fact, formal participation by the provinces in the WTO negotiations is practically non-existent. In the Doha Round, the provincial representatives were not even part of the negotiation team, and no formal agreement or rule enables the provinces to engage directly in negotiations with international organizations, although some provinces have demonstrated a willingness to get involved in some way (Iglesias, Merke, and Iglesias 2009, 23). An alternative way of interacting with international organizations is the conclusion of cooperation agreements, like the ones signed by the provinces of Chubut, Rio Negro, and Santa Cruz with the UN Global Environment Facility Trust Fund on the prevention of the sea pollution and the management of maritime biodiversity (Iglesias, Merke, and Iglesias 2009, 23).

In sum, based on the previous discussion, the most relevant reasons to conduct IRSSG in Argentina are globalization, regionalization (Mercosur), democratization, decentralization (with 1994 Constitutional reform), and the asymmetry between federal units (exporting provinces), and the predominant motives of the SSGs to conduct IR are economic and cross-border issues. The institutionalization of the IRSSG has taken place through the creation of SSG Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the organization of official visits abroad, international exhibitions and forums, and transborder SSG networks (Mercosur), and the consequence of the IRSSG in the development of nation has been the

rationalization of national foreign policy, allowing provinces to be active in areas where they have powers.

Table 4.1. Summary of Argentina's SSG International Relations

Relevant reasons to conduct IRSSG	Globalization Regionalization (Mercosur) Democratization Decentralization (with 1994 Constitutional reform) Asymmetry of federal units (exporting provinces) Managing border issues
Legal bases of the IRSSG	Inclusive constitutional powers to conduct international relations for SSG; residual powers (not explicitly granted to federal government) are reserved to SSG. Exclusive SSG (very limited) consultation or participation in national foreign policy decision making and implementation
Predominant motive of the SSGs to conduct IR	Economic Cross-border issues
Institutionalization of the IRSSG	SSG Ministries of Foreign Affairs Official visits abroad International exhibitions and forums Transborder SSG networks (Mercosur)
Consequences of the IRSSG in the development of nation	Rationalization of national foreign policy, allowing provinces to be active in areas where they have powers
Type of central-local coordination in foreign affairs	Complementary

In terms of the legal bases of the IRSSG, Argentina has inclusive constitutional powers to conduct international relations for SSG, where residual powers (those not explicitly granted to federal government) are reserved to SSG; however, it has an exclusive SSG, since there is very limited consultation or



participation in national foreign policy decision making and implementation, and the minor inter-governmental coordination mechanisms are non-functional. For these reasons, the type of central-local coordination in foreign affairs in Argentina is complementary IRSSG.

#### 4.2. Brazil

Brazil has a presidential system of government. The Executive, Legislative and Judicial branches of government are the three powers of the federal Union. The President is democratically elected and he serves as Chief of State and Government.

The Legislative branch of government is bicameral. According to Article 44 of the Brazilian Constitution, the Legislative branch of government is made up of the Chamber of Deputies and the Federal Senate. Article 45 establishes that the Chamber of Deputies is integrated by the representatives of the people, elected by the Proportional Representation (PR) electoral system at each state, territory and the Federal District (FD). The Federal Senate is integrated by the representatives of the states and the Federal District, elected according to the majority voting system. Each state and the Federal District elect three senators, based on Article 46 of the Constitution. Therefore, it is an incongruent and symmetrical bicameral system: incongruent because the lower House represents the people and the upper House represents the states, and symmetrical

because, with some minor exceptions established in articles 51 and 52 of the Constitution, both Chambers have the same powers over legislation.

As for the political division of Brazil, this country is a federation. The political-administrative organization of Brazil comprises the federal Union, the states, the Federal District and the municipalities, all of which are autonomous (Constitution of Brazil; Article 18). There are 26 states and one Federal District, for a total of 27 federal units. Therefore, since 3 senators are elected by each constituent unit, there are 81 senators. Brazil has been a federal republic since 1889, composed of a federal government, 17 federal units, and 5,563 municipalities (De Queiroz and Braulete 2009, 77).

More than an ethnic division, in Brazil there are social differences marked by economic status. Historically, the Brazilian population originated largely from mix of the indigenous people with the European settlers (mainly Portuguese) and with black African slaves who were brought to the country during the colonial era. After independence (1822), important immigration flows came to Brazil from countries like Italy, Portugal, Germany, Spain, Poland, Lebanon, Syria, and Japan. The descendants from European immigrants are mainly concentrated large cities like Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, and in the south of the country. Portuguese is the official language, and 74% of the population is Roman Catholic, while Protestants account for 15% of the population (De Queiroz and Braulete 2009, 77).

Even if the independence of Brazil dates back to 1822, it was until the 1980s that this country began its current democratic era. The democratization

transition in 1985 and the Constitution of 1988 made it possible to create new mechanisms to decentralize and give more autonomy to the states (Vigevani 2004, 31). Brazil epitomizes everything that according to comparative literature, could undermine the consolidation of democracy: a presidential regime with a weak and fragmented party system; very permissive electoral laws that favor candidates over political parties; a strong federalism, a fragmented congress that attacks presidential initiatives; presidents who can and are willing to bypass congress and rule by decree; a pervasive pattern of clientelism and economic inefficiencies. "Yet, Brazilian democracy survives. And there is evidence that it survives well" (Chieub, Figueredo, and Limongi 2002, 2).

The authoritarian regime in power in Brazil from 1964 to 1985 failed to eliminate the prominence of sub-State actors and interests in national politics. As democratic transition progressed, governors re-emerged as powerful political actors (Samuels and Abrucio 2000, 58). The democratization began in the 1980s, and the new Constitution of 1988 recognized states and municipalities as relevant members of the federation (De Queiroz and Braulete 2009, 76).

In terms of disparities among Brazil regions, the uneven economic development of the states and cities has created differences that are reflected in its social structure. The Human Development Index (HDI) indicates a lower development of the northeast area of Brazil. Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paolo represent over 65% of the national GDP (Marcelo de Almeida Medeiros 2010, 166-168). From 1985 to 2001, the south-eastern states presented higher income levels and most of the north-eastern states had lower

income levels. The economic inequalities were extremely high: the richest state of Sao Paulo had a per capita income level six times higher than the poorest, Maranhao state (Silveira-Neto and Azzoni 2006, 602–03).

In the area of foreign policy, the Constitution of Brazil establishes the main actors, their main responsibilities and powers. The Constitution establishes that The Union has the power to maintain relations with foreign states and participate in international organizations (Art. 21). The Executive power is the key actor in foreign policy. Article 84 of the Constitution establishes the exclusive powers of the President of the Republic to maintain relations with foreign States, designate diplomatic representatives, and conclude international treaties with the approval of the Congress.

The exclusive power of formal international relations belongs to the central government. Neither the local constitutions nor the organic laws of the municipalities establish or mention anything about the faculties of the SSG regarding international relations. Nevertheless, there are some *de facto* modalities of international cooperation, such as the establishment of economic and cultural agreements (Vigevani 2005).

Within the Executive branch of government, the Ministry of Foreign Relations (*Ministério das Relações Exteriores*), also known as *Itamaraty*, is responsible for foreign policy implementation. According to the Internal Rules of the Ministry (*Portaria N° 212* of April, 30 2008), this Ministry assists the President of the Republic in the formulation of the foreign policy of Brazil, guarantees its execution, holds diplomatic relations with the governments of foreign States and

international organizations, and promotes the interests of the State and the society abroad (Article 1). There is a Secretariat-General for Foreign Affairs and seven under-Secretariats-Generals.

Besides *Itamaraty*, other Ministries and agencies of the Federal government are also involved in foreign policy issues. *The* Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (*Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior*) regulates and executes programs and activities related to foreign trade. It also participates in international negotiations related to this topic. It has oversight powers in the area of foreign trade, but the foreign policy implementation is the responsibility of the Foreign Affairs Ministry.

All powers related to foreign policy are given by the Constitution to the federal government. Article 21 of the Constitution of Brazil establishes the powers of the Union to maintain relations with foreign states and participate in international organizations. Article 22 establishes the exclusive legislative powers of the Union. It includes foreign and interstate trade, as well as emigration, immigration, entry, extradition and deportation of foreigners, but foreign policy is not on the list. However, paragraph 1 of Article 25 states that “All powers that this Constitution does not prohibit the states from exercising shall be conferred upon them”, that is federal units have residual powers, and can exercise them, including international relations. The National Congress has exclusive competence to decide conclusively on international treaties, agreements or acts which generate responsibilities for the country (Article 49-I). Article 52 of the

Constitution gives the states the possibility to make foreign transactions of financial nature with the previous approval of the federation.

Therefore, there is no legal restriction about the international activities of the states as long as they do not interfere with federal foreign policy. A proposal to legislate on these activities has been discussed: Project no. 4745/2005 “PEC da paradiplomacia”, would give the states the constitutional support to promote cooperation agreements with international actors. Despite this legal gap, the SSG have developed many international activities (Milani and Ribeiro 2010, 27). However, these activities are restricted to those areas in which they have competence; this excludes the high politics issues which are strictly reserved for *Itamaraty* and other federal ministries.

Brazil has acknowledged the increasing role that SSG are playing in the international arena, and the central government has created several agencies to support their activities. One of the agencies of the Ministry of State is the Special Office of Federal and Parliamentary Affairs (*Assessoria Especial de Assuntos Federativos e Parlamentares AFEPA*). The main objective of this office is to coordinate and support the integration process of the SSG with foreign countries, not only with members of MERCOSUR. Its objective is to improve the communication between the Ministry and the local governments during the integration process (Milani and Ribeiro 2010, 27). AFEPA assists directly the Minister and its powers include promoting the linkage between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the state and municipal governments, as well as their respective Local Assemblies, with the aim of assisting them with their foreign

affairs initiatives. The AFEPA is aided by Itamaraty's representation bureaus located throughout the country, which have to coordinate the actions of the Ministry with the local authorities (Milani and Ribeiro 2010, 29).

The SSG have created Secretariats or offices within their bureaucracies to deal with foreign affairs and international relations' activities. For example, the City of Sao Paulo has a Municipal Secretariat for International and Federative Relations (*Secretaria Municipal de Relações Internacionais e Federativas*) which is part of the *Prefeitura* of Sao Paulo. The objective of this Secretariat is to coordinate covenants and projects regarding international cooperation that involve the city of Sao Paulo, and with this, to insert it in the world scenario taking into account its economic, social and cultural dimension. Furthermore, the main responsibilities and duties of this office are: to assist and advise the Mayor on international contacts with governments and other institutions; to establish and maintain relations and partnerships with multilateral international organizations, sister cities, international NGOs, diplomatic representatives of other governments, representatives of international entrepreneurs, among others; to provide technical support regarding international contacts, the development and making of international cooperation covenants (Law No. 13.165 of 5 July 2001; Article 2). In Sao Paulo, local authorities promote regional integration and push the companies and municipalities to be connected with foreign actors. They also promote the local investment in infrastructure like airports and railroads. Sao Paulo has relations with international organizations like the World Bank, but also it has developed permanent contacts with foreign cities (Vigevani 2004, 31-33).

The city of Rio de Janeiro has an International Relations Coordination which is part of the Cabinet of the Mayor. Its aim is to advise the Mayor in the making and execution of policies related to international cooperation. This office has the following areas: Multilateral Cooperation, Bilateral Cooperation, Institutional Relations, International Mobilization, and Events Organization. Belo Horizonte has an office under of the Secretariat for Development (*Secretaria Adjunta de Relações Internacionais*). This office is in charge of establishing and maintaining international relations and partnerships, also of planning and coordinating the actions and policies for the negotiation and gathering of funds with multilateral organizations and foreign governmental agencies (Article 19).

The involvement of SSG in international relations is relatively new. However, in the past few years, several legal and technical modifications have been made in order to further advance this issue and increase the role of SSG in the international arena. The IRSSG in Brazil increased in the 1990s because the changes in the international system (the end of the Cold War, globalization, the presence of more international actors, etc.) concurred with the re-democratization of Brazil and with the promulgation of its new Constitution of 1988 (Milani and Ribeiro 2010, 26). The number of topics on which SSG currently work regarding international relations is as big as the mechanisms they have established to increase their contacts with foreign actors in all the regions of the world.

All the states have carried out missions abroad, especially in the MERCOSUR area, to advance their specific interests. For example, Amapá and



Roraima are interested, mainly, with strengthening relations with neighboring countries. Amazonas seeks special relations with Peru and Venezuela. Pará has trade activities with many countries, including Asia and Middle East. The cities engage in international activities through international missions, international fairs, technical projects of cooperation, and sister cities agreements. For example, the city of Macapá signed cooperation projects with Cayenne (France) during 1990. Uberlandia has had constant interaction with the Chamber of Commerce of the United States; and Olinda has cultural programs with UNESCO. Nevertheless, the majority of the municipalities do not have a formal international strategy, and their external activities do not have a clear objective or planning (Milani and Ribeiro 2010, 31-33).

Although both the central and SSG have expressed their interest and willingness to continue to strengthen the role of the latter in international relations' activities, there are still some discrepancies as to how independent they are from the central government's activities or if they are just a tool that can be used by the Foreign Affairs Ministry to implement Brazil's foreign policy. Itamaraty argues that the main objective of the IRSSG should be the integration of the initiatives and proposals of the states and municipalities into the national interests (Vigevani 2004, 31). In this line, the central government seeks to retain the power by regulating the actions of the SSG. But also, states want more economic and political autonomy (Vigevani 2006, 30).

Even when the internationalization of Brazil was very centralized, in the 1990s, the government was cooperative and supportive with the states through

the “Asesoría de Relaciones Federativas” and also through the embassies. For example, in 2004 the Embassy of Brazil in Argentina opened an office dedicated to all sub-State and regional issues (Vigevani 2006, 33). As the years have passed, there has been a decentralization of the IRSSG (Marcelo de Almeida Medeiros 2010, 176). In most of the cases, the central government supports the SSG through the “Asesoría de Relaciones Federativas” and the embassies.

Table 4.2. Summary of Brazil’s SSG International Relations

Relevant reasons to conduct IRSSG	Globalization Regionalization (Mercosur) Democratization Decentralization Asymmetry of federal units (larger states) Managing border issues
Legal bases of the IRSSG	Inclusive constitutional powers to conduct international relations for SSG. Residual powers (not explicitly granted to federal government) are reserved to SSG. Exclusive SSG consultation or participation in national foreign policy decision making and implementation
Predominant motive of the SSGs to conduct IR	Economic Cross-border issues
Institutionalization of the IRSSG	SSG Ministries of Foreign Affairs Official visits abroad International exhibitions and forums Global and transborder SSG networks
Consequences of the IRSSG in the development of nation	Rationalization of national foreign policy
Type of central-local coordination in foreign affairs	Complementary

In sum, in the case of Brazil, the most relevant reasons to conduct IRSSG are globalization, regionalization, democratization, decentralization, the asymmetry of federal units, and managing border issues, while the predominant motives of the SSGs to conduct IR are economic and cross-border issues with their neighbors. The institutionalization of the IRSSG has taken place through the creation of SSG Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the organization of official visits abroad and international exhibitions and forums, and the participation in global and transborder SSG networks.

As a consequence of the IRSSG, there has been a small rationalization of national foreign policy. In terms of the legal bases of the IRSSG, Brazil is a case where the constitutional rules, through the residual clause, open the door for an inclusive participation of the SSG in international affairs. However, even if there are inter-governmental mechanism to coordinate the activities of the SSG with the federal government, these are completely dominated by the Foreign Affairs Ministry, and thus do not serve the purpose of including the federal units in the definition of implementation of Brazil's foreign policy, but only as a support mechanism of the internationalization of the sub-State governments in those areas in which they have powers. Therefore, foreign policy decision making and implementation in Brazil excludes the SSG, and the IRSSG could be characterized as complementary.

#### 4.3. South Africa

South Africa is a parliamentary federal country. Article 83 of the Constitution (1996) states that the President is the Head of national executive. According to article 86 (1), South Africa has a parliamentary system of government: the National Assembly elects one of its members to be the President, and when that person is elected President, he ceases to be a member of the National Assembly. If a vote of no confidence is posed against the President, the whole government is dismissed. The President appoints the Deputy Minister, the Head of Cabinet, and the Ministers. The majority of the ministers must be elected among the members of the National Assembly. The National Assembly may pass a motion of no confidence to the Cabinet excluding the President (article 102-1).

Regarding the legislative branch of government, according to the Constitution, Parliament consists of two chambers. First, the National Assembly is elected to represent the people, and it chooses the President. Second, the National Council of Provinces represents the provinces to ensure that their interests are taken into account in the national sphere of government (art. 42). The National Assembly consists of no fewer than 350 and no more than 400 members, who are elected through the method of proportional representation (Art.46). According to Article 49, the National Assembly is elected for a term of five years. The President has the authority to dissolve the National Assembly under Article 50. With respect to the National Council of Provinces, it is

composed of a single delegation from each province consisting of ten delegates (Art.60). The Constitution establishes who is eligible for the position of permanent delegates and who the special delegates are.

Therefore, South Africa has an incongruent legislature because the lower House represents the people and the upper House represents the Provinces. Also, the bicameral legislature is symmetrical because both Chambers have the same powers to consider, pass, amend or reject any legislation, as well as to initiate or prepare legislation, except for money bills which are an exclusive faculty of the National Assembly, according to Articles 55 and 68 of the Constitution.

As stated before, South Africa is a federation. Article 40 of the Constitution establishes that the government is constituted as national, provincial and local spheres of government which are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated. Geldenhuys argues that even if the Constitution does not once mention the word “federation”, the distribution of powers between South Africa’s central and provincial governments displays “unmistakable federal features” (Geldenhuys 1998, 1). South Africa has been described as a weak federal system and sometimes as a quasi-federation. The bitter legacy of separate development accounts for strongly centralizing tendencies in South Africa’s federal structure, and the dominance of the national sphere of government established in the Constitution is coupled with the dominance of the national party of liberation, the African National Congress (ANC), which controls more than 70% of the vote in

the National Assembly and controls practically all provinces (Murray y Nakhjavani 2009, 213).

According to Article 103 of the Constitution, there are nine provinces. Although provinces were not created based on the settlements of the different ethnic and racial groups, such factor did play a role in the final decision. In social terms, racial segregation and the profound divisions between black and white people were not only a social concern, but also a political one. This reality became the main issue that was addressed in 1994. When the interim constitution was negotiated in 1993, one of the primary concerns was to unite the country across color lines. The nine provinces “were not intended to have distinct ethnic identities, nor were they to have significant autonomy” (Murray and Nakhjavani 2009, 213).

The Northern Cape province has the largest proportion of Afrikaans speakers, being the first language of 66% of the population, and it is, with Western Cape, one of only two provinces where blacks are not a majority (Geldenhuys 1998, 8). There are important differences in the racial composition of South Africa’s provinces. In seven of them, black South Africans are over the 75% of national population, but in the two other provinces, the “colored”, i.e. mixed-race, constitutes the majority. These racial divisions (black, colored, Indian and white) remain in politic arena, while differences in language use and ethnicity are not that important. English is one of eleven official languages, and it is the first language of only 8.2% of the population; however it is considered the facto national auxiliary language (Murray and Nakhjavani 2009, 212).

South Africa has undergone a difficult and violent process of democratization and democratic consolidation. The founding constitution, known as the South Africa Act of 1909, integrated four former British colonies together in legislative union under a national government, and each territory became a province of the new state. Then, the Constitution Act created a tricameral Parliament of Whites, Coloureds and Indians (Geldenhuys 1998, 4) with racial segregation, which generated high levels of violence during the 1980s and early 1990s. The democratization began in 1994 and now it has a stable constitutional framework, an independent judiciary and it has developed a human rights approach (De Visser 2009, 268).

In the international arena, South Africa was isolated economically and diplomatically during the most part of its apartheid years. Even though the United Nations condemned South Africa's racial policies since the 1940s and close to fifty countries cut arms links in 1963, the major powers "would not condone South Africa's expulsion from the UN" (Murray and Nakhjavani 2009, 214). South Africa's transition to democracy in 1994 changed both domestic and international politics. Most significantly, domestically, all adult South Africans could vote, and a commitment to constitutionalism and integration was central in the Constitution of 1996. The constitution also created a federal system, by dividing the country into provinces and municipalities with protected powers. At the international level, South Africa engaged constructively with the regional and international organizations like the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Organization of African Unity (now the African Union), the Commonwealth of

Nations, and the United Nations (UN) (Murray y Nakhjavani 2009, 213). In sum, this transition to a liberal democracy has contributed to South Africa's rapid integration into the international community (Murray and Nakhjavani 2009, 215).

In terms of South Africa's foreign policy, article 231 of the Constitution establishes that the negotiating and signing of all international agreements is the responsibility of national executive. Also the article 231(2) states that an international agreement binds the country only after it has been approved by resolution in both the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces. Also, article 84 of the Constitution establishes that the President is responsible for receiving and recognizing foreign diplomatic and consular representatives; appointing ambassadors, diplomatic and consular representatives.

The federal government has the Department of International Relations and Cooperation, who is in charge of implementing South Africa's foreign policy. Its objectives are: to protect and promote South African national interests and values; conduct and co-ordinate South Africa's international relations and promote its foreign policy objectives; monitor international developments and advise government on foreign policy related domestic matters; protect South Africa's sovereignty and international integrity; contribute to the formulation of international law; and, promote multilateralism to secure a rules based international system" (<http://www.dfa.gov.za>).

In terms of the distribution of powers between levels of government, Schedule 4 of the Constitution establishes the functional areas of concurrent and provincial legislative competence, which include tourism and trade. Schedule 5



establishes the exclusive provincial legislative competence, which gives extensive legislative powers to the provinces in policy areas like agriculture, transport, regional planning and development, environmental protection and local government. However, neither schedule contains any overtly foreign policy tasks; thus, all key matters of foreign relations are by implication reserved for the central government (Geldenhuys 1998, 5). The Constitution does not recognize the provinces as subjects of international law. That disqualifies them from entering into international treaties, but there is no prohibition for the provinces to establish other kind of agreements with external counterparts. The provinces enter into memorandums of understanding with foreign parties (Geldenhuys 1998, 6). The national government has not enforced its exclusive mandate over international affairs, and consequently, provinces and municipalities have made their autonomy in this area de facto (Zondi 2012, 52).

Van Wyk (1997) argues that the only constitutionally prescribed foreign affairs role of SSG relates to the ratification of treaties through the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) (art. 231(2)). On the other hand, Murray and Salim argue that in the same article the Constitution establishes that an international agreement can be vetoed by the vote of five of the nine provincial delegations (Murray and Nakhjavani 2009, 218).

There is discussion on which international agreements could be considered as being part of the reserved areas of provincial and local governments. “The *Manual on Executive Acts of the President of the Republic of South Africa* states that provinces may not enter into agreements governed by

international law except as agents of the National Executive. But, it adds, they may “conclude contracts with foreign companies or constituent unit entities” (Murray and Nakhjavani 2009, 219). This means that those agreements concluded by the provinces in their exclusive areas of power only bind them, and thus are not treaties under international law.

During the second half of the 1990s, the Department of Foreign Affairs created a Directorate Provincial Liaison to coordinate and cooperate with SSG in matters of mutual concern. The objective of this Directorate was to act as a bond between provincial governments and the various branches of the Department of Foreign Affairs to coordinate their international activities (Van Wyk 1997, 31). Later, the Department of International Relations and Cooperation transformed it into the Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) to coordinate the policy framework on SSG international relations. The objective was that this framework helped all spheres of government to have efficient programs of international relations and support the development of priority areas. The role of DPLG was defined in 1997, and its objective was to coordinate and facilitate the municipal international relations, and establish learning networks between subunits (Murray and Nakhjavani 2009, 221).

Also the national government has tried to ensure coordination of the IRSSG through the creation of International Relations Coordinating Groups for each sphere of public policy. These groups bring together the key national departments with SSG practitioners and the South African Local Government

Association, an organization established under the Constitution to represent municipalities (Murray and Nakhjavani 2009, 222).

Practically all the provincial governments have, at least, a small, dedicated directorate for intergovernmental and international relations within the Office of the Premier. These provincial directorates for international relations serve as liaisons between the national and provincial governments to coordinate the international activities of all provincial departments (Murray and Nakhjavani 2009, 221-224). Also the larger cities conduct international relations. Major cities like Pretoria, Durban, and Johannesburg, have international relations personnel in small units that function as a protocol officer and an international media adviser to the mayor, advising on the implementation of international relations projects (Murray y Nakhjavani 2009, 224). Durban has a Governance and International Relations office that is an administrative cluster within the administration of the city government. Johannesburg has an External Relations Unit that is committed to seek out, establish and maintain relationships on an international level, to place the city on the global agenda and present it as "an entry point into the rest of Africa" ([http://www.joburg.org.za/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=973&Itemid=78&limitstart=1#ixzz2nr7nUhVM](http://www.joburg.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=973&Itemid=78&limitstart=1#ixzz2nr7nUhVM)).

In October of 1994, Mpumalanga was the first South African province to engage in international affairs. The province signed a comprehensive development agreement with the German Land of North Rhine Westphalia, and in January 1995, it was the first province to conclude a sisterhood agreement with Taiwan. After that, this province also established provincial relations with

Gaza and Maputo, Mozambican provinces. Western Cape signed the first sisterhood agreement with a US State, Florida, in 1995. During the same year, this province also signed an agreement with the German Land of Bavaria, an agreement on partnership with the province of Upper Austria, and in 1996 it signed a general cooperation agreement with Tunis. (Van Wyk 1997, 34-37).

Since then, all the provinces are conducting more systematic international relations. The strategic visions of most provinces have projected them as active players in international affairs (Zondi 2012, 49). SSG conclude sisterhood agreements to share information and expertise, to attract foreign direct investments, to promote business activities and to generate capacity building; they usually cover sectorial areas such as trade, investment, agriculture, education, training, town planning, and institution building (Zondi 2012, 46). Provinces also go international to attract development support, donor funding and technical assistance, and this type of cooperation is more common in SSG with lower levels of development. However, there have been some changes: both Eastern Cape and KwaZulu have been changing their international relation policies to encourage partnerships rather than relationships based on dependency. For example, in 2010 the wine industry in Western Cape, the service industry in Gauteng and the tourism in KwaZulu-Natal showcased their potential in Germany and at the Shanghai Expo in China (Zondi 2012, 48).

Trans-border issues have been one of the most important international topics for SSG international cooperation. Nevertheless, their agendas have been broadened over time. KwaZulu-Natal has an agreement with the regions in

Lesotho, whose primary function is trans-border cooperation in fighting crime along the common frontier, especially stock theft, drug and weapons trafficking smuggling and car hijackings. These agreements have expanded their scope to include co-operation in such areas as health (AIDS and malaria), agriculture, nature conservation, and skills development in indigenous populations (Geldenhuys 1998, 35). SSG bordering neighboring counties use internationalization as a strategy towards regional integration. South Africa's interest on regional integration has made the provinces of Mpumalanda, North West, Limpopo and Free State, to pursue economically beneficial relations with their respective counterparts in Swaziland, Botswana, Mozambique and Lesotho (Zondi 2012, 50). Sub-State governments have also become important actors in the multilateral system. Many, if not all of provinces are involved in the activities of the AWEPA (Africa West European Parliamentary Association) and the CPA (Commonwealth Parliamentary Union) (Van Wyk 1997, 50).

The promulgation of the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act (Act 13 of 2005) has provided the legal basis for intergovernmental coordination in international relations. As a result of this Act, all provinces established inter-governmental forums with national departments and municipalities in most sectors of government (Zondi 2012, 53). In the recent years, SSG have tried to participate in South Africa's foreign policy design and implementation. The National Council of Provinces represents the nine provinces to ensure that provincial interests are taken into account in the national sphere of government (Geldenhuys 1998, 6). It does this mainly by participating in the national

legislative process and by providing a national forum for public consideration of issues affecting the provinces. However, Murray and Nakhjavani argue that the federal government does not consult the provinces on international issues on a regular basis, and it only takes into account their opinion in some issues and rarely. With the notable exception of environmental matters, “the national government seldom consults with provinces on international matters relating to their competences” (Murray and Nakhjavani 2009, 212). They further argue that if provinces are to implement the laws that result from international agreements, they should be involved on the negotiations. Despite this, current practice indicates that “provinces have –and expect– little involvement in international negotiations” (Murray and Nakhjavani 2009, 219). The sole exception seems to be environmental issues. This happens because some provinces, like KwaZulu-Natal, have more experience and capacity in this area. Therefore, provinces are essential to make possible the effective implementation of the international environmental arrangements of the country (Murray and Nakhjavani 2009, 222).

In summary, in the case of South Africa, the most relevant reasons to conduct IRSSG are globalization, regionalization, democratization, decentralization, and managing border issues. The most important motives of the SSGs to conduct IR are economic and cross-border issues. The institutionalization of the IRSSG has taken place through the creation of SSG Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the establishment of permanent diplomatic representations abroad, the organization of official visits abroad and international exhibitions and forums, and the participation in global and transborder SSG

networks. Its consequence has been a small rationalization of national foreign policy, allowing provinces to be active in areas where they have powers.

Table 4.3. Summary of South Africa's SSG International Relations

Relevant reasons to conduct IRSSG	Globalization Regionalization Democratization Decentralization Managing border issues
Legal bases of the IRSSG	Inclusive constitutional powers to conduct international relations for SSG. Exclusive SSG consultation or participation in national foreign policy decision making and implementation
Predominant motive of the SSGs to conduct IR	Economic Cross-border issues
Institutionalization of the IRSSG	SSG Ministries of Foreign Affairs Permanent diplomatic representations abroad Official visits abroad International exhibitions and forums Global and transborder SSG networks
Consequences of the IRSSG in the development of nation	Rationalization of national foreign policy (small)
Type of central-local coordination in foreign affairs	Complementary

In terms of the legal bases of the IRSSG, South Africa is inclusive in terms of the institutional framework. However, even if as a result of several areas of concurrent powers between the federation and the SSG would require consultation between both levels of government, and there are intergovernmental mechanisms to conduct these consultations, they are mostly formal and

controlled by the central government, with the exception of environmental issues. Therefore, even if it is formally inclusive in terms of the participation of SSG in South Africa's foreign policy, the reality is that, in practice, it is exclusive. Thus, South Africa can be considered a complementary case of IRSSG.

#### 4.4. United States of America

The United States of America has a presidential system of government. According to the Constitution, the powers of the Union are a Congress comprised by the Senate and the House of Representatives (Article 1 section 1); a President of the United States (Article 2 section 1); and a Supreme Court (Article 3 section 1). Congress is a bicameral legislature.

According to Lijphart's definition, the legislature is incongruent and symmetrical. It is incongruent because the Upper House (the Senate) works as a federal representation chamber of the states, while the Lower House represents the population. Each state votes for two senators (Article 1 section 3.1). The U.S. legislature is symmetrical because section 8 of Article 2 establishes the powers of the Congress as a whole; it does not split the powers of each chamber separately, and they have very similar powers. However, section 7 of the same Article establishes that all bills that have to do with revenues must be originated in the House of Representatives, while only the Senate has power to ratify treaties, federal judges and Cabinet appointments.



Article 1 section 10 of the U.S. Constitution establishes the prohibitions of the states regarding entering treaties and alliances, coining money, laying trade imposts and taxes, or keeping troops in time of peace. Also, amendment 10 establishes that all powers not delegated to the federal government by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states are reserved to the states in a residuary way.

The United States was the first country to adopt a federal system of government. Today, the federation is constituted by 50 states, and the federal system is complicated even further by the presence of 562 federally recognized tribal governments, each exercising some degree of sovereignty and autonomy and many being recognized as “domestic dependent nations” (Fry 2009, 297-298). In terms of social cleavages or divisions within the United States, Kincaid argues that the United States has not had a strong and territorially concentrated group with the desire of national autonomy or with any particular international interest. The exception may be the American Indian tribes, but they are in a “subjugated condition” and exist in small size, also they have the status of “domestic dependent nations” (Kincaid 1999).

The United States is considered one of the oldest modern democracies in the world. The Articles of Confederation of 1781 were the original constitutional document. In it, the states granted most authority to themselves, leaving the national government extremely weak, consisting of a unicameral legislature without functioning executive or judicial branches. Then, the decentralizing tendencies began to fragment the new nation (Fry 2009, 299). The current

constitution of 1789 tried to preserve the fragile union by changing the confederation into a federal system which divided authority between the national and state governments. The national government was divided into three branches with separation of powers, and checks and balances were put in place to ensure that no branch could become predominant. Finally the national economic system tried to avoid the protectionism of state and local governments. The federal system prevailed, but it experienced some historical events such as the civil war that altered to some extent the balance of power, centralizing it in the federal government. Currently, “most governors and state legislative leaders would agree with the premise that Washington has usurped too much authority” (Fry 2009, 300).

As the most powerful country in the world in the second half of the XX century, the United States is involved in almost all relevant international issues, which is why its foreign policy is broad in the number of topics on its agenda and relevance both domestically and internationally. Foreign affairs are national affairs, and the United States is a single nation-state that has relations with other nations. Thus the federal government conducts these relations and makes foreign policy (Henkin 1975, 15).

It is well known that the foreign relations of the United States are an Executive responsibility. Henkin points out that the Supreme Court of the United States has “described ‘the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations’” (Henkin 1975, 37). In terms of central-local relations in the field of

international affairs, Fry (2009, 302) argues that the commerce and supremacy clauses in the US Constitution appear to grant all important foreign policy and foreign relations functions to the national government. Article 1, Section 8, stipulates that Congress can regulate commerce with foreign nations; declare war; make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers. Section 10 adds that no state can enter into “any Treaty, Alliance or Confederation... without the consent of Congress”. Also, it stipulates that no state should, “enter into any agreement or compact with another state, or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded”.

The Constitution establishes that the President determines the foreign policy. The Secretary of State is the President’s chief foreign affairs adviser. Congress approved legislation on July 21, 1789 to create the Department of Foreign Affairs, and on July 27, President Washington signed it into law. This law made the Department of Foreign Affairs the first Federal agency that was created under the Constitution. In September, the name was changed to Department of State. The Department of State is the lead foreign affairs agency within the federal executive and the lead institution for the conduct of American diplomacy. The Secretary carries out the President’s foreign policies through the State Department. Under the Secretary of State, there are six under-secretaries: Political Affairs, Economic Growth, Energy and Environment, Arms Control and International Security Affairs, Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Management,

and Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights (Fiscal Year 2012 Agency Financial Report. <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/200506.pdf>).

Although the Department of State is the main federal government agency responsible for foreign affairs, practically all other federal Departments and agencies also have international relations. For example, the US Department of Commerce and the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) are offices of the Executive branch that carry out foreign activities. The USTR is responsible for developing and coordinating U.S. international trade, commodity, and direct investment policy, and overseeing negotiations with other countries. The U.S. Trade Representative is a Cabinet member who serves as the president's principal trade advisor, negotiator, and spokesperson on trade issues (Office of the United States Trade Representative <http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/mission>).

The Congress of the United States also has several foreign affairs powers, especially through resolutions and acts that are related to this topic. Article 1 section 8 of the U.S. Constitution establishes the powers of the Senate, some of which are related to foreign policy, such as regulating commerce with foreign Nations. Particularly, the Senate has important exclusive powers in foreign policy: to ratify the treaties by two thirds of the present chamber members and consent the appointment of Ambassadors and other public Ministers and Consuls (Article 2, section 2).

Regarding the involvement of SSG in international affairs, the Constitution expressly forbids states to "enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation".

This last statement prohibits specific state actions. Kincaid argues that these are, however, the only absolute prohibitions to the federative entities in foreign affairs. Also, he maintains that other restrictions are implied, because some specific powers are delegated to the federal government. For example, the article 1 of the Constitution states that the Congress has the power to declare war, and the article 2 says that the President shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers. Finally, additional limits are “politically conditional” (Kincaid 1999, 112). However, Henkin points out a difference with regard to the specific actions that states undertake in the international affairs’ arena. Treaties are absolutely forbidden to the States, but compacts and agreements are permitted, and “no agreement by a State with a foreign power has been challenged as a forbidden treaty” (Henkin 1975, 230).

Some scholars and SSG officials have claimed that the states have no legal restriction to engage in international relations under the Amendment X of the Constitution, which states that “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States”. Therefore, since the foreign affairs powers are not established in the Constitution, there is no explicit prohibition for states to undertake international actions. Even if the Constitution forbids US states from entering into any compact with foreign powers, in the last decades, US state and local governments have “entered into thousands of accords and agreements (but not ‘treaties’) with national and subnational governments do in the international system is generally considered as tactic approval of such activities’ (Henkin 1996, 152-56, cited by

Fry 1998, 279-80). The Tenth Amendment is interpreted by some governors and US state legislators to give them the right to engage in foreign relations activities in any way that is not expressly prohibited in the 1789 text or subsequent amendments (McMillan 2012, 66).

The State Department is well aware of the increasing participation of the states and cities in international affairs, which is why it has created an agency to coordinate these activities. The Office of Intergovernmental Affairs in the State Department is located within the Bureau of Public Affairs. Its primary activities are coordinating external communications to help US states and localities connect their activities with the nation's foreign policy goals. It is not a proactive agency that watches foreign relations activities of the SSG, but one that only notices when "US states or governors take controversial actions that are likely to gain media attention" (McMillan 2012, 106).

Governors are not only interested in domestic issues, but increasingly in international relations. Therefore, in 1978, the National Governor's Association, which represents the chief executives of the fifty states and the US territories, established the Committee on International Trade and Foreign Relations to oversee state interests abroad (Fry 1990, 287). Also, regional groups or commissions have been established to coordinate certain trade policies, like the Mid-America Trade Council, the Great Lakes Commission, and the New England Trade Group. In the agricultural arena, the Mid-American International Agri-Trade Council, the Southern US Trade Association, and the Agricultural Trade

Association exist. In the tourism area, the Travel South organization was created (Fry 1990, 287).

At the SSG level, the governors, lieutenant governors and the cabinet officials have control over international relations activities. The role of governors has evolved over the last decades, mostly as a result of rapidly increasing economic globalization and interdependence, as well as US state reforms emphasizing professionalization, efficiency and management (Teaford 2002, cited by McMillan 2012, 5). These changes have increased the governors' interest in international relations and has enabled US states to become engaged internationally (Kincaid 1984, 101). The activities of Governors go well beyond international economic development, although they usually remain connected to it (McMillan 2012, 40).

Before the 1960's the governors only acted to support a foreign policy of the president but it did not exist a direct state interest. Then the foreign trade and investment grew significantly in the 1970's, so the states began to worry about expanding markets for exporters and attracting new foreign investment (Kline 1993, 106). SSG acquired a vested interest in the formulation and implementation of US foreign economic policy, and at the same time, they expanded their direct contacts with overseas business executives and foreign government officials (Kline 1993, 107). Luther H. Hodges, governor of North Carolina, directed the first state mission to Western Europe as early as 1959 (Fry 1990, 283). Washington governor Daniel J. Evans (1965-1977) became a pioneer in international trade by traveling to Russia in 1975 Virginia Governor

Mills E. Godwin, Jr. (1966-1978) was another pioneer who sent a state representative to Brussels in 1969, one of the first international offices (McMillan 2012, 36-38). Later, Maryland governor Parris N. Glendening (1995-2003) created a subcabinet for international affairs in 2001 to coordinate agencies dealing with foreign relations (McMillan 2012, 57).

Some states have created offices of international relations in order to coordinate these activities. Others have opened international offices abroad to maintain a permanent contact with their counterparts from other countries. New York was the first US state to open an office overseas in 1953, and by the end of the 1960s, Virginia and Illinois had representatives in Belgium, Ohio had an office in Germany, and California had three international offices in the 1960s (McMillan 2012, 79). While only four states had international offices in 1970, many more created their international contact networks by the end of this decade. Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, North Carolina, and South Carolina established international offices in the 1970s. Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, and Wisconsin sent representatives overseas in the 1970s (McMillan 2012, 80). At this time, most overseas offices concentrated on attracting foreign investment, which increased substantially due to the rising costs of doing business in Europe, the falling value of the US dollar and revaluations of foreign currencies, and the 1973 energy crisis (McMillan 2012, 80).

With respect to the issues and topics on the SSG international agendas, the states began to be more active in matters of tourism, foreign investment, and new markets since the 1970s. Their international activities began to increase



because the global interdependence (Fry 1990, 179–281). The political variable is also important in the IRSSG in the United States. If the governors have success in international activities such as foreign direct investment, tourism and trade, they can generate more jobs. This scenario attracts electoral support. Since states governments are decreasing their reliance on transfer payments from Washington, governors seek new options to promote local development, including a search abroad for trade, investment, and tourism (Fry 1990, 282).

According to McMillan, foreign direct investment attraction and export promotion are the two most important international relations' activities undertaken by the SSG. Also, foreign political and security activities are in the agenda of the local governments, but economic relations remain at the top of it. The US state officials interviewed by the author said they focused on FDI attraction, spending an average of 65 percent of their time on this matter and the remainder on export promotion. This fact reveals the great importance of FDI to US states when dealing with international activities (McMillan 2012, 86).

Geographic location is also important. Border-state governors are also engaged in international relations' activities because of their close connection and links with Mexico and Canada. Security, migration, trade and environment are some of the issues on their agendas. Border-state governors are much more likely to be involved in foreign relations as these governors have more opportunities to meet their counterparts in Canada and Mexico and to deal with transborder issues such as environmental affairs and border security (McMillan 2012, 138). The visit of Mexican president Ernesto Zedillo to California in 1999 is

an good example of the gradual move away from Washington to US state capitals, described as a new era in international relations, shifting the focus from the national to the state level because previous visits to California by Mexico's presidents in 1964, 1970, 1982, and 1992 had been national affairs that included meetings with US presidents (McMillan 2012, 51).

When dealing with a broad national foreign policy and many sub-State international relations' policies and activities, some conflicts might emerge. At first, during the 1970s and 1980s, the SSG began to be interested in the foreign economic policy and the interests of both levels (local and federal) began to overlap in some areas, and the irritation factor developed as national and state efforts began to intersect (Kline 1993, 107). When governors wanted to carry out any action (trip, visit, statement) that could affect the national foreign policy, the federal government intervened. For example, since 2003, as many as 40 governors have visited Iraq and Afghanistan sponsored by the State Department and The Pentagon. The aim of such trips was for governors to be able to visit their respective National Guard troops as well as staff from different federal agencies. Also, governors were allowed to meet with elected Iraqi and Afghani leaders at the national and the sub-State levels. Given these activities, the trips were considered diplomatic missions, and since Iraq and Afghanistan are matters of national security and foreign policy, the State Department sponsored the trips in order for governors not to interfere on these issues (McMillan 2012, 120).

Governors and local government officials have engaged in various international relations activities with relative or absolute independence. In other

words, SSG have been able to organize trips abroad, open offices overseas and hold meetings with foreign governors, entrepreneurs and social actors without the explicit consent, authorization or prohibition of the national government. It is also worth noting the increasing institutionalization of international relations of SSG, through the creation of international offices, governor-led missions and specific assignments for lower-level officials within the states' governments. Also, the institutionalization has made it possible for states to be less dependent on the national government and more committed with their own priorities and goals.

Another activity in which SSG engage is in multilateral, regional and bilateral negotiations. Governors and state governments have been involved in the negotiation of the NAFTA, and McMillan points out that, recently, the international actors are not the only parties in an agreement that the federal government has to pay attention too, but also the SSG (McMillan 2012, 25). Fry (1990a) also notes that California sent representatives to advocate its positions on agricultural trade during the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations, while the Midwest US-Japan Association was formed between Japan and ten US states to enhance economic opportunities (McMillan 2012, 38). However, there are no intergovernmental mechanisms to include SSG in international negotiations or even to consult them in the design or implementation of US foreign policy.

Based on the previous discussion, the most important causes of IRSSG in the United States are globalization, regionalization, decentralization, asymmetry of federal units, and managing border issues. The most relevant motives of the SSGs to conduct IR are economic and cross-border issues. The

institutionalization of the IRSSG has taken place through the creation of SSG Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the establishment of permanent diplomatic representations abroad, the organization of official visits abroad and international exhibitions and forums, and the participation in global and transborder SSG networks, and a consequence of the IRSSG has been the rationalization of national foreign policy, allowing states to be active in areas where they have powers.

Table 4.4. Summary of the United States' SSG International Relations

Relevant reasons to conduct IRSSG	Globalization Regionalization Decentralization Asymmetry of federal units Managing border issues
Legal bases of the IRSSG	Inclusive constitutional powers to conduct international relations for SSG. Residual powers (not explicitly granted to federal government) are reserved to SSG. Exclusive SSG consultation or participation in national foreign policy decision making and implementation
Predominant motive of the SSGs to conduct IR	Economic Cross-border issues
Institutionalization of the IRSSG	SSG Ministries of Foreign Affairs Permanent diplomatic representations abroad Official visits abroad International exhibitions and forums Global and transborder SSG networks
Consequences of the IRSSG in the development of nation	Rationalization of national foreign policy
Type of central-local coordination in foreign affairs	Complementary

Finally, in terms of the legal bases of the IRSSG, due to the state residuary clause in the US constitution, the United States has an inclusive legal framework in terms of allowing the IRSSG, which has been taking place for almost five decades. However, these international activities are concentrated in those areas in which the states have powers, seldom participating in national foreign policy or even being consulted on this matter, thus being exclusive in terms of their direct participation in it. Therefore, the United States is a complementary case in terms of IRSSG.

## Conclusions

The most important variables analyzed in the four complementary cases can be seen in Table 4.5. Since the Mexican case is complementary, it was also included in the table for comparative purposes.

A number of conclusions can be derived from the analysis of the four complementary case studies. First, as in the case of inclusive federal countries, there is also an important variation in the central-local coordination in foreign affairs between complementary cases. However, among complementary countries, there was no type change in the period analyzed.

Table 4.5. Summary of the IRSSG in complementary countries

Variable / Country	Argentina	Brazil	South Africa	Mexico	United States
<b>Relevant reasons to conduct IRSSG</b>					
Globalization	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regionalization	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Democratization	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Foreign policy domestication and internationalization of domestic politics	No	No	No	No	No
Decentralization	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Problems with the national building process	No	No	No	No	No
Central governments inefficiency in conduction of foreign policy	No	No	No	No	No
Asymmetry of federal units	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Promotion by SSG leaders or political parties	No	No	No	No	No
Managing border issues	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Legal bases of the IRSSG</b>					
Inclusive constitutional powers to conduct international relations for SSG.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Exclusive constitutional powers to conduct international relations for SSG.	No	No	No	No	No
Inclusive SSG consultation or participation in national foreign policy decision making and implementation	No	No	No	No	No
Exclusive SSG consultation or participation in national foreign policy decision making and implementation	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Predominant motive of the SSGs to conduct IR</b>					
Political	No	No	No	No	No
Economic	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cultural	No	No	No	No	No
Cross-border issues	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Institutionalization of the IRSSG</b>					
SSG Ministries of Foreign Affairs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Permanent diplomatic representations abroad	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 4.5. Summary of the IRSSG in complementary countries, continued

Official visits abroad	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
International exhibitions and forums	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Global and transborder SSG networks	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Participation in official central government delegations abroad	No	No	No	No	No
<b>Consequences of the IRSSG in the development of nation</b>					
Rationalization of national foreign policy	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Democratization of the decision making process in national foreign policy	No	No	No	No	No
Disintegration of the state	No	No	No	No	No
<b>Type of central-local coordination in foreign affairs</b>					
Complementary	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Second, all countries share the same relevant causes to conduct IRSSG as discussed in the previous chapter: globalization, regionalization, and decentralization. Also, all of them conduct IRSSG to manage border issues. With the exception of the United States that is a consolidated democracy, democratization was an important cause of the IRSSG in Argentina, Brazil and South Africa. However, in the complementary cases analyzed, there were no problems with the national building process or perceived central government inefficiency in the external representation of their interests, and thus, there was no promotion of external activism by SSG leaders and parties.

Third, replicating the findings of the inclusive cases, the most important motive to conduct IRSSG in all complementary countries was economic. The

management of border issues was also relevant in all four cases, while cultural and political motivations were not present in any case.

Fourth, the SSG of the complementary cases have created SSG agencies to conduct their international relations, but their size and importance varies considerably between them. All of them carry out the basic actions of internationalization (official visits abroad, international exhibitions and forums, global and transborder SSG networks), and only two of them (South Africa and the United States) have opened permanent diplomatic representations abroad. None of them participate in official delegations of the federal government abroad, but there is a small but increasing rationalization of national foreign policy, by allowing SSG to enact international cooperation in those areas where they have powers. In none of the cases the IRSSG could lead to the disintegration of the State.

Fifth, just as in the case of inclusive countries, all the complementary cases make a difference between foreign policy and international relations or affairs. Complementary types allow SSG to conduct international relations as long as they do not interfere with the national foreign policy, but they do not allow SSG to participate in the foreign policy decision making process or implementation. Lastly, sixth, in terms of the type of central-local coordination in foreign affairs, all the complementary cases are developing democracies in consolidation (the United States is an exception) with presidential systems.



## CHAPTER 5: THE IRSSG IN EXCLUSIVE FEDERAL COUNTRIES

### Introduction

This chapter analyzes the IRSSG of the two exclusive cases: India and Russia. After this introduction, the chapter is integrated by two sections, one to study India and one for Russia, and the organization of the case studies follow the same logic of the previous two chapters. At the end of each case, a table presents a summary of the most important factors observed in the IRSSG of the country, providing empirical evidence to support the hypotheses presented in Chapter 2. The conclusions summarize the most relevant findings about the IRSSG in exclusive federal systems.

### 5.1. India

India is a parliamentary system with a President, a bicameral Parliament and a federal government. Articles 52 and 53 of the Constitution establish that the President of India is the head of the executive power. According to Article 54, he is elected by the members of an electoral college consisting of the elected members of both Houses of Parliament; and the elected members of the Legislative Assemblies of the States. Article 55 establishes the specifics of the procedure to elect the President for a five year term in office, with the possibility of re-election.

The Prime Minister is the Chief of Government and is appointed by the President; the other Ministers of the Cabinet are appointed by the President following the advice of the Prime Minister. The Ministers stay in office as long as they have the confidence of the President and the whole Cabinet (or Council of Ministers) is responsible to the House of the People (Lok Sabha— Lower House). India, nowadays, is considered a robust parliamentary democracy with a multiparty system (Arora 2010, 23; Mathew and Hooja 2009, 168).

In terms of the Legislative branch of government, Article 79 of the Constitution states that the Parliament for the Union consists of two Houses, the Council of States and the House of the People. The Council of States is also called Rajya Sabha and the House of the People is also known as Lok Sabha. The Council of States consists of twelve members nominated by the President and not more than 238 representatives of the States and of the Union territories (Article 80, section 1, a, b). The representatives of each State in the Council of States are elected by the members of the Legislative Assembly of the State in accordance with the system of proportional representation by means of the transferable vote (Article 80,4). The House of People consists of not more than 530 members chosen by direct election from territorial constituencies in the States, and not more than 20 members to represent the Union territories (Article 81,1).

India has an incongruent legislative system because the lower House represents the people, whereas the upper House represents the federal units and territories. As for the powers of each chamber, it is symmetrical because

both houses have practically the same powers and a bill can originate in either House of the Parliament, with the exception of fiscal, money and other financial bills that have to originate in the House of the People, according to Article 107.

In terms of Indian federalism, the Republic of India comprises 28 states and seven Union Territories. The states differ vastly in terms of their natural resource endowment, development, language, ethnicity and political culture. The asymmetric arrangement in Indian federalism has a long history and goes back to the way in which the British unified the country under their rule, and later, in the way in which the territories under the direct control of the British and various principalities were integrated in the new country (Rao y Singh 2004, 7).

The development of the federal system can be, in general terms, divided into three phases. The first one goes from 1947 to 1967, and is characterized by the domination of the Congress party at both levels of government. This dominance was challenged in the 1967 elections, and finally overturned twelve years later, in 1979. During the second phase, which roughly goes from 1979 to 1988, there was a transition to a highly competitive multiparty system, where the Congress party slowly lost its preeminent position. Finally, the third phase, starting in 1988, an opposition coalition, The National Democratic Alliance, headed by the Bharatiya Janta Party effectively presented a Congress alternative, generating a full transition to democracy since then (Arora 2010, 27).

In terms of its democratic history, India was a British colony and it became independent in 1947. The dominance of the Congress party started with independence. Since then, and until the 1960s, India's democratic record

suggests that two sets of political processes have guided the management of power conflicts in that country. First, a delicate balance has been struck and re-struck between forces of centralization and decentralization, and, second, the interests of the elites in society have been served without fully excluding the weaker groups (Kohli 2001, 2). During the 1970s and 1980s, the political scene was dominated mainly by Nehru's daughter, Indira Gandhi. With the assassination of Indira Gandhi, in the mid-1980s, her son Rajiv Gandhi witnessed the end of an era of Congress party domination. Since the 1990s, the political scene has been characterized by the variety of national level political experiments to find a substitute for the old Congress Party rule (Kohli 2001, 9).

India has a multicultural society with a long history. Hindi is the official language of the Union but a provision exists for the use of English for official purposes (Mathew y Hooja 2009, 168). The force of the linguistic and cultural diversities existed since the early years of the Republic. In India there are multiple identities, the states have different cultural histories, and in some cases there are distinct communities within each state (Arora 2010, 29-30). As such, India is among the most diverse societies in the world: it has people from all the major religions in the world (Mahajan 2005, 111). The major ethnic groups are Indo-Aryan 72%, Dravidian 25%, Mongoloid and other 3% (CIA World Factbook 2000). Also, several languages are spoken throughout the country: Hindi 41%, Bengali 8.1%, Telugu 7.2%, Marathi 7%, Tamil 5.9%, Urdu 5%, and Gujarati 4.5%, among others. As for religion, these are the most important: Hindu 80.5%,

Muslim 13.4%, Christian 2.3%, Sikh 1.9%, and other 1.8% (CIA World Factbook 2014).

In economic terms, in the 1990s, India's government adopted neoliberal reforms of economic liberalization. As a result, there was a sharp increase in regional inequality during this decade. In 2002-2003, the per capita income of the richest state, Punjab, was about 4.7 times that of Bihar, the poorest state, and the disparity between the richest and poorest state increased during the 1990s (Pal y Ghosh 2007, 5-6). Even if India is a well-established middle-income country (gross GDP was \$1.95 trillion USD in 2012), being the tenth richest country in the world, with robust macroeconomic management and relatively stable fiscal and monetary bases since 1950, its income per capita ranks at 149 in the world, and the country is home to the largest number of poor in the world (Sanghamitra Bandyopadhyay 2014).

In terms of the Constitutional rules regarding the conduction of its foreign policy, the treaty-making power belongs exclusively to the federal government and there are no constitutional requirements relating to consultation with the states in relation to the making or implementation of treaties. A very limited, informal and non-binding consultation with the states has taken place in practice, but its impact has been nil (Trone 2001, 50). Nalin Jha Kant argues that there are three provisions in the Indian Constitution that give the Federal Government full power to conduct foreign policy. First, Parliament has the power to legislate for the whole or any part of India in terms of implementing treaties, agreements or conventions with any country (Art. 253); second, the federal government has full

powers to implement its laws, treaties and agreements (Art. 73); and third, in order to prevent the States from obstructing the administration of laws by the Union, the executive powers of the states are to be exercised without affecting the exercise of the executive power of the Union (Art. 257) (Jha Kant 1999, 2). Therefore, constitutional rules on the IRSSG in India are exclusive.

The federal government has a Ministry responsible for implementing India's foreign policy. The Ministry of External Affairs is the governmental body responsible of conducting foreign affairs, foreign policy making and implementation of policy, as well as conducting day to day international relations. Besides the Office of the Prime Minister and the Ministry of External Affairs there are other government agencies that participate in foreign policy-making. The ministers of defense, commerce, and finance provide input to foreign policy decisions discussed in cabinet meetings, but their influence is overshadowed by the predominant position of the prime minister (USA 2001, 62).

India has a national institution that oversees the implementation of its foreign policy and the activities of SSG in international affairs. In 2001, the Parliament adopted the "Indian Council of World Affairs Act, 2001" (Act No. 29 of 2001) whose objectives are to promote the study of Indian and international affairs and to promote India's relations with other countries through study, research, discussions, lectures, exchange of ideas and information with other organizations within and outside India engaged in similar activities. In a parallel way, various SSG have created their own bureaucratic institutions that focus in coordinating their international activities. For example, Andhra Pradesh has a

Protocol Department which is part of the General Administration Department of the Government (<http://www.ap.gov.in/Pages/Orgs.aspx>). The government of New Delhi has a Protocol Branch that is part of the General Administration Department. Its responsibilities are to provide protocol facilities to the Chief Minister, Ministers and Senior Officers of the government, to provide protocol facilities to visiting delegations of foreign countries who visit to Delhi (Government of New Delhi 2014). In Uttar Pradesh, the Chief Minister's Office Section 1 deals with the disposal and monitoring of letters received from the foreign Embassies, and it also has a protocol department ([http://upcmo.up.nic.in/section1\\_eng.htm](http://upcmo.up.nic.in/section1_eng.htm)). However, most of them deal with the most basic protocol responsibilities.

Economic and political changes in India have led its SSG to increase their interests in foreign affairs. In the early 1990s, India embraced economic liberalization, which meant new opportunities for the states to develop international activities. Also, the regional leaders and regional parties have become more important players in the political system of India, which is why they have been demanding a more decentralized system. This also meant new perspectives for new foreign activities (Sridharan 2003, 486-70). Some international relations areas in which Indian subnational entities are getting involved are economic issues. The electric sector is an example of states having more autonomy and having negotiated agreements directly with large multinationals, which is translated in funding from international financial institutions like the World Bank. The most cited example is the "power purchase

agreement” signed by the government of Maharashtra and the Enron Corporation (Jenkins 2003, 70). Another example in the area of economic policy is the economic external assistance; for example, the agreements between the government of Andhra Pradesh and the World Bank. They include major components covering broad institutional and fiscal reforms, and poverty and rural-development programs (Jenkins 2003, p.72). After Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka negotiated directly with the World Bank a lending and to obtain funds to introduce a fiscal reform plan (Sridharan 2003, 477).

The attraction of foreign direct investment is also an important incentive to conduct international activities. Sridharan argues that some state governments have done their best to provide investment incentives, and some have also signed memoranda of understanding with external agencies. For example, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka have promoted their capitals as high-tech hubs (Sridharan 2003, 475). Finally, the states have begun to demand a bigger role in controlling migration. In this case, the Constitution does not specify who has the power to control entry and exit from the nation. In West Bengal, the Border Security Forces and the state police cooperate to control the flow of people and goods from Bangladesh (Dossani and Vijaykumar 2010, 5).

In terms of participation in international organizations, India signed in 1994 the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Formally, the central government is not obligated to consult the states for signing treaties, and the SSG had not shown interest to intervene in this matter. But the Act was going to affect the agricultural organization and



production in the states, and the item 14 of the State List (Seventh Schedule of the Constitution) establishes agriculture as a state issue. Constitutionally the federal government did not have to consult the states; and the states did not have any formal mechanism to obstruct the ratification or implementation of an international treaty. In this case, very little information was shared with the local governments and only a few states had a reaction to the lack of information and consultation by the federal government. Nevertheless, some states were significantly worried and decided to push to have influence on the decision-making process; however the Prime Minister ignored their interests (Sridharan 2003, 478-80). Being so, the participation of SSG in India in the definition and implementation of foreign policy is minimal, informal, and with a very limited impact.

In some cases, the federal government has intervened on international activities undertaken by the subnational governments. In regard to the agreements of the states with the World Bank, the government of India intervened in the negotiations of the government of Andhra Pradesh; the central authorities used indirect methods to exercise a degree of discretionary control and influence in this negotiations with the World Bank (Jenkins 2003, 72). Jenkins argues that bureaucrats and ministers in the federal government are very protective of the Center's authority over certain policy areas, including both those over which is control is based on historical usurpation rather than constitutional entitlement (agriculture), and those to which it has a more substantial claim, like foreign relations (Jenkins 2003, 72). Thereby, the Center curtails the diplomatic

autonomy of state governments not only directly, but also through its formal power to withhold approval to any agreement. It also intervenes indirectly, by exerting leverage on the external actor, like the World Bank, with whom states are negotiating for assistance (Jenkins 2003, 73).

On the other hand, Sridharan argues that the Department of Economic Affairs within the Ministry of Finance has encouraged states to seek external financial assistance and cooperation. Even if the responsibility to provide a sovereign guarantee for the loans rests with the federation, and the negotiations have to adhere to the norms established by the center, states have been empowered to negotiate with the multilateral institutions to attract foreign cooperation to India (Sridharan 2003, 476).

It is important to determine whether subnational preferences related to foreign affairs are taken into account by the federal government. Rob Jenkins argues that in the area of foreign economic policy, the states play a very limited role in the process of policymaking (Jenkins 2003, 67). In India there are “barriers to collective action” among states, and this makes impossible the development of sub-State autonomy in international affairs. In this country, only a small minority of regional parties is empowered to obtain central consent for specific international activities (Jenkins 2003, 79). More recently the preferences and interests of the states have started to be considered by the central government. In respect to the agricultural matters of Doha negotiations, the Commerce Ministry convened a meeting of the principal secretaries of the states and officials from the Ministry of Agriculture to ‘sensitize’ the states on the issues facing the

agricultural sector and expressed the government's desire to build a broad consensus on the negotiation strategy. The central government has started doing some minor consultations with the states, so the subnational governments are very slowly becoming players in the negotiation process. (Sridharan 2003, 483). One example of the new relationship are the WTO cells that the government has established to educate farmers about the new regulations, and training is provided so they can handle their tasks conforming to the WTO requirements. This, according to Sridharan, proves that the center and the states are now taking a cooperative stance, because the federal government realized that is more expensive to adopt a unilateral position on matters that affects the states (Sridharan 2003, 485).

Subnational governments have expressed their interest in participating in international organizations too. Since the 1990's, several states have been making negotiations and agreements with international economic institutions as the Asian Development Bank and the International Labor Organization. Also, some aid agencies have begun to work more directly with the state governments, for example the United Kingdom's Department for International Development. Another important international actor that has negotiations and agreements with the states is the World Bank; actually, this institution is the most important source of external debt-financing for India's states (Jenkins 2003, 71). States also participate and negotiate with the WTO. The WTO does not provide any formal mechanisms for the participation of the subnational units. Yet they can influence certain issues through the collaboration in determining India's actions within the

WTO; also, they can trigger the use of safeguard provisions the Government of India bargained to have included in the WTO agreements (Jenkins 2003, 77).

In sum, the IRSSG in India are limited, mostly reactive and concentrated in economic issues. The most relevant reasons to conduct IRSSG in are globalization, regionalization, and managing border issues, while the predominant motives of the SSGs to conduct IR are economic and cross-border issues.

Table 5.1. Summary of India's SSG International Relations

Relevant reasons to conduct IRSSG	Globalization Regionalization Decentralization Managing border issues
Legal bases of the IRSSG	Exclusive constitutional powers to conduct international relations for SSG. Exclusive SSG consultation or participation in national foreign policy decision making and implementation
Predominant motive of the SSGs to conduct IR	Economic Cross-border issues
Institutionalization of the IRSSG	SSG Ministries of Foreign Affairs (small) Official visits abroad International exhibitions and forums Global and transborder SSG networks
Consequences of the IRSSG in the development of nation	Very limited rationalization of national foreign policy
Type of central-local coordination in foreign affairs	Exclusive

The institutionalization of the IRSSG is limited, with small agencies to coordinate foreign affairs, some basic organization of official visits abroad and international exhibitions and forums, and some basic participation in global and transborder SSG networks. The consequence of the IRSSG in the development of nation has been a small rationalization of national foreign policy. Finally, In terms of the legal bases of the IRSSG, India's federalism is still very centralized, and the SSG have very limited powers to conduct international relations, thus having a very exclusive legal framework for the IRSSG. Until very recently, they were also excluded from policy making decisions, negotiations and implementation, and the recent participation has always been led and coordinated by the federal government, thus being very exclusive too. This makes India an exclusive case in terms of IRSSG.

## 5.2. Russia

Article 1 defines the Russian Federation as having a democratic, federal and republican form of government. Russia is a semi-presidential federal republic. According to the Article 80 (1) of the Constitution, the President of the Russian Federation is the head of the State, and he has the power to determine the guidelines of the internal and foreign policies of the State and represent the Russian Federation within the country and in international relations. Article 111 specifies that the Chairman of the Government, also called Prime Minister, is appointed by the President with the consent of the State Duma.

Russia has a bicameral legislative system. Article 94 of the Constitution establishes that the Federal Assembly is the representative and legislative body of the Russian Federation, which consists of two chambers, the Council of the Federation and the State Duma. The Council of the Federation is the upper Chamber and the State Duma is the lower Chamber. Section 2 of the same article specifies that the first one includes two representatives from each subject of the Russian Federation: one from the legislative and one from the executive body of state authority. The members of the upper house are elected by the legislative bodies of the constituent units. The second chamber consists of 450 deputies (section 3), and all seats are awarded by a national election using proportional representation.

Russia has is an incongruent legislative system because the State Duma represents the people and the Council of the Federation represents the constituent units or subjects of the Federation. As for the powers of each chamber, it is an asymmetrical system because Article 104 states that bills shall be submitted to the State Duma, and once adopted (Article 105), they are submitted in five days for the consideration of the Council of the Federation, who only has powers to revise the decisions of the Duma. There are clear provisions for the conclusion of international treaties and the actors that are involved in the process of ratification. Article 106 of the Constitution establishes that the Council of Federation has to ratify the decisions on the Duma in terms of ratification and denunciation of international treaties and agreements and the status of the state borders of the Russia.

At the end of the 1980s, the federation was composed of 89 constituent units (CUs), all with the same powers, all equally subordinated and responsible to the central government in Moscow, since Soviet Russia was a highly centralized state (Obydenkova 2006, 31). However, during the 1990s dramatic changes took place at the national level with the regime transition, and also at the regional level, with decentralization reforms which took the form of asymmetrical federalism (Obydenkova 2006, 31).

With the Federation Treaty of March of 1992 and the Constitution of 1993, 16 autonomous republics were established, and four of the five autonomous *oblasts*<sup>6</sup> were given the status of “republics”. The other 68 constituent units became known as “regions” of the Russian Federation. Then, in 1992, President Yeltsin signed three other treaties that elevated the autonomous republics and the autonomous *oblasts* to the status of republics. The federation Treaty described republics as “sovereign states”, implying that they had powers in areas like natural resources, external trade, and internal budgets. This also suggested that the republics not only had a right to refuse to join the federation, but could also decide to secede (Obydenkova 2006, 32). However, in reality, the power in practically all policy areas was concentrated in Moscow. The democratization in the 1990s was accompanied by some regionalization, as an attempt of regions to act independently, and some decentralization, as concessions of enhanced autonomy to regions made by the central government (Obydenkova 2006, 30-31).

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<sup>6</sup> Oblasts are the subnational entities of the former Soviet Union.

The current Russian Federation was created with the end of the Soviet Union. Between 1992 and 2001, the richest region was Moscow with an income, on average, exceeding 3 times the national mean. The poorest was Ingush Republic in North Caucasus, with real money per capita equal to around 30 per cent of the average. The richer constituent units are located in rich resource and export-oriented regions, and industrially developed regions of the Volga Basin (Tatarstan Republic, Rostov, Perm and Samara). The poorest constituent units are in South Siberia and the agrarian regions of the Volga Basin (Ruslan 2003, 10). With respect to social cleavages and ethnic groups in Russia, ethnic groups are highly dispersed across the territory of the Russian Federation. The highest percentage of any ethnic group living within their own unit are the Tatars. However, only 48.9% of the population of Tatarstan are Tatars, while the rest is composed of Russian, Ukrainians, Moldovans, and others (Obydenkova 2006, 28).

The Constitution sets forth the main actors that control Russia's foreign policy, as well as their duties and powers. Article 86 of the Constitution states that the President has power to govern the foreign policy of the Russian Federation, hold negotiations and sign international treaties and agreements of the Russian Federation, and receive diplomatic representatives. The main subjects of foreign policy remain a federal responsibility. Article 71 of the Constitution states that the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation includes foreign policy, international treaties, and foreign trade relations. Nevertheless, Article 72 establishes that there should be coordination of the international and external



economic relations of the SSG with the Russian Federation, to guarantee compliance with the international treaties of Russia.

Within the government of Russia, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation develops a general foreign policy strategy for the Russian Federation, submits relevant proposals to the President and implements the foreign policy; it also coordinates foreign policy activities of the federal executive bodies. This ministry also assists the SSG in implementing international and foreign economic cooperation, but “in strict compliance with sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia 2008, sec.V). According to Makarychev, the coordination of international contacts of the SSG and the implementation of international treaties falls into the sphere of joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and SSG (Makarychev 1999, 503). For example, the federal law On State Regulation of Foreign Economic Activity adopted on October 13, 1995 stipulates under joint central/regional competence the coordination of foreign economic activities of the SSG, where they may deal autonomously with foreign economic contacts within their territories and send trade missions abroad” (Makarychev 1999, 503).

Russian SSG international activities began in the 1990s. With the fall of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the new Russian Federation, SSG began to express their interest in issues related to external relations. Many regions started international activities to gain access to foreign markets or restore direct contacts that had been interrupted by the fall of the USSR. Many regions “were disappointed with the level of effectiveness of Russian trade missions abroad

and began seeking their own ways to international markets” (Makarychev 1999, 508).

In January 1999, President Yeltsin signed a law that allows the SSG to maintain international relations and to sign certain international agreements on the basis of their own competencies under the Russian constitution and federal laws. The SSG can also establish missions abroad as well as receiving official delegations from foreign states (Cornago 2000, 3). Being so, in terms of the legal and institutional framework, Russia was an inclusive case for the IRSSG in the 1990s. Nevertheless, when President Vladimir Putin assumed power, the importance of trans-border integration for the regions decreased. The political reforms aimed at the centralization and the consolidation of power launched by Putin in the 2000s cut extensively the political and economic autonomy of the SSG, having a direct impact in the reduction of the external activities of the various regions (Kuznetsov 2009, 15). Therefore, since the 2000s, the legal framework has become increasingly exclusive.

There are many factors that led the SSG to increase their interest and participation in international activities in the 1990s. The emergence of Russian local governments as actors in the international scene reflects the processes of globalization in the international system and regionalization within Russia. Thirty-five regions in Russia have borders with foreign countries, and many of them have to deal with trans-border issues. Trans-border cooperation in the Barents Sea linked the Northwestern regions of Russia with Finland and Sweden. Those regions of Russia’s South, near the Caspian Sea, cooperated with their foreign

neighbors. The regions in Russia's Far East initiated cooperation with China, Japan and Korea (Sharafutdinova 2003, 613).

Economic, educational, and cultural contacts were an essential source for regional development. The regions with high economic or industrial potential started to make permanent contacts with international partners. The industrial Sverdlovsk oblasts choose the German Baden-Württemberg region as their main international partner. The main oil region of Russia, Khaty-Mansiisky, established close cooperation with Alberta, the main Canadian oil province (Kuznetsov 2009, 18). Also, environmental issues promoted cross-border cooperation; an illustrative example with high focus on ecology was the case of North-Western regions of Russia with their neighbor countries of Scandinavia and the Baltic countries. Cultural motives were also important for regions that had an ethnic, cultural or linguistic particularity; Finno-Ugric regions of Russia participated in the World Council of Finno-Ugric people with Hungary, Estonia, and Finland (Kuznetsov 2009, 19-20).

The regions were also interested in expanding their international activities in order to attract foreign direct investment and other forms of economic input, so that they could decrease their dependence on the central government. Some of the Russian regions have been pursuing their economic interests and the center is worried that these regions are conducting their own foreign economic policies. To coordinate this activities, the Russian Foreign Ministry opened branch offices in some republics to help businessmen with foreign international activities of the regions (Sridharan 2003, 471).

Regarding the internationalization of Russian SSG, the Republic of Tatarstan is one of the most active in matters of IRSSG. According to the Constitution of Tatarstan, "Within its powers Tatarstan alone participates in international and foreign economic relations" (Republic of Tatarstan 2014). Furthermore, two other articles establish the powers of this republic regarding foreign relations. Article 6 states that Tatarstan, within its authority to enter into international and foreign economic relations with units of foreign states, can conclude international agreements, exchange offices, and participate in the activities of international organizations (Republic of Tatarstan 2014). Article 94 establishes that, among others, the President represents Tatarstan in relations with federal authorities, state authorities of the Russian Federation, as well as foreign countries and international organizations (Republic of Tatarstan 2014).

Over time, subnational governments have created their own bureaucracies that specialize in foreign affairs. Once again, Tatarstan is the most institutionalized. The first international contacts of the republic started in the late 1980s, and a more systematic pursuit of foreign contacts started after the adoption of the Declaration of Sovereignty in August 1990 (Sharafutdinova 2003, 616). In 1993, Tatarstan established its Ministry of Foreign Economic Affairs and defined its "Conception of the Foreign Economic Policy of Tatarstan". After integrating other areas, the Department of Foreign Affairs of Tatarstan is the main institution coordinating and organizing foreign activities of the government of the republic (Sharafutdinova 2003, 616).

In regard to the activities undertaken by Tatarstan in the realm of international relations, there are over 50 international agreements signed with countries like Azerbaijan, Belarus, Cuba, Czech Republic, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, San Marino, Turkey, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. All the agreements are restricted to cooperation on economic, trade, science, technology or cultural and educational issues, and no agreements concerning security issues have been signed (Sharafutdinova 2003, 617). Regarding its presence abroad, since the 1990s, Tatarstan has opened 16 missions abroad (Sharafutdinova 2003, 616).

Samara oblast is another region that has engaged in international relations activities. It conducts its foreign relations through the Department of International Relations of the Administration of Samara, which was created in 1996 to promote its foreign economic relations. However, its activities have been limited, and it has not opened representative offices abroad. Regarding economic international relations, Samara region is one of the most important regions in Russia in terms of foreign trade; it has developed trade relations with more than 100 countries, and established joint ventures with foreign capital from countries like China, Germany, Italy, Ukraine, and the United States (Sharafutdinova 2003, 619-620).

It is important to determine whether the preferences of the SSG are taken into account when designing or executing Russia's foreign policy. During the 1990s, the legal arrangements and procedures for consideration the subnational interests in the federal foreign policy had not been created. Almost all the federal

ministries had no clear positions on the regionalization process and the preferences of SSG. For example, there was no official reaction to the appeal of several governors of central Russian SSG to the federal government to reconsider the terms for the destruction of chemical weapons located in their regions (Makarychev 1999, 506). On July 15, 1995, the federal law 'On International Treaties of the Russian Federation' was adopted. It stipulated that texts of international treaties to be signed on behalf of the central government should be checked with the regions if the treaty affected that region; regions were welcome to submit recommendations concerning specific international documents of the central government (Makarychev 1999, 503). This law also specified that the central authorities had the responsibility to defend the economic interests of the regions worldwide.

When dealing with foreign affairs at the federal and state levels, some issues promote cooperation while others might create conflict between the levels of government. The political decentralization process complicated the foreign policy making process, and the federal government became more sensitive to the interests of the regions, recognizing that some foreign policy decisions required taking into account the opinions of regional elites. Thus, a growing number of foreign policy actions were taken after consultation with regional authorities, and some governors were invited to diplomatic talks as official members of the delegations (Makarychev 1999, 504). During the 1990s, the central government had an inclusive state foreign policy, which accepted various initiatives coming from the constituent units. The position of the state officials was mostly soft. In

1994 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs set up a consultative council of constituent parts of the Russian Federation for international and foreign economic ties. However, in the 2000s the IRSSG changed to be controlled from the center, becoming exclusive of the SSG. Putin centralized the foreign policy of the state, excluding SSG in its definition and implementation (Kuznetsov 2009, 26).

Table 5.2. Summary of Russia's SSG International Relations

Relevant reasons to conduct IRSSG	Globalization Regionalization Democratization Decentralization Managing border issues
Legal bases of the IRSSG	Inclusive (1990s) to exclusive (post-2000) constitutional powers to conduct international relations for SSG. Exclusive SSG consultation or participation in national foreign policy decision making and implementation
Predominant motive of the SSGs to conduct IR	Economic Cultural Cross-border issues
Institutionalization of the IRSSG	SSG Ministries of Foreign Affairs Official visits abroad International exhibitions and forums Global and transborder SSG networks
Consequences of the IRSSG in the development of nation	Rationalization of national foreign policy (only 1990s)
Type of central-local coordination in foreign affairs	Complementary (1990), to Exclusive (post-2000)

In Russia, the most important causes of IRSSG are globalization, regionalization, democratization, decentralization, and managing border issues. The most relevant of the SSGs to conduct IR are economic, cultural, and cross-

border issues. The institutionalization of the IRSSG has taken place through the creation of SSG agencies of Foreign Affairs, the organization of official visits abroad and international exhibitions and forums, and the participation in global and transborder SSG networks. The initial consequence of the IRSSG in the development of nation was a small rationalization of national foreign policy, but it was reverted with the centralization that resulted from Putin's administration. In terms of the legal bases of the IRSSG, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation has always been exclusive in terms of considering the preferences and ideas of SSG in the national foreign policy. However, during the 1990s, its constitutional and legal framework allowed SSG to participate in international affairs in the areas in which they had powers, thus being a complementary country in terms of IRSSG. With the Putin administration (post-2000), the powers were gradually centralized, becoming increasingly exclusive in terms of SSG capacities to conduct international activities, and thus changing to an exclusive type of IRSSG.

## Conclusions

The summary of the most relevant variables in the cases of India and Russia previously analyzed can be observed in Table 5.3.



Table 5.3. Summary of the IRSSG in exclusive countries

<b>Variable / Country</b>	<b>India</b>	<b>Russia</b>
<b>Relevant reasons to conduct IRSSG</b>		
Globalization	Yes	Yes
Regionalization	Yes	Yes
Democratization	No	Yes
Foreign policy domestication and internationalization of domestic politics	No	No
Decentralization	Yes	Yes
Problems with the national building process	No	No
Central governments inefficiency in conduction of foreign policy	No	No
Asymmetry of federal units	Yes	Yes
Promotion by SSG leaders or political parties	No	No
Managing border issues	Yes	Yes
<b>Legal bases of the IRSSG</b>		
Inclusive constitutional powers to conduct international relations for SSG.	No	Yes (1990s)
Exclusive constitutional powers to conduct international relations for SSG.	Yes	Yes (post-2000)
Inclusive SSG consultation or participation in national foreign policy decision making and implementation	No	No
Exclusive SSG consultation or participation in national foreign policy decision making and implementation	Yes	Yes
<b>Predominant motive of the SSGs to conduct IR</b>		
Political	No	No
Economic	Yes	Yes
Cultural	No	Yes
Cross-border issues	Yes	Yes
<b>Institutionalization of the IRSSG</b>		
SSG Ministries of Foreign Affairs	Yes	Yes
Permanent diplomatic representations abroad	No	No
Official visits abroad	Yes	Yes
International exhibitions and forums	Yes	Yes

Table 5.3. Summary of the IRSSG in exclusive countries, continued

Global and transborder SSG networks	No	Yes
Participation in official central government delegations abroad	No	No
<b>Consequences of the IRSSG in the development of nation</b>		
Rationalization of national foreign policy	Yes (small)	Yes (1990s)
Democratization of the decision making process in national foreign policy	No	No
Disintegration of the state	No	No
<b>Type of central-local coordination in foreign affairs</b>		
Exclusive	Yes	Yes (post-2000)
Complementary	No	Yes (1990s)

Some conclusions can be derived from the study of these cases. First, even if only two exclusive cases were studied, important variation can be observed between them in the central-local coordination in foreign affairs. Also, during the period under analysis, Russia changed from being a complementary to exclusive type in 2000 with the Putin administration.

Second, even if the IRSSG in exclusive cases is limited, Russia and India share the same relevant reasons to conduct these activities as the inclusive and complementary cases of the previous two chapters: globalization, regionalization, and decentralization. Also, both of them conduct IRSSG to manage border issues. The democratization process in the 1990s was an important variable in the case of Russia to increase the IRSSG, becoming a complementary country; however, with the democratic reversal under the Putin administration after 2000,

these activities were dramatically reduced, transforming Russia into an exclusive case. The national building process, perceived central government inefficiency in the representation of SSG in foreign affairs, and the promotion of external activism by SSG leaders and parties is not present in these two cases, even if there are cultural and linguistic differences in their societies.

Third, in the cases of India and Russia, the predominant motive to enact IRSSG was economic. The management of border issues was also relevant in both cases, and cultural factors were also present in some Russian SSGs. There appears to be no political motivation for the IRSSG in any of the two countries.

Fourth, the SSG of both countries have created agencies to attend their international affairs, but their size and importance varies considerably between the two countries and within them. Russian and Indian SSGs conduct the basic internationalization activities, like official visits abroad, international exhibitions and forums, and global and transborder SSG networks). They do not participate in official central government delegations abroad either. Therefore, there is a small rationalization of national foreign policy in India and in Russia during the 1990s, which disappeared with the Putin administration in 2000, and no threats that the IRSSG could lead to the disintegration of these countries.

Fifth, the two countries make an important difference between foreign policy, which is jealously defended as an exclusive power and responsibility of the federal government, and international relations, which allows SSG to conduct activities in those areas in which SSG have powers in mostly low politics issues.

Sixth, even if both cases have federal systems, they both (Russia post-2000) function in a relatively centralized way.

Having analyzed the ten federal countries in the last three chapters of the dissertation, several general conclusions can be reached. The factors analyzed in each of them are summarized in Table 5.4., which includes the tables presented at the end of chapters 3, 4 and the present one. The cases are organized depending of their type of central-local coordination in foreign affairs, from the more exclusive to most inclusive. For comparative purposes, Mexico is also included in this table, to introduce the in-depth analysis to be conducted on this country's IRSSG in the next four chapters.

Table 5.4. Summary of the IRSSG in 10 Federations and Mexico

Variable / Country	India	Russia	Argentina	Brazil	South Africa	Mexico	United States	Australia	Germany	Canada	Belgium
<b>Relevant reasons to conduct IRSSG</b>											
Globalization	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regionalization	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Democratization	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Foreign policy domestication and internationalization of domestic politics	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Decentralization	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Problems with the national building process	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes (Quebec)	No
Central governments inefficiency in conduction of foreign policy	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes (Quebec)	No
Asymmetry of federal units	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Promotion by SSG leaders or political parties	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes (Quebec)	Yes
Managing border issues	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Legal bases of the IRSSG</b>											
Inclusive constitutional powers to conduct international relations for SSG.	No	Yes (1990s)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes (post-1993)

Table 5.4. Summary of the IRSSG in 10 Federations and Mexico, continued

Exclusive constitutional powers to conduct international relations for SSG.	Yes	Yes (post-2000)	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes (pre-1993)
Inclusive SSG consultation or participation in national foreign policy decision making and implementation	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Exclusive SSG consultation or participation in national foreign policy decision making and implementation	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
<b>Predominant motive of the SSGs to conduct IR</b>											
Political	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes (Quebec)	Yes
Economic	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cultural	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes (Quebec)	Yes
Cross-border issues	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Institutionalization of the IRSSG</b>											
SSG Ministries of Foreign Affairs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Permanent diplomatic representations abroad	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Official visits abroad	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
International exhibitions and forums	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Global and transborder SSG networks	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Participation in official central government delegations abroad	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Consequences of the IRSSG in the development of nation</b>											
Rationalization of national foreign policy	Yes (small)	Yes (1990s)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Democratization of the decision making process in national foreign policy	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Disintegration of the state	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Possible
<b>Type of central-local coordination in foreign affairs</b>											
Exclusive	Yes	Yes (post-2000)	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Consultative	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes (pre-1993)
Complementary	No	Yes (1990s)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Inclusive	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes (post-1993)

Based on the empirical evidence summarized in Table 5.4, all the ten secondary hypotheses presented in Chapter 2 can be supported, some of them partially. One, in terms of variation of the IRSSG, sufficient evidence was presented to sustain the hypothesis that there is a very important variation in the IRSSG and central-local coordination in foreign affairs in federal countries. This variation goes from the most exclusive cases (India and Russia post-2000), continuing with the consultative (Belgium pre-1993) and complementary cases (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Russia in the 1990s, South Africa, and the United States), to inclusive cases (Australia, Canada, Germany and Belgium post-1993). The most inclusive case is Belgium after the constitutional reform of 1993. In the areas in which Belgian SSG have powers, they participate in equal terms with the federal government in the definition of national foreign policy. Being so, the relevance of the IRSSG for foreign policy decision making and implementation is increasingly important in inclusive cases, particularly in areas where SSG have constitutional powers (culture, education, trade, environment, and border issues), limited in consultative and complementary cases, and negligible in exclusive cases. It must be stressed that, even in inclusive cases, the participation of SSG is insignificant in high politics areas of foreign policy, like security issues.

Two, regarding type change, a couple of the cases analyzed provide partial evidence to support the hypothesis there can be change in the types of central-local coordination. Belgium passed from being consultative to inclusive with its 1993 constitutional reform, and it became the most inclusive case in terms of participation of SSG in foreign affairs. Russia changed from being

complementary to exclusive as a consequence of the centralization imposed by the Putin administration after 2000.

Three, in terms of the relevant reasons to conduct IRSSG, all the cases analyzed have provided uncontroversial evidence to argue that the most important causes of the increasing IRSSG in federal countries are globalization, regionalization, and decentralization. Another important cause for increasing IRSSG is the need to manage border issues (with the exception of Australia who has no land borders). Exclusively in the European cases (Belgium and Germany), foreign policy domestication and internationalization of domestic politics was also relevant, as a consequence of the integration process of the European Union.

Four, analyzing domestic variables, regarding democratization, the evidence supports the hypothesis partially, showing that it is a relevant cause for increasing IRSSG only in countries with democracies in consolidation processes (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Russia and South Africa), and it is not important in the cases of consolidated democracies. Perceiving problems in national building process, central government inefficiency in representing SSG's interests in foreign policy, and promoting external activism by SSG leaders and parties were only relevant factors in two countries with important cultural and linguistic cleavages in their societies (Belgium and Canada).

Five, in terms the central motives for IRSSG, the analysis of the ten cases provides uncontroversial evidence to sustain the hypothesis that the predominant motive to conduct IRSSG is to promote local economic development. Managing

border issues, with the exception of Australia is also important. Cultural motivation was only present in cases where cultural variation exists between SSG (Belgium, Canada, Germany and Russia), while political motivation was observed in only two cases (Quebec in Canada and Belgium), where a political cleavage exists between cultural communities.

Six, the hypothesis about institutional building is also supported: in all ten countries studies, their SSG have created ministries or agencies to coordinate their international affairs. However, it is also clear that there is a huge variation in size, resources, activities and level of consolidation between them. Their level of activity and relevance is very restricted in exclusive cases (India and Russia post-2000), limited in consultative cases (Belgium pre-1993), important and growing in complementary cases (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Russia in the 1990s, South Africa, and the United States), and very important and substantive in inclusive cases (Australia, Canada, Germany and Belgium post-1993).

Seven, regarding the variation in the international activities conducted by SSGs, the empirical evidence sustains the hypothesis that there is very important variation in the activities enacted. In all the countries, their SSG are conducting the most simple actions of internationalization, like official visits abroad, international exhibitions and forums, and participating global and transborder SSG networks. Only the seven complementary and inclusive countries have opened permanent diplomatic representations abroad, while only three of the four inclusive cases (Belgium, Canada and Australia), participate regularly in



official federal government delegations abroad, democratizing the decision making process in national foreign policy.

Eight, in terms of the consequences of the IRSSG, the evidence presented supports the hypothesis that there has been a rationalization of national foreign policy, since in all cases the federal government allows SSGs to conduct international affairs in the policy areas where they have powers. However, there is important variation in this rationalization. It is very small in exclusive cases (India and Russia post-2000), small but growing in consultative (Belgium pre-1993), and complementary cases (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Russia in the 1990s, South Africa and the United States), and very important in inclusive cases (Australia, Canada, Germany and Belgium post-1993). In Belgium, this participation could affect the consolidation of the federal State, since the equal participation of SSG with the federal government in areas where they have powers could generate incentives for the disintegration of the national State.

Nine, the hypothesis on the separation between foreign policy and international relations or affairs is widely sustained, as all ten countries analyzed differentiate foreign policy, which is considered an exclusive power and responsibility of the federal government, including high politics issues, from international relations or affairs, which refer to those areas in which SSG have powers, in general low politics issues. It is important to stress that low politics issues (international cooperation in the areas of culture, education, environment, trade, and investment) are of paramount importance to SSG's provision of local

welfare in a globalized world. In complementary cases, SSG are enacting international actions that do not interfere with foreign policy. In inclusive cases, SSG are increasingly being allowed to participate in foreign policy decision making process and implementation, always under the coordination of the federal MFA. The case of Belgium is unique, since its SSGs participate in foreign policy definition and implementation in those areas in which they have constitutional powers, in equality with the federal government.

Lastly, ten, regarding the hypothesis on institutional variation, it is partially sustained by the case analysis. Developed and consolidated parliamentary democracies are all inclusive cases (Australia, Germany, Canada and Belgium after 1993). Presidential systems with developing democracies in consolidation (the United States is an exception of the latter) are all the complementary cases (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Russia in the 1990s, South Africa and the United States). Finally, the exclusive types (Russia post-2000 and India), even if they have federal systems constitutionally, in reality, they function in a very centralized way, practically nullifying federal institutions.

## CHAPTER 6: THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF MEXICAN SUB-STATE GOVERNMENTS

### Introduction

Having discussed the variation in the IRSSG between countries, this chapter seeks to explain the variation in the external actions of SSG within a country, Mexico, between the 32 federal units that compose it. It is divided in five sections. The first and second sections, replicating the findings in the previous chapters, explain the dramatic increase of the IR of Mexican SSG through a combination of systemic international variables (globalization and interdependence) in the first section, and institutional domestic variables (democratization, decentralization, and structural reform), using the veto points and players model developed in Chapter 2. Section three describes the Mexican constitutional and legal framework for the IRSSG. Based on this framework, section four is dedicated to construct the MI-IRSSG to quantify the level of international activities of the federal units, taking into account the institutionalization of these actions at the local level, and the economic and political activities conducted abroad; this index is used as the dependent variable whose variation is explained in the next and final section. The MI-IRSSG is measured in three moments in time, with a five year interval (2004, 2009, and 2014), in order to have information on how the IRSSG in Mexico has changed in the course of the last decade.

In section five, three domestic variables at the sub-State level are used to explain the variation in the MI-IRSSG: gross state income, juxtaposed government, and geographic border location. Using a simple statistical model (OLS regression), the income variable is submitted to empirical testing, sustaining the argument that the larger the economic resources at the state level, the larger the IRSSG. It is also argued that the existence of juxtaposed government and geographical border location, will generate incentives for sub-State governments to conduct more international relations.

#### 6.1. The international and domestic factors

As it was previously argued, growing globalization has significantly increased the costs of isolation for national States in the international system and has also reduced the control of the State over its territory and population, generating a substantial increase in the number and nature of actors with interests in international affairs. As a result, globalization is more intense and, therefore, the costs for the sub-State governments and actors to remain isolated are much higher. New actors with international incidence have decreasing costs of participation in external affairs, generating incentives for these players, among them sub-State governments, to participate more actively in international issues.

Specifically for the Mexican case, the country has witnessed a remarkable internationalization since the 1980s. For example, as a result of the incentives generated by globalization and interdependence, Mexico changed its economic

model and development strategy from a closed economy with strong state intervention and an import substitution industrialization (ISI) model, into an open economy which promotes economic development through the integration to the international market and the promotion of exports (Haggard and Webb 1994, Fuentes and Schiavon 2007). In only 15 years, from 1993 to 2008, the sum of imports and exports increased from representing 30% to 65% of GDP (World Bank 2015). Economic liberalization generated incentives for greater competition between sub-State units in the global market, to place their exports, attract foreign direct investment and tourism, and benefit from international cooperation. Facing a more open and competitive global market, the external activities of sub-State governments increased in order to find markets for their exports and sources of foreign investment and international cooperation to boost local development.

Parallel to the globalization and interdependence of the international system, since the 1970s, there has been a wave of democratization and decentralization around the globe. The return to democracy in the developing world and the growing decentralization of powers have provided the incentives for sub-State governments to participate in areas that used to be monopolized by the central government, including international affairs. Democratization opened the political space for a more ample and diverse representation of the local governments, while administrative decentralization gave these actors powers and resources to conduct public policies which are closer to the local preferences (Lijphart and Waisman 1996).

## 6.2. Mexican constitutional and institutional design

The Mexican Constitution establishes that Mexico is a presidential and federal system, with strong bicameralism (two symmetric and incongruent Houses of Congress). Thus, in terms of the institutional division of power, it is a system with the strongest possible formal level of separation of powers. However, as a result of more than 70 years (from 1929 to 2000) of hegemony or dominance of the official party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), Mexico functioned as one of the most centralized political systems of the world (Cornelius 1996). The extremely powerful federal Executive in Mexico can be understood by analyzing the relation between two central political actors in the system: the president, who has served as Chief of State and Government, and the official party. According to Weldon (1997), presidential power depends on: 1) the constitutional powers of the Executive, 2) the legislative strength of the President's party; 3) the degree of discipline exercised by the leaders over party members; and, 4) the competition that the President faces from rivals within his own party.

Due to the authoritarian system and the non-competitive nature of the elections that sustained the Mexican political system before 2000, the PRI had a majority (in some cases of more than 90% of the seats) in both houses of Congress from 1929 to 1997. Since the mid-1930s, the President had also been the *de facto* leader of the party; this, combined with the fact that there was no congressional or presidential reelection since that time, and that the party

delegated to the President the power to designate his successor and control key party nominations, generated a supremacy of the federal Executive over Congress and sub-State governments (Cornelius and Craig 1991). The latter was implemented through the nomination of party candidates to state and municipal posts, who most of the time won in uncontested elections. Also, the President could freely remove Governors from power, through constitutional means, via the PRI-controlled Senate or negotiated resignations. Even in the last years of the authoritarian regime, the control over the 32 federal units still existed. As an example, under President Carlos Salinas (1988-1994), 16 constitutionally elected Governors were removed from their posts during his administration (Ward, Rodríguez and Cabrero 1999).

As the practically undisputed leader of a highly disciplined party that held uninterrupted congressional majorities in both Houses of Congress for close to 70 years, the federal Executive was far from restrained by constitutionally limited powers (Cornelius 1996). The other relevant political actors in the system had incentives to ally with the Executive and support his policy preferences because he controlled, due to the rule of no reelection, their career advancement possibilities by defining who were the PRI candidates for the federal Congress and local (Governor, state legislatures and even the most important local governments) elections (Weldon 1997, 17). Thus, even if there were several *de jure* veto points in the Mexican institutional system due to the presidential, bicameral and federal divisions of power, the Mexican President was able to control *de facto* all the political actors in the system. To put it simply, he had the

power to enact his preferred policies once he perceived them as desirable, and then implement them to a considerable degree.

The President has always had the power to designate his cabinet members, among them the Foreign Affairs Secretary, who has traditionally been personally close to the President. For example, from 1982 to 2006, during the Miguel de la Madrid, Carlos Salinas, Ernesto Zedillo and Vicente Fox administrations, the Foreign Affairs Secretary was chosen from outside the ranks of the Mexican Foreign Service (Servicio Exterior Mexicano, SEM) —except in the last 11 months of the Salinas' administration when Ambassador Manuel Tello Macías replaced Manuel Camacho. President Felipe Calderón (2006-2012) designated a career diplomat, Ambassador Patricia Espinoza. However, Enrique Peña (2012-2018), once again designated Secretaries José Antonio Meade (2012-2015) and Claudia Ruiz Massieu (2015-present) from outside of the ranks of the SEM.

Until 2003, the SEM was the only professional civilian —non-military— service in Mexico, where the admission and promotion criteria were defined by merit, through periodical public exams. However, due to Mexican presidentialism, the SEM has always been under the direct command of the incumbent President in office. For example, a considerable number of Mexican Ambassadors — approximately 35-40% are presidential designations— are not foreign service diplomats, but appointed directly by the President. This situation has not changed with democratization; the Zedillo and the Fox administrations had 38% and 37% presidential appointees (in 1998 and 2001, respectively). President Calderon



established a distribution of approximately 2/3-1/3 as a parameter for the appointment of career and political Ambassadors (Garza, Schiavon and Velazquez, 2013), and the Peña Nieto administration has maintained these criteria in practice.

Due to these characteristics of the Mexican political system, during the authoritarian period, the President was able to impose his public policy preferences most of the time, because the other two branches of government were under his direct control and supported his preferred policies, particularly in foreign affairs. However, if the official party lost its majority in the Houses of Congress, or the President was no longer able to be the undisputed leader of his party, or discipline broke down in that party, the federal Executive would lose his extra-constitutional powers, keeping only those indicated in the Constitution. The following paragraphs will discuss how this happened with democratization between 1997 and 2000, especially with the election of an opposition candidate, Vicente Fox from center-right Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) in 2000, and the strengthening of the center-left Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD).

Table 6.1 shows the institutional and party variables of the Mexican political system, compared at four historical moments: 1982 (the last year of practically absolute PRI domination), 2000, 2006, and 2012. As it can be observed, the institutional variables (presidentialism, bicameralism, and federalism), and the foreign policy powers of the President have remained constant since the enactment of the 1917 Constitution, even after the democratization process. However, due to the changes in the composition of the

Houses of Congress and the sub-State governments, and decreasing party discipline, foreign policy and international affairs domination by the federal Executive has evolved to a situation where the President can no longer impose his preferred external policy, but has to coordinate international interests and activities with other political actors, specially the Legislature and sub-State governments.

Table 6.1. Institutions and power distribution in México (1982-2012)

Variable	1982	2000	2006	2012
Party in Executive	PRI	PAN	PAN	PRI
Constitutional division of power	Presidential	Presidential	Presidential	Presidential
Legislative division of power	Strong bicameralism	Strong bicameralism	Strong bicameralism	Strong bicameralism
Federal division of power	Federalism	Federalism	Federalism	Federalism
Foreign policy powers	Executive control, with foreign policy analysis, and treaty and Ambassador ratifications by Senate	Executive control, with foreign policy analysis, and treaty and Ambassador ratifications by Senate	Executive control, with foreign policy analysis, and treaty and Ambassador ratifications by Senate	Executive control, with foreign policy analysis, and treaty and Ambassador ratifications by Senate
Party Fragmentation	Low fragmentation ENP Deputies: 1.720 ENP Senate: 1.032	Medium fragmentation ENP Deputies: 2.769 ENP Senate: 2.786	Medium and growing fragmentation ENP Deputies: 3.520 ENP Senate: 3.596	Medium and stable fragmentation ENP Deputies: 3.550 ENP Senate: 3.320
Division of purpose between federal powers	Unified government: Absolute majority in House of Deputies and Senate: PRI	Divided government: Absolute majority in House of Deputies and Senate: No party	Divided government: Absolute majority in House of Deputies and Senate: No party	Divided government: Absolute majority in House of Deputies and Senate: No party

Table 6.1. Institutions and power distribution in México (1982-2012), Continued

Division of purpose between Houses of Legislature (first political force)	Unified legislature: PRI in Deputies: 74.8% PRI in Senate: 98.4%	Divided legislature: PRI in Deputies: 42.2% PRI in Senate: 46.1%	Divided Legislature: PAN in Deputies: 41.4% PAN in Senate: 40.6%	Divided Legislature: PRI in Deputies: 42.8% PRI in Senate: 42.1%
Division of purpose between orders of government	Unitary government: PRI Governors: 100%	Juxtaposed government: PAN Governors: 25.0%	Juxtaposed government: PAN Governors: 25.0%	Unitary Government: PRI Governors: 62.5%
Division of purpose within parties	Absolute discipline: Discipline index <sup>7</sup> with a tendency to 1.00	Discipline in decline: Discipline index between 0.899 and 0.957	Discipline stable: Discipline index between 0.920 and 0.980	Discipline stable: Discipline index between 0.915 and 0.985
Share of sub-State expenditures	17.8% (1990)	25.4%	34.4%	35.6%
Foreign policy and international affairs	Federal Executive absolute control without participation of federal powers and sub-State governments	Federal Executive control with participation of federal powers and sub-State governments	Federal Executive control with participation of federal powers and sub-State governments	Federal Executive control with participation of federal powers and sub-State governments

In 1982, the president's political party, the PRI, controlled 74.8% and 98.4% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate respectively, which generated a very low party fragmentation in the system (ENP

<sup>7</sup> Party discipline can be measured using the Rice Index, using the following formula:  $I_i = [\%Yes_i - \%No_i]$ . The index represents the absolute difference between the percentage of votes in favor and against in Congress of members of party  $i$ ; it varies between 0 and 1, where 0 means complete indiscipline (the members of a party vote half in favor and half against:  $[0.50-0.50]=0$ ) and 1 implies complete discipline (all the members of a party vote in the same way:  $[1-0]=1$  or  $[0-1]=1$ ). By legislature, the modified Rice Index (abstentions are counted as votes against) were: LVII legislature (1997-2000): PRI, 0.993; PAN, 0.882; PRD, 0.883; LVIII legislature (2000-2003): PRI, 0.899; PAN, 0.957; PRD, 0.922; there is no reliable data for the previous legislatures, but the majority of the authors support the idea that the discipline was close to 1.00 (Weldon 2003, 206-217). LX Legislature (2006-2009), PRI, 0.96; PAN, 0.98; and PRD, 0.92; LXII Legislature (2012-2015), PRI, 0.970; PAN, 0.985; and PRD, 0.915 (García Martínez 2009).

Representatives: 1.720; ENP Senate: 1.032); at the same time, Mexican federalism did not operate due to the fact that 100% of state Governors were from the PRI, generating the maximum possible degree of unitary government. Also, party discipline of PRI congressmen was almost absolute, due to the fact that their future political careers depended directly on the informal PRI leader, the President. Finally, sub-State expenditure was only 17.8% of total government expenditure. Therefore, it should not be surprising that the combination of the previous variables made the division of powers, bicameralism, and federalism unimportant institutional variables, thus generating a system without real checks and balances, where foreign policy reflected the preference of the federal Executive because of its domination over the system.

Nonetheless, even if the institutional configuration remained constant throughout the period, the democratization and decentralization processes changed the distribution of power considerably after 1997. On one hand, by year 2000, party fragmentation increased dramatically, especially in the Senate (ENP Representatives 2.769 (2000), 3.520 (2006), and 3.550 (2012); ENP Senate 2.786 (2000), 3.596 (2006), and 3.320 (2012)), and divided government became a reality. The PAN won the presidency in 2000 and 2006, but no party was able to control an absolute majority in any of the Chambers: the PRI had a plurality in 2000 in both of them (42.2% and 46.1% in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate respectively); even if PAN strengthened its presence in 2006, it did not obtain an absolute majority (41.4% and 40.6% in Deputies and Senate, respectively). The PRI won the presidential elections in 2012; however, it was

only able to gain a plurality of the seats in Congress (Deputies: 42.8%, Senate: 42.1%).

On the other hand, juxtaposed government also became a reality after 2000, because PAN only controlled one fourth (25.0%) of state governorships both in 2000 and 2006. The PRI was able to reverse this by 2012, when 62.5% of the state Governors was from this party. At the same time, party discipline started to decline in all three major parties (PRI, PAN and PRD), due to the factional struggles within them; party discipline declined from practically total discipline (1.0 in the Rice index) to, depending on the party, between 0.882 to 0.993; parties which control the Executive (PRI before 2000 and 2012-2015; PAN from 200-2012) present higher levels of discipline than opposition parties in Congress. Finally, sub-State expenditure increased in more than 40% in one decade, accounting for 25.4% of total government expenditure by year 2000, and almost 100% by 2006, when it reached over 34.4%, where it has marginally increased since then (35.6% in 2012).

Therefore, due to increasing party fragmentation and decreasing discipline, which generates divided and juxtaposed governments, the institutional configuration of the system (presidentialism, bicameralism, and federalism) achieved renewed and substantial importance in the Mexican system since 2000. The changes in these variables directly affected the provision of public policies, including foreign policy, functioning facilitators of increasing external activities in the other branches and orders of government. Thus, the total domination by the federal Executive of international affairs is now history.

In sum, the increasing participation of the Mexican SSG in the international arena responds to a combination of domestic (democratization, decentralization, and liberalization) and international (globalization and interdependence) variables. The democratization of the system, together with the economic liberalization and decentralization, created the spaces and incentives for the sub-State governments to participate more actively in international affairs, with the objective of advancing their particular interests and strengthening their local development.

Considering this, it can be argued that, facing an open and competitive global market, with the existence of a more plural economic and political system in Mexico, where the logic of the market prevails, the international activities of the Mexican federal unities will pursue three main objectives: 1) finding markets for their exports, 2) attracting foreign direct investment, tourism, and international cooperation for productive activities within their territory, and 3) strengthening ties with their emigrant populations to promote their protection and to encourage the flow of remittances and the productive investment of a proportion of them.

Along with these institutional objectives, as it was previously discussed, there can be other political or personal ones. First, international activism can be used as a mechanism of differentiation of the local Executive's public policies from those of other local authorities or the federal Executive, particularly when they belong to different political parties or defend contrasting ideologies. Second, given the wide publicity given to international activities at the local level, these can be used as a strategy by the local Executives to increase their visibility at the

national and international levels, in order to promote their political career. Finally, the personal or professional characteristics —education, origin and preferences— of the local Executive can also have an impact on the importance given to international affairs in its administration.

### 6.3. The legal framework of the international relations of Mexican SSG

In Mexico, the legal framework regarding foreign policy can be found in the Constitution, where the powers of the three branches of government are clearly defined. Even if there is no ruling in the Constitution that gives the federal units the power to have a direct participation in international affairs, neither is there an explicit prohibition. Article 124 of the Constitution establishes that “the powers that are not explicitly defined in the Constitution [...] are reserved for the states”. In the specific case of treaties, it is more precise by establishing that “states cannot, in any case, enter into alliances, treaties or coalitions with other States or foreign powers [...]” (article 117.I).

The specific attributions on foreign policy issues are defined in the Organic Law of Federal Public Administration, whose article 28.I, establishes that the SRE has the attribution to coordinate the external actions of all the ministries and agencies of the federal Executive and sub-State governments, without affecting their attributions. As such, SRE’s main responsibility is to conduct foreign policy. To do so, it has the power to participate in all types of treaties, agreements, and conventions of which the country is part. Regarding the negotiation of treaties,

the legal bases can be found in the Constitution and the Law for the Conclusion of Treaties of 1992. This law refers to two types of international instruments: first, the treaty, which is the agreement typified in the Constitution that, in order to be valid, must be approved by the Senate, and second, the Inter-Institutional Agreement (IIA), which is defined as “the agreement ruled by public international law, concluded [...] between any ministry or decentralized agency of the public federal, state or municipal administrations, and one or many foreign government agencies or international organizations [...]” (article 2.II).

One of the most important contributions of this law is that it incorporates the figure of IIA, which establishes the legal basis that allows sub-State governments to have greater participation in the international arena. However, the same law explicitly states that “the areas covered by inter-institutional agreements must be strictly circumscribed within the faculties of the ministries or decentralized agencies of the different levels of government” (article 2.II). Also, this law establishes that the bureaucratic agencies that enter into this type of agreements must keep the SRE informed, and that this ministry has the power to do a revision and determine if the agreements are legal, in which case, it registers them and keeps their official record (article 7). In practice, especially before the turn of the XXI century, some of the agreements signed by the states and other agencies of the different levels of government were not formally reviewed and approved by the SRE, and thus there is no precise record of all these legal instruments; however, the unregistered IIA are not valid according to Mexican and international law.



Due to the fact that the Law on the Conclusion of Treaties establishes that IIA are ruled by public international law; according to Palacios Treviño (2002, 64-67),

The law does not give the offices of the federal, state and municipal public administrations the status of subjects of international law — *ius tractate*— but only the attribution to pact in the name of Mexico, because those “institutions” cannot contract by themselves commitments that are regulated by international law since they are not subject of this legal order. As a consequence, if one of these ministries or decentralized agencies [...] signs an inter-institutional agreement, even if it is limited to “the faculties of the ministries or decentralized agencies of the different levels of government” and, for any reason, they cannot comply with it, the international responsibility rests on the Mexican State.

In order to prevent possible legal problems, the SRE published a “Guide for the Conclusion of Treaties and Inter-institutional Agreements”, which establishes the criteria to be followed in the negotiation of these legal instruments. According to the Guide, a treaty must be concluded if at least one of the following conditions applies: “a) it is an issue which rests within the powers of the federal legislature; b) it involves the Nation as a whole; c) it affects the national territory; d) it affects the human rights of individuals; e) it extends or modifies existent legislation; f) it generates financial obligations in which the Nations’ credit is compromised; g) the issue convened could be challenged before national courts” (Palacios Treviño 2002, 224). In case that the issue is not a matter of a treaty, according to the criteria above, an IIA can be signed by a ministry or agency, at the federal, state or municipal levels, as long as “a) the

content of the agreement falls within the exclusive faculty of the ministry or agency [...]; b) the agreement only affects the attributions of the signing ministry or agency; c) the financial obligations can be covered by the ordinary budget of the ministry or agency; d) it does not affect the human rights of individuals; and e) it does not modify the existing law” (Palacios Treviño 2002, 228).

Even if the regulations established by this Guide are very precise, it is important to point out that this document is not legally binding. This, combined with the fact that the Law on the Conclusion of Treaties is not widely known at the state and local levels, has led to the negotiation and adoption of several IIA without the knowledge or consent of the SRE, which is authorized to “determine the validity of the inter-institutional agreements that ministries and agencies of the federal Public Administration, as well as state and municipal governments, seek to sign” (article 11.X).

Given that the Constitution grants the federal Executive the exclusive power to conduct foreign policy, the activities of sub-State governments in international affairs, from a legal point of view, are not part of the national foreign policy. None of the federal units has a ministry within its governmental structure exclusively in charge of international affairs. Compared to the local issues of the state and its relations with the federal government, foreign affairs have had a smaller relative importance, even in a globalized world. As a consequence, the federal units have not tried to displace the federal government in foreign policy issues and the relation between the federal and sub-State governments has been complementary.

There have been a few cases in which there has been differences between the federal and SSG, when the latter have tried to sign IIA that are not circumscribed to the state's powers or faculties. For example, there was a case when a local government in Michoacán was negotiating an IIA with a Cuban local government to increase the levels of academic and scientific cooperation between them; one of the articles of the agreement included the provision of visas to facilitate the academic exchange. Since granting visas is an exclusive power of the federal government, this article was declared invalid by the SRE when it revised the IIA. In another occasion, the state of Tamaulipas, located in the border with the United States, started negotiations with the state of Texas, on the US side of the border, to facilitate the trade of goods and services between them, that is, a local version of a free trade agreement. Trade policy is a federal area of competence, and thus, when the SRE knew that this negotiation was taking place, it reacted immediately, and contacted the Mexican and US states to declare such negotiations and possible IIA as null. However, these cases have been exceptions and they have always been solved without generating conflict between the federal and SSG.

In sum, foreign policy, from a legal perspective, is still the exclusive responsibility of the federal Executive. Even so, the states have shown a considerable increase in their level of participation in international relations over the past two decades. However, the level of activism is not the same for all units, as it will be discussed in the next section. This is why it is important to classify and explain their varying degree of international participation.

#### 6.4. Measuring and classifying the international relations of Mexican SSG

In the literature on the international relations of sub-State governments in Mexico, the measurement and classification of the level of activity of states and municipalities in the international affairs is relatively recent (Schiavon 2006). In order to measure and classify these activities, in the following paragraphs a basic measurement of the International Relations of Sub-State Governments (IRSSG) will be constructed. The proposed levels of IRSSG, from lesser to greater degree are: 1) low; 2) medium; 3) high; and 4) very high.

Once the levels proposed have been established, the following step is to classify the Mexican federal units according to these criteria.<sup>8</sup> As previously discussed, Michelmann and Soldatos (1992) establish that the most important areas of international activity of SSG are export promotion, foreign investment attraction, service to their emigrant community abroad and international cooperation. They provide evidence that these areas of interest are valid in different countries around the world. Kincaid (2003) agrees with them when analyzing the case of the United States. Specifically, in order to achieve these interests, according to Duchaceck (1990) and Nganje (2013) among many others, in the past few decades, the increasing international activity of the federal

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<sup>8</sup> The information used to measure and classify the international activities of the states was obtained from the database and files on IIA of the SRE, the yearly reports presented by state Executives to their local Congress, the revision of the web pages of the states, interviews with federal (SRE) and state (coordinators and staff of the External Affairs Offices of the states) , and a survey conducted jointly with the SRE to all federal units, which was completed by 27 out of the 32 federal units. The information reflects the IRSSG during the first semesters of 2004, 2009, and 2014.

units worldwide has taken place in at least six areas: 1) establishment of offices of representation of the units in national capitals or cities of other countries; 2) organization of highly publicized trips of local Executives to other countries; 3) sending missions of local officers abroad to promote the unit; 4) organization of international events or exhibitions for local products at state and external levels; 5) deepening of the relations with other federal units in the regional scope or on global issues; and, 6) participation of local officers in international meetings or organizations. In the Mexican case, one more activity should be included: the establishment of offices to provide services to migrant communities abroad, particularly in the United States (Schiavon 2006).

Using the above activities identified in the literature, the next step is to measure the international participation of Mexican federal units. In order to do so, the international activities are aggregated in three areas: institutional structure (I), economic activity (E) and political activity (P). To measure the international relations of Mexican federal units in a quantitative way, a total value of one point is assigned to each of these areas of activity, which will then be divided equally between the specific international activities aggregated by each area.<sup>9</sup>

The institutional structure is divided in two parts: I1, indicates the existence of a bureaucratic structure for external economic promotion at the level of Direction or Deputy Direction within the state Ministry of Economics or Development; and I2 measures whether there is an office or coordination area of

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<sup>9</sup> The most important limitation of this exercise is that it only measures whether a specific activity takes place or not, without providing information on the frequency or quality of the activities reported. The measurement is neutral on the importance of each activity compared to the others, since it weighs all of them in equal terms.

the unit's international affairs that depends directly from the state Executive. Each of these variables will be assigned a value of 0.50, since the maximum value of I is 1.

The international economic activity is integrated by five variables, each of them reflecting a type of activity that contributes to the promotion of the external economic relations of the federal unit. The order in which the activities are presented (less to more costly) reflects the amount of financial and human resources that the sub-State government has to assign for their implementation. E1 contemplates activities to internationally promote the state through electronic resources as web pages or the existence of programs, funds and advisory agencies for export promotion and the attraction of foreign investment. E2 refers to international official trips for the promotion of trade and investment and/or the participation in international exhibitions or events for trade promotion. E3 represents the conclusion of agreements with trade chambers and/or cooperation agreements in the economic area with international partners. E4 includes the conclusion of agreements with external counterparts to finance local projects or cooperation agreements for regional development. Finally, E5 represents the establishment of offices in other countries for economic promotion. Although the order in which these activities are presented implies increasing costs in terms of resources to implement them, each of them has been granted the same value (0.20), and thus 1 is the maximum value for the economic activity area.

Finally, the international political activity is integrated by five activities, again each of them with a value of 0.20, and 1 being the maximum value for this

category. In increasing order of costs of implementation, P1 represents courtesy trips or visits abroad; P2, trips abroad directed to address the migrant population or activities carried out before other governments for the protection of local emigrants; P3, measures the conclusion of general sisterhood agreements where specific areas of international cooperation are not specified; P4, represents the membership in international associations or working groups that have a regional or border scope; and, finally, P5, establishes membership in international associations or organizations whose scope is global.

If	$IRSSG = 3,$	then,	very high
If	$2 \leq IRSSG < 3,$	then,	high
If	$1 \leq IRSSG < 2,$	then,	medium
If	$IRSSG < 1,$	then,	low

Figure 6.1. Typology of IRSSG in Mexico

When the three areas of international activity are added, the range of variation, depending on the number of activities enacted, is between 0 and 3; this number is the IRSSG for a specific federal unit. Based on this, the following ranges of international relations of the federal units can be established, according to the total points obtained by each unit (see Figure 6.1). Based on this typology, it is possible to quantify the international activity of the Mexican SSG. Such exercise will be presented in the following paragraphs for three different periods (2004, 2009 and 2014), in order to analyze and compare the levels of

international activity between Mexican federal units and its variation in time (see Tables 6.2 through 6.4).

According to Table 6.2, the states with the higher levels of IRSSG (high) are: Jalisco (2.60), Baja California (2.00) and Chiapas (2.00). In 2004, these states distinguished themselves from the rest for having an office dedicated to international affairs which depended directly on the state's Executive. In addition, they had within their respective Ministry of Economics an office in charge of the economic promotion of the state.

These are the only three states to obtain 1 point in the institutional component. In the economic area, although none of these units reached the highest possible grade, their participation was remarkable. Chiapas and Jalisco also stood out in the economic area for having agreements to promote local development. In the political aspect, Jalisco and Chiapas, besides Tabasco and the Estado de Mexico, were states that belonged to an international association with global scope, not only circumscribed to the discussion of immediate problems, like those derived from a border or regional situation. According to the typology, these three states would be placed in a high level of sub-State diplomacy.



Table 6.2. IRSSG in Mexico (2004)

Federal unit	I1	I2	I	E1	E2	E3	E4	E5	E	P1	P2	P3	P4	P5	P	IRSSG 2004
Aguascalientes	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.90</b>
Baja California	0.50	0.50	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.20	<b>0.60</b>	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.20	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	<b>2.00</b>
Baja California Sur	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	0.20	0.00	0.20	0.00	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	<b>1.30</b>
Campeche	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.20	<b>0.60</b>	0.00	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	<b>1.50</b>
Coahuila	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	<b>1.00</b>	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.20	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	<b>1.90</b>
Colima	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.00	0.00	<b>0.20</b>	<b>1.10</b>
Chiapas	0.50	0.50	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.20	0.00	<b>0.60</b>	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.00	0.20	<b>0.40</b>	<b>2.00</b>
Chihuahua	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.20	0.00	<b>0.60</b>	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.20	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	<b>1.50</b>
Distrito Federal	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.20</b>	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.00	0.00	<b>0.20</b>	<b>0.90</b>
Durango	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.90</b>
Guanajuato	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	<b>1.00</b>	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.00	0.00	<b>0.20</b>	<b>1.70</b>
Guerrero	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.90</b>
Hidalgo	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.20	<b>0.60</b>	0.00	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.20</b>	<b>1.30</b>
Jalisco	0.50	0.50	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.20	0.20	<b>0.80</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.20	<b>0.80</b>	<b>2.60</b>
Estado de México	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	<b>1.00</b>	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.00	0.20	<b>0.40</b>	<b>1.90</b>
Michoacán	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	<b>1.30</b>
Morelos	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.00	0.00	<b>0.20</b>	<b>1.10</b>
Nayarit	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.00	<b>0.20</b>	<b>1.10</b>
Nuevo León	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	<b>1.00</b>	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.20	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	<b>1.90</b>
Oaxaca	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.20	<b>0.60</b>	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.00</b>	<b>1.10</b>
Puebla	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.20	0.20	<b>0.80</b>	0.00	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	<b>1.70</b>
Querétaro	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.90</b>
Quintana Roo	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.20	<b>0.40</b>	<b>1.30</b>
San Luis Potosí	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.90</b>
Sinaloa	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.00	0.00	<b>0.20</b>	<b>1.10</b>
Sonora	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.00	<b>0.80</b>	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.20	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	<b>1.70</b>
Tabasco	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.20	<b>0.60</b>	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.20	<b>0.40</b>	<b>1.50</b>
Tamaulipas	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.20	<b>0.60</b>	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.20	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	<b>1.50</b>
Tlaxcala	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.00	0.00	<b>0.20</b>	<b>1.10</b>
Veracruz	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.20	<b>0.60</b>	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.20	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	<b>1.50</b>
Yucatán	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.00	<b>0.20</b>	<b>1.10</b>
Zacatecas	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.20	<b>0.60</b>	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.00</b>	<b>1.10</b>
<b>AVERAGE</b>	<b>0.50</b>	<b>0.05</b>	<b>0.55</b>	<b>0.20</b>	<b>0.19</b>	<b>0.03</b>	<b>0.06</b>	<b>0.09</b>	<b>0.57</b>	<b>0.02</b>	<b>0.03</b>	<b>0.12</b>	<b>0.07</b>	<b>0.03</b>	<b>0.27</b>	<b>1.38</b>

As an example of the international relations of these states, at that time, Jalisco designed its regional development policy based on the experience of the Committee of the Regions of the European Union. This state had an Office of International Affairs that depended upon the Governor's office. Its goals were to establish, promote, facilitate and coordinate communication and collaboration among the governmental units, and national, international and NGO, to

strengthen the international presence of the state. Its objectives were to plan, develop, coordinate and direct, along with the state ministries, the agenda of the state's executive regarding his international trips and to promote the cooperation with international organizations, states and regions of the world.

In the case of Chiapas, the uprising of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional, EZLN) in 1994 generated an important international visibility for the state, especially in terms of the poverty and inequality in which the indigenous populations in the state lived. Under the first non-PRI government in the history of the state (Governor Pablo Salazar Mendiguchía, 2000-2006, supported by a coalition of 8 parties, with the PRD, a center-left party, leading the coalition), in 2001, the state created a Coordination of International Relations to seek international cooperation in order to promote local development. This coordination was maintained by Governor Juan Sabines (2006-2012), also from the PRD. Both PRD governors saw international cooperation as a complement of the limited national resources dedicated to promote local growth and development, especially for indigenous communities which represent more than ¼ of the state's population (28.4%). The mission of the coordination was to consult and support all the areas of the state's government to establish projects, proposals and negotiations with international actors. By 2002, Chiapas had established cooperative relations with 43 countries of the five continents, as well as with diverse international organizations. Even if the majority of these relations were reduced to the conclusion of a general cooperation agreement that received little or no follow up, some of the

relationships generated specific cooperation projects. For example, in 2004, Chiapas signed an agreement with the European Union, through which it received 15 million euros to support the government's programs on poverty alleviation, indigenous development, and the conservation of the Lacandona rainforest. The state also established relations with international organizations such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, and the United Nations Development Program, among others, from which it received resources and training in the form of international decentralized cooperation.

In 2004, 23 states were identified in the medium IRSSG level. Although they all were positioned in the same level, it was not a homogenous group in terms of their level of international activity. There were some activities, both economic and political, that were only executed by some of them. Given that the majority of the Mexican federal units were positioned in this category, it was divided in three subcategories in order to provide a more detailed analysis. As such, divided in equal parts, three sub-levels of medium IRSSG can be observed: medium low ( $1 \leq PT < 1.33$ ), medium average ( $1.33 \leq PT < 1.67$ ), and medium high ( $1.67 \leq PT < 2$ ). The first rank included 12 states: Baja California Sur, Colima, Hidalgo, Michoacán, Morelos, Nayarit, Oaxaca, Quintana Roo, Sinaloa, Tlaxcala, Yucatán, and Zacatecas. There were 6 federal units located within the second rank: Campeche, Chihuahua, Puebla, Tabasco, Tamaulipas, and Veracruz. Finally, in the rank of medium high diplomacy, 5 states were included: Coahuila, Guanajuato, Estado de México, Nuevo León and Sonora.

From this last group, with the exception of Sonora, all of them have the highest possible points in the economic component.

A clear example of the international activities of these federal units was the participation of Campeche, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, Tamaulipas, Veracruz, and Yucatán, in the Gulf of Mexico States Agreement, with Texas, Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida. The main objective of this agreement was to promote cooperation to enhance the development of the states' economies and the region's infrastructure. However, its results have been limited. The state of Nuevo León worked hand in hand with its business community, universities and local research centers to encourage and promote local production and exports, as well as attracting direct foreign investment to the state. It held periodic meetings of a Mixed Commission for Export Promotion, which identified and organized business groups to encourage exports with high standards of quality, and organized commercial missions of businessmen and universities to selected countries to facilitate the creation of international networks.

The Estado de México, under the government of Arturo Montiel (1999-2005), developed an important political international activism, going beyond the economic and commercial arenas. In 2000, Governor Montiel made an official trip to South America, and had interviews with businessmen and public officials at the local and federal level, among them, the Presidents of Argentina and Chile, Fernando de la Rúa and Ricardo Lagos. In 2003, the Estado de México hosted the Biarritz Forum, which for the first time was held outside of Europe. This forum took place in Valle de Bravo as a result of the negotiations of Governor Montiel,

who offered to pay most of the logistic costs of the event. This gave him great national and international visibility. In the next administration, under Enrique Peña Nieto (2005-2011), the coordination of the international activities of the state were systemized and institutionalized.

On the other hand, the state of Michoacán initiated an automobile cluster with the Chinese builder FAW as a result of the investment promotion activities made by Governor Lázaro Cárdenas Batel (2002-008) in China since the beginning of his administration. Also, Michoacán, along with Guanajuato, Puebla, and Zacatecas, to mention a few, established representation offices abroad for the attention of their emigrant communities in the United States, in states like California, Illinois, New York and Texas, where a majority of Mexican migrants abroad live. These offices not only provided information and organized cultural and social events for their communities, but also coordinated their activities with Mexican Consulates in the U.S,<sup>10</sup> the central offices of the SRE in Mexico City, and SRE's delegations at the state capitals, in order to provide diverse services to the migrants and their families, like documentation, consular protection, legal advice, and repatriation of bodies.

Finally, the low level of sub-State diplomacy included 6 federal units: Aguascalientes, Distrito Federal, Durango, Guerrero, Querétaro, and San Luis Potosí. This group had a reduced participation in the economic scope, and practically had no activities in the political arena. The case of the Federal District during the administration of Andrés Manuel López Obrador (2000-2006) is worth

<sup>10</sup> Mexico has the largest Consular system in the world in a single country. Only in the United States, Mexico has 50 consulates (2016).

noting. Even though it had an office in charge of attracting foreign investment, there were no attendance logs to any event for the promotion of the state abroad, nor visible programs to encourage exports. Also, the series of agreements signed with foreign counterparts were either for technical cooperation or so general that no real bonds were established. As it will be explained in depth later, his successor, Marcelo Ebrard (2006-2012), reactivated the international participation of the Federal District decisively.

In only five years (between 2004 and 2009) the international relations of the Mexican states increased considerably. It is important to notice that, on average, the international activity of the federal units rose from 1.38 to 1.91 points, that is, 0.53 points in just five years, equivalent to a growth of 40.09% in the IRSSG.

By 2009, none of the federal units ranked at the low level. There were 21 states in the medium level, divided according to subcategories: medium-low, six states (Aguascalientes, Colima, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Querétaro, and Sinaloa); medium-average, three states (Nayarit, San Luis Potosí and Tlaxcala); and medium-high, 12 states (Baja California Sur, Campeche, Chihuahua, Durango, Hidalgo, Morelos, Puebla, Quintana Roo, Sonora, Tabasco, Tamaulipas, and Zacatecas). At the high level, there were seven states: four at the high-low level (Guanajuato, Michoacán, Veracruz, and Yucatán), two at the high-average (Baja California and Coahuila), and one at the high-high level (Nuevo León).

Table 6.3. IRSSG in Mexico (2009)

Federal unit	I1	I2	I	E1	E2	E3	E4	E5	E	P1	P2	P3	P4	P5	P	IRSS G 2009
Aguascalientes	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.20</b>	<b>1.10</b>
Baja California	0.50	0.50	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.20	<b>0.90</b>	0.20	0.00	0.20	0.20	0.00	<b>0.60</b>	<b>2.50</b>
Baja California Sur	0.50	0.50	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	0.20	0.00	0.20	0.00	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	<b>1.80</b>
Campeche	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.20	<b>0.60</b>	0.00	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.00	<b>0.60</b>	<b>1.70</b>
Coahuila	0.50	0.50	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.20	<b>0.80</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.00	<b>0.80</b>	<b>2.60</b>
Colima	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.00	0.00	<b>0.20</b>	<b>1.10</b>
Chiapas	0.50	0.50	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	<b>1.00</b>	<b>3.00</b>
Chihuahua	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.20	<b>0.60</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.00	<b>0.80</b>	<b>1.90</b>
Distrito Federal	0.50	0.50	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	<b>1.00</b>	<b>3.00</b>
Durango	0.50	0.50	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	<b>1.80</b>
Guanajuato	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	<b>0.60</b>	<b>2.10</b>
Guerrero	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.00	0.00	<b>0.20</b>	<b>1.10</b>
Hidalgo	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.20	<b>0.80</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	<b>0.60</b>	<b>1.90</b>
Jalisco	0.50	0.50	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	<b>1.00</b>	<b>3.00</b>
Estado de México	0.50	0.50	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	<b>1.00</b>	<b>3.00</b>
Michoacán	0.50	0.50	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	<b>0.60</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	<b>0.60</b>	<b>2.20</b>
Morelos	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	<b>0.60</b>	0.20	0.00	0.20	0.00	0.20	<b>0.60</b>	<b>1.70</b>
Nayarit	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	<b>0.60</b>	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	<b>1.50</b>
Nuevo León	0.50	0.50	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.00	<b>0.80</b>	<b>2.80</b>
Oaxaca	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	0.00	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	<b>1.30</b>
Puebla	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.20	0.20	<b>0.80</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	<b>0.60</b>	<b>1.90</b>
Querétaro	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	0.20	0.00	0.20	0.00	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	<b>1.30</b>
Quintana Roo	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	<b>0.60</b>	0.20	0.00	0.20	0.20	0.20	<b>0.80</b>	<b>1.90</b>
San Luis Potosí	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	<b>0.60</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	<b>1.50</b>
Sinaloa	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.20</b>	<b>1.10</b>
Sonora	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.20	0.00	<b>0.60</b>	0.20	0.00	0.20	0.20	0.00	<b>0.60</b>	<b>1.70</b>
Tabasco	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.00	<b>0.80</b>	<b>1.70</b>
Tamaulipas	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.20	<b>0.60</b>	0.20	0.00	0.20	0.20	0.00	<b>0.60</b>	<b>1.70</b>
Tlaxcala	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	0.20	0.00	0.20	0.20	0.00	<b>0.60</b>	<b>1.50</b>
Veracruz	0.50	0.50	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.00	<b>0.80</b>	<b>2.20</b>
Yucatán	0.50	0.50	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.20	0.00	<b>0.60</b>	<b>2.00</b>
Zacatecas	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.20	<b>0.60</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.20	<b>0.60</b>	<b>1.70</b>
<b>AVERAGE</b>	<b>0.50</b>	<b>0.19</b>	<b>0.69</b>	<b>0.20</b>	<b>0.20</b>	<b>0.09</b>	<b>0.05</b>	<b>0.10</b>	<b>0.63</b>	<b>0.18</b>	<b>0.12</b>	<b>0.16</b>	<b>0.11</b>	<b>0.04</b>	<b>0.60</b>	<b>1.91</b>

Finally, by 2009, four federal units ranked at the very high level: Chiapas, Distrito Federal, Jalisco, and Estado de México, compared to 2004, when there were none. These four units characterized themselves by conducting all the activities included in the quantitative analysis. Their involvement in international relations is such that these states, along with Coahuila and Hidalgo, are the main actors in the creation of the Association of International Affairs Offices of the

States (Asociación de Oficinas de Asuntos Internacionales de los Estados, AMAIE), which was officially founded on April 2, 2009, with the initial participation of 13 federal units. AMAIE defined as its mission to coordinate the foreign activities of the states, both in the global sphere and with the federal government. Even more, starting in 2009, Chiapas integrated its coordination of international activities and the promotion of tourism, creating the Ministry of Tourism and International Relations. Although this ministry is not exclusively dedicated to international relations, Chiapas was the first state to take its external affairs to a ministerial level.

The federal units whose level of international relations increased more drastically between 2004 and 2009 were the Distrito Federal (2.10 points), Estado de México (1.10), and Chiapas (1.10), while Durango, Michoacán, Nuevo León, and Yucatán increased their international activity in 0.90 points. Only three states (Colima, Sinaloa, and Sonora) did not increase their international activities, while no state reduced them in net terms. The international actions that grew the most were the political ones, with an increment, on average, of 0.33 points, while the institutional structure and the economic activity rose slightly in 0.14 and 0.07 points each.

Regarding the Distrito Federal, its growing international activities under the Ebrard administration were due to several internal changes: 1) the re-initiation of international trips by the local Executive; 2) the reactivation of cooperation and sisterhood agreements that already existed; 3) the strengthening of mechanisms to attract foreign investment and to promote



exports; 4) the project to open five representation offices for the attention of its emigrant community abroad of which two were opened; 5) the widening in the number of foreign counterparts, at all levels of government, and with public and private international organizations; and 6) the coordination of all of the above in a harmonic way by restructuring the bureaucracy of the General Coordination of International Affairs. As such, Ebrard's administration, unlike those of his predecessor, made international affairs an essential part of his government strategy. As a result, the Federal District has passed from a level of low to very high IRSSGG between 2004 and 2009 (Schiavon, 2008).

Five years later, in 2014, the IRSSG once again grew. In absolute terms, the international activity increased in similar terms as in the previous five years (0.51 points); however, in relative terms, taking 2009 as the base year, the external actions only grew 32.81% between 2009 and 2014. The accumulated growth in the decade (2004-2014), using 2004 as the base year, was of 85.70%. Once again, there are no federal units in the low level, and in the medium level, there are only six states: one at the medium-low (Colima), two at the medium-average (Nayarit and Tlaxcala), and three at the medium-high (Baja California Sur, Guerrero, and Sinaloa). For the first time, the vast majority of the states (21) are at the high level of IRSSG: six at the high-low level (Campeche, Chihuahua, Morelos, Oaxaca, San Luis Potosí, and Tamaulipas), ten at the high-average (Aguascalientes, Baja California, Coahuila, Durango, Michoacán, Quintana Roo, Sonora, Tabasco, Yucatán, and Zacatecas), and five at the high-high level (Guanajuato, Nuevo León, Puebla, and Veracruz). Finally, five federal units are

at the maximum level (very high): apart from the four that had already reached this level in 2009 (Chiapas, Distrito Federal, Jalisco, and Estado de México), Querétaro has joined the ranks of the Mexican sub-State governments with the highest possible level of international activity.

Table 6.4. IRSSG in Mexico (2014)

Federal unit	I1	I2	I	E1	E2	E3	E4	E5	E	P1	P2	P3	P4	P5	P	IRSSG 2014
Aguascalientes	0.50	0.50	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.00	<b>0.80</b>	0.20	0.00	0.20	0.00	0.20	<b>0.60</b>	<b>2.40</b>
Baja California	0.50	0.50	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.00	0.20	0.20	0.00	<b>0.60</b>	<b>2.60</b>
Baja California Sur	0.50	0.50	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	0.20	0.00	0.20	0.00	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	<b>1.80</b>
Campeche	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	<b>1.00</b>	0.00	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	<b>0.80</b>	<b>2.30</b>
Coahuila	0.50	0.50	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.20	<b>0.80</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.00	<b>0.80</b>	<b>2.60</b>
Colima	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.00	0.00	<b>0.20</b>	<b>1.10</b>
Chiapas	0.50	0.50	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	<b>1.00</b>	<b>3.00</b>
Chihuahua	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.00	<b>0.80</b>	<b>2.30</b>
Distrito Federal	0.50	0.50	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	<b>1.00</b>	<b>3.00</b>
Durango	0.50	0.50	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.00	<b>0.80</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	<b>0.60</b>	<b>2.40</b>
Guanajuato	0.50	0.50	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.20	<b>0.80</b>	<b>2.80</b>
Guerrero	0.50	0.50	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.20	<b>0.40</b>	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.00	0.20	<b>0.40</b>	<b>1.80</b>
Hidalgo	0.50	0.50	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.20	<b>0.80</b>	<b>2.80</b>
Jalisco	0.50	0.50	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	<b>1.00</b>	<b>3.00</b>
Estado de México	0.50	0.50	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	<b>1.00</b>	<b>3.00</b>
Michoacán	0.50	0.50	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.00	<b>0.80</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.20	<b>0.80</b>	<b>2.60</b>
Morelos	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.00	0.20	0.00	0.20	<b>0.60</b>	<b>2.10</b>
Nayarit	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	<b>0.60</b>	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.20	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	<b>1.50</b>
Nuevo León	0.50	0.50	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.00	<b>0.80</b>	<b>2.80</b>
Oaxaca	0.50	0.50	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.00	<b>0.80</b>	0.00	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.20	<b>0.60</b>	<b>2.40</b>
Puebla	0.50	0.50	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.20	<b>0.80</b>	<b>2.80</b>
Querétaro	0.50	0.50	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	<b>1.00</b>	<b>3.00</b>
Quintana Roo	0.50	0.50	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.00	<b>0.80</b>	0.20	0.00	0.20	0.20	0.20	<b>0.80</b>	<b>2.60</b>
San Luis Potosí	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.00	<b>0.80</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	<b>1.00</b>	<b>2.30</b>
Sinaloa	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.00	<b>0.80</b>	0.20	0.00	0.20	0.20	0.00	<b>0.60</b>	<b>1.90</b>
Sonora	0.50	0.50	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.00	<b>0.80</b>	0.20	0.00	0.20	0.20	0.00	<b>0.60</b>	<b>2.40</b>
Tabasco	0.50	0.50	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.20	0.00	<b>0.60</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	<b>1.00</b>	<b>2.60</b>
Tamaulipas	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.00	0.20	0.20	0.00	<b>0.60</b>	<b>2.10</b>
Tlaxcala	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.40</b>	0.20	0.00	0.20	0.20	0.00	<b>0.60</b>	<b>1.50</b>
Veracruz	0.50	0.50	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.00	<b>0.80</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	<b>1.00</b>	<b>2.80</b>
Yucatán	0.50	0.50	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.00	<b>0.80</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.00	<b>0.80</b>	<b>2.60</b>
Zacatecas	0.50	0.00	<b>0.50</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	<b>1.00</b>	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	<b>1.00</b>	<b>2.50</b>
<b>AVERAGE</b>	<b>0.50</b>	<b>0.34</b>	<b>0.84</b>	<b>0.20</b>	<b>0.19</b>	<b>0.17</b>	<b>0.16</b>	<b>0.11</b>	<b>0.83</b>	<b>0.18</b>	<b>0.13</b>	<b>0.19</b>	<b>0.13</b>	<b>0.12</b>	<b>0.74</b>	<b>2.42</b>

It is important to note that all the federal units, with the exception of Colima and those that had already reached the highest level in 2009, increased their international relations between 2009 and 2014, and none of them had a reversal in its internationalization.

Table 6.5. Comparative IRSSG (2004-2014)

Federal Units	2004	2004 IRSSG	2009	2009 IRSSG	2014	2014 IRSSG
Aguascalientes	0.90	Low-High	1.10	Medium-Low	2.40	High-Average
Baja California	2.00	High-Low	2.40	High-Average	2.60	High-Average
Baja California Sur	1.30	Medium-Low	1.80	Medium-High	1.80	Medium-High
Campeche	1.50	Medium-Average	1.70	Medium-High	2.30	High-Low
Coahuila	1.90	Medium-High	2.60	High-Average	2.60	High-Average
Colima	1.10	Medium-Low	1.10	Medium-Low	1.10	Medium-Low
Chiapas	2.00	High-Low	3.00	Very High	3.00	Very High
Chihuahua	1.50	Medium-Average	1.90	Medium-High	2.30	High-Low
Distrito Federal	0.90	Low-High	3.00	Very High	3.00	Very High
Durango	0.90	Low-High	1.80	Medium-High	2.40	High-Average
Guanajuato	1.70	Medium-High	2.10	High-Low	2.80	High-High
Guerrero	0.90	Low-High	1.10	Medium-Low	1.80	Medium-High
Hidalgo	1.30	Medium-Low	1.90	Medium-High	2.80	High-High
Jalisco	2.60	High-Average	3.00	Very High	3.00	Very High
Estado de México	1.90	Medium-High	3.00	Very High	3.00	Very High
Michoacán	1.30	Medium-Low	2.20	High-Low	2.60	High-Average
Morelos	1.10	Medium-Low	1.70	Medium-High	2.10	High-Low
Nayarit	1.10	Medium-Low	1.50	Medium-Average	1.50	Medium-Average
Nuevo León	1.90	Medium-High	2.80	High-High	2.80	High-High
Oaxaca	1.10	Medium-Low	1.30	Medium-Low	2.40	High-Low
Puebla	1.70	Medium-High	1.90	Medium-High	2.80	High-High
Querétaro	0.90	Low-High	1.30	Medium-Low	3.00	Very High
Quintana Roo	1.30	Medium-Low	1.90	Medium-High	2.60	High-Average
San Luis Potosí	0.90	Low-High	1.50	Medium-Average	2.30	High-Low
Sinaloa	1.10	Medium-Low	1.10	Medium-Low	1.90	Medium-High
Sonora	1.70	Medium-High	1.70	Medium-High	2.40	High-Average
Tabasco	1.50	Medium-Average	1.70	Medium-High	2.60	High-Average
Tamaulipas	1.50	Medium-Average	1.70	Medium-High	2.10	High-Low
Tlaxcala	1.10	Medium-Low	1.50	Medium-Average	1.50	Medium-Average
Veracruz	1.50	Medium-Average	2.20	High-Low	2.80	High-High
Yucatán	1.10	Medium-Low	2.00	High-Low	2.60	High-Average
Zacatecas	1.10	Medium-Low	1.70	Medium-High	2.50	High-Average
<b>AVERAGE</b>	<b>1.38</b>	<b>Medium-Average</b>	<b>1.91</b>	<b>Medium-High</b>	<b>2.42</b>	<b>High-Average</b>

This means that those international actions that were enacted in the first period (2004-2009) are to some extent institutionalized and maintained or increased during the second period (2009-2014). However, the rate of growth decreased from 42.09% to 32.81% from the first to the second period. The federal units that presented the highest increments in their international relations in the decade were the Distrito Federal and Querétaro (both with 233.33%), followed by Aguascalientes and Durango (166.67% both).

In sum, the IRSSG in Mexico has grown substantially in the last decade, increasing at the national level from a medium-average in 2004, to medium high in 2009, to high-average in 2014. However, there is an important variation in these international activities not only in time, but most importantly between federal units. The next section seeks to understand better what explains these substantive differences between the Mexicans SSG.

#### 6.5. Explaining the variation in the IRSSG in Mexico

Once the IRSSG in Mexico has been measured, the next step is to confront these levels of international activities with the explanatory variables proposed in this chapter's hypothesis: level of income, juxtaposed government, and geographic location, to establish the impact of these variables on the activities of Mexican federal units in the international arena. In this dissertation, the MI-IRSSG will be treated as the explained variable. However, a previous version of the MI-IRSSG (for 2004 and 2009) has been used as an explanatory

variable of the FDI attracted by Mexican states (Grau 2013). In his B.A. thesis, Grau demonstrates (through quantitative analysis) that the higher the level of MI-IRSSG in a given Mexican state, the more FDI it attracts, especially with countries with whom it has IIAs. This demonstrates that investing in international activities and signing IIAs are effective strategies for Mexican SSG to attract FDI and thus promoting local development and welfare.


#### 6.5.1. Economic variable: Income

It can be expected that, the greater the level of income of a federal unit, measured through the state's gross internal product,<sup>11</sup> the more economic resources there should be to invest in public policies, among them, a greater international participation. In order to test the relationship between the level of state income (2003 data, in millions of constant pesos) and the level of IRSSG, a statistical model (Ordinary Least Squares) was used to describe the relation between the two variables.


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<sup>11</sup> The variable of state gross internal product can be used as a proxy of many variables, since it is the aggregation of government expenditure, investment, consumption, imports and exports at the state level.

Graph 6.1. State income and IRSSG in 2004 (with DF)



Graph 6.2. State income and IRSSG in 2004 (without DF)



The result of this simple regression model was a moderately significant statistical relation between income and level of participation. However, observing 2004 data (see Graph 6.1), the Distrito Federal is an outlier, since it is the federal unit with the highest income and the lowest level of international activity. Given that it is an atypical case between 2000 and 2006, as was previously discussed, this federal unit was excluded from the model. When the statistical model is executed including only the 31 states, the results are impressive: the coefficient establishes a positive relation between income and international relations ( $1.22 \cdot 10^{-6}$ ), which is statistically significant with a degree of confidence of 99% (.001) and an adjusted  $R^2$  of 0.3965. By not including the Distrito Federal, the level of statistical relation between both variables is considerable and significant at the level of 1% of confidence, and approximately 40% of the variation in the level of IRSSG can be explained by a single variable: income (see Graph 6.2).

The same statistical exercise was performed for 2009, including the 32 federal units. The results of the OLS model between income of the federal units (data of 2008, in millions of constant pesos) and the level of IRSSG, generates a positive relationship coefficient ( $9.76 \cdot 10^{-7}$ ), which is statistically significant at the 99% level of confidence (0.001), and an adjusted  $R^2$  of 0.3990. This means that by 2009, the statistical relationship between the two variables exists for the all the federal units —the Distrito Federal is no longer an outlier—, and there is no change in the level of statistical significance and almost no modification in the level of importance of the income variable (see Graph 6.3).





Once again, this statistical exercise was conducted for 2014, also including all 32 federal units (data of 2013, in millions of constant pesos) and the level of IRSSG for 2014. Just as in the two previous cases, the model generates a positive relationship coefficient ( $5.84 \times 10^{-7}$ ), which is statistically significant at the 99% level of confidence (0.0028), and an adjusted  $R^2$  of 0.2372. This means that by 2014, there is a shift in the power of explanatory variables over time: the statistical relationship between the two variables exists, but is less important, for all the federal units —the Distrito Federal included—. The level of statistical significance is still at 99%, and the level of importance of the income variable is reduced to explain around one fourth of the variation in the IRSSG (see Graph 6.4).

Table 6.6. The effect of state income on IRSSG (2004, 2009, 2014)

Variable	2004 w/DF	2004 wo/DF	2009	2014
State income 2003	6.089e-08 (1.854e-07)	2.899e-07*** (2.230e-07)		
State income 2008			9.761e-07*** (2.101e-07)	
State income 2013				5.842e-07*** (1.791e-07)
Constant	1.3621097	1.3065507	1.5482624	2.1792038
Observations	32	31	32	32
Adjusted R-squared	0.0311	0.3965	0.3990	0.2372

Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses; \*p<0.10; \*\*p <0.05; \*\*\*p <0.01.

In sum, in terms of explanatory power, approximately 40%, 40% and 24%<sup>12</sup> of the variation in the international relations of the states in 2004, 2009 and 2014, respectively, is explained by a single variable: state income. If instead of these models a simple correlation was calculated, there is also a strong correlation between income and IRSSG: 0.2347 (2004), 0.6468 (2009) and 0.5117 (2014). Therefore, with the exception of the Distrito Federal between 2000 and 2006, the states with higher levels of income tend to have higher levels of international participation. The exceptionality of the federal unit with the highest income having the lowest degree of international activity has been solved by Marcelo Ebrard's administration, as will be discussed in depth. By 2009, the relationship between the two variables has been generalized for all the cases, keeping its statistical significance and correlation, strengthening the argument that state income is a variable of considerable importance for explaining the level of IRSSG in Mexico.

#### 6.5.2. Political variable: Juxtaposed governments

Another possible explanatory variable for the states' participation in the international arena is the party affiliation of the state's Executive. It can be argued that when the Governor of a state belongs to the same party as the federal Executive, they share a similar political program, and thus the foreign

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<sup>12</sup> Since the maximum value of the MI-IRSSG is 3 and several states have already obtained the maximum value in 2009, the rate of change of the MI-IRSSG between 2009 and 2014 (and afterwards if it is measured again in 2019) and the statistical relation will tend to decrease, since several states cannot increase quantitatively their IRSSG anymore.

policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs represents the interests of the state in international issues. On the other hand, those state Executives with a party affiliation different from that of the federal Executive (juxtaposed government), may have different or complementary interests to those reflected on the foreign policy of the federation, and therefore will have more incentives to conduct international activities. Therefore, a higher level of activity should be observed in federal units with juxtaposed governments. In a strict sense, the incentive for greater international activity only applies in quantitative terms, since the quality of this participation could be complementary or opposed to the foreign policy of the federal government. Alternatively, it could also be argued that if the same party rules in the federal and state governments, then the latter could have more opportunities to expand its international relations, since local officials would face fewer hurdles in pursuing their own activities due to similar political agendas, personal and party links with the federal government, or could be included in government visits abroad, in negotiating teams or in the national representation in international organizations.

According to Table 6.7, in 2004, among the three states that have the higher levels of sub-State diplomacy, two are governed by the same party at the federal level, including the state of Jalisco, which has the highest score of all the federal units. However, the PAN also governed states with medium-low levels of international activity (Morelos, Nayarit, and Yucatán) and three states in the low level of IRSSG (Aguascalientes, Querétaro, and San Luis Potosí). The PRD and

PRI also control the governorship in federal units with high, medium, and low levels of participation indistinctly (see Table 6.7).

Table 6.7. Party affiliation and IRSSG in 2004

Political Party	Low-High	Medium-Low	Medium-Average	Medium-High	High-Low	High-Average	High-High	Very High
<b>PAN</b>	Aguascalientes Querétaro San Luis Potosí	Morelos Nayarit Yucatán		Guanajuato	Baja California	Jalisco		
<b>PRD</b>	Distrito Federal	Baja California Sur Michoacán Tlaxcala Zacatecas			Chiapas			
<b>PRI</b>	Durango Guerrero	Colima Hidalgo Oaxaca Quintana Roo Sinaloa	Campeche Chihuahua Tabasco Tamaulipas Veracruz	Coahuila Estado de México Nuevo León Puebla Sonora				

Note: Federal Executive: PAN (October 2004)

Table 6.8. Party affiliation and IRSSG in 2009

Political Party	Low-High	Medium-Low	Medium-Average	Medium-High	High-Low	High-Average	High-High	Very High
<b>PAN</b>		Aguascalientes	Tlaxcala	Morelos Sonora	Guanajuato	Baja California		Jalisco
<b>PRD</b>		Guerrero		Baja California Sur Zacatecas	Michoacán			Chiapas Distrito Federal
<b>PRI</b>		Colima Oaxaca Querétaro Sinaloa	Nayarit San Luis Potosí	Campeche Chihuahua Durango Hidalgo Puebla Quintana Roo Tabasco Tamaulipas	Veracruz Yucatán	Coahuila	Nuevo León	Estado de México

Note: Federal Executive: PAN (October 2009)

Table 6.9. Party affiliation and IRSSG in 2014

Political Party	Low-High	Medium-Low	Medium-Average	Medium-High	High-Low	High-Average	High-High	Very High
<b>PAN</b>				Baja California Sur Sinaloa		Baja California Sonora	Guanajuato Puebla	
<b>PRD</b>				Guerrero	Morelos Oaxaca*	Tabasco		Distrito Federal
<b>PRI</b>		Colima	Nayarit Tlaxcala		Campeche Chihuahua San Luis Potosí Tamaulipas	Aguascalientes Coahuila Durango Michoacán Quintana Roo Yucatán Zacatecas	Hidalgo Nuevo León Veracruz	Chiapas** Jalisco Estado de México Querétaro

\*Coalition with Movimiento Ciudadano; \*\*Coalition with Partido Verde; Federal Executive: PRI (October 2014)

By 2009, the lack of correlation between party affiliation of the local Executives and the level of international activity of the states remains constant, since Governors of the same political party (in the three most important political parties), have medium, high, and very high levels of international relations (see Table 6.8). In the level of highest participation there are federal units governed by PAN (Jalisco), PRD (Chiapas and Distrito Federal), and PRI (Estado de México).

In the 2012 federal election, the PRI candidate, Enrique Peña Nieto, was elected as President, after two PAN administrations. Even if there is a change in the political party at the federal level, we can observe the exact same phenomena in terms of the external activities of the Mexican federal units: states governed by the same political party have different degrees of IRSSG, and within the same level of activity, we observe states of different political colors.

Thus, it can be argued that the fact that a state is governed by a political party different from the President's party at the federal level, be it from PRI or PAN, is not a variable that affects the IRSSG in a positive or negative way. It is interesting to note that the three states with greater external participation in 2004 (Baja California, Jalisco, and Chiapas) initiated and increased their international activities intensively during the administrations where the state governments had a party affiliation other than that of the President: the first two had PAN Governors when the federal Executives were from the PRI during the decade of 1990, and the third, had a PRD government when there was a PAN President in 2000-2006. The same situation can be observed in 2009, since the biggest increment in international activity during this period (Distrito Federal, Estado de México, and Chiapas) took place in federal units governed by parties different to that of the federal Executive (the PRD in the first and last cases, and the PRI in the second one). Finally, Querétaro, under a PRI government that was juxtaposed to the federal PAN administration, also increased its external activities between 2009 and 2012. If this is taken into consideration, it seems that the political juxtaposition works more as a trigger variable that provides an incentive to initiate and increase international relations, than an explanation of the amount of IRSSG.

### 6.5.3. Geographic location: Border situation

The geographic location of border states favors the establishment of contacts and communication with the territorial units of countries with which they share a border. Therefore, it can be argued that states that are located at international borders should have higher levels of IRSSG than those with no foreign borders.

Table 6.10. Northern Border States and level of IRSSG (2004)

<b>States</b>	<b>Points</b>	<b>Level of IRSSG</b>
Baja California	2.00	High-Low
Chihuahua	1.50	Medium-Average
Coahuila	1.90	Medium-High
Nuevo León	1.90	Medium-High
Sonora	1.70	Medium-High
Tamaulipas	1.50	Medium-Average
<b>Average</b>	<b>1.75</b>	<b>Medium-High</b>

Table 6.11. Northern Border States and level of IRSSG (2009)

<b>States</b>	<b>Points</b>	<b>Level of IRSSG</b>
Baja California	2.40	High-Average
Chihuahua	1.90	Medium-High
Coahuila	2.60	High-Average
Nuevo León	2.80	High-High
Sonora	1.70	Medium-High
Tamaulipas	1.70	Medium-High
<b>Average</b>	<b>2.18</b>	<b>High-Low</b>

Table 6.12. Northern Border States and level of IRSSG (2014)

<b>States</b>	<b>Points</b>	<b>Level of IRSSG</b>
Baja California	2.60	High-Average
Chihuahua	2.30	High-Low
Coahuila	2.60	High-Average
Nuevo León	2.80	High-High
Sonora	2.40	High-Average
Tamaulipas	2.10	High-Low
<b>Average</b>	<b>2.46</b>	<b>High-Average</b>

According to Table 6.10, the six Mexican states that share a border with the United States had higher levels of IRSSG than the national average of 1.38, and their average international activity (1.75 or medium-high) is considerably higher (26.8%) than the national (medium-average). Four of them are qualified as having an important international activity (one with high-low and three with medium-high levels), while the other two had a medium-average participation level. By 2009, (see Table 6.10), the international activity of all states located at the northern border increased, with the exception of Sonora. All of them were, at least, at the medium-high category and, on average, their international relations were once again higher (2.18 or high-low level), than the national average (1.91) of medium-high. On 2014, the IRSSG of the northern border states (2.46) was again higher than the national average (2.42), both of them being at the high-average level, and four of them (Baja California, Chihuahua, Sonora, and Tamaulipas) increased their external activities.

The international activism presented in the northern border states of Mexico can be mostly explained by the attraction pole that the market of the United States represents for them. This factor gained even more relevance with



the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994. On the other hand, the intense dynamism of the northern border has led to cooperation between local authorities on both sides of the border to solve common problems. The fact that these states participate in border associations and conferences that have high level of institutionalization is an important indicator of the level of interaction between the northern Mexican states and their counterparts in the United States. As an example, this close relation led to the creation of the Association of Border Governors, whose mandate is to improve the comparative advantages of the region through cooperation in areas of security, infrastructure, environment, education, and energy. Taking into account the previous information, it can be argued that in the case of the Mexican northern border states, the geographic location has been an important incentive for the active participation of these federal units internationally.

Table 6.13. Southern Border States and level of IRSSG (2004)

<b>States</b>	<b>Points</b>	<b>Level of IRSSG</b>
Campeche	1.50	Medium-Average
Chiapas	2.00	High-Low
Quintana Roo	1.30	Medium-Low
Tabasco	1.50	Medium-Average
<b>Average</b>	<b>1.58</b>	<b>Medium-Average</b>

Table 6.14. Southern Border States and level of IRSSG (2009)

<b>States</b>	<b>Points</b>	<b>Level of IRSSG</b>
Campeche	1.70	Medium High
Chiapas	3.00	Very High
Quintana Roo	1.90	Medium High
Tabasco	1.70	Medium High
<b>Average</b>	<b>2.08</b>	<b>High-Low</b>

Table 6.15. Southern Border States and level of IRSSG (2014)

<b>States</b>	<b>Points</b>	<b>Level of IRSSG</b>
Campeche	2.30	High-Low
Chiapas	3.00	Very High
Quintana Roo	2.60	High-Average
Tabasco	2.60	High-Average
<b>Average</b>	<b>2.62</b>	<b>High-Average</b>

According to Table 6.13, in 2004 the relation between being a southern border states and their international participation (1.58, medium-average) was not as intense as in the case of the North (1.75). However, their activism is still higher than the national average (1.38). Among the four border states, Chiapas is the only one that presents a high level of international relations. This elevated level of external activity is a consequence of the growing international visibility that resulted from the Zapatista uprising in 1994, which led to the creation of its Coordination of International Relations at the state level in 2001, and not necessarily of its border location. Tabasco and Campeche had a medium-average level of IRSSG, while Quintana Roo was at the medium-low level.

However, by 2009 (see Table 6.14), the international relations of the southern border states increased considerably (31.65% in five years), more intensively than those of the northern border (24.57%), but below the national

average (38.41%). In 2006, as a result of the war against organized crime implemented by the Calderón administration, there was a substantial increase in insecurity; at the same time, the irregular migration flows from Central America in transit through Mexico also increased. The combination of these two variables also generated more human rights violations against these irregular migrants. Finally, cooperation among the southern Mexican border states and the countries of Central America (through mechanisms such as the Plan Puebla-Panamá under the Fox administration, and the Mesoamerica Project during the government of Calderón, which has been maintained by the Peña Nieto administration), For these reasons, the foreign activity of all southern border states increased considerably, especially with their Central American counterparts.

Once again, by 2014, their international activities grew at a higher rate (25.97%, twice as much) than those of the northern border states (12.81%), very close to the national average (26.70%), reaching, on average, a level of high-average IRSSG (2.62), more than the northern border states (2.46) and the national average (2.42). Being so, even if the southern border states started from a lower level of international activities than their northern counterparts, the intensity of their external actions motivated by the changing reality in the Mexico-Central American border, allowed them to surpass the northern states in less than a decade.

Although the geographic variable played an important part in the level of international activity of the states at the northern border, some states in the

center (Estado de México, Jalisco, Distrito Federal with Ebrard, and Querétaro with Calzada) seem to be an exception to this situation. It is evident that these federal units, by not having a privileged geographic location with respect to the biggest market in the world, had to invest a greater amount of resources to promote their advantages as foreign investment destinations and export promotion. In addition, in these cases, there was a clear intention to take advantage of the cooperation mechanisms with other international actors to deal with issues that go beyond the economic scope, such as technical, scientific and educational cooperation, as well as promotion of tourism or the protection of their emigrant communities, especially in the United States. In sum, the geographic variable, particularly in the case of the northern border and recently in the southern border, has contributed to increase their international participation, but this variable is only a necessary, but not sufficient condition, for explaining the foreign activism of Mexican sub-State governments.

## Conclusions

This chapter was dedicated to explaining the variation of the IRSSG in Mexico. Following the findings discussed in the previous chapters, the growing international activity of Mexican SSG was triggered by the globalization and interdependence in the international system. However, Mexican federal units reacted a few decades later than other industrialized and democratic federal countries because domestic economic and political liberalization was necessary

for the SSG governments to have the powers and incentives to go international. Therefore, with increasing democratization, decentralization, and structural reform at the national level, the IRSSG started growing in an accelerating pace since the late 1990s.

Mexican foreign policy is an exclusive domain of the federal government. However, as it was widely explained, the Mexican legal framework gives ample powers to Mexican SSG to conduct international relations in those areas in which they have legal capacity, therefore being inclusive in terms of legal powers. However, the federal government practically never consults or includes SSG in international negotiations or foreign policy design or implementation, thus being exclusive in terms of intergovernmental coordination. In sum, the IR of Mexican SSG can be considered as complementary, since even if there is practically no coordination between the federation and federal units in international affairs, each of them conducts in a relatively harmonious way the international activities for which they have powers, without any visible conflict between levels of government.

Based on the institutionalization and the economic and political activities of Mexican SSG, the MI-IRSSG, which can be replicated in any other country if the necessary information is available, was constructed and measured in three moments in time (2004, 2009, and 2014). It was clear that the IR of Mexican SSG increased considerably during the last decade. From 2004 to 2009, it increased in over 40%, and between 2009 and 2014, it grew almost 33% more, for an accumulated growth (using 2004 as the base year) in the decade (2004-

2014) of over 85%. By 2014, the majority of the states were at the high level of IRSSG, while five had reached the maximum level of very high (Chiapas, Distrito Federal, Estado de México, Jalisco, and Querétaro), conducting every possible international activity measured by the MI-IRRSSG. Also, all the federal units increased their international relations in these ten years, and none of them had a reversal in its internationalization (the international actions that were enacted were institutionalized and maintained or increased during the decade).

In terms of the variables that explain the variation between Mexican federal units in terms of their IRSSG, in terms of explanatory power, one single variable, state income, explains almost 40% of this variation, supporting the argument that state income is a variable of considerable importance for explaining the level of IRSSG in Mexico.

Considering the political variable (juxtaposition), there is no correlation between the party affiliation of the local Executives and the President, and the level of IRSSG. Since states that are governed by the same political party have different degrees of IRSSG, there is no empirical support for the juxtaposition argument. However, the states with greater IRSSG in 2004 (Baja California, Jalisco, and Chiapas) initiated and increased their international activities intensively in moments of juxtaposition; the same situation happened in 2009 with the Distrito Federal, Estado de México, and Chiapas, and in 2014 with Querétaro. Thus, political juxtaposition impacts the IRSSG more as a trigger variable (provides incentives to initiate and increase international relations), than as an explanatory variable of the amount of IRSSG.

Finally, in terms of the geographic variable, northern border states have always had higher IRSSG than the national average, and this can be explained by the huge relevance of the US markets for them, as well as the intense dynamism at the northern border. For the southern border states, their IRSSG increased considerably during the last decade, as cooperation between these states and the countries of Central America increased during the Fox and Calderón administrations, having a level of IRSSG above the national average. Even if they started from a lower level of IRSSG than their northern counterparts, the intensity of their external actions allowed them to surpass the northern states in less than a decade. This evidence supports the argument that, in the case of the Mexican border states, geographic location serves as an incentive for more active participation of these federal units internationally.

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*Mexicana de Política Exterior*, n. 104, 2015, pp. 103-127; Jorge A. Schiavon, “Las relaciones exteriores de los gobiernos estatales: el caso de México”, Luis Maira (ed.), *La Política Internacional Subnacional en América Latina*, Buenos Aires, Libros del Zorzal, 2010, pp. 135-176; Jorge A. Schiavon, “Las relaciones internacionales de los gobiernos estatales en México en la década 2000-2009”, Blanca Torres & Gustavo Vega (coord.), *Los grandes problemas de México: XII Relaciones Internacionales*, México, El Colegio de México, 2010, pp. 241-283. The author of this dissertation is the single author of all these publications and they were based on data that was later added to for this dissertation.



## CHAPTER 7: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION THROUGH INTER- INSTITUTIONAL AGREEMENTS

### Introduction

This chapter analyses the IR of Mexican SSG from another perspective, the legal instruments established in the 1992 Law of Treaties that allow Mexican SSG to conduct international activities in the areas in which they have powers. The chapter is divided in four sections, each of them studying these instruments from a different angle.

The first section simply describes the amount of IIA concluded by Mexican SSG, as well as the order of government (state or municipal) that signed the agreement, and if this is a sisterhood agreement or other type. It underscores the fact that the vast majority of IIA have been signed by a minority of the federal units, especially those with the highest levels of IRSSG. Then, section two analyses how the negotiation and signing of IIA has evolved through time; the central finding, which is coherent with the analysis of the previous chapter, is that the rate of negotiation and signing of IIA has increased in the last years.

Section three analyzes the foreign partners, both in terms of whether they are governmental or non-governmental, and in their geographic location. The vast majority of the external partners are sub-State governments, and the majority of the international relations of Mexican SSG measured through the IIA, just as it happens with Mexican foreign policy, is concentrated with partners of

the Americas, especially with the United States. Section four is dedicated to study the areas of cooperation where these IIA takes place. It should not be surprising that the majority of them are concluded in areas where the federal units have powers to do so, particularly those that have a direct effect on the welfare and development of the unit (cooperation in education, culture, science, and technology, as well as promotion of trade, investment and tourism). Finally, the conclusions summarize the most important findings of the chapter.

### 7.1. Measuring internationalization through IIA

As previously discussed, IIAs are the legal instruments through which sub-State governments conduct, within the Mexican legal framework, international relations with foreign government agencies, international organizations and other private and public actors. The areas of cooperation covered by these agreements are strictly circumscribed within the faculties of the state or municipal actors. Sub-state governments have to keep the SRE informed of their negotiation and conclusion, and if this ministry determines that the agreements are legal, they are registered in the official record, the Register of Inter-Institutional Agreements (RIIA), which is publicly available through the SRE's web page.<sup>13</sup> Since not all the sub-State governments register their IIAs before the SRE, this register does not include the totally of all existing agreements; however, it does include all the IIAs

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<sup>13</sup> The web page is: <https://coordinacionpolitica.sre.gob.mx/index.php/registro-de-acuerdos-interinstitucionales-r-a-i>.

recognized as legal by the Mexican government, that is, those that are legally binding according to Mexican and international law, as was previously discussed.

As of January 1, 2015, the RIIA included 668 IIAs, signed by Mexican state and municipal governments with international counterparts. Using this information, a database was created to identify the number of agreements signed, when the agreements were signed (period, presidential administration, pre/post-NAFTA), who signed them (state or municipal government), who is the international counterpart (government, international organization, NGO, private), what type of agreement was signed (sisterhood or other) and the areas of cooperation covered by them.<sup>14</sup> In the following tables and paragraphs, a preliminary analysis —mostly descriptive statistics—, will be made of the legally binding IIAs agreements signed by Mexican sub-State actors.

As it can be observed in Table 7.1, there is a huge variation in the number of IIA signed by Mexican sub-State governments. The range of variation goes from 0 (Baja California Sur) to 139 (Jalisco). Over two thirds of the IIAs (468 out of 668, representing 70.05% of the total) have been signed by only 10 states (less than one third of the Mexican federal units). The most active states are, in decreasing order: Jalisco (139), Chiapas (74), Estado de México (49), Nuevo León (39), Distrito Federal (38), Michoacán (37), Chihuahua (28), Quintana Roo (23), Puebla (21), and Guanajuato (20). The two states with the most IIA (Jalisco and Chiapas) concentrate almost one third of all IIA (31.89%).

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<sup>14</sup> The first version of the database of IIAs based on the RIIA was integrated by May 1, 2010, and it included 304 IIAs. In four and a half years (January 1, 2015), 364 more IIA were included in the registry, for a total of 668. This means that there was an increase of approximately 120% in the IIAs registered in only 5 years.

Table 7.1. IIA by federal unit, level of government and type of agreement

Federal unit	IIA	% total	Level of government				Type of agreement			
			State	% total	Municipal	% total	Sisterhood	% total	Other	% total
Aguascalientes	7	1.05%	3	42.86%	4	57.14%	4	57.14%	3	42.86%
Baja California	14	2.10%	6	42.86%	8	57.14%	4	28.57%	10	71.43%
Baja California Sur	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Campeche	9	1.35%	3	33.33%	6	66.67%	5	55.56%	4	44.44%
Chihuahua	28	4.19%	22	78.57%	6	21.43%	4	14.29%	24	85.71%
Chiapas	74	11.08%	62	83.78%	12	16.22%	7	9.46%	67	90.54%
Coahuila	9	1.35%	2	22.22%	7	77.78%	7	77.78%	2	22.22%
Colima	1	0.15%	1	100.00%	0	0.00%	1	100.00%	0	0.00%
Distrito Federal	38	5.69%	38	100.00%	0	0.00%	15	39.47%	23	60.53%
Durango	15	2.25%	13	86.67%	2	13.33%	2	13.33%	13	86.67%
Guanajuato	20	2.99%	8	40.00%	12	60.00%	11	55.00%	9	45.00%
Guerrero	6	0.90%	2	33.33%	4	66.67%	2	33.33%	4	66.67%
Hidalgo	17	2.54%	10	58.82%	7	41.18%	7	41.18%	10	58.82%
Jalisco	139	20.81%	90	64.75%	49	35.25%	43	30.94%	96	69.06%
Estado de México	49	7.34%	17	34.69%	32	65.31%	33	67.35%	16	32.65%
Michoacán	37	5.54%	11	29.73%	26	70.27%	25	67.57%	12	32.43%
Morelos	7	1.05%	1	14.29%	6	85.71%	6	85.71%	1	14.29%
Nayarit	6	0.90%	4	66.67%	2	33.33%	1	16.67%	5	83.33%
Nuevo León	39	5.84%	7	17.95%	32	82.05%	28	71.79%	11	28.21%
Oaxaca	16	2.40%	14	87.50%	2	12.50%	1	6.25%	15	93.75%
Puebla	21	3.14%	8	38.10%	13	61.90%	12	57.14%	9	42.86%
Querétaro	15	2.25%	6	40.00%	9	60.00%	5	33.33%	10	66.67%
Quintana Roo	23	3.44%	6	26.09%	17	73.91%	16	69.57%	7	30.43%
San Luis Potosí	14	2.10%	1	7.14%	13	92.86%	12	85.71%	2	14.29%
Sinaloa	2	0.30%	1	50.00%	1	50.00%	0	0.00%	2	100.00%
Sonora	14	2.10%	13	92.86%	1	7.14%	1	7.14%	13	92.86%
Tabasco	6	0.90%	5	83.33%	1	16.67%	0	0.00%	6	100.00%
Tamaulipas	6	0.90%	0	0.00%	6	100.00%	6	100.00%	0	0.00%
Tlaxcala	2	0.30%	2	100.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	2	100.00%
Veracruz	15	2.25%	1	6.67%	14	93.33%	13	86.67%	2	13.33%
Yucatán	11	1.65%	7	63.64%	4	36.36%	2	18.18%	9	81.82%
Zacatecas	8	1.20%	2	25.00%	6	75.00%	4	50.00%	4	50.00%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>668</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>366</b>	<b>54.79%</b>	<b>302</b>	<b>45.21%</b>	<b>277</b>	<b>41.47%</b>	<b>391</b>	<b>58.53%</b>

Taking into consideration the level of government that signs the IIA, there is a balance between state and municipal actors: 366 (54.79%) were signed by state authorities, and 302 (45.21%) by municipal governments. Since the Distrito Federal is not divided into municipalities, but into political delegations (which

have legal restrictions to sign IIAs), all 38 IIA were signed by the former. The preferred type of IIA concluded by Mexican sub-State governments is sisterhood agreements, which account for 41.47% of all the IIA that have been signed.

Table 7.2. Federal units and number of IIA

Number of IIA	Number of Federal units	Federal unit
0-10	13	Campeche (9), Coahuila (9), Zacatecas (8), Aguascalientes (7), Morelos (7), Guerrero (6), Nayarit (6), Tabasco (6), Tamaulipas (6), Sinaloa (2), Tlaxcala (2), and Baja California Sur (0)
11-30	13	Chihuahua (28), Quintana Roo (23), Puebla (21), Guanajuato (20), Hidalgo (17), Oaxaca (16), Querétaro (15), Durango (15), Veracruz (15), Baja California (14), San Luis Potosí (14), Sonora (14), and Yucatán (11)
31-50	4	Estado de México (49), Nuevo León (39), Distrito Federal (38), and Michoacán (37)
50+	2	Jalisco (139) and Chiapas (74)

It should be no surprise that four out of the five of the federal units with the largest number of IIA (Jalisco, Chiapas, Estado de México, and Distrito Federal) are also the states that reached the highest level of international activity (very high) since 2009, and all ten of them have a high to very high level of external actions by 2014, as was previously discussed. On the other hand, the four states that have 5 or less IIA registered (Baja California Sur, Colima, Sinaloa, and Tlaxcala) share two characteristics: first, they have had considerably lower levels of external activities during the last decade (average at best), and second, their international actions have only increased marginally (within the average category) over the last ten years. Therefore, it can be argued that Mexican federal units use IIA as legally binding mechanisms to regulate and sustain their

international relations with foreign counterparts, especially those units with higher degrees of external activities.

## 7.2. Increasing IIA in time

As it can be seen in Table 7.3, the vast majority of the IIAs (96.86%) were signed after the initiation of NAFTA on January 1, 1994, and the opening of the Mexican economy. As it was previously discussed, there is an increasing international activity of Mexican sub-State governments through time. During the Miguel de la Madrid government (1982-1988) and before, only 3 (0.45%) IIAs were signed; the number of IIA signed increased during the next presidential administrations: Salinas, 18 (2.69%); Zedillo, 86 (14.37%), Fox, 119 (21.71%), Calderón, 336 (50.30%). Under the current Peña administration (2012-2018), in only two years (2012-2014), 71 (10.63%) IIA were signed and registered before the SRE (see Table 5.3).

Table 7.3. IIA by Presidential Administration and Pre/Post-NAFTA

<b>Period vis à vis NAFTA</b>	<b>Number of IIAs)</b>	<b>% total</b>
Pre-NAFTA (before 1/1/1994)	21	3.14%
Post-NAFTA (after 1/1/1994)	353	96.86%
<b>Presidential Administration</b>		
Miguel de la Madrid (12/1/1982-11/30/1988)	3	0.45%
Carlos Salinas (12/1/1988-11/30/1994)	18	2.69%
Ernesto Zedillo (12/1/1994-11/30/2000)	96	14.37%
Vicente Fox (12/1/2000-11/30/2006)	145	21.71%
Felipe Calderón (12/1/2006-11/30/2012)	336	50.30%
Enrique Peña (first two years: 12/1/2012-12/31/2014)	71	10.63%

### 7.3. Partners and regions

By analyzing Table 7.4, it is important to underline that the majority of the international counterparts of Mexican sub-State governments are governmental, accounting for over two thirds (67.96%) of all IIA. Some IIA have been signed with international organizations (12.43%) especially from the United Nations system, NGOs (2.69%), and private partners (16.92%), mostly universities and research centers. The state of Chiapas is the only one that concentrates most of its international cooperation with partners other than governments, like international organizations, NGOs and private actors (83.78%), like the United Nations, the European Union, and foreign universities; as previously discussed, the center-left governments of Salazar Mendiguchía (2000-2006) and Sabines (2006-2012) saw international cooperation as a strategy to promote local development, thus concentrating their international activities with international organizations and private actors. On the other side, more than one third of the states (12 out of 32) have only concluded IIA with governmental counterparts.

Table 7.4. IIA by Type of International Partners

Federal unit	Type of International Partner							
	Government	% total	International Organization	% total	NGO	% total	Private	% total
Aguascalientes	5	71.43%	1	14.29%	0	0.00%	1	14.29%
Baja California	8	57.14%	1	7.14%	3	21.43%	2	14.29%
Baja California Sur	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Campeche	8	88.89%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	1	11.11%
Chihuahua	9	32.14%	4	14.29%	1	3.57%	14	50.00%
Chiapas	12	16.22%	24	32.43%	2	2.70%	36	48.65%
Coahuila	9	100.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Colima	1	100.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Distrito Federal	32	84.21%	3	7.89%	0	0.00%	3	7.89%
Durango	7	46.67%	7	46.67%	0	0.00%	1	6.67%
Guanajuato	18	90.00%	1	5.00%	0	0.00%	1	5.00%
Guerrero	3	50.00%	3	50.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Hidalgo	12	70.59%	3	17.65%	0	0.00%	2	11.76%
Jalisco	90	64.75%	4	2.88%	6	4.32%	39	28.06%
Estado de México	43	87.76%	5	10.20%	0	0.00%	1	2.04%
Michoacán	32	86.49%	3	8.11%	0	0.00%	2	5.41%
Morelos	7	100.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Nayarit	5	83.33%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	1	16.67%
Nuevo León	36	92.31%	3	7.69%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Oaxaca	7	43.75%	7	43.75%	1	6.25%	1	6.25%
Puebla	14	66.67%	1	4.76%	1	4.76%	5	23.81%
Querétaro	13	86.67%	1	6.67%	1	6.67%	0	0.00%
Quintana Roo	22	95.65%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	1	4.35%
San Luis Potosí	14	100.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Sinaloa	1	50.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	1	50.00%
Sonora	14	100.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Tabasco	1	16.67%	4	66.67%	1	16.67%	0	0.00%
Tamaulipas	6	100.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Tlaxcala	2	100.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Veracruz	13	86.67%	1	6.67%	1	6.67%	0	0.00%
Yucatán	4	36.36%	6	54.55%	0	0.00%	1	9.09%
Zacatecas	6	75.00%	1	12.50%	1	12.50%	0	0.00%
TOTAL	454	67.96%	83	12.43%	18	2.69%	113	16.92%



In terms of the region of the world where the international counterparts are geographically located, 29.49% of the IIA were signed with partners from North America (the United States and Canada), and 28.44% from Latin America and the Caribbean. It is no surprise that almost 60% of all IIA have been concluded with countries of the Americas, replicating the concentration of Mexican foreign policy in the region, where 60.99% of all Mexican foreign representations (embassies and consulates) are concentrated in the American continent: 40.43% in North America, and 20.56% in Latin America and the Caribbean (Figueroa and Schiavon, 2014). The next regional partners of Mexican sub-State governments are Europe (18.71%), Asia (10.93%), and Africa and Oceania (0.75%). The remaining 11.83% are IIA signed with global partners, like international organizations and NGOs (see Table 7.5).

Table 7.5. IIAs by Region of Foreign Counterpart

Federal unit	Region											
	North America	% total	Latin America & Caribbean	% total	Europe	% total	Asia	% total	Africa and Oceania	% total	Global	% total
Aguascalientes	2	28.57%	1	14.29%	3	42.86%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Baja California	8	57.14%	3	21.43%	1	7.14%	1	7.14%	0	0.00%	1	7.14%
Baja California Sur	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Campeche	4	44.44%	4	44.44%	1	11.11%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Chihuahua	11	39.29%	1	3.57%	9	32.14%	3	10.71%	0	0.00%	4	14.29%
Chiapas	1	1.35%	29	39.19%	18	24.32%	4	5.41%	0	0.00%	24	32.43%
Coahuila	8	88.89%	1	11.11%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Colima	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	1	100.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Distrito Federal	3	7.89%	12	31.58%	9	23.68%	9	23.68%	2	5.26%	3	7.89%

Table 7.5. IIAs by Region of Foreign Counterpart, Continued

Durango	2	13.33%	1	6.67%	0	0.00%	5	33.33%	0	0.00%	7	46.67%
Guanajuato	7	35.00%	9	45.00%	4	20.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Guerrero	1	16.67%	0	0.00%	2	33.33%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	3	50.00%
Hidalgo	6	35.29%	2	11.76%	4	23.53%	3	17.65%	1	5.88%	3	17.65%
Jalisco	57	41.01%	28	20.14%	28	20.14%	20	14.39%	2	1.44%	4	2.88%
Estado de México	8	16.33%	18	36.73%	9	18.37%	5	10.20%	0	0.00%	5	10.20%
Michoacán	7	18.92%	23	62.16%	4	10.81%	1	2.70%	0	0.00%	2	5.41%
Morelos	3	42.86%	3	42.86%	0	0.00%	1	14.29%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Nayarit	1	16.67%	2	33.33%	3	50.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Nuevo León	21	53.85%	5	12.82%	7	17.95%	3	7.69%	0	0.00%	3	7.69%
Oaxaca	1	6.25%	2	12.50%	3	18.75%	3	18.75%	0	0.00%	7	43.75%
Puebla	2	9.52%	7	33.33%	7	33.33%	4	19.05%	0	0.00%	1	4.76%
Querétaro	4	26.67%	2	13.33%	5	33.33%	3	20.00%	0	0.00%	1	6.67%
Quintana Roo	3	13.04%	17	73.91%	2	8.70%	1	4.35%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
San Luis Potosí	9	64.29%	5	35.71%	1	7.14%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Sinaloa	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	1	50.00%	1	50.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Sonora	14	100.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Tabasco	0	0.00%	3	50.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	3	50.00%
Tamaulipas	5	83.33%	1	16.67%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Tlaxcala	0	0.00%	1	50.00%	1	50.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Veracruz	4	26.67%	6	40.00%	2	13.33%	2	13.33%	0	0.00%	1	6.67%
Yucatán	1	9.09%	1	9.09%	1	9.09%	2	18.18%	0	0.00%	6	54.55%
Zacatecas	4	50.00%	3	37.50%	0	0.00%	1	12.50%	0	0.00%	1	12.50%
TOTAL	197	29.49%	190	28.44%	125	18.71%	73	10.93%	5	0.75%	79	11.83%

It is interesting to note that for the Mexican states that share a border with the United States, the percentage of their agreements signed with the United States is significantly higher than that of the national average of 29.49% (Baja California, 57.14%; Coahuila, 88.89%; Chihuahua, 39.29%; Nuevo León 53.85%;

Sonora, 100%; and Tamaulipas, 83.33%). The same is true for the Mexican states that border with Central America: they have a considerably higher relation with Latin America than the national average of 28.61% (Chiapas 39.19%; Quintana Roo, 73.91%; and Tabasco, 50.00%). As discussed earlier, the geographic location of a state has a direct impact not only in its degree of international activity, but also with which international partners this cooperation takes place: Mexican sub-State governments have signed more IIA with their immediate geographic counterparts.

Taking into account specific countries, the U.S. sub-State governments have the largest number of IIA with their Mexican counterparts (166 IIA, 24.85% of the total), considerably more than the next four partners: Spain, 74 (11.08%); Cuba, 57 (8.53%); and Canada and China, 31 each (4.64% each). Once again, the Mexican states located at the northern border of the country with the United States have much higher levels of cooperation with this country compared to the national average of 24.85% (Baja California, 50.00%; Coahuila, 88.89%; Chihuahua, 39.29%; Nuevo León 41.03%; Sonora, 100%; and Tamaulipas, 83.33%). It is particularly worth noting that the number of IIA (60, equivalent to 8.98% of the total) that have been signed with one single U.S. state, Texas, is close to those concluded with Spain, and more than with any other country of the world. Half of them (30, exactly 50%) have been signed with neighboring Mexican counterparts (Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León, and Tamaulipas).

#### 7.4. Areas of cooperation

Finally, in terms of the areas of cooperation covered by the IIA,<sup>15</sup> Mexican sub-State governments are most interested in cooperating internationally in the following 10 areas: education (59.79%), culture (56.63%), tourism (38.55%), trade (33.28%), science and technology (29.82%), human resources training (23.04%), investment (22.89%), the environment (20.03%), urban development (18.41%), and security (18.41) (see Table 7.6).

Table 7.6: IIA by Areas of Cooperation

Rank	Area	% of total
1	Education	59.79%
2	Culture	56.63%
3	Tourism	38.55%
4	Trade	33.28%
5	Science and Technology	29.82%
6	Human Resources	23.04%
7	Investment	22.89%
8	Environment	20.03%
9	Urban Development	18.41%
10	Security	8.68%

It is important to remember that the international activities of Mexican sub-State government is restricted to those areas in which they have powers; therefore, it is not surprising that the areas covered by the IIA signed by them are concentrated in those issues in which they are legally capable of subscribing

<sup>15</sup> The areas of cooperation are not mutually exclusive, since one agreement may contain several of them.

them. Also, as discussed previously, the central objective of the international activities of the federal units is to promote state and local development and welfare; thus, the areas of cooperation most widely included in the IIA are those directly related to these objectives: strengthening human capital through education, culture, science, technology, and human resources training; generating welfare through the promotion of trade, investment and tourism; and, to a lesser extent, improving the environment, urban development and security.

## Conclusions

In sum, several conclusions about the international relations of Mexican sub-State governments can be reached by analyzing the IIAs signed by them. First, there is a considerable variation in the number of agreements signed by Mexican states and their municipalities; the vast majority of them are signed by states with high or very high levels of sub-State diplomacy (Jalisco, Chiapas, Estado de México, Nuevo León, and Distrito Federal). Second, there appears to be a balance in the IIAs signed by state and municipal governments. Third, due to the geographical location of Mexico, it is not surprising that there is a concentration of cooperation with the Americas (North America, Latin America and the Caribbean), accounting for almost 60% of all IIAs; the states that share a physical border with North America or Central America have significantly higher levels of cooperation than the rest of the Mexican sub-State governments with these regions.

Fourth, in terms of countries, the highest level of cooperation takes place with the United States (116 IIA), with approximately one fourth of all IIA at the national level, but increasing considerably in the case of Mexican states that share a border with this country (over 50% in Baja California, Coahuila, Nuevo León, Sonora, and Tamaulipas); the degree of cooperation through IIA is particularly intense with the US state of Texas, that concentrates almost 10% of all IIA and if it were a country, it would only be third in cooperation after the United States and Spain. Fifth, international cooperation is concentrated in those areas in which the subnational governments have legal powers (among the most important: education, culture, tourism, trade, science and technology, human resources training, and investment). Finally, sixth, the Mexican sub-State governments concentrate their international activities in those areas that promote local development and welfare, by strengthening human capital or generating welfare.

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## CHAPTER 8: IRSSG IN MEXICO THROUGH THE EYES OF THE SSG INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES

### Introduction

This chapter is dedicated to analyze the results of a survey answered directly by high-ranking Mexican SSG government officials, in order to better understand the perceptions, preferences, and interests of the agencies and the personnel responsible for the internationalization of the Mexican federal units. It is integrated by eight different sections, each of them analyzing a different component of the survey.

The first section describes the survey instrument in terms of when it was applied, who answered it, and how long it took to obtain a response. Section two analyzes the information about the institutional organization and capacities of the international relations agencies, while section three concentrates on the formation and capacities of their personnel. Section four analyzes the local legal and institutional frameworks under which the agencies conduct their activities. It should be expected that the SSG that have higher levels of IRSSG and have concluded more IIA are those that will have more and better trained personnel, more institutionalized agencies, and better legal and institutional frameworks.

Section five explains the domestic coordination and international implementation activities conducted by the Mexican SSG, and section six studies the domestic and international partners with whom these activities take place.

Once again, the higher the level of IRSSG and the number of IIA, we should expect to see a higher the number and scope of the activities and partners in the internationalization strategy of the units. Section seven analyzes the most important challenges perceived by the agencies, as well as the strategies used to address them in terms of communication and coordination. The last section, studies how much the federal units know about the instruments of internationalization, and also the evaluation of their international activities *vis à vis* the federal government. Finally, the conclusions present a brief summary of the central findings of the survey and its analysis.

#### 8.1. Asking the sub-State public officials their perceptions

In order to better understand the institutional structure, activities, personnel profile, financial and legal capacities, as well as the central objectives, concerns, needs, and successes of the agencies or offices in charge of the IRSSG in Mexico, a comprehensive survey tackling all these points was conducted during the second semester of 2014. The survey was developed by the author in July of 2014.<sup>16</sup> With the support of the General Direction for Political Coordination of the SRE (which is the area in the Ministry in charge of the relations with sub-State government in international affairs), and AMAIE, which is the only organization in the country that that brings together and coordinates the

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<sup>16</sup> The survey in Spanish and English is included as Appendix I of this dissertation.



actions of state agencies in charge of international relations of 20 federal units), the survey was sent to all 32 federal units in August 2014.<sup>17</sup>

In a letter sent together with the survey, CIDE, SRE and AMAIE requested that the survey was completed by the highest authority in the federal unit in charge of international affairs or, if this was not possible, by the person with the most knowledge about the international activities of the state. As a result of over a decade of working together with several of the Mexican federal units on the subject, and even if in some cases the survey had to be sent three or four times,<sup>18</sup> the level of response was impressive: 27 (84.37%) out of the 32 federal units answered the request, 26 (81.25%) of them responding practically every question in it; Zacatecas, instead of responding the survey, sent a letter in which it explained that it did not have a specialized area to coordinate the international affairs of the state, and that this responsibility was shared by the Ministry of Economy (for investment and trade), the Institute of Migration (for relations with emigrants), the Ministry of Tourism (for tourist and cultural promotion), and the Ministry of Social Development (for social development and repatriations involving the migrant population).

Unfortunately, the states of Campeche, Coahuila, Nayarit, Sinaloa, and Veracruz did not answer the survey after being requested to do so in four times; in the cases of Campeche, Nayarit and Sinaloa, this can be explained by the fact

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<sup>17</sup> A second survey is being conducted in the second semester of 2016, replicating all the questions included in the 2014 survey and including 5 new ones. Once the results of the second survey are processed, a comparative analysis of how the perceptions, capacities and preferences of Mexican SSG have evolved can be done.

<sup>18</sup> The vast majority of the federal units (24) responded in less than two months, while three of them (Chihuahua, Morelos and Tlaxcala), took up to six months to answer.

that, during the last decade (in the 2004, 2009 and 2014 evaluations), all three states do not have a specific area or office to coordinate the international affairs of the unit, have had the lower levels of IRSSG among the Mexican federal units, and less than 10 IIAs by 2014. However, the cases of Coahuila and Veracruz are puzzling, since both have international affairs coordinating areas, and their level of IRSSG and IIA have been above the national average during the last 10 years.<sup>19</sup>

This chapter will be dedicated to analyze the results of this survey (including the 26 federal units that answered it), in order to better understand how and why the Mexican sub-State governments conduct their international affairs. As often as possible, the central findings of the survey will be contrasted with the information on IRSSG and IIA previously discussed, to provide an integral analysis of the phenomenon.

## 8.2. Institutional organization and capacities

The first variable to be analyzed is the type of organizations and agencies in charge of international affairs in the Mexican federal units. From the 26 cases, 17 (65.38%) have a specific area, office or agency in charge of coordinating the international relations of the state government (Aguascalientes, Baja California,

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<sup>19</sup> After discussing the cases of Coahuila and Veracruz with contacts from AMAIE and the SRE, a possible explanation of the lack of response can be that the current administrations of Rubén Moreira (Coahuila) and Javier Duarte (Veracruz) have dramatically reduced the budget and personnel of their international relations offices, but further evidence would be required to support this point.

Chiapas, Distrito Federal, Durango, Estado de México, Guanajuato, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Jalisco, Nuevo León, Oaxaca, Puebla, Querétaro, Sonora, Tabasco, and Yucatán). Based on the information of the IRSSG chapter, Coahuila and Veracruz could also be included.

Table 8.1. International Relations Agencies

State	IR Area	Centralized IR Coordination	Year of Creation
Aguascalientes	Yes	Yes	2010
Baja California	Yes	Yes	2013
Baja California Sur	Yes	No	2011
Chiapas	Yes	Yes	2001
Chihuahua	Yes	No	NA
Colima	Yes	No	2001
Distrito Federal	Yes	Yes	2007
Durango	Yes	Yes	2006
Estado de México	Yes	Yes	2010
Guanajuato	Yes	Yes	2013
Guerrero	Yes	Yes	2011
Hidalgo	Yes	Yes	2011
Jalisco	Yes	Yes	1997
Michoacán	Yes	No	2014
Morelos	No	No	NA
Nuevo León	Yes	Yes	2010
Oaxaca	Yes	Yes	2014
Puebla	Yes	Yes	2011
Querétaro	Yes	Yes	2012
Quintana Roo	Yes	No	2011
San Luis Potosí	Yes	No	2004
Sonora	Yes	Yes	1959
Tabasco	Yes	Yes	2013
Tamaulipas	No	No	2011
Tlaxcala	Yes	No	2011
Yucatán	Yes	Yes	2009

Therefore, 19 out of the 32 Mexican federal units (59.38%) have a centralized coordination of their international affairs. Seven more states (Baja California Sur, Chihuahua, Colima, Michoacán, Quintana Roo, San Luis Potosí, and Tlaxcala) conduct international relations, but do not have an agency to coordinate and centralize these activities. Finally, only two states (Morelos and Tamaulipas), do not have specific agencies to attend the international affairs of their states, even if both of them have areas or institutes to relate with their migrant populations.

It is important to mention that the vast majority of the international relations areas are of relatively recent creation. Only two of them (Jalisco and Sonora) established an international affairs agency before year 2000. As it was widely discussed in previous chapters, the IRSSG in Mexico increased dramatically as a result of the combination of international structural variables (interdependence and globalization), but most importantly, domestic variables (democratization, decentralization and structural reform). Six other federal units (Chiapas, Colima, Distrito Federal, Durango, San Luis Potosí, and Yucatán) created their agencies during the decade of 2000, and 16 more did it between 2010 and 2014. Finally, two states (Morelos and Chihuahua) still do not have specific international relations offices.

The next point to be stressed is the huge variation in the names of the centralizing agencies in charge of the international affairs of the unit: their official names include Under-secretariat, General Coordination, Coordination, Direction, Office, Unit, and Institute. There is also variation in the institutional and

administrative adscription of these agencies or areas. However, the vast majority of them (15) are directly responsible to the Office of the Governor, two are Under-secretariats in a Joint Ministry (Ministry of Southern Border Development and International Cooperation in Chiapas, and Ministry of Migrants and International Affairs in Guerrero), one is an autonomous agency reporting to the Governor (Puebla), five are coordinated by other ministries (four by the Ministry of State and one, Baja California, by the Ministry of Tourism), one is located at the office of the state's representation in Mexico City (Tabasco), one more depends on the Migration Institute (Tamaulipas), and finally, in Chihuahua, the responsibility is divided between four ministries.

Of all these agencies, only ten of them have institutionalized and regular budgets for their activities, and the rest depend on the budgets of the areas of which they depend. Only two states have considerable budgets, of over 1 million USD per year (Puebla, with a yearly budget of 50 million MXP, and Estado de Mexico with 27 million MXP).<sup>20</sup> The rest of the agencies have substantially smaller budgets, ranging from 500,000 to 11.5 million MXP.

### 8.3. Personnel and capacities

It should not be surprising that the states with institutionalized budgets also have the largest amount of full time personnel. Only four federal units have 20 or more staff (Distrito Federal, 52; Puebla, 41; Estado de México, 29; and

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<sup>20</sup> The average exchange rate in 2015 was approximately 1 USD = 16 MXP.

Chiapas, 20), all of them with the higher levels of IRSSG and IIAs. Three other states (Durango, Querétaro, and Tamaulipas) have a staff between 10 and 19, and the rest (19 states) have 9 or less people dedicated to international affairs, four of them (Baja California Sur, Chihuahua, Michoacán, and Morelos) with only one person. The average staff for the 26 states that answered the survey is 9.31.

Table 8.2. Personnel

State	Number of personnel	Academic profile of Head of Office	Graduate Studies
Aguascalientes	3	Law	MA
Baja California	2	NA	NA
Baja California Sur	1	Administration and Accounting	NA
Chiapas	20	Communication	NA
Chihuahua	1	NA	NA
Colima	4	Law	NA
Distrito Federal	52	Engineering	NA
Durango	10	Administration and Accounting	NA
Estado de México	29	International Relations	NA
Guanajuato	2	Education	MA
Guerrero	2	International Relations	NA
Hidalgo	6	Administration and Accounting	NA
Jalisco	9	Law	MA
Michoacán	1	Administration and Accounting	MA
Morelos	1	International Relations	NA
Nuevo León	4	Political Science	MA
Oaxaca	4	Law	NA
Puebla	41	Administration and Accounting	PhD
Querétaro	13	International Relations	MA
Quintana Roo	3	Political Science	MA
San Luis Potosí	6	Law	MA
Sonora	8	International Relations	MA
Tabasco	2	Engineering	NA
Tamaulipas	11	Law	NA
Tlaxcala	3	Economics	NA
Yucatán	4	Engineering	NA

Table 8.3. Staff Academic Profile

State	Education								Languages				
	IR	Law	Econ	Pub Ad	PS	Comm.	Other	Total	English	French	German	Other	Total
Aguascalientes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	NA	4	Yes	No	No	NA	1
Baja California	No	No	No	No	No	No	Int. Business	0	Yes	Yes	No	NA	2
Baja California Sur	No	No	No	No	No	No	Adminstr. Int. Business	0	No	No	No	NA	0
Chiapas	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Int. Trade	3	Yes	Yes	No	NA	2
Chihuahua	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Manufacturing	3	Yes	Yes	No	NA	2
Colima	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	NA	2	Yes	No	No	NA	1
Distrito Federal	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Design	5	Yes	Yes	No	Chinese, Italian Portuguese	2
Durango	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	Administration Tourism,	2	Yes	Yes	No	Portuguese	2
Estado de México	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Business Adm.	5	Yes	Yes	Yes	NA	3
Guanajuato	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	NA	2	Yes	No	No	NA	1
Guerrero	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	NA	1	Yes	Yes	No	NA	2
Hidalgo	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	NA	3	Yes	No	Yes	NA	2
Jalisco	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Marketing Int. Trade	3	Yes	No	No	NA	1
Michoacán	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	NA	2	Yes	Yes	Yes	Italian	3
Morelos	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	NA	5	Yes	Yes	No	NA	2
Nuevo León	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	NA	4	Yes	Yes	No	NA	2
Oaxaca	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Tourism	3	Yes	Yes	No	Italian	2
Puebla	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	NA	4	Yes	Yes	Yes	NA	3
Querétaro	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	NA	3	Yes	Yes	No	NA	2
Quintana Roo	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	NA	2	Yes	Yes	No	Russian	2
San Luis Potosí	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Accounting, Psychology	1	Yes	Yes	No	NA	2
Sonora	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	NA	4	Yes	No	No	NA	1
Tabasco	No	No	No	No	No	No	International Trade, Engineering	0	Yes	Yes	No	Portuguese	2
Tamaulipas	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Migration	5	Yes	No	No	NA	1
Tlaxcala	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	NA	2	Yes	No	No	NA	1
Yucatán	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Anthropology	2	Yes	Yes	No	NA	2

Now then, what is the academic and professional profile of the personnel in charge of conducting the international affairs of the federal units? First, in terms of the academic background of the head of the office, the majority have undergraduate degrees in the social sciences (6 in Law, 5 in International Relations, 2 in Political Science, and 1 each in Economics, Communication and Education), five in administrative sciences (Administration and Accounting), three in applied sciences (Engineering), and one in the medical sciences (Medicine). Ten out of the 26 heads of the areas have graduate studies, 9 at the Masters level, and one (Puebla) hold a Ph.D. in Finance.

The staff of the agencies is mostly concentrated in the social sciences. In the 26 federal units, 19 have personnel specialized in International Relations, 14 in Law, 12 in Public Administration, 9 in Political Science, and 8 in Economics and Communications. Ten of the states have at least one specialist in the following areas: tourism, administration, business, migration, marketing, psychology, and anthropology. Also, half of the units (13) report that they have personnel with graduate studies. Almost all the federal units, with the exception of Baja California Sur, have staff members that, apart from Spanish, have proficiency in English (25). In terms of other languages, 17 have personnel that speak French, 4 German, 3 Portuguese and Italian, and only 1 Chinese (Distrito Federal) and Russian (Quintana Roo). The proficiency in the use of English is central to the internationalization of the federal units, and therefore it is not surprising that all but one of them have personnel proficient in this language; what is surprising is that apart from English and French, less than five federal



units have staff members who can communicate in other languages, specially Chinese (only the Federal District) due to the large amount of cooperation and IIA with this country.

#### 8.4. Legal and institutional framework

In terms of their legal and statutory capacities, there is a huge variation in terms of the legal documents that not only support the activities of the international agencies, but also in terms of their strategic planning and organization. The majority of the areas (15 out of 26) derive their responsibilities and activities from the State Development Plan (Plan Estatal de Desarrollo), which is a document that the state Executives construct during their first year in office to establish the central objectives and priorities of their administrations. This document is more of a political than legal nature, and therefore, it is not legally binding, not only for the administration that proposes it, but most importantly for the next administration. Sixteen of the international areas have legally binding rules of action, 12 of them in the form of internal rules of procedure, two as an organizational manual (Chiapas and Estado de México), one as an executive decree of creation (Puebla), and one as part of the organic law of the state (Oaxaca). The relevance of these legally binding documents is that they generate a bureaucratic structure that can become institutionalized, facilitating its permanence between administrations. Finally, 15 of the international areas have strategic planning, and 12 of them develop yearly

working plans that establish the specific activities that will be enacted during the year.

Table 8.4. Legal and Institutional Capacities

State	State Development Plan	Yearly Working Plan	Rules of Procedure	Strategic Plan	External Repr. Offices	Location of Office
Aguascalientes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	
Baja California	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	San Diego, CA
Baja California Sur	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	
Chiapas	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Salt Lake City, UT
Chihuahua	NA	NA	NA	NA	No	
Colima	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Lynwood, CA
Distrito Federal	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Los Angeles, CA, Chicago, IL
Durango	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Los Angeles, CA Chicago, IL
Estado de México	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Houston, TX Chicago, IL Los Angeles, CA
Guanajuato	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	NA
Guerrero	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Santa Anna, CA Chicago, IL
Hidalgo	No	Yes	No	No	No	
Jalisco	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	
Michoacán	No	No	No	No	No	
Morelos	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	
Nuevo León	No	No	Yes	No	No	
Oaxaca	No	No	No	No	Yes	Los Angeles, CA
Puebla	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	New York, NY Passaic, NJ Los Angeles, CA
Querétaro	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	
Quintana Roo	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	
San Luis Potosí	No	No	No	No	No	
Sonora	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	
Tabasco	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	
Tamaulipas	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	
Tlaxcala	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	
Yucatán	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	

One of the strategies that sub-State governments use to promote themselves internationally is the opening of representation offices abroad. Currently, only nine Mexican federal units have these offices abroad: Baja California in San Diego, California; Chiapas in Salt Lake City, Utah; Colima in Lynwood, California; Distrito Federal and Durango, both in Los Angeles, California and Chicago, Illinois; Estado de México in Houston, Texas, Chicago, Illinois, and Los Angeles, California; Guerrero in Santa Anna, California and Chicago, Illinois; Oaxaca in Los Angeles, California; and, Puebla in New York City, New York, Passaic, New Jersey, and Los Angeles, California. It is important to note that the states have opened these offices abroad in those cities where there diasporas are located, and that the most important activity of these offices is providing services to these migrant communities more than doing economic promotion of the state. It should also be underscored that all these offices are located in the United States, especially in the four states where historically Mexican emigration has concentrated (California, Illinois, New York, and Texas), but also including two states of more recent migration flows (Utah and New Jersey).

#### 8.5. International and coordination activities

What are the most important international and coordination activities conducted by the agencies in charge of the IRSSG in Mexico? As it has been widely discussed, sub-State government conduct international activities in order

to promote local development and welfare, specially through the external promotion of the state (to attract foreign direct investment, tourism, international cooperation in education, culture, science and technology, promotion of exports, among others).

Table 8.5. International and Coordination Activities

State	Foreign Visitors	Governor's Foreign Trips	IIA	Sisterhood Agreements	DIC	Relations with IO	Econ. Promotion	Migration	Culture	Education	Tourism	Total
Aguascalientes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	6
Baja California	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	8
Baja California Sur	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	0
Chiapas	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	10
Chihuahua	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	11
Colima	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	1
Distrito Federal	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	10
Durango	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	9
Estado de México	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	9
Guanajuato	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	7
Guerrero	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	6
Hidalgo	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	4
Jalisco	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	6
Michoacán	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	1
Morelos	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	9
Nuevo León	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	5
Oaxaca	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	7
Puebla	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	11
Querétaro	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	8
Quintana Roo	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	10
San Luis Potosí	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	1
Sonora	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	5
Tabasco	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	7
Tamaulipas	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	7
Tlaxcala	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	4
Yucatán	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	8

In order to do so, both the external participation of local actors and the attention of foreign visitors and partners have to be coordinated. Therefore, the majority of the state international areas are responsible for organizing and coordinating the external trips of the local Executive (20 of them) and the visits of international personalities (21 of them).

Also, 19 states supervise the international events that take place in the state, and 14 are in charge of external economic promotion. In terms of international cooperation and relations, 18 are responsible of the unit's IIA, 14 of sisterhood agreements, and 14 of decentralized cooperation mechanisms. Also, 14 of the areas are in charge of relations with their migrants, the same number that do cultural and education cooperation. Eleven of them are responsible for tourist promotion. Finally, 16 take care of the state's relations with international organizations, especially of the United Nations system, while 10 of them supervise their participation in international networks of sub-State governments.

#### 8.6. Domestic and international partners

In order to conduct the international affairs of the local governments, these agencies require to establish strategic relations with local partners and to coordinate with agencies and organizations at the state and federal levels. In order to substantiate their international activities, almost all of the units (23 out of 26) have developed relations with universities and research centers, while 19

have them with their local business communities, 18 with civil society organizations, and 14 with their migrant diasporas.

Table 8.6. Local Partners

State	Business	Civil Society Organizations	Universities	Migrant Associations	Total
Aguascalientes	No	No	Yes	No	1
Baja California	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	4
Baja California Sur	No	Yes	Yes	No	2
Chiapas	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	3
Chihuahua	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	4
Colima	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	4
Distrito Federal	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	4
Durango	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	3
Estado de México	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	4
Guanajuato	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	3
Guerrero	No	No	Yes	Yes	2
Hidalgo	No	No	No	No	0
Jalisco	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	3
Michoacán	No	No	Yes	Yes	2
Morelos	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	4
Nuevo León	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	3
Oaxaca	No	No	No	No	0
Puebla	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	4
Querétaro	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	3
Quintana Roo	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	3
San Luis Potosí	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	4
Sonora	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	3
Tabasco	No	Yes	Yes	No	2
Tamaulipas	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	4
Tlaxcala	Yes	No	Yes	No	2
Yucatán	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	3

Table 8.7. Relations with other institutions

State	AMAIE Member	Relation with AMAIE	Governors' National Conference	Foreign Affairs Secretariat	Office of Political Coordination	Embassies	Consulates	AMEXCID	IMR
Aguascalientes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Baja California	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Baja California Sur	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes
Chiapas	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Chihuahua	NA	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Colima	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No
Distrito Federal	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Durango	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Estado de México	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Guanajuato	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Guerrero	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Hidalgo	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
Jalisco	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Michoacán	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Morelos	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Nuevo León	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Oaxaca	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Puebla	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Querétaro	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
Quintana Roo	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
San Luis Potosí	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Sonora	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
Tabasco	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No
Tamaulipas	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
Tlaxcala	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Yucatán	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No

In terms of the institutional relations in order to coordinate with other federal units in their process of internationalization, on one hand, 15 of them are officially members of AMAIE, and one more, Morelos, is in the process of becoming one; as previously argued, it is in this association where technical cooperation and sharing of best practices in terms of internationalization takes

place between the federal units. On the other hand, 20 of them participate directly or indirectly in the international affairs commission of CONAGO, where political coordination between the governors takes place.

The most important institutional relation of the international areas at the federal level is, not surprisingly, with the SRE, where all of them, with the exception of Tlaxcala, have direct and constant relations. Within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the majority of the federal units (19) have direct relations with the General Direction for Political Coordination, which is the Ministry's area responsible of interacting with sub-State governments; some of them also have relations with other areas in the SRE's central offices: 14 with the Mexican Agency for International Cooperation (AMEXCID), eight with the Mexican Diplomatic Academy (Instituto Matías Romero, IMR), six with the office of the Secretary, and six more with the offices of the Undersecretaries. Finally, the majority have contact and relations with Mexican representations abroad, 21 of them with Mexican Embassies, and 18 with Mexican Consulates, especially with the Mexican consular system composed of 50 consulates in the United States, where 98.5% of Mexican migrants reside.

#### 8.7. Perceived challenges and strategies

However, in order to conduct their activities both in terms of local coordination and external projection, the international affairs areas face considerable challenges.



Table 8.8. Challenges

State	Legal Rules of Procedure	Budget	Human Resources	Knowledge and Training	Inter-Institutional Coordination	Federal Coordination	Strategic Planning	Political Support	Total
Aguascalientes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	0
Baja California	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	5
Baja California Sur	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	7
Chiapas	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	4
Chihuahua	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Colima	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	3
Distrito Federal	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	1
Durango	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	7
Estado de México	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	5
Guanajuato	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	3
Guerrero	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	5
Hidalgo	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	7
Jalisco	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	5
Michoacán	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	7
Morelos	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	4
Nuevo León	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	2
Oaxaca	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	1
Puebla	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	0
Querétaro	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	3
Quintana Roo	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	2
San Luis Potosí	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	0
Sonora	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	3
Tabasco	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	2
Tamaulipas	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	0
Tlaxcala	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	6
Yucatán	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	4

Only half of them (14) consider that their current legal and operative status facilitates the fulfillment of their responsibilities, and the most important challenges that they recognize that they face in their everyday activities are: insufficient budgets (15), lack of highly professionalized staff in international affairs at the local level (16), insufficient staff members (11), lack of an official

legal framework (10), limited mechanisms of coordination with the federal government (10) and other federal units (9), lack of strategic planning (9) and, in six cases, insufficient political support from their own local executives.

How do these international areas face and, to some extent, try to solve these challenges. Unfortunately, they have limited mechanisms to coordinate the activities of other state ministries, to communicate locally and externally their actions, and to evaluate their performance. Only 12 of them have permanent mechanisms with other state agencies and ministries to coordinate their international actions, nine have developed a communication strategy to share their activities at the local and external level, nine have institutional mechanisms to evaluate the fulfillment of their objectives, and nine have published books, newsletters and reports of their accomplishments.<sup>21</sup> What is surprising in the age of internet and social networks is that only six states have an official web page of the external affairs agency (Colima, Durango, Estado de México, Guerrero, Puebla, and Sonora).

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<sup>21</sup> In terms of the publications, the lack of institutional continuity is an unfortunate reality. For example, the person in charge of the international affairs of the state of Michoacán does not know of the existence of the publication of a very thorough report on the international activities of the state only two administrations before (Heredia Zubieta and Vélez Sánchez, 2008), during the Lázaro Cárdenas Batel administration. Also, the webpage of the activities of this administration (<http://www.michoacan.gob.mx/asuntosinternacionales>) is no longer available.

Table 8.9. Coordination and Communication

State	Coordination Mechanisms with other Ministries	Communication Strategy	Web Page	Publications	Impact Evaluation Mechanisms	Total
Aguascalientes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	3
Baja California	No	No	No	No	No	0
Baja California Sur	No	No	No	No	No	0
Chiapas	No	No	No	No	No	0
Chihuahua	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Colima	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	5
Distrito Federal	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	3
Durango	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	2
Estado de México	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	4
Guanajuato	Yes	No	No	No	No	1
Guerrero	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	3
Hidalgo	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	2
Jalisco	No	No	No	Yes	No	1
Michoacán	No	No	No	No	No	0
Morelos	No	No	No	Yes	No	1
Nuevo León	Yes	No	No	No	No	1
Oaxaca	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	2
Puebla	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	5
Querétaro	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	3
Quintana Roo	No	No	No	No	No	0
San Luis Potosí	No	No	No	No	No	0
Sonora	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	2
Tabasco	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	2
Tamaulipas	No	No	No	No	No	0
Tlaxcala	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	3
Yucatán	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	2

#### 8.8. Professionalization, knowledge and evaluation of IRSSG

What is the level of knowledge that the staff of the international relations areas of Mexican sub-State governments have about the legal procedures and resources available at the federal level to conduct their external affairs.

Table 8.10. Knowledge

State	Knows Inter-institutional Agreement Procedure	Evaluation	Foreign Affairs Secretariat's Microsite	Evaluation	Foreign Affairs Secretariat's Guide	Evaluation
Aguascalientes	Yes	Very efficient	Yes	Very useful	Yes	Very useful
Baja California	No	NA	No	NA	No	NA
Baja California Sur	No	NA	No	NA	Yes	NA
Chiapas	Yes	Very efficient	Yes	Very useful	Yes	Very useful
Chihuahua	Yes	Efficient	Yes	Useful	Yes	Very useful
Colima	No	NA	Yes	Very useful	No	NA
Distrito Federal	Yes	Little efficient	Yes	Useful	Yes	Very useful
Durango	Yes	Efficient	No	NA	Yes	Useful
Estado de México	Yes	Very efficient	Yes	Very useful	Yes	Very useful
Guanajuato	Yes	Very efficient	Yes	Very useful	No	NA
Guerrero	Yes	Very efficient	Yes	Very useful	Yes	Very useful
Hidalgo	Yes	Efficient	No	NA	Yes	Little useful
Jalisco	Yes	Efficient	Yes	Useful	Yes	Little useful
Michoacán	Yes	Efficient	Yes	Useful	Yes	Useful
Morelos	Yes	Very efficient	Yes	Very useful	Yes	Very useful
Nuevo León	Yes	Efficient	Yes	Useful	Yes	Useful
Oaxaca	Yes	Efficient	Yes	Useful	Yes	Useful
Puebla	Yes	Not efficient	Yes	Not useful	Yes	Little useful
Querétaro	Yes	Very efficient	Yes	Useful	Yes	Useful
Quintana Roo	Yes	Very efficient	Yes	Very useful	Yes	Very useful
San Luis Potosí	Yes	Efficient	Yes	Useful	Yes	Very useful
Sonora	No	NA	Yes	Useful	No	NA
Tabasco	Yes	Very efficient	Yes	Useful	No	NA
Tamaulipas	No	NA	No	NA	No	NA
Tlaxcala	No	NA	Yes	Very useful	No	NA
Yucatán	Yes	Very efficient	Yes	Useful	Yes	Very useful

First, in terms of the legal procedures established in the Law of Treaties of 1992 for the negotiation, completion, registration and implementation of IIA, it is surprising, and to some extent problematic, that not all the federal units know the basic legal basis to conduct their international affairs and cooperation: 20 states

know the procedure, while 6 (Baja California, Baja California Sur, Colima, Sonora, Tamaulipas, and Tlaxcala) do not. Those units that know the procedure have a relatively good impression of its efficiency. The vast majority (18) consider it as being very efficient (10) or efficient (8), while the Distrito Federal thinks it only a little efficient and Puebla considers that it is not efficient at all.

Almost the same number of federal units (21) knows about the existence of the SRE's web site to support and facilitate the internationalization of sub-State governments; in this case, the states that ignore its existence are again Baja California, Baja California Sur, and Tamaulipas, together with Durango and Hidalgo. Those units that know about the web site have a relatively good evaluation of how useful it is to support their internationalization efforts: 20 consider it very useful (9) or useful (11), and once again Puebla is the outlier, thinking that it is not useful at all.

Finally, as previously discussed, the SRE has published the "Guide of the SRE's recommendations on the international actions of Mexican states and municipalities", to provide ideas, best practices and recommendations to Mexican sub-State governments in their internationalization process. In this case, 18 federal units know about this guide. Those who do not are among those that either ignore the procedure to conclude IIA or the existence of SRE's web site on IRSSG (Baja California, Colima, Sonora, Tabasco, Tamaulipas, and Tlaxcala) with the addition of Guanajuato. The evaluation of this guide is also very positive among those states that know about it: 15 consider it very useful (10) or useful, while 3 (Hidalgo, Jalisco, and Puebla) think it is of little use.

Puebla is an interesting case, because it is the only state that has created an autonomous agency to centralize the coordination of international affairs, and also has the largest budget and the second largest staff among all units. It has institutionalized its legal procedures, a yearly working plan, and mechanisms to evaluate the impact of its activities. The head of the office has not only the highest academic qualifications (he is the only one with a Ph.D.), but was also Undersecretary at the SRE during the Fox administration. In sum, Puebla has substantially institutionalized and professionalized its international relations, developing its own model of internationalization. Maybe that is why it is the only state that does not find useful the information, support, and procedures provided by the SRE.

The survey also asked about the number of IIA that the federal unit had completed, in order to compare that information with the amount of IIA that each unit has historically registered before the SRE. It is interesting to note that only in four cases (Baja California Sur with no IIA, and Guerrero, Michoacán, and Tlaxcala), the number of agreements reported by the state are the same as those included in the RIIA of the SRE. In six cases (Chiapas, Distrito Federal, Estado de México, Puebla, Sonora and Tabasco), the federal units have not registered all the IIA which they have concluded. Together with Jalisco and Michoacán, these six units are the ones that have the largest number of IIA, both registered and unregistered, as well as some of the higher levels of IRSSG. It could be argued that as the amount of IIA increases, so does the level of under-registration.

Table 8.11. Inter-Institutional Agreements vs. RIIA

State	Survey	RIIA	Difference
Aguascalientes	3	7	4
Baja California	2	14	12
Baja California Sur	0	0	0
Chiapas	84	74	-10
Chihuahua	9	28	19
Colima	0	1	1
Distrito Federal	95	38	-57
Durango	12	15	3
Estado de México	75	49	-26
Guanajuato	14	20	6
Guerrero	6	6	0
Hidalgo	2	17	15
Jalisco	114	139	25
Michoacán	37	37	0
Morelos	5	7	2
Nuevo León	25	39	14
Oaxaca	NA	16	16
Puebla	30	21	-9
Querétaro	12	15	3
Quintana Roo	7	23	16
San Luis Potosí	0	14	14
Sonora	30	14	-16
Tabasco	10	6	-4
Tamaulipas	NA	6	6
Tlaxcala	2	2	0
Yucatán	5	11	6

What can be seen as a lack of professionalization and institutionalization of the international activities at the local level is when the federal unit recognizes less IIA than those that are officially registered before the SRE. This could be seen as an indicator that the current administrations do not have all the information on the internationalization activities done by previous governments, and therefore there is no continuity of these actions between administrations. In

some cases (Baja California, Chihuahua, Colima, Hidalgo, Oaxaca, Quintana Roo, and Tamaulipas), less than one third of the registered IIA are known to the current administrations; once again, with the exception of Oaxaca and Quintana Roo, the other states either ignore the procedure to conclude IIA or the existence of SRE's web site on IRSSG where the RIIA is publicly available.

How do the sub-State governments evaluate their relations with the federal ministry in charge of foreign affairs (SRE) and the association that integrates the state agencies in charge of the internationalization of the units (AMAIE). The good news is that the states that evaluated this relation (23 on SRE, and 19 on AMAIE), have a positive perception of these relations: 21 have very good (15) or good (6) relations with the SRE, while 17 have very good (9) or good (8) relations with AMAIE. Only Michoacán evaluates its relations with both organizations as bad, while Tabasco and Sonora consider their relations with the SRE and AMAIE, respectively, as average.

When the federal units are asked to qualify their international activities *vis à vis* Mexico's foreign policy, it is extremely interesting that the vast majority of the 25 units that answered the question, 21 or 84% of them, consider their international affairs as complementary to the country's foreign policy. Only two states (Querétaro and Guanajuato) think that they are competitive, while Hidalgo perceives them as autonomous.



Table 8.12. Evaluation of relations and International Relations of sub-State Governments

State	Foreign Affairs Secretariat	AMAIE	Type of IRSSG
Aguascalientes	Very good	NA	Complementary
Baja California	NA	Good	Complementary
Baja California Sur	Good	Good	NA
Chiapas	Very good	Very good	Complementary
Chihuahua	NA	NA	Complementary
Colima	Very good	Bad	Complementary
Distrito Federal	Good	Good	Complementary
Durango	Good	Good	Complementary
Estado de México	Very good	Good	Complementary
Guanajuato	Very good	Very good	Competitive
Guerrero	Very good	Very good	Complementary
Hidalgo	Very good	Very good	Autonomous
Jalisco	Good	Very good	Complementary
Michoacán	Bad	Bad	Complementary
Morelos	Very good	Good	Autonomous
Nuevo León	Good	Good	Complementary
Oaxaca	Very good	Very good	Complementary
Puebla	Very good	Good	Complementary
Querétaro	Very good	Very good	Competitive
Quintana Roo	Very good	Very good	Complementary
San Luis Potosí	NA	NA	Complementary
Sonora	Very good	Average	Complementary
Tabasco	Average	NA	Complementary
Tamaulipas	Good	NA	Complementary
Tlaxcala	Very good	NA	Complementary
Yucatán	Very good	Very good	Complementary

Finally, three open questions were included in the survey, asking the federal units to share, in each of them, up to three of the most important challenges that they face, of their current training needs, and of the most relevant actions conducted to institutionalize and consolidate their internationalization to the future. In terms of the relevant challenges that they have in their activities, the

most recurrent answers are being able to transcend after the change in the gubernatorial administration, strengthening inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms, solving the insufficiency of budget and staff, providing a legal framework and rules of procedure to the area, and coordinating at the state level the international activities of the municipal governments. The areas in which the international affairs areas require training are: first and foremost, diplomatic protocol; languages, strategic planning; impact evaluation; and strategies to conduct international cooperation, receive international donations, and attract foreign direct investment. Finally, the most important strategies enacted by the federal units so their international activities transcend their administration are: becoming members of AMAIE and participating in the International Affairs Commission of CONAGO and international networks of local governments; including local stakeholders (like business, academia and civil society organizations) in their international cooperation agreements and activities; drafting and approving legal frameworks and rules of procedures; publishing reports about their activities; and, concluding and registering their IIA.

## Conclusions

This chapter analyzed the results of the survey applied to the heads of the agencies (or their representatives) responsible for the internationalization of Mexican SSG government officials. There are several findings which are worth discussing. First, two third of the units that answered the survey have a specific

area, office or agency in charge of coordinating their international relations, and close to 60% have a centralized coordination of these external affairs. Also, the vast majority of the international relations areas are of relatively recent creation: only two were established before year 2000, six between 2000 and 2009, and the other 16 between 2010 and 2014. There is a huge variation in the names of these centralizing agencies (Under-secretariat, General Coordination, Coordination, Direction, Office, Unit, and Institute), and also in terms of their institutional and administrative adscription, even if half of them are directly responsible to the state Executive.

On average, the staff of these international agencies is 9.31, but there is a huge variation, from an office of one to a team of 52 people. The most active federal units have the largest agencies (Distrito Federal, Puebla, Estado de México, and Chiapas) with a staff of 20 or more. In terms of the academic formation of the personnel, the majority of the heads of the office have undergraduate degrees in the social sciences, and only 10 of them have graduate degrees. The staff of the agencies is also concentrated in the social sciences (International Relations, Law, Public Administration, Political Science, and Economics), and with one exception, the staff members are proficient, other than Spanish, in English (25). However, proficiency in other languages is very limited (only a few have staffers that speak French, German, Portuguese, Italian, and Chinese).

In terms of their legal and statutory capacities, there is also huge variation in terms of the legal documents that support their activities. The majority of the

units follow the State Development Plan, and only half of them have legally binding rules of action or internal rules of procedure. Also, around half do strategic planning or develop yearly working plans. Finally, only nine Mexican federal units have representation offices abroad. The units recognize that the most important challenges that they face in terms of their consolidation are insufficient budgets, lack of highly professionalized staff in international affairs, insufficient staff members, the lack of an official legal framework, and limited mechanisms of coordination with the federal government and other federal units. As expected, the federal units that have higher levels of IRSSG and have concluded more IIA are those that will have more and better trained personnel, more institutionalized agencies, and better legal and institutional frameworks.

The most important international activities conducted by the federal units are directly related with promoting local development and welfare (attract foreign direct investment, tourism, remittances, international cooperation in education, culture, science and technology, export promotion, and providing services to communities abroad). The vast majority are responsible of organizing and coordinating the external trips of the Governor, the visits of foreign personalities, supervising international events that take place in the state and the relations with international organizations, as well as coordinating the conclusion and implementation of IIA. Around half are in charge of external economic promotion, sisterhood agreements, decentralized cooperation, relations with their migrants, cultural and education cooperation, tourist promotion, and the participation in international networks. To conduct these international affairs, almost all the units

have established strategic relations with universities and research centers, while around half of them relate with their local business communities, civil society organizations, and their migrant diasporas. Fifteen are members of AMAIE, and 20 participate in the international affairs commission of CONAGO. However, their most important institutional relation is with the SRE, where all (but one of them) have direct and constant relations. Also, the vast majority have contact and relations with Mexican Embassies and Consulates around the world. Once again, those units with higher levels of IRSSG and IIA, are those with the highest the number and scope of the activities and partners in the internationalization strategy of their units.

Even if the vast majority knows about the resources available (SRE's website and guide) to support and facilitate their internationalization of sub-State governments and evaluates them positively, there are still some federal units that have no idea about these resources. The federal units have a very positive perception of their relations with SRE and AMAIE, and the good news is that almost 85% of them consider their international relations as complementary to the country's foreign policy, not competitive or conflictive.

## CHAPTER 9: THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE FEDERAL DISTRICT

### Introduction

In order to better understand the kind of international activities that Mexican sub-State governments conduct, a case study of the Federal District is included. As previously discussed, the Federal District is an interesting case, which passed from low to very high levels of external interaction in a few years.

The Federal District, Mexico's capital city, is the economic and political center of the country, as well as the geographical site for the diplomatic representation of other countries. As such, it should be a federal unit with a considerable amount of international activities. In its four sections, this case study analyses the international activities of the Federal District during the administrations of Andrés Manuel López Obrador (2000-2005) and his substitute Alejandro Encinas Rodríguez (2005-2006), and Marcelo Ebrard Casaubon (2006-2012); it will also make some preliminary discussion of the first two years of Miguel Ángel Mancera (2012-2014). This case study seeks to answer the following questions: Which were the levels of international activity during these administrations? Which were the bureaucratic structures, topics and mechanisms of cooperation used by each of them in terms of their international activities? What explains the dramatic increase in the level of international participation under Ebrard, with respect to López Obrador and Encinas?

In order to answer the previous questions, the chapter is divided in four sections. First, it briefly reprises the explanation of how the changes in the international and domestic systems have generated incentives for greater external participation by Mexican federal entities, among them the Federal District. Second, it describes and analyzes the attributions and main actions of the state ministries and administrative units of the Federal District in international affairs. Third, it presents and discusses the international events and IIA concluded by the federal unit. The fourth section details the main changes in external matter in the administration of Ebrard, and outlines some explanatory variables through which the considerable increase in the international activity of this government can be understood as opposed to the previous administrations. Finally, the conclusions summarize the main findings and briefly discuss the international projection of the first two years of Mancera's administration.

### 9.1. From López Obrador to Encinas

López Obrador considered that “the best external policy is the internal policy” (Ruiz Parra, 2005), and was followed in this idea by Encinas. As such, during the administrations of López Obrador and Encinas, the norm was a reduced participation of the Federal District in external affairs. An important limitation to the international activity of the Federal District under his administration was the *Law of Austerity* promoted by López Obrador himself, which only allowed one official trip to the exterior per year, per administrative unit

(Ley de Austeridad, 2003: art. 7). This law did not clarify whether this restriction also applied to the local Executive. However, the actions of López Obrador and Encinas suggest that this is how they interpreted it.

In five years (2000-2005), López Obrador did not make any trips outside Mexico to promote the entity internationally. Encinas, as Secretary of State of the Federal District under López Obrador, made visits to Washington D.C. and Massachusetts in September 2004; however, as Chief of Government, he only left the country once to go to Los Angeles, California, in December 2005.

The international activities of both López Obrador and Encinas could be interpreted more as a reaction to what the world had to offer, instead of actively looking for additional spaces of cooperation between the Federal District and the rest of the world. In general, they would meet with dignitaries who visited Mexico City to participate in events that had nothing to do with the Federal District. In most cases, these personalities were designated as distinguished visitors and were given the keys to the city. As a result of the lack of relations of the Federal District with the world, there were only two IIA signed between 2000 and 2006: the first was a cooperation agreement with the Region of Wallonia in Belgium during the López Obrador administration, and the other was a sisterhood agreement with the City of Buenos Aires, Argentina, when Encinas was in office.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> A memorandum of understanding with Canada and FAO, a letter of intention with the municipality of Córdoba and the Protocol for Mutual Cooperation with the City of Sao Paulo are not considered IIA by the SRE.



As previously discussed, the Federal District was classified in 2004, along with Aguascalientes, Durango, Guerrero, Querétaro and San Luis Potosí, as one of the federal units with low levels of IRSSG. This low level of external activity implies that the local government does not have relevant international relations or that its participation takes place in a sporadic way or in areas or topics of low importance or impact.

In spite of this, by 2005 the Federal District was the fourth federal unit with greater number of external agreements and cooperation mechanisms in Mexico: 61 (Luna and Ballesteros, 2005: 26-27). Some of the agreements were signed with other important cities, like Berlin (Germany), Buenos Aires (Argentina), Havana (Cuba), Los Angeles (United States), Madrid (Spain), Nagoya (Japan), and Seoul (South Korea). These agreements established mechanisms of cooperation in diverse matters, such as trade, investment, tourism, environment, science and technology, among others. However, from 2000 to 2006, the Federal District did not take advantage of the agreements and some were forgotten, since neither López Obrador nor Encinas thought that the relation of the Federal District with the world was an important strategy for its development in the medium or long term. Therefore, bonds with international partners were not based on logic of continuity or to establish lasting networks in the long run. For this reason, in spite of having multiple agreements signed with external counterparts, there were no sufficient or suitable administrative mechanisms established to administer them. Thus, the relations with the exterior were more reactive than proactive.

This situation changed dramatically in 2006. Unlike his predecessors, Ebrard declared in multiple forums his intention to reactivate the sisterhood agreements and the IIA to boost international cooperation, in order to create and strengthen bonds between the Federal District and the rest of the world (Luna and Ballesteros 2005, 26-27). During his first semester as Chief of Government, he was able to take the Distrito Federal from a low level of IRSSG to one of considerable activism in international matters, reaching the highest degree of international relations by the end of his administration. Besides reactivating the sisterhood agreements and the IIA to promote decentralized international cooperation, his administration extended the spaces and topics for external cooperation, the promotion of local exports, and attraction of foreign direct investment. He also made a commitment to open five offices for Federal District representation in the exterior to promote the entity's interests, as well as to respond to its migrant community outside the country; at the end of the administration, due to budget constraints, only two offices were opened in Los Angeles, California, and Chicago, Illinois (Bolaños 2007).

As previously discussed, in the last decade, the increasing international activity of the Mexican federal units increased substantially, specially en seven areas: 1) establishment of offices of representation; 2) organization of highly publicized trips of the local executives; 3) official trips of local civil employees; 4) organization of international fairs for export promotion; 5) deepening of the relations with other federal units regionally and globally; 6) participation in meetings or international organizations; and, 7) opening offices to serve migrant

communities. During the first year of his administration, Ebrard conducted specific actions in each of these seven areas, or publicly declared his intention to carry them out; by the end of his administration, specific actions in each of these areas were implemented. In short, it is clear that the Ebrard administration considered the strengthening of the international relations of the Federal District as a good domestic and local policy.

## 9.2. Attributions and actions of the ministries and administrative units of the Federal District in international affairs

Based on the Statutory Law of the Public Administration of the Federal District of 1998, there was no Secretariat or Under-secretariat in the government structure that was specifically in charge of the international relations of the Federal District. This does not imply that the entity lacked the capacity to establish relations with other states, cities or international organizations. It meant that the attributions in international matters were spread among the diverse secretariats and offices of the local government, instead of being concentrated into a single unit.

In order to coordinate the multiplicity of possible international activities derived from the faculties and attributions of each secretariat, the General Coordination of International Affairs (GCIA) was created in 1995, directly

responsible to the Chief of Government.<sup>23</sup> Since the first democratic election in 1997, won by Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Solórzano (1997-1999), who was replaced by Rosario Robles Berlanga (1999-2000), up to January 2015, only six people have been designated as directors of the GCIA: Patricia Zorrilla (under Cárdenas and Robles), Virginia Martínez (under López Obrador and Encinas), Víctor Kerber, Mauricio Camps, and Francesca Ramos Morgan (under Ebrard), and the Ex-Chief of Government Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas (under Mancera). Even though a law or public regulation that specifies its attributions and functions did not exist, the essential responsibility of the GCIA was to serve as a coordinating axis of all international actions of all other ministries of the Federal District.<sup>24</sup> The GCIA had an important activism during the administration of Cárdenas, which was reduced drastically when both López Obrador and Encinas were in office, and was considerably reactivated with Ebrard,<sup>25</sup> and maintained by Mancera, as will be described in the next sections.

The attributions of the Chief of Government and the agencies in international affairs are established in the Rules of Procedure of the Public Administration of the Federal District (RIAPDF 2000). The Secretariat with greater attributions related to the international arena has been the Secretariat for Economic Development. The General Direction of Regulation and Economic Promotion of this secretariat, among other activities of local scope, had the responsibility to promote the Federal District's economy, through its productive

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<sup>23</sup> Interview with Virginia Martínez.

<sup>24</sup> Interview with Mauricio Camps.

<sup>25</sup> Interview with Guadalupe González Chávez.

specialization and its dynamic insertion in the regional and global markets, as well as to promote its exports, foreign trade and foreign direct investment. To do this, it organized international fairs, exhibitions, and congresses to promote the economic activities of the Federal District, as well as coordinated the celebration of agreements and actions with international financial institutions, public and private, in order to stimulate investment and local economic development (RIAPDF 2000, art. 51).

The attributions of the Secretariat for Economic Development clearly establish the importance that foreign direct investment has always had for the Federal District. In 2006, 41.2% of the enterprises with foreign participation registered in Mexico were in the Federal District, whereas the foreign direct investment of this federal unit represented 57.4% of all investment in the center region of the country. This investment came primarily from the United States (62.4%), Spain (16.7%) and the Netherlands (7.3%), and most of it concentrated in the service sector (48.1%), followed by manufacture (29.4%), and commerce with (12.5%) (Secretaría de Economía, 2006: 2-3).

As mentioned before, in addition to the economic activities conducted by the Secretariat of Economic Development, other agencies and ministries can also establish international bonds (RIAPDF 2000, art. 32). The General Direction of the Institute of Tourist Promotion of the Federal District is in charge of establishing a permanent communication system with the international and national media and to promote the tourist attractions in Mexico City (RIAPDF 2000, art. 97-bis). Nonetheless, a great part of the tourist campaign publicity, like

"DFiesta en el DF", was directed to the Mexican population, diminishing the importance that the international tourism could have for Mexico City.

The Government of the Federal District has had a growing participation in environmental issues through its Secretariat of Environment. This ministry is in charge of encouraging scientific exchange with the international community in the area of atmospheric pollution, as well as collaborating with international organizations to obtain cooperation and financing to promote sustainable public transportation (RIAPDF 2000, art. 54). In June 2004, the Secretariat initiated the Program of Retro-Adaptation of Polluting Control Equipment (Retrofit), which consisted on placing particle traps and catalytic converters, certified by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), in urban buses. With this, the Secretariat intended to reduce the polluting particle emissions and the nitrogen monoxide levels produced by public transport. This program received a 350,000 USD support of the government of the United States and 150,000 USD from the World Resources Institute (WRI). The program was presented in January 2005 by López Obrador and the American Ambassador in Mexico, Tony O. Garza.

It is important to note that the relations between China and the Federal District have been intense during the last years. In December 2005, the government of the Federal District initiated a program to rehabilitate the Chinese District in downtown Mexico City. In addition to the Foundation of the Historical Center and the government of the Federal District, through the Mexico City's Historical Center Trust, this program was funded by the Chinese government,

through its Embassy, and the Chinese community in the city (Comunicación Social del Distrito Federal 2006).

The importance of these relations were emphasized by Ebrard, who as elected Chief of Government did a trip to China; at his return, he declared that for Mexico City the relation with China is a high priority and that during his administration, there would be a Chinese portfolio of infrastructure projects and investment in the Mexican capital (El Universal 2006). This trip was paid by the Chinese company Sinosure, dedicated to finance exports and investments in infrastructure (La Crónica 2006), and with which he signed an agreement to promote the development of infrastructure and to attract investment to the Federal District. Although the trip was not considered official because it was organized by Chinese entrepreneurs, Ebrard had the opportunity to meet with the mayor of Beijing, Wang Qi Shan, in a forum organized by the Association of Mayors of China, where they discussed the potential of Chinese investment in Mexico City.

Also, as result of this trip, Ebrard, as Chief of Government, met with the financial director of the Chinese technological company ZTE to sign a memorandum of understanding in which both were committed to explore the ways to offer wireless technologies in the city and solutions in telecommunications for the government headquarters (El Financiero 2007). In this same area, in March 2007, Ebrard met with Bill Gates in Mexico City to sign an agreement of technological collaboration with Microsoft Mexico (Reforma 2007).

After his visit to China, before taking office, Ebrard traveled to Berlin and London, invited by the mayors of these cities. The trip lasted five days and had the purpose of promoting agreements and projects of investment for the capital of the country (EI Universal 2006). The transportation costs were covered by Ebrard's own pocket, while the local costs were financed by the host local governments. During these days, Ebrard had the opportunity to meet with the mayors of London and Berlin, as well as of Washington D.C., New York, Sao Paulo and Hamburg (Reforma 2006).

### 9.3. International events and conclusion of IIA

The government of the Federal District organizes diverse international events, sports events being among the most visible. The Sports Institute of the Federal District has organized for more than 30 consecutive years, the Mexico City's International Marathon, the most important athletic competition in the country, which summons more than 10,000 runners from different nationalities (Instituto del Deporte 2007).

The representatives of the Federal District's government conducted diverse diplomatic activities. In December 2000, Rosario Robles organized a tribute to the Cuban president, Fidel Castro, who was visiting Mexico to participate in the inauguration of President Fox. The Cuban president was declared distinguished guest and was given a public recognition, a medal, and the keys of Mexico City. The Federal District was the only Mexican federal unit to



organize a ceremony for Fidel Castro or any other head of state or government participating in the inauguration of Mexico's first democratically elected president in over 70 years (Vanguardia 2000).

In July 2003, López Obrador met with the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dominique de Villepin. However, this meeting did not contribute to the strengthening of relations between the Federal District and France, since there were no agreements signed or commitments for future cooperation established with the French Embassy in México (2003). Three years later, in April of 2006, the president of Uruguay, Tabaré Vázquez, after making a state visit to the federal government, met with the Chief of Government Alejandro Encinas, who gave him the keys of Mexico City and recognized him as a distinguished guest. During this meeting, Tabaré Vázquez defined Encinas as an unshakeable politician of the Latin American left (Bolaños 2006). However, this visit did not strengthen the bonds between Uruguay and Mexico City, even if there was an ideological identification between the two executives, which could have been the basis for the consolidation of stronger ties.

The international activity of the Federal District can also be seen in the signature of sisterhood agreements and IIA with cities and states. According to Luna and Ballesteros, the sisterhood agreements between cities are a technical-political instrument that allows the existence of a relationship between local organizations of different nations that seek to increase bonds and capacities at the international level (2005, 17-19). The issues covered by these agreements were mostly of economic, cultural and social in their nature, leaving aside other

areas like local management. These agreements can be as inclusive or limited as both parts desire, as long as they do not exceed the legal attributions of the organizations, cities, states or regions (Ley Sobre Celebración de Tratados 1992).

As mentioned before, there were only two IIA concluded between 2000 and 2006. López Obrador signed an agreement of cooperation with the Region of Valonia, Belgium, in June of 2001, and Encinas established a sisterhood agreement with the City of Buenos Aires, Argentina, in August of 2006. In spite of the limited international activism of Mexico City during these administrations, the Federal District had many previous agreements with cities like Los Angeles, Berlin, Havana, Madrid, Nagoya, and Seoul, among many others, but they were left in oblivion during the López Obrador and Encinas' administrations. These agreements establish mechanisms of cooperation in science and technology, trade, investment, tourism, environment, decentralization, administrative development, social promotion, urbanism and culture, among others. However, out of all these IIA, only thirteen were registered and recognized officially by the SRE by 2007,<sup>26</sup> because they complied with the requirements established in the Law on Treaty Celebration of 1992.

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<sup>26</sup> These were: three sisterhood agreements with Buenos Aires (Argentina), San José (Costa Rica) and Quito (Ecuador); four of general cooperation with the Region of Walloon (Belgium), San Francisco's Mayor Office (United States), the Junta de Andalucía (Spain), and the State of Pennsylvania (United States); five of cooperation on environmental issues with the State of Colorado (United States), the Development Research Center (Canada), the French Development Agency (France), The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO-UN), and the International Council for Local Environment Initiatives (ICLEI); one for exchange of information with the Colegio de Registradores de la Propiedad y Mercantiles (Spain) and finally, one for technical cooperation with the Secretariat of State (Honduras).

Before the Ebrard administration, the Federal District failed to take advantage of most of its agreements. A clear example was the sisterhood agreement with Los Angeles, signed in 1969. Los Angeles is the city outside of Mexico with the largest Mexican population (the second world-wide, only after Mexico City), and many of these migrants come from the Federal District. However, the most important approach between this city and the Federal District had been in the environmental arena, leaving aside opportunities of cooperation in urban and migratory issues. With this in mind, on December 2005, Encinas traveled to Los Angeles to establish a more effective partnership (Truax 2005), and to participate in the forum “Crossing Borders: Reuniting the two Mexican capitals”, celebrated on December 3, at California State University, in Long Beach.

Another tool to establish international bonds is the organization of official visits by the local executive to international destinations. However, as it was mentioned before, this strategy was only used once during the López Obrador and Encinas’ administrations. López Obrador never left the country while being in office, and Encinas made only one trip to Los Angeles. By not traveling more, the opportunities to make the Federal District known to the world, to sign agreements, attract investments, promote tourism and exports, as well as to protect and approach migrant communities, were substantially restricted.

In addition to the relations with other states and cities of the world, the Federal District also participated in meetings, forums and activities of international organisms, like the United Nations (UN). For example in May of

2006, the Encinas administration developed with UNICEF a research project and report on the situation of infant and teenage population that were not attending school in the Federal District (United Nations 2006).

In addition to the limited activities in which the Federal District participated voluntarily, there were other issues that required the government's attention, such as migration. The Federal District received \$1,450 million USD in remittances in 2005, ranking in fifth place at the national level, just behind the Estado de México, Jalisco, Guanajuato and Michoacán. The amount of remittances increased 31.5% between 2004 and 2005, being the federal unit with the highest grow rate in the country in this period (Mejía Flores 2006). Reacting to this reality, the Federal District, through the Mexico City's Development Trust (FONDESOC), organized in February of 2004 the Forum "Migration and remittances in the Federal District", where the situation of the local migrants that resided in the United States and Canada was discussed. This forum considered the mechanisms of financial intermediation and public policies that the Federal District's government could implement in order to generate the right incentives to use part of the remittances towards productive projects related to economic development and social welfare (Gobierno del Distrito Federal and H. Asamblea Legislativa 2006).

Among the most important recommendations derived from this forum was the creation of alternative low cost financial services for the migrants, and mechanisms to stimulate the productive use of remittances, such as the creation of cooperatives of receivers of remittances to initiate small businesses, and the

reform of the laws to incentive local saving and credit provision to promote productive projects through remittances (Mejía Flores 2006). However, no public policies were implemented to address these opportunities.

In sum, during the López Obrador and Encinas' administrations, the Federal District was an outlier in Mexico, because it was the richest federal unit but had the lowest level of international activities. This can be explained, in part, because the Federal District did not require to promote itself as much as other states, due to its privileged position as the political and economic center of the country, and its vast amount of infrastructure and services. However, the most important explanation is political: as statist and nationalist leftist politicians, both the López Obrador and Encinas administrations did not believe in the importance of international promotion to generate local development, even introducing an austerity policy to constrain international trips. However, as it will be analyzed in the following section, the international activity of the Federal District increased substantially after Marcelo Ebrard, a social liberal and internationalist leftist politician, took office as Chief of Government, activating the Federal District's international participation.

#### 9.4. Change of administration: change to an internationalist vocation

Why do leftist politicians (López Obrador and Encinas on one side, and Ebrard and Mancera on the other)<sup>27</sup> who have the same responsibility (Chiefs of Government in Mexico City) in relatively similar moments in time (economic and political conditions were relatively similar in the 2000-2006 and 2006-2012-present periods) follow completely different strategies in terms of their public policy priorities, especially in the internationalization of the Federal District?

As Levitsky and Roberts (2011) remind us, Latin American left political parties are marked by considerable diversity, and even if they share a commitment to more equitable development, they vary both in their socioeconomic policies and approach to democratic governance; this could be extended to leftist politicians too. The variation ranges from liberal democratic lefts or politicians who pursue “redistributive goals within the constraints of macroeconomic orthodoxy, to openly statist policies” (399). Some of these differences are attributed to the ideologies and personal preferences of individual leaders (Vargas Llosa 2007).

Using the characterization of the Latin American lefts developed by Levitsky and Roberts (2011) based on the social and economic policies and the orientation toward democracy in Latin American countries from 1998 to 2010, López Obrador would be classified a statist and plebiscitary leftist leader, while

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<sup>27</sup> The analysis will concentrate in the differences between López Obrador and Ebrard, since Encinas only served a year as López Obrador’s substitute and followed the same policy lines as him, while Mancera has not only followed Ebrard’s international policies, but deepened them.

Ebrard would be a social liberal and liberal democratic leftist leader (400-401). López Obrador tried to transform the market model and expand the State control over social policy. He created new social programs at the local level and expanded public expenditure in them increasing the debt of the Federal District. He also concentrated in local and domestic issues, disregarding international affairs as not important, to the degree of saying that the best external policy was the internal policy. Ebrard maintained an orthodox fiscal policy but, at the same time, continued with López Obrador's social programs, financing a substantial part of them with increases in property taxes. In the external sphere, he saw the internationalization of the Federal District as a strategy to promote local development by attracting more foreign direct investment, remittances, and tourism.

The change from a modest profile (López Obrador) to one of high international activism (Ebrard) in the Federal District can be explained, in part, by the personal characteristics of the two Chiefs of Government. The academic training of Marcelo Ebrard as an internationalist generated a personal conviction about the importance of international relations to promote local development.<sup>28</sup> This contrasts with the more nationalistic and parochial view of López Obrador,

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<sup>28</sup> He holds a B.A. degree in International Relations from El Colegio de México, one of the most prestigious and internationalized institutions in the social sciences in Latin America.

who emphasized national solutions to local needs based on his training<sup>29</sup> in public administration.<sup>30</sup>

These differences not only affected their strategies in terms of the internationalization of the Federal District, but also in terms on how each of them constructed their strategy to obtain the PRD candidacy for the presidential election. López Obrador preferred investing his time and resources in building an electoral base through the expansion of social redistributive programs and a direct relation with the masses. Ebrard preferred to avoid direct contact with the masses and used alliances with other national political leaders and external activism as a strategy to position him politically at the national and international levels. At the end, for the 2012 presidential election, López Obrador's strategy prevailed in an open consultation to the general public organized by the coalition of leftist parties (PRD, Partido del Trabajo and Movimiento Ciudadano), and he obtained the coalition's candidacy for the 2012 presidential election, as he had done in 2006.

In terms of the institutions for the internationalization of the Federal District, even though the GCIA has existed since 1995 and had moments of activism between 1997 and 2000, its work was modest during the administrations of López Obrador and Encinas. Between 2000 and 2006, it was divided in four

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<sup>29</sup> He holds a B.A. in Political Science and Public Administration from UNAM, Mexico's National Autonomous University, which is regarded as one of the most nationalistic institutions in the country in the social sciences.

<sup>30</sup> Interview with Mauricio Camps



areas: bilateral, multilateral, embassies and high level visits. During this period, its relation with the SRE was limited but very cordial.<sup>31</sup>

At the initiation of the Ebrard administration the GCIA was reconstructed, consolidating its current structure by January 2007. An expert in international relations was appointed as General Coordinator,<sup>32</sup> and he reported directly to the Chief of Government. The coordination started with two areas: international cooperation and special projects. Besides the existing General Coordinator, two additional experts in international relations were hired; the complete team of the GCIA had nine full time staff members by May of 2007.<sup>33</sup> Mauricio Camps, Assistant General Coordinator replaced Víctor Kerber as General Coordinator in August 15, 2007, and Francesca Ramos Morgan took his place in 2009. It is interesting to note that Ebrard, Kerber, and Morgan studied together the B.A. in International Relations at El Colegio de México from 1977 to 1981 (Vega and Garza 2012).

At the beginning of the Ebrard government, the Federal District faced some restrictions to launch its external relations. Until 1997, the Federal District was an administrative department of the federal government, and its head, the Regent, was appointed by the President. After 1997, the Chief of Government

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<sup>31</sup> Interview with Virginia Martínez.

<sup>32</sup> Dr. Víctor Kerber had substantive academic credentials (he was professor and researcher at El Colegio de México and Instituto Tecnológico de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey) and relevant public sector professional experience (he was member of the Mexican Foreign Service) in international relations. Interview with Víctor Kerber.

<sup>33</sup> Mauricio Camps, as Assistant General Coordinator (from January to August 15, 2007) and Guadalupe González Chávez as Director of Special Projects, both with a degree and graduate studies in international relations or social sciences. Virginia Martínez, previous General Coordinator headed the Direction of International Cooperation, which allowed the current GCIA to maintain previous knowledge.

gained independence since he began to be democratically elected. However, the Federal District is not a state, and therefore, it does not have budgetary autonomy —its budget and debt are still approved by the Federal Chamber of Deputies— or its own Constitution, which limits its powers in the economic and legal scope. Nonetheless, even when limited by the federal government, the Federal District took advantage of its three identities (as a federal unit, as capital city of the country, and as a megalopolis) to promote itself internationally. These identities gave it flexibility to associate with different international actors, like cities, states, national metropolis, capital cities, and regions, in addition to international organizations and associations, public and private, national and international.

The essential function of the GCIA was to function as a coordinating axis of all the international actions of all the local ministries and agencies. It served as the only point of access to the Chief of Government on international issues, and its main responsibility was to structure a unified position with the world. Being so, its efforts were directed to promote the cohesion, communication, coordination, and collaboration between all the agencies of the local government to reach a coherent international action.<sup>34</sup>

The main tasks as a horizontal coordinating axis were to avoid the duplication of efforts between agencies, to eliminate the existence of gray areas or without definition, to harness the resources available, and to give coherence and unity to the international relations of the Federal District. Thus, the GCIA not

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<sup>34</sup> Interview with Guadalupe González Chávez.

only had a function toward the world, but most importantly within the local government. At the local level, since many ministries and agencies had their own areas or directions of international affairs, and they all shared that their activities should promote the development of the Federal District, the coordination of the GCIA tried to avoid efforts to be dispersed, duplicated, or even confronted. Toward the exterior, it was responsible of positioning Mexico City as one of the most important metropolis world-wide for its competitiveness, tourist attractions, growth of financial services, high technology, and security, among others. The objective was to have a positive effect on local development since it would attract investment, promote its exports in the world market, and attract remittances for productive uses, and strengthen its relations with the migrant community in the exterior.<sup>35</sup>

Since Ebrard was elected Chief of Government, there was a huge change in the DF's international relations. For example, every time a President or Prime Minister from other countries visited Mexico, his administration sought –and obtained in the majority of the cases— a meeting of Ebrard with them, and in each of them Ebrard and the visitors declared the desire and intention of their governments to strengthen bilateral relations, in many case generating specific cooperation agreements or IIA. On December 5, 2006, a few days after Ebrard took office, the American Ambassador, Tony O. Garza, expressed the desire to strengthen and expand the relations between the United States and the Federal District (Embajada de los Estados Unidos en México 2006). Later, on January

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<sup>35</sup> Interview with Mauricio Camps.

2007, the Ambassador Ren Jingyu offered a banquet in honor to the new Chief of Government. Both sides used this event to exchange friendly opinions on the promotion of cooperation between the Federal District and the provinces and municipalities of China (Embajada de la República Popular de China en México 2007).

Table 9.1. Official visits of foreign Chiefs of State and Government

Name	Position	Country	Year
José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero	Prime Minister	Spain	2007
Néstor Kirchner Ostoic	President	Argentina	2007
Luis Inácio Lula da Silva	President	Brazil	2007
Michelle Bachelet	President	Chile	2007
Rafael Correa Delgado	President	Ecuador	2008
Tabaré Vázquez Rosas	President	Uruguay	2008
Fernando Lugo Méndez	President	Paraguay	2008
Georgi Zarvanov	President	Bulgaria	2008
Xi Jinping	President	China	2009
Nicolas Sarkozy	President	France	2009
Prince Philippe and Princess Mathilde	Prince and Princess	Belgium	2009
Oscar Arias Sánchez	President	Costa Rica	2009
Manuel Zelaya Rosales	President	Honduras	2009
Queen Beatrix	Queen	The Netherlands	2009
Evo Morales	President	Bolivia	2010
Michel Sleiman	President	Lebanon	2010
Sebastián Piñera	President	Chile	2011
Álvaro Colom	President	Guatemala	2011
Juan Manuel Santos	President	Colombia	2011
Laura Chinchilla	President	Costa Rica	2011

Source: Mexico City, Global City, 2011

In addition to economic interests, Ebrard managed to establish bonds with other countries through his ideological identity as a social liberal. In March 2007, Ebrard gave the keys to the city to the Chilean President, Michelle Bachelet, along with a medal and a declaration as a distinguished guest. In his speech, Ebrard emphasized that both governments have common concerns, especially in the area of social policy, where there exists a confluence of interests that strengthens the will to construct viable alternatives to conservative liberalism (Comunicación Social 2007), and a model of global economy (Martínez 2007). Also, Ebrard expressed his desire to strengthen the relation of the Federal District with Chile to “find opportunities of cooperation in diverse areas, like science, technology and innovation, and investment of joint projects” (Comunicación Social 2007).

Ebrard also met with the Chief of the Spanish Government, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, who also received the keys of the city, along with a medal and a declaration as distinguished guest of the city. In this meeting, Ebrard emphasized the ideological identification between both governments when he declared that “Spain and Mexico City share a humanist perspective where the people and their problems come first” (Comunicación Social July 2007). Also, following the strategy to strengthen international bonds, Ebrard declared his intention to deepen relations with Spain, by identifying common projects and establishing new possibilities of cooperation (Reforma July 2007). Zapatero, in turn, was more specific and mentioned his desire to maintain and deepen the economic cooperation with the Federal District and to share the experiences of

the leading Spanish companies on public transportation, infrastructure, water management and gas distribution as clean energy. Among the cooperation projects, they mentioned the construction of a suburban train in Mexico City, and the remodeling of the Spanish Cultural Center, in order to transform the Federal District as one of the Latin American cultural capitals (Agencia EFE 2007).

Three months later, on July 2007, Ebrard received and recognized the President of Argentina, Néstor Kirchner, as a distinguished guest of the city. Kirchner had traveled to Mexico to meet with President Felipe Calderón to reinforce bilateral cooperation and sign a Strategic Association Agreement between both nations. Ebrard declared that both governments shared the same perspective on topics such as social inclusion, effective programs to alleviate poverty and the construction of new platforms for sustainable economic growth that generated jobs and offered effective opportunities for social development (Milenio July 2007).

Another important visitor was Brazil's President, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, in August 2007, who also received the keys to the City and was designated distinguished guest of the city. Ebrard declared his interest in developing a common agenda with Brazil, especially on scientific and technological cooperation. Mexico City was in the process of changing its transportation policy to improve efficiency in energy consumption and reducing polluting emissions; for this reason the administration requested Brazilian cooperation on energy, especially with new bio-fuels like ethanol. With this in mind, Ebrard expressed his desire to sign an energy agreement with Brazil (Reforma August 2007). Lula da

Silva declared his interest in the results of Mexico City's social programs, and invited Ebrard to Brazil. He also recommended him to contact the Ministry of the Cities in Brazil, in order to exchange experiences on the administration of large cities. Finally, Ebrard expressed his sympathy with Lula's political platform, ideology and social programs, and publicly declared that he felt very proud of the advances that his leftist government had made in Brazil (Ramírez 2007), using again the ideological identity card to widen the international bonds of the Federal District.

Between 2006 and 2012, other Chiefs of State and Government from the left end of the political spectrum that did an official visit to Mexico City and met with Ebrard were the Presidents of Bolivia (Evo Morales), Bulgaria (Georgi Zharvanov), China (Xi Jinping), Ecuador (Rafael Correa), Honduras (Manuel Zelaya), Paraguay (Fernando Lugo), and Uruguay (Tabaré Vázquez). Many other dignitaries from different political ideologies also made official visits, like the Presidents of Chile (Sebastián Piñera), Colombia (Juan Manuel Santos), Costa Rica (Oscar Arias in 2009 and Laura Chinchilla in 2011), France (Nicolas Sarkozy), Guatemala (Álvaro Colom), and, Lebanon (Michel Sleiman), and the Queen Beatrix from the Netherlands and Crown Prince Philippe from Belgium. In sum, over 20 official visits from foreign dignitaries were received by the Ebrard administration during its 6 years term.

Table 9.2. Official visits of foreign Mayors

Name	City	Year
Takehisa Matsubara	Nagoya	2007
Jordí Hereu	Barcelona	2007
Michael Bloomberg	New York	2007
Alberto Ruiz-Gallardón	Madrid	2009
Mauricio Macri	Buenos Aires	2009
Samuel Moreno Rojas	Bogota	2009
Juan Contino Aslán	Havana	2009
Juan Del Granado	La Paz	2009
Luis Castañeda Lossio	Lima	2009
Ricardo Ehrlich	Montevideo	2009
Andrés Vallejo Arcos	Quito	2009
Norman Noel Quijano	San Salvador	2009
Eduardo Paes	Rio de Janeiro	2009
Pablo Zalaquett	Santiago	2009
Gilberto Kassab	Sao Paulo	2009
María Evangelista Trocha	Asunción	2009
Ray Nagín	New Orleans	2009
Gavín Newsom	San Francisco	2009
Tadashí Akiba	Hiroshima	2009
Teófila Martínez Saiz	Cadiz	2009
Guo Jinlong	Beijing	2009
Antonio Villaraigosa	Los Angeles	2010
Liu Jinming (Vice-Mayor)	Beijing	2010

Source: Mexico City, Global City, 2011

The official visits were not restricted to Chiefs of State and Government, but also included the Mayors of the most important cities of the world. For example, on April 2007, Ebrard received Michael Bloomberg, Mayor of New York, with whom he exchanged experiences in issues of social programs, environment and security, since they considered that both cities face similar problems (La Jornada April 2007). In this meeting both of them expressed their



intention to strengthen bonds between both governments, in order to establish a collaboration frame in which they could share methods of problem solving. The elected Mayor of Buenos Aires, Mauricio Marci, met with Marcelo Ebrard to initiate conversations to work together to learn from each other to solve similar problems in both cities, especially in areas like environmental policies, water management, urban development, transportation, and housing. Marci invited Ebrard to participate in the ceremony where he would take office (Reforma August 2007).

On 2010, Antonio Villaraigosa, Mayor of the sister city of Los Angeles, visited Mexico City to reciprocate Ebrard's visit when he opened the House Of Mexico City in Los Angeles in 2007. Also the Mayors of several other important cities, several of them having sisterhood agreements with the Federal District, came to officially visit Mexico City, among them Asunción, Barcelona, Beijing, Bogotá, Cádiz, Havana, La Paz, Lima, Madrid, Montevideo, Nagoya, New Orleans, Quito, Rio de Janeiro, San Francisco, San Salvador, Santiago, Sao Paulo, just to mention a few of the close to 25 visiting mayors.

Several international personalities and heads of international organizations also visited Mexico City and held official meetings with Marcelo Ebrard. Some of them were Al Gore (Former Vice-President of the United States), Francesco Frangially (Secretary General of the World Tourism Organization), José Miguel Insulza (Secretary General of the Organization of American States), Ban Ki-moon (Secretary General of the United Nations), Koichiro Matsuura (Director General of UNESCO), Mercedes de la Merced

Monge (Secretary General of the Ibero-American Union of Capital Cities), Navi Pillay (United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights), and Taleb D. Rifai (Secretary General of the World Tourism Organization), among many others.

Table 9.3. Official visits of international personalities

Name	Position	Year
Al Gore	Former Vice-President of the USA	2007
Koichiro Matsuura	Director General of UNESCO	2007
Erling Norrby	Member of the Nobel Prize Committee from the Karolinska Institute	2008
Francesco Frangially	Secretary General of the World Tourism Organization	2008
Mercedes de la Merced Monge	Secretary General of the Ibero-American Union of Capital Cities	2009
José Miguel Insulza	Secretary General of the Organization of American States	2009
Ban Ki-moon	Secretary General of the United Nations	2009
Taleb D. Rifai	Secretary General of the World Tourism Organization	2010
Navi Pillay	United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights	2011

Source: Mexico City, Global City, 2011

In terms of international cooperation, it is interesting to note that the Law of Austerity was not a restriction to the international activity of the Federal District, because other strategies were used to reestablish the relations with international partners, such as e-mail, telephone and fax.<sup>36</sup> Also, since the Law did not specify if the Chief of Government was restricted to make one single trip outside the borders, it was interpreted that it only applied to state secretaries and not the local executive. In addition, the limitation only applied when public

<sup>36</sup> Interview with Guadalupe González Chávez.

resources were used, and many of Ebrard trips in the first two years in office were paid by an international organization or even foreign partners.<sup>37</sup>

The Ebrard administration initiated a new era for the Federal District. In May of 2007, Ebrard traveled to New York to the World Summit of Great Cities (C40) on climate change, supported by the William J. Clinton Foundation. Ebrard's goal was to turn Mexico City into the city with the most important ecological program of Latin America (El Universal May 2007). Among his concerns were the efficiency of the government in energy issues, the capture of methane in sanitary fillings for the generation of energy and the creation of norms of energy efficiency for the entity, such as having 25 percent of the water heated by means of solar energy or some other alternative energy source (Bolaños 2007). He also declared his intention to promote the use of hybrid vehicles, to increase public spending in research on science, technology in environmental issues, to enter into the emissions trade, among other international initiatives. As result of this trip, the Clinton Foundation granted 200 million dollars to the Federal District to finance programs of environmental improvement (Cuevas 2007). Among other things, this money was used to change the electric net used by the City's Water System on water pumping and drainage.

Marcelo Ebrard was extremely active in his international travelling. Apart from the trip to Beijing in 2006 to attracting investment and fostering technological innovation, and its two trips to New York (2007 and 2008) to attract investment and foster technological innovation, he traveled to Los Angeles

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<sup>37</sup> Interview with Mauricio Camps.

(2007), to open the House of Mexico City, and to San Juan (2007) to promote direct cooperation during his first two years in office.

Table 9.4. Official visits of Mexico's City Mayor 2006-2012

City	Year	Objective of the visit
Beijing	2006	Attracting investment and fostering technological innovation
Los Angeles	2007	Opening of the House of Mexico City
San Juan	2007	Promoting direct cooperation
New York	2007	Attracting investment and fostering technological innovation. Participation at Summit of Mayors of Large Cities on Climate Change
New York	2008	Attracting investment and fostering technological innovation
Copenhagen	2009	Discussions on climate Change
Kyoto	2009	Discussions on climate Change
Nagoya	2009	Strengthen bonds
La Paz	2009	Promoting direct cooperation
Boston	2009	Receiving award
Tokyo	2009	Attracting investment and fostering technological innovation
Bonn	2010	Discussions on climate Change
London	2010	Discussions on climate Change
Toronto	2010	Discussions on climate Change
Chicago	2010	Promoting direct cooperation
Madrid	2010	Delivering of lecture and keynote speech
Bonn	2011	Climate Change. Participation at Mayors Adaptation Forum
Davos	2011	World Economic Forum. Participation in the plenary session of 3rd Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction (UN)

Source: Mexico City, Global City, 2011

The external activities increased during the next years. In 2009 he traveled to Copenhagen and Kyoto to participate in discussions on climate change, to Nagoya to strengthen bonds with this sister city, to La Paz to promote direct cooperation, to Boston (Harvard University) to receive an award, and to Tokyo to attract investment and foster technological innovation. Year 2010 was

equally intense. Ebrard went to Bonn, London and Toronto to participate in discussions on climate change, to Chicago, to promote direct cooperation, and to Madrid to deliver a lecture and keynote speech. Finally, in 2011, he travelled to Bonn to participate at Mayors Adaptation Forum and to Davos to attend the summit.

All these international actions had direct effects on specific public policy areas of the local government. For example, in terms of environmental protection and climate change, several programs were initiated in the Federal District. The *Plan Verde* was presented on August 2007, to achieve sustainability and protect Mexico City's natural heritage; it was recognized as one of the most complete sustainability projects in the world by the International Conference on Green Plans in 2008. The *Mexico City Climate Action Program* was developed as an instrument of the *Plan Verde* to establish goals and objectives, especially to reach two main targets: a seven million ton reduction in carbon dioxide, and to implement a program that adapts Mexico City to climate change.

The Federal District also worked together with international and cooperation organizations. A number of studies were conducted with the support of the World Bank in order to assess the feasibility of programs designed to mitigate greenhouse gas and climate change adaptation. In 2009, Mexico City worked alongside this US-AID to promote renewable energies, strengthen Mexico City's Environmental Management System, and support the certification program of sustainable buildings. The British Embassy donated 68,000 British pounds to the Metropolitan Environmental Commission of Mexico City to

enhance its Agenda for Environmental Sustainability in the Metropolitan Area of the Valley of Mexico. Finally, the Green Roofs World Congress was held in Mexico City in October 2010, becoming the first Latin American city to host it.

In the area of sustainable transportation, the program *ECOBICI* was inaugurated in 2010, and has been a point of reference for other Latin American cities that wish to have their own bicycle projects. The *Metrobús* bus system has gained wide international recognition as a policy that improves urban mobility and contributes to a better environment, receiving several awards from foreign governments, universities, NGOs and international organizations.

International cooperation was also used to recover and rehabilitate public spaces in Mexico City. The Federal District developed a strategy for the recovery of heritage areas of the city in partnership with several embassies, diplomatic representatives and foreign communities. The countries (or communities of their nationals) that were part of these projects include China (Chinese Arch, Vietnam (Garden of Free People), India (Gandhi Monument), Turkey (Ottoman clock), Spain (Cibeles fountain), South Korea (Friendship Bell), Ecuador (Sculpture of Benjamín Carrión), and Azerbaijan (Tlaxcoaque Plaza and park in Chapultepec).

In terms of culture, entertainment and sports, the Fair of Cultures and Friendship was instituted to promote solidarity and respect for artistic traditions from around the world. This initiative was launched in response to the AH1N1 outbreak in 2009, and since then, every year Mexico City works with embassies, international organizations and foreign communities to organize it. Mexico City was also selected as the Ibero-American Capital of Culture by the Union of Ibero-

American Capital Cities (UCCI), and the first edition of the *Feria Internacional del Turismo de las Américas* (FITA) took place in 2010 to bring together the main players of the tourism industry from around the world.

In the science, technology and human capital area, more than 20 projects on socio-economic development of the city have been awarded grants sponsored by the government of Mexico City, the Center for China-Mexico Studies at the School of Economics of UNAM and the government of China. A program for exchange, education and training of Latin American human resources, focused on physics, chemistry, and issues related with the physical study of health was signed with the Latin American Center of Physics, and an agreement was signed between the Mexico City Government's School of Public Administration (EAPDF) and the École Nationale d'Administration of France to strengthen public administration.

In terms of social and security policies, a Community Program for Neighborhood Improvement was launched in order to trigger a comprehensive and participative process to improve public spaces in low-income neighborhoods and districts, receiving an award from the United Nations and the United Kingdom. Also, the Technical Institute for Police Training of Mexico City engaged in a number of academic exchanges with police academies from Canada, Germany, Spain, United States, France, Italy, China, Argentina, Chile among others.

Under the Ebrard administration the participation and membership of international networks and forums increased exponentially. For example, Mexico

City is a founding member of the Executive Bureau of United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG), the largest organization of local governments in the world and focuses on fostering the values, preferences and interests of cities and local governments, with more than one thousand cities as direct members. It also chairs Commission 4, "Megacities", of the Metropolis International Organization, where over 100 cities explore issues and concerns of large cities and urban regions; Mexico City was elected Chair of Commission 4 in 2008. In 2009, Marcelo Ebrard was unanimously elected as chair of the World Mayors Council on Climate Change during the Mayors' Summit at the 15<sup>th</sup> United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Mexico City also obtained the Local Governments for Sustainability's (ICLEI) vice-presidency (this organization gathers together more than 1,200 local governments and municipal associations committed to sustainable development) and the Vice-presidency of the Union of Ibero-American Capital Cities, UCCI, where Mexico City held a vice-chair position in Central America, Mexico and the Caribbean.

The Distrito Federal also participated actively at the C40, a group of cities created in 2005 to struggle against climate change from the local perspective. Mexico City also joined in 2009 the Mayors for Peace and Peace Messenger Cities, which united cities which are committed to promoting a ban on nuclear weapons.

The most important international activity with other mayors within an international network was when Mexico City hosted the Local and Regional Leaders World Summit of 3<sup>rd</sup> World Congress of United Cities and Local



Governments (UCLG) in November 2010. This event was attended by 2,975 participants, including mayors, governors, regional leaders and local elected authorities from around the world. Delegates from 94 countries spent six days in Mexico City discussing various issues such as the local impact of world crises, the role of local governments in enhancing global governance and ideas of how cities will be like in 2030 (Mexico City 2011, 163).

The 2010 UCLG World Summit also served as a space for several other organizations to hold special meetings such as the Forum of Local Authorities for Social Inclusion (FAL), Mayors for Peace, the International Observatory on Participatory Democracy and Metropolis Commission 4. Right after the Congress ended, the government of Mexico City organized the World Mayors Summit on Climate, in which the Mexico City Pact was signed by 152 mayors who voluntarily committed to working on climate change adaptation in cities and greenhouse emission reduction. The Mayor of Mexico City was selected as spokesperson representing these mayors at the COP 16 Conference in Cancun, Mexico.

At the end of the World Summit, a number of significant decisions related with international relations of local governments were made on three areas, namely, culture, strategic planning and human rights in cities. In respect to the first issue, the Political Declaration on Culture was adopted, which establishes culture as the fourth pillar of sustainable development (Mexico City 2011, 164). The three other pillars are economic growth, social inclusion and environmental protection. The second document adopted by the Executive Bureau of UCLG focused on strategic urban planning, which underscored the role of local

governments in improving urban development around the world and provided several recommendations to local and regional governments, as well as international agencies on how to further promote development in sub-national entities. Finally, the Executive Bureau approved the Charter-Agenda on Human Rights in the City, which stresses that human rights must be part of local policies undertaken by cities and local governments.

During the Summit, the mayors signed the Manifesto of the City of 2030 which includes some ideas on how cities should be like. The Manifesto establishes that the most important goal for 2030 is to have inclusive cities, which means that citizens must work alongside local authorities to design and implement strategies aimed at meeting the needs of their cities (Mexico City 2011, 164).

In terms of the migration area, the Federal District promoted that its emigrants could reestablish their identity, establishing a direct bond to give them a more coherent vision of Mexico City. For this reason, during his visit to New York, Ebrard announced that he would open five offices of representation of the Federal District in the United States, originally in Los Angeles, Chicago, New York, Washington and Houston, to strengthen the bonds with the migrants of the Federal District; at the end of the administration, only the Los Angeles and Chicago offices were opened. These offices also promoted local exports and served to attract direct foreign investment to the city.<sup>38</sup> Ebrard indicated that in

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<sup>38</sup> Interview with Mauricio Camps.

some cases, the public and private sectors would provide the physical space for the offices of representation, without cost for the tax payers.

In terms of existing sisterhood and cooperation agreements, due to the fact that most of them were still valid, the strategy of international insertion of the Federal District was to resurrect them. As such, during the first years of the administration, instead of signing new agreements, the CGIA reactivated those that already existed.<sup>39</sup>

Table 9.5. Sisterhood and Friendship Agreements

Region	Country	City	Year of signature	Type of Agreement
North America	United States	Los Angeles	1969	Sisterhood
		Chicago	1991	Sisterhood
Latin America	El Salvador	San Salvador	1979	Sisterhood
	Peru	Cuzco	1987	Sisterhood
	Cuba	Havana	1997	Sisterhood
	Honduras	Tegucigalpa	1999	Sisterhood
		San Pedro Sula	1999	Friendship
	Ecuador	Quito	1999	Sisterhood
	Costa Rica	San José	2000	Sisterhood
Argentina	Buenos Aires	2006	Sisterhood	
Europe	Spain	Madrid	1983	Sisterhood
		Barcelona	1999	Friendship
		Cadiz	2009	Sisterhood
	Germany	Berlin	1996	Sisterhood
	France	Paris	1999	Sisterhood
	Belgium	Region of Wallonia	2006	Friendship
Asia	Japan	Nagoya	1978	Sisterhood
	South Korea	Seoul	1993	Sisterhood
	China	Beijing	2009	Sisterhood
	Turkey	Istanbul	2010	Sisterhood

Source: Mexico City, Global City, 2011

<sup>39</sup> Interview with Virginia Martínez.

However, only two years into office, the administration increased substantially its IIA, passing from only 13 registered in the SRE to 38, an increment of almost 200%. The sisterhood and friendship agreements were revamped, especially with international counterparts that had specific cooperation agendas with the Federal District, like Barcelona, Beijing, Berlin, Buenos Aires, Cadiz, Chicago, Havana, Istanbul, Los Angeles, Madrid, Nagoya, Paris, Quito, the Region of Walloon, San José, San Salvador, and Seoul.

In sum, since international actions of cities and local governments contribute to design a new world order, for they are more open, dynamic, diverse and closer to the people, municipalities and regions have become leading players in the current international system. Mexico City became seriously part of this phenomenon during the Ebrard administration, when its economic, social, political and cultural policies were no longer limited to its geographic borders. According to this administration, for years, the city kept a low profile in its international relations, with no specific department dedicated to this matter, but during his administration, a wide array of projects, cooperation programs and global exchanges where Mexico City participates were “a fundamental strategy for the development of the city and its inhabitants” (Mexico City 2011, 169).

The Ebrard government thought that the role of Mexico City in the world could not be spontaneous or informal, so it promoted multi-year strategies and policies to meet the needs of its population and address the demands of world order. Mexico City developed a more permanent international agenda that covered a broad range of issues and, more importantly, tried to institutionalize it

to reduce changes with every new administration. The international relations' activities of the Federal District were institutionalized and professionalized so as to have a clear and coherent strategy to bolster its place in the world. In terms of actors, Mexico City's international strategy was not limited to the government, but included universities, business, commerce chambers, associations, the civil society and others. Finally, Mexico City reviewed the legal and institutional framework that regulated its international relations' activities, by revising the mission, powers and capabilities of the General Coordination for Foreign Relations of the Government of Mexico City (Mexico City 2011, 170).

In sum, because of his academic formation and his political interest to position him nationally and internationally, Marcelo Ebrard, being a socio-liberal leftist leader, believed that there was a close relation between the events in the global system and local politics. Since domestic conditions like democratization, decentralization, and structural reform, and international conditions such as increasing interdependence and globalization in the international system, resulted in an intense international activity on behalf of the sub-State governments, the administration of Ebrard decided to take advantage of these changes to increase the international relations of the Federal District. Hence, the local government passed from a low to a very high level of IRSSG in less than six years. This was done through the bureaucratic reconstruction of the GCIA, the reactivation in cooperation and sisterhood agreements, the launching of trips to the exterior by the Chief of Government, the opening of offices of representation and attention to migrants abroad, the strengthening of the schemes of promotion

of exports and attraction of foreign direct investment and, finally, the expansion of international topics of cooperation with external partners. In sum, for the Ebrard administration, the internationalization of the Federal District was considered a public policy priority to enhance domestic and local policies, development and welfare.

## Conclusions

This chapter analyzed the international activity of the Federal District of the three last Chiefs of Government (López Obrador, Encinas and Ebrard). It established that the international participation of this entity was the product of a combination of two international phenomena, the increase of interdependence and globalization worldwide, and domestic variables, mainly the processes of democratization, decentralization and structural reform in Mexico. It then described the local bureaucratic structure in the area of international relations and the mechanisms of cooperation, as well as the actions implemented to relate the Federal District to the world. Along with this description, the chapter analyzed the levels of international activity in the past three administrations and explained the causes of the considerable increase in these activities at the beginning of Ebrard's administration.

Even though the international and national phenomena previously described caused the increase of the external projection of the Mexican federal units in general, the Federal District, unlike the other states, had not granted the

sufficient importance to its international relations until the Ebrard administration. It was argued that, apart from the international and domestic variables that incentivize sub-State international activities, Ebrard had a particular interest in international participation. This was due to his personal and academic formation, combined with a strategy of differentiation *vis à vis* other states and the federal executive, as well as to further his political career. With these institutional and personal interests in mind, Ebrard and his team took advantage of the internal and external conditions to increase the Federal District's international activities, with the purpose of attracting foreign direct investment, promoting local exports and strengthening its links and relations with its migrant communities outside the country. As a result, the Federal District passed from a very discreet international position, to one of high activism during the Ebrard administration. In sum, Ebrard, unlike his two predecessors, made international activity an essential part of its strategy of government in the Federal District.

Such was the success of this strategy, that Ebrard's successor, Mancera, decided to maintain the CGAI, and even designated a top political figure as General Coordinator, Cuaúhtemoc Cárdenas, the first democratically elected Chief of Government of the Federal District, son of Mexican President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940), and three times PRD presidential candidate (1988, 1994, and 2000). Under Cárdenas, the CGAI has consolidated and even expanded its activities, using the internationalization of the Federal District as a strategy to promote local welfare and development.

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## FINAL CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation started with the argument that the IRSSG is a worldwide phenomenon, that SSG are increasingly conducting international relations, and that this activity can impact foreign policy decision making and implementation and States' interactions in the international system. However, it also claimed that the IRSSG were the elephant in the room of International Relations, and very little consideration had been given to explain its causes and consequences. It further argued that was important to study the IRSSG because it could impact the decision making and implementation of national foreign policy, generate international responsibility to central governments if SSG did not fulfill their external commitments, and impact local development and welfare (attracting more FDI, increasing exports, and receiving more IDC. In order to contribute to fill this very important gap in the IR literature, this dissertation has analyzed and explained why and how SSG conduct their international relations, and how they coordinate or not with federal authorities in the definition and implementation of foreign policy.

This dissertation has studied the IRSSG, a worldwide phenomenon that has occurred for at least half a century that has a direct impact on the welfare of the societies in which it is taking place, and has not been analyzed systematically and theoretically in a satisfactory way. It has developed a comprehensive and comparative study of the IRSSG in ten federal systems using a typology to measure and explain intergovernmental relations in foreign policy decision

making and implementation, and the external activity of SSG around the world. Based on the comparative cross-national analysis, then it performed the first in-depth analysis of the IRSSG within a federal country, Mexico, that measures and explains comparatively the international relations of its 32 federal units, analyzing the economic, political and geographic causes that explain the wide variation in regards to the units' international actions and mechanisms of IDC (through inter-institutional agreements), as well as providing a replicable survey to better understand the preferences, perceptions, and interests of the public officials responsible of the internationalization of their sub-State governments.

Since there is no comprehensive theory of paradiplomacy or IRSSG, in order to develop causal explanations of why and how the IRSSG take place, and to explain the variation between and within countries through time, several theoretical frameworks of IR and comparative politics were integrated, using various levels of analysis, presenting the central research questions and hypothesis from the most general (systemic), to intermediate (domestic), to most specific (individual or leader) explanations, and emphasizing the interaction effects between levels.

First, using neoliberal IR theories, the increasing IRSSG was explained using systemic variables like globalization and interdependence. The vast literature on paradiplomacy and IRSSG was reviewed, summarized, and organized depending on whether it argued that the international actions of SSG were considered complementary or competing with the foreign policy of the countries. A central finding of the dissertation is that, contrary to the division in

the literature on whether IRSSG are intrinsically cooperative or conflictive *vis à vis* national foreign policy, in essence, this depends on the institutional and legal characteristics of the domestic systems. When the constitutional powers of the SSG are clearly defined and the intergovernmental mechanisms of cooperation between levels of government in international affairs are more developed, the internationalization strategy of the country is more inclusive, and thus, cooperation between the IRSSG and national foreign policy will prevail; however, when the constitutional power or cooperation mechanisms are not clear or well developed, then conflict can take place.

With the integration of domestic theories of federalism and institutional theories on veto points and players, a typology of the constitutional framework and intergovernmental relations in international policy in federal systems was developed. Each of the ten federal countries was analyzed using the model, first presenting the institutional configuration, then the most important political, economic and social variables, and then analyzing the legal framework, coordination and international actions of SSG. Using all this information, the ten cases were classified as inclusive, exclusive, complementary or consultative.

By ordering the variables to be analyzed in the ten cases studies using an improved version of Kuznetsov's model, the two first research questions and hypotheses of this dissertation on the causes of the IRSSG and the variations in this phenomenon were tackled. It was argued that important variation in the IRSSG and central-local coordination and changes in the types of central-local coordination were expected. Also, that the most important reasons to conduct

IRSSG were globalization, regionalization, decentralization, and border management, and that the democratization variable was expected to be relevant for increasing IRSSG in countries with democracies in process of consolidation, but not in consolidated democracies. The predominant expected motive to conduct IRSSG would be promoting local economic development, and a considerable variation in institutional building and international activities was foreseen. Regarding the consequences of the IRSSG, rationalization of national foreign policy was expected in all cases, as well as a differentiation between foreign policy and IRSSG. Finally, it was anticipated that developed and consolidated parliamentary democracies would be inclusive cases, while developing presidential systems with democracies in consolidation would be complementary cases.

Through the analysis of the ten federal countries, sufficient evidence was provided to fully or partially support all the hypotheses presented, providing ten relevant findings about the IRSSG.

First, sufficient evidence was provided to support the argument that there is a very important variation in the IRSSG and central-local coordination in foreign affairs worldwide. This variation goes from the most exclusive cases (India and Russia post-2000), continuing with the consultative (Belgium pre-1993) and complementary cases (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Russia in the 1990s, South Africa and the United States), to the inclusive cases (Australia, Canada, Germany and Belgium post-1993). The most inclusive case is Belgium after the constitutional reform of 1993, where SSG participate in equal terms with the

federal government in the definition of foreign policy in those areas in which they have powers. Thus, the relevance of the IRSSG for foreign policy decision making and implementation is negligible in exclusive cases, limited in consultative and complementary cases, and increasingly important in inclusive cases, especially in those areas where SSG have constitutional powers (economic, culture, education, environment, border issues). However, even in inclusive cases, the participation of SSG in other areas of foreign policy, like security issues, is insignificant.

Second, there has been change in the types of central-local coordination during the last decades. Russia passed from complementary to exclusive in 2000 as a result of the centralization imposed by the Putin administration, while Belgium changed from consultative to inclusive in 1993 with its constitutional reform, becoming the most inclusive case in the world in terms of participation of SSG in foreign affairs.

Third, the cases also provided sufficient evidence to state that the most important reasons to conduct IRSSG are globalization, regionalization, and decentralization. With the exception of Australia, that has no land borders, another important incentive for the IRSSG is to manage border affairs. In the European cases (Belgium and Germany), due to the integration process of the European Union, foreign policy domestication and internationalization of domestic politics was also important.

Fourth, the democratization variable was also a relevant variable for increasing IRSSG in all countries with democracies in process of consolidation

during the period (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Russia and South Africa); however, it was not as important in the cases of consolidated democracies. Due to the cultural and linguistic cleavages in their societies, Belgium and Canada were the only two cases in which the IRSSG were related with perceived problems in the national building process and the central government inefficiency in the representation of their interests in foreign policy, together with the promotion of external activism by SSG leaders and parties.

Fifth, the case studies showed that the predominant motive to conduct IRSSG in all countries was to promote local economic development. Another important reason was the management of border issues (with the exception of Australia). Cultural motivation was only relevant in cases where there is cultural variation between SSG, like Belgium, Canada, Germany and Russia. Finally, the political motive was present only in a couple of cases (Quebec in Canada and Belgium) where there is also a political cleavage between cultural communities.

Sixth, institution creation and building is the norm between SSG to coordinate their international relations. In all the countries, the SSG have created ministries or agencies to conduct their international affairs. However, the size, resources, activities and level of consolidation varies considerably between cases. Their level of importance is very restricted in exclusive cases (India and Russia post-2000), limited in consultative cases (Belgium pre-1993), growing in complementary cases (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Russia in the 1990s, South Africa and the United States), and substantive in inclusive cases (Australia, Canada, Germany and Belgium post-1993).

Seventh, there is considerable variation in the international activities conducted by SSG. In all the cases analyzed, the SSG are launching the simplest actions of internationalization, like official visits abroad, international exhibitions and forums, and participating global and transborder SSG networks. Only the seven complementary and inclusive countries have opened permanent diplomatic representations abroad, while only three of the four inclusive cases (Belgium, Canada and Australia), participate regularly in official federal government delegations abroad, democratizing the decision making process in national foreign policy.

Eighth, when analyzing the consequences of the IRSSG, in all cases, a rationalization of national foreign policy is observed, as the federal government allows SSG to conduct international affairs in those areas where they have powers. This rationalization is very small in exclusive cases (India and Russia post-2000), small but growing in consultative (Belgium pre-1993), and complementary cases (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Russia in the 1990s, South Africa and the United States), and increasingly important in inclusive cases (Australia, Canada, Germany and Belgium post-1993). The only case where this participation could have negative consequences for the consolidation of the federal State is Belgium, where the equal participation of SSG with the federal government in those areas of foreign policy where they have powers could generate incentives for the disintegration of the State.

Ninth, it is important to note that all countries analyzed make a difference between foreign policy (considered an exclusive power and responsibility of the

federal government, which includes high politics issues), and international relations or affairs (which include those areas in which SSG have powers, mostly low politics issues). However, low politics issues like international cooperation in the areas of culture, education, environment and economic (trade and investment) affairs are increasingly relevant for all countries in a globalized world. In the case of complementary countries, SSG can conduct international relations as long as they do not interfere with foreign policy. However, in inclusive cases, SSG are allowed to participate in the foreign policy decision making process and implemented, under the coordination of the federal MFA. Belgium is the only case in which SSG participate in foreign policy definition and implementation in equal terms with the federal government, in those areas in which the former have constitutional powers.

Finally, tenth, when analyzing the types of central-local coordination in foreign affairs, some interesting conclusions can be reached in terms of national institutions. First, all inclusive cases (Australia, Germany, Canada and Belgium after 1993) are developed and consolidated parliamentary democracies. Second, all the complementary cases (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Russia in the 1990s, South Africa and the United States) are presidential systems with developing democracies in consolidation (with the exception of the United States). Third, the exclusive types (Russia post-2000 and India), have federal systems constitutionally; however, in reality, they function in a very centralized way, practically nullifying federal institutions.



After analyzing these ten countries, based on the previous findings, Mexico was classified as a complementary federal country in terms of its IRSSG, and an in-depth study to explain the variation within the Mexican SSG was conducted from three different perspectives: the measurement and explanation in the variation in the international activities, the variation in the legal cooperation instruments (IIA), and the differences in the perceptions and preferences of SSG in terms of their internationalization.

As in the comparative cases, the growing international activity of Mexican SSG was explained by the globalization and interdependence in the international system, and the fact that these SSG initiated their activities decades after the consolidated democracies, was attributed to the democratization, decentralization and economic reform processes that took place in the country during the 1980s and 1990s. Then, on one hand, it was described how Mexican foreign policy is an exclusive power of the federal government; however, since there is a state residuary clause in the constitution, the Mexican legal framework allows the Mexican SSG to conduct international relations in those areas in which they have legal capacity, thus being inclusive in terms of constitutional powers. On the other hand, Mexican SSG do not participate in foreign policy decision making or implementation, and the federal government practically never consults or includes them in international negotiations or foreign policy execution; therefore, it is exclusive regarding intergovernmental coordination. The sum of these two characteristics, make the IRSSG in Mexico complementary, as more than 85% of the federal units surveyed consider it. Thus, these international

activities are conducted in a relatively harmonious way, since they circumscribe exclusively to those areas in which they have powers, and there have been no visible or important conflicts with the federal government in their enactment.

In order to measure and explain variation in the international activities of the SSG, the MI-IRSSG was constructed. Then, the external actions were measured every five years (2004, 2009, and 2014), observing a substantive increase in the index during these ten years (over 85% increment). In 2014 all the SSG were conducting international relations, with variation from medium to very high levels, and the majority of the federal units were at the high or very level of IRSSG, while none of them observed reversals in their internationalization in the period. Then, the variation in the MI-IRSSG was explained by state income (explaining almost 40% of the variation), while juxtaposed government was not an explanatory variable of the amount of IRSSG, but only a trigger variable that provided the incentives to initiate and increase international relations. Finally, in terms geographic location, states both in the northern and southern border of Mexico had more IRSSG than the national average, supporting the argument that a border location generates incentives for more active participation of these federal units internationally.

In terms of the IIA, several conclusions were reached. There is a considerable variation in the number of agreements signed by Mexican states and their municipalities; the federal units with the higher levels of IRSSG are those with the most IIA. There is a balance between municipal and state IIA, and the vast majority are concluded with countries of the Americas (almost 60%),

especially with the United States (116 IIA, approximately 25% of all IIA), particularly those Mexican states that share a border with this country. The areas covered by the IIA are concentrated in those areas in which SSG have legal powers (education, culture, tourism, trade, science and technology, human resources training, and investment), thus emphasizing international activities that promote local development and welfare.

The findings of the previous two chapters were supplemented by the results of the survey answered by Mexican SSG government officials. Even if the creation of IRSSG agencies is relatively recent (2 were established before 2000, 6 between 2000 and 2009, and 16 after 2010), the institutionalization is growing at the state level, with two thirds of the federal units having a specialized area to coordinate their international relations, 60% doing this coordination in a centralized way, and 50% being directly responsible to the state Executive. The agencies are relatively small, with a national average of 9.3 staff members, being the federal units with the largest IRSSG and IIA those with larger and more professional (academic background, language proficiency, among others) staff.

The legal and statutory capacities are lagging behind in the institutionalization process, and the state agencies face important challenges to consolidate their activities (insufficient budgets, lack of highly professionalized staff, insufficient staff members, lack of an official legal framework, and limited mechanisms of coordination with the federal government and other federal units). As it was seen in the comparative cases, in Mexico the most important international activities are directly related with promoting local development and

welfare, like attracting foreign direct investment, tourism, promoting exports and international cooperation in education, culture, science and technology. The vast majority conduct the same activities as their foreign counterparts, like organizing and coordinating the external trips of the Governor and the visits of foreign personalities to the unit, as well as supervising international events that take place in the state and the relations with international organizations. They are also responsible of coordinating the conclusion and implementation of IIA. However, only half of them have relations with their migrants, cultural and education cooperation, tourism promotion, and participation in international networks.

SSG agencies seek local, domestic and international partners to conduct their external activities, like universities and research centers, local business communities, civil society organizations, and their diasporas. They also work together as federal units, by being part of AMAIE, and participating in the international affairs commission of CONAGO. With the federal government, their most important relation is with the SRE, and almost all have direct contact and relations with Mexican Embassies and Consulates around the world. Once again, the states with higher levels of IRSSG and IIA have the largest number and scope of international activities and partners, as well as knowledge about the available resources to support and facilitate their internationalization.

It is particularly interesting to note that the vast majority of the federal units have a very good perception of the relevance of their international activities as well as an excellent perception of their relations with SRE and AMAIE. Finally, as it was expected theoretically due to the legal and coordination frameworks for the

IRSSG in Mexico, almost 85% of them think that their international relations are complementary to Mexico's foreign policy, and not competitive or conflictive.

The last chapter was dedicated to explain the case of the Distrito Federal, the outlier in terms of its internationalization during the López Obrador and Encinas governments, which finally increased its international activities from practically nothing to covering all the areas of internationalization during the Ebrard administration. After analyzing the systemic (interdependence and globalization), domestic (democratization, decentralization and structural reform) and institutional (local bureaucratic structure) variables, an additional variable was included (the leaders' characteristics which explain their interest in international affairs as a result of academic formation and political strategy of differentiation) to explain the dramatic change in terms of the IR of the Distrito Federal, making the international actions an essential part of the strategy of development of the local government in the Ebrard administration.

Given the growing globalization and interdependence at the international level, and the increasing decentralization, democratization and liberalization of the national political and economic systems, it is expected that the international activity of SSG will keep growing. For this reason, it is essential that the domestic legislations be perfected and updated, to guarantee that the international activities of the SSG are conducted within a framework of legality and are not conflictive with the national foreign policy. As long as the participation of the federal units is framed within this legality and cooperative with the country's foreign policy, and thus becomes complementary to it, it can be considered that

this phenomenon will be positive for SSG and local and national societies, since it will allow greater and better schemes of cooperation and relations with the world in order to promote local development and welfare. This creates an important challenge for the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, since they must function as a representative and coordinator not only of the other federal ministries and the Legislature, but also of the international activities of SSG where they have legal powers, both at the state and municipal levels. As it happens in a globalized and competitive market, the federal units that will benefit most from the growth in their international relations are those that have better levels of local competitiveness and more efficient institutional frameworks.

In order to foster greater governance in the international relations of sub-State governments and to generate the incentives for local authorities to conduct their external affairs in a more effective and efficient way, based on the previous analysis, ten public policy recommendations can be made. 1) All federal units should have an Office of International Affairs under the office of the state executive, the Governor, which coordinates the external activities of the different state agencies. 2) State legislatures should have a foreign affairs commission that legislates, appropriates budgets, and provides oversight of the international activities of the sub-State governments. 3) The federal government should provide positive and negative incentives for federal units to circumscribe their foreign actions within their constitutional powers. 4) Better coordination mechanisms should be constructed between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and the federal units to foster the complementarity of the sub-State government's

international activities with the national foreign policy. 5) Previous consultation between representatives from the sub-State and federal governments should take place when the latter conducts international negotiations which have an impact over the areas of local responsibility. 6) Foreign service diplomats should be trained on local diplomacy issues, while the personnel responsible for sub-State international activities should be educated in foreign policy decision-making, international law, and protocol. 7) Positive incentives should be provided to foreign service personnel to be commissioned to serve at the sub-State level. 8) Strengthen the cooperation and coordination mechanisms among state governments, both at the political and technical levels. 9) Conduct the international relations of sub-State governments as an investment, which requires the establishment of accountability and impact evaluation mechanisms. Finally, 10) the Foreign Affairs Ministries should design a national campaign to incentive sub-State governments to register their IIA in the national registry of each country.

As SSG participate more actively in international affairs, better explanations of this phenomenon will be required. Not only economic, political and geographic variables, as those analyzed in this dissertation might be relevant; new research lines on different angles of this reality should be developed, in order to prove their impact on the international relations of the federal units. Variables that could be considered are exports and imports, foreign direct investment flows, tourism, migration, and remittances. Territory, population, GDP, GDP per capita, GDP growth, border location, education,

corruption, government efficiency, among others, should be included as control variables.

On one hand, to understand better the causes of the IRSSG, some of these factors could be tested as explanatory variables of the level or degree of IRSSG. A model which includes these variables can be constructed, analyzing them individually or interactively. In terms of trade openness, it would be expected that SSG which are more deeply inserted in the international trade system and have higher percentages of their state GDP depending on international trade, should have the incentives to conduct more IRSSG to promote their exports. Those SSG that depend on tourism, should follow the same logic described. Regarding migration flows, it could be hypothesized that SSG with higher proportions of their populations living abroad should present higher levels of IRSSG, because they have the incentive to provide services to their diasporas to maintain or strengthen the connections with their families and locality, thus maintaining or increasing the flows of individual or collective remittances.

On the other hand, to explain the consequences or impacts of the IRSSG, it can be used as an explanatory variable of the amount of FDI, remittances, or exports, having in mind the problem of a making a tautological analysis in the latter case. Grau (2013) has provided empirical evidence, in the case of Mexican SSG, that higher levels of IRSSG generate more FDI, arguing that more external promotion and communication provides information for international investors, thus increasing FDI flows. The same causal mechanism could apply to exports,



where closer ties with better informed international customers would increase external sales, and thus exports. In terms of remittances, if SSG provide services to their citizens abroad, they will maintain closer ties with their communities of origin, thus increasing the probability of sending resources in the form of remittances, both individual and collective.

In order to be able to do comparative analysis of the IRSSG worldwide, not only in federal systems, it would be desirable to quantify the international activities of SSG in other countries using an index similar to the MI-IRSSG, or a better one. The variables included for the Mexican case could also be empirically tested in the other countries, and ideally, also the ones proposed in the previous paragraphs. Finally, it would be desirable to make regular measurements of the IRSSG worldwide on a yearly basis (not only every five years), to better understand how this phenomenon is evolving through time.

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## APPENDIX 1

### VALUATION SURVEY OF THE PROFILE OF THE OFFICES OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS OF MEXICAN STATES

Distinguished officials:

The Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, through the Office of Local Governments of the Directorate-General for Political Coordination, in coordination with the Mexican Association of International Affairs Offices of the States (AMAIE) and the Center for Research and Teaching in Economics (CIDE) seek to have a better knowledge of the profile of the Offices of International Affairs of the Mexican states with the aim of promoting its development and professionalization. To that end, we have designed a valuation survey that will provide us with more information about these Offices.

We will very much appreciate if the official in charge of the international affairs of the state answers the present survey, which will take no longer than 30 minutes. If such official cannot respond to it personally, we kindly ask them to transfer it to the person who is better informed about the international issues of the state.

1. State: \_\_\_\_\_

2. Date of response:

\_\_\_\_\_

3. Name and position of the official who responds the survey:

\_\_\_\_\_

4. Does your state have an Office of International Affairs?

a) Yes                       b) No                       c) It is not an office, but it is in charge of international affairs

a.1) If the answer is c), what is the name of the government area in charge of international affairs?

\_\_\_\_\_

5. Name and position of the official who is responsible of the international affairs of the state:

\_\_\_\_\_

6. Academic background (degrees and subjects) of the official who is responsible of the international affairs of the state:

Bachelor's degree: \_\_\_\_\_

Specialization: \_\_\_\_\_

Graduate studies: \_\_\_\_\_

7. Is your state a party to AMAIE?

a) Yes                       b) No                       c) It is in the process of ratification

8. How many officials work at the office or government area in charge of the international affairs of the state?

\_\_\_\_\_

9. In which date was the office or government area in charge of the international affairs of the state created or when did it become operational?

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10. Does this office or government area have its own budget?

a) Yes  b) No

11. If it does not have its own budget, by which means are the activities of this office or government area financed?

---

12. Approximately, what is the annual budget of the office or government area in charge of international affairs?

---

13. In terms of the organizational structure, what is the government office or area on which the office or area in charge of international affairs depend?

---

14. What is the legal framework within which the office or government area in charge of international affairs operates? (Select all options that apply)

- Rules of procedure
- State Development Plan
- Working Plan
- Other (specify: \_\_\_\_\_)

15. What is the academic background of the officials who work at the office or area in charge of international affairs? (Select all options that apply)

- International Relations
- Law
- Economics
- Public Administration
- Political Science
- Communication
- Other (specify: \_\_\_\_\_)

16. How many officials of the office or area in charge of international affairs hold graduate degrees?

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17. Do the officials of the office or area in charge of international affairs speak foreign languages?

a) Yes  b) No

a.1) If the answer is yes, specify, in average, how many languages: \_\_\_\_\_

18. Which foreign languages are spoken by the officials of the office or area in charge of international affairs? (Select all options that apply)

- English
- French
- German
- Chinese
- Other (specify: \_\_\_\_\_)

19. Which are the main issues addressed by the office or area in charge of international affairs?  
(Select all options that apply)

- Economic promotion abroad (attraction of foreign investment and/or exports promotion)
- Organizing and/or coordinating visits abroad of the Governor or other officials of the state
- Organizing and/or coordinating visits of distinguished foreign officials to the state
- Organizing and/or coordinating international events in the state
- Signing and/or managing Inter-institutional Agreements
- Signing and/or managing Sisterhood Agreements
- De-centralized international cooperation
- Connection with and support to the migrant community
- Promotion of tourism
- Promotion of culture
- Promotion of educational exchanges
- Participation in regional organizations (specify: \_\_\_\_\_)
- Participation in international organizations (specify: \_\_\_\_\_)
- Participation in international networks (specify: \_\_\_\_\_)
- Sustainable development
- Participation in Mexican Association of International Affairs Offices of the States (AMAIE)
- Participation in the International Affairs Commission of National Conference of Governors (CONAGO)
- Interaction with the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs (SRE)
- Other (specify: \_\_\_\_\_)

20. Approximately, how many Inter-institutional and/or Sisterhood Agreements has the state signed with foreign actors?

---

21. Do you know the legal procedure at the SRE for the formalization of Inter-institutional and/or Sisterhood Agreements

- a) Yes                       b) No
- a.1) If the answer is yes, what is your perception on this procedure?
- Very efficient               b) Efficient       c) Little efficient               d) Not efficient

22. Does your state participate in any international cooperation scheme?

- a) Yes                       b) No
- a.1) If the answer is yes, in which schemes do the state participate?:
- 

23. Does your state have representation offices abroad?

- a) Yes                       b) No
- a.1) If the answer is yes, where?: \_\_\_\_\_
- a.2) If the answer is yes, what issues does it address?: \_\_\_\_\_

24. Do you consider that the administrative structure of the state government facilitates the operation of the office or area in charge of international affairs?

- a) Yes                       b) No                       c) Somewhat

25. Do you consider that the office or area in charge of international affairs has been able to articulate a middle and long-term international strategic planning?

- a) Yes                       b) No

26. What factors challenge the operation of the office or area in charge of international affairs? (Select all options that apply)

- Lack of an adequate legal framework
- Low budget
- Insufficient human resources
- Lack of training of the local personnel in international affairs
- Lack of adequate inter-institutional coordination with the other agencies of the state government
- Lack of adequate inter-institutional coordination with the agencies and offices of the federal government
- Lack of strategic planning
- Lack of political support
- Other (specify: \_\_\_\_\_)

27. What is your assessment on the relation between the office or area in charge of international affairs and the secretariats of the state?

- a) Very good  b) Good  c) Average  d) Bad  e) Very bad

28. Is there any coordination mechanism in place between the office or area in charge of international affairs and the secretariats of the state for issues of common interest?

- a) Yes  b) No

a.1) If the answer is yes, which are these mechanisms?: \_\_\_\_\_

29. Does the office or area in charge of international affairs have a communication strategy within the state government and towards the people?

- a) Yes  b) No

a.1) If the answer is yes, which is such strategy?: \_\_\_\_\_

30. Does the office or area in charge of international affairs have an official website?

- a) Yes  b) No

a.1) If the answer is yes, please provide the URL: \_\_\_\_\_

31. Has the office or area in charge of international affairs published a book or brochure that provides details regarding its activities or achievements?

- a) Yes  b) No

a.1) If the answer is yes, please provide the bibliographical reference:

\_\_\_\_\_

32. Does the office or area in charge of international affairs have a mechanism to assess the impact of its activities or achievements?

- a) Yes  b) No

a.1) If the answer is yes, which is it?: \_\_\_\_\_

33. Does the office or area in charge of international affairs have links with any of the following non-governmental actors on a regular basis? (Select all options that apply)

- Civil Society Organizations
- Businesspersons
- Universities and academia
- Migrant associations or clubs
- Other (specify: \_\_\_\_\_)

34. Does the office or area in charge of international affairs have links with any of the following government actors on a regular basis? (Select all options that apply)

- Secretariat of Foreign Affairs  
 Other federal-level Secretariats (specify: \_\_\_\_\_)  
 Congress (Chamber of Deputies and Senate)  
 CONAGO  
 Foreign embassies, consulates and diplomatic representations based in Mexico  
 International or regional organizations (specify: \_\_\_\_\_)  
 Other (specify: \_\_\_\_\_)

35. Does the office or area in charge of international affairs have links with any of the following areas of SRE on a regular basis? (Select all options that apply)

- Directorate-General for Political Coordination  
 Office of the Secretary  
 Under-secretariats (specify: \_\_\_\_\_)  
 Mexican embassies abroad  
 Mexican consulates abroad  
 Mexican Agency for International Cooperation Development (AMEXID)  
 Other (specify: \_\_\_\_\_)

36. Do you know the microsite of local governments of the SRE?

- a) Yes                       b) No   
 a.1) If the answer is yes, how useful is it to the advancement of your activities?  
 Very useful                       b) Useful                       c) Little useful                       d) Not useful

37. Do you know the "Recommendations' Guideline of the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs (SRE) for International Action of States and Municipalities of Mexico?

- a) Si                       b) No   
 a.1) If the answer is yes, how useful is it to the advancement of your activities?  
 Very useful                       b) Useful                       c) Little useful                       d) Not useful

38. What is your assessment on the relation between the office or area in charge of international affairs with the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs (SRE)?

- a) Very good  b) Good                       c) Average                       d) Bad                       e) Very bad

39. What is your assessment on the relation between the office or area in charge of international affairs and AMAIE?

- a) Very good  b) Good                       c) Average                       d) Bad                       e) Very bad

40. What is your assessment on the activities undertaken by the office or area in charge of international affairs and the Mexican foreign policy?

- a) Autonomous  b) Complementary  c) Competitive                       d) Other  (specify:\_\_\_\_\_)

41. What are the three main strengths of the office or area in charge of international affairs?

1. \_\_\_\_\_  
 2. \_\_\_\_\_  
 3. \_\_\_\_\_

42. What are the three main opportunity areas of the office or area in charge of international affairs?

1. \_\_\_\_\_
2. \_\_\_\_\_
3. \_\_\_\_\_

43. What are the current training needs of the office or area in charge of international affairs?

1. \_\_\_\_\_
2. \_\_\_\_\_
3. \_\_\_\_\_

44. What actions have been undertaken to institutionalize and consolidate the progress made by the office or area in charge of international affairs?

1. \_\_\_\_\_
2. \_\_\_\_\_
3. \_\_\_\_\_

45. Ideally, if there were no budgetary and/or legal restrictions, what would you do to strengthen or consolidate the office or area in charge of international affairs?

1. \_\_\_\_\_
2. \_\_\_\_\_
3. \_\_\_\_\_

Additional comments or suggestions:

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Thank you for your valuable answers.



## APPENDIX 2

### ENCUESTA DE VALORACIÓN DEL PERFIL DE LAS OFICINAS DE ASUNTOS INTERNACIONALES DE LOS ESTADOS

Estimados funcionarios:

La Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, a través de la Dirección de Gobiernos Locales de la Dirección General de Coordinación Política, junto con la Asociación Mexicana de Oficinas de Asuntos Internacionales de los Estados (AMAIE) y el Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE) buscamos conocer mejor el perfil de las Oficinas de Asuntos Internacionales de las entidades federativas mexicanas, con la finalidad de promover su desarrollo y profesionalización. Para ello, hemos diseñado una encuesta de valoración que nos proporcionará mayor información sobre estas Oficinas.

Mucho agradeceremos que el funcionario responsable de los asuntos internacionales del estado responda esta breve encuesta, la cual no deberá tomar más de 30 minutos de su tiempo. En caso de no poder hacerlo personalmente, le pedimos atentamente designar a la persona con mayor conocimiento del área internacional.

1. Favor de indicar su entidad federativa:

Entidad: \_\_\_\_\_

2. Fecha de respuesta de la encuesta:

\_\_\_\_\_

3. Nombre y puesto del funcionario que responde la encuesta:

\_\_\_\_\_

4. ¿Su entidad cuenta con una oficina de asuntos internacionales?

a) Si  b) No  c) No es una oficina pero sí se atiende el tema internacional

a.1) En caso de responder c), ¿cómo se le llama a esta área del gobierno de la entidad trata los asuntos internacionales?

\_\_\_\_\_

5. Nombre y puesto del funcionario responsable de los asuntos internacionales en la entidad:

\_\_\_\_\_

6. Formación académica (grados y disciplinas) del funcionario responsable de los asuntos internacionales en la entidad:

Licenciatura: \_\_\_\_\_

Especialidad: \_\_\_\_\_

Posgrado/s: \_\_\_\_\_

7. ¿Su entidad es parte de la AMAIE?

a) Si  b) No  c) En proceso de integración

8. ¿Cuántos funcionarios están adscritos a la oficina de asuntos internacionales o área encargada del tema?

\_\_\_\_\_

9. ¿Cuál es la fecha de creación o inicio de funciones de la oficina de asuntos internacionales o área encargada del tema?

---

10. ¿Esta oficina o área cuenta con un presupuesto propio?

a) Sí                       b) No

11. En caso de no contar con un presupuesto propio, ¿cómo se financian las actividades de la oficina o área de asuntos internacionales?

---

12. Aproximadamente, ¿con qué presupuesto anual cuenta para realizar las actividades de la oficina o área de asuntos internacionales?

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13. Orgánicamente, ¿de qué oficina área del gobierno del estado depende la oficina o área de asuntos internacionales?

---

14. ¿Cuál es el marco jurídico de referencia en el que opera la oficina o área de asuntos internacionales? (seleccione todos los que apliquen)

Reglamento interno

Plan estatal de desarrollo

Programa de trabajo

Otro/s (especificar: \_\_\_\_\_)

15. ¿Cuál es el perfil académico de los funcionarios adscritos a la oficina o área de asuntos internacionales? (seleccione todos los que apliquen)

Relaciones Internacionales

Derecho

Economía

Administración Pública

Ciencias Políticas

Ciencias de la Comunicación

Otro/s (especificar: \_\_\_\_\_)

16. ¿Cuántos funcionarios de la oficina de asuntos internacionales cuentan con estudios de posgrado?

---

17. ¿Los funcionarios de la oficina o área de asuntos internacionales hablan idiomas extranjeros?

a) Sí                       b) No

a.1) En caso afirmativo, especifique, en promedio, cuántos: \_\_\_\_\_

18. ¿Qué idiomas hablan los funcionarios de la oficina o área de asuntos internacionales? (seleccione todos los que apliquen)

- Inglés  
 Francés  
 Alemán  
 Chino  
 Otro/s (especificar: \_\_\_\_\_)

19. ¿Cuál o cuáles son los principales temas que atiende la oficina o área de asuntos internacionales? (seleccione todos los que apliquen)

- Promoción económica en el exterior (atracción de inversión extranjera y/o promoción de exportaciones)  
 Organización y/o coordinación de giras del Gobernador y otros funcionarios de la entidad al exterior  
 Organización y/o coordinación de visitas de extranjeros distinguidos a la entidad  
 Organización y/o coordinación de eventos internacionales en la entidad  
 Firma y/o administración de Acuerdos Inter-Institucionales  
 Firma y/o administración de Acuerdos de Hermanamiento  
 Cooperación internacional descentralizada  
 Vinculación y atención a la comunidad migrante  
 Promoción turística  
 Promoción cultural  
 Promoción e intercambios educativos  
 Participación en organismos regionales (especificar: \_\_\_\_\_)  
 Participación en organismos internacionales (especificar: \_\_\_\_\_)  
 Participación en redes internacionales (especificar: \_\_\_\_\_)  
 Desarrollo sustentable  
 Participación en la Asociación Mexicana de Oficinas de Asuntos Internacionales de los Estados (AMAIE)  
 Participación en Comisión de Asuntos Internacionales de CONAGO  
 Interacción con la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (SRE)  
 Otro/s (especificar: \_\_\_\_\_)

20. Aproximadamente, ¿cuántos Acuerdos Inter-Institucionales y/o de Hermanamiento ha firmado la entidad con el exterior?

---

21. ¿Conoce el procedimiento legal ante la SRE para la formalización de Acuerdos Inter-Institucionales y/o de Hermanamiento?

- a) Si  b) No   
 a.1) En caso afirmativo, ¿cómo considera que es el procedimiento?  
 Muy eficiente  b) Algo eficiente  c) Poco eficiente  d) Nada eficiente

22. ¿Participa su entidad federativa en algún esquema de cooperación internacional?

- a) Si  b) No   
 a.1) En caso afirmativo, ¿en cuál/es?: \_\_\_\_\_

23. ¿Cuentan con oficinas de representación en el exterior?

a) Sí  b) No

a.1) En caso afirmativo, ¿en dónde?: \_\_\_\_\_

a.2) En caso afirmativo, ¿qué temas atiende?: \_\_\_\_\_

24. ¿Considera que el esquema administrativo del gobierno estatal facilita la operación de la oficina o área de asuntos internacionales?

a) Sí  b) No  c) Regular

25. ¿Considera que la oficina o área de asuntos internacionales ha logrado articular una planeación estratégica internacional de mediano y largo plazo?

a) Sí  b) No

26. ¿Qué factores dificultan la operación de la oficina o área de asuntos internacionales? (seleccione todos los que apliquen)

Falta de un marco jurídico adecuado

Presupuesto insuficiente

Recursos humanos insuficientes

Falta de capacitación y formación de cuadros locales en temas internacionales

Falta de una adecuada coordinación interinstitucional con las otras dependencias del gobierno estatal

Falta de una adecuada coordinación interinstitucional con las dependencias del gobierno federal

Falta de planeación estratégica

Falta de apoyo político

Otro/s (especificar: \_\_\_\_\_)

27. ¿Cómo calificaría la relación de la oficina o área de asuntos internacionales con las secretarías del estado de su entidad?

a) Muy buena  b) Buena  c) Regular  d) Mala  e) Muy mala

28. ¿Existen mecanismos de coordinación entre la oficina o área de asuntos internacionales y las secretarías del gobierno estatal para temas de interés común?

a) Sí  b) No

a.1) En caso afirmativo, ¿cuáles?: \_\_\_\_\_

29. ¿Cuenta la oficina o área de asuntos internacionales con una estrategia de comunicación al interior del gobierno estatal y hacia la ciudadanía?

a) Sí  b) No

a.1) En caso afirmativo, ¿cuál(es)?: \_\_\_\_\_

30. ¿Cuenta la oficina o área de asuntos internacionales con una página web?

a) Sí  b) No

a.1) En caso afirmativo, favor de proporcionar el dominio: \_\_\_\_\_

31. ¿Ha publicado la oficina o área de asuntos internacionales algún libro o folleto donde detalle sus actividades o logros?

a) Sí  b) No

a.1) En caso afirmativo, favor de proporcionar la referencia bibliográfica: \_\_\_\_\_

32. ¿Cuenta la oficina o área de asuntos internacionales con mecanismos de evaluación del impacto de sus actividades o logros?

a) Si  b) No

a.1) En caso afirmativo, ¿cuál(es)?: \_\_\_\_\_

33. ¿Con cuáles actores no gubernamentales se vincula de manera regular? (seleccione todos los que apliquen)

Organizaciones de la Sociedad Civil

Empresarios

Universidades y académicos

Clubes o asociaciones de migrantes

Otro/s (especificar: \_\_\_\_\_)

34. ¿Con cuáles actores gubernamentales fuera de la entidad se vincula de manera regular? (seleccione todos los que apliquen)

Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores

Otras Secretarías de Estado a nivel federal (especificar: \_\_\_\_\_)

Congreso de la Unión (Cámaras de Diputados y Senadores)

CONAGO

Embajadas, consulados y representaciones diplomáticas extranjeras en México

Organismos internacionales o regionales (especificar: \_\_\_\_\_)

Otro(s) (especificar: \_\_\_\_\_)

35. Dentro de la SRE, ¿con cuáles áreas se vincula de manera regular? (seleccione todos los que apliquen)

Dirección General de Coordinación Política

Oficina del Secretario

Subsecretarías (especificar: \_\_\_\_\_)

Embajadas de México en el exterior

Consulados de México en el exterior

Agencia Mexicana de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo (AMEXID)

Otro/s (especificar: \_\_\_\_\_)

36. ¿Conoce usted el microsítio de gobiernos locales de la SRE?

a) Si  b) No

a.1) En caso afirmativo, ¿qué tan útil lo considera para la realización de sus actividades?

Muy útil  b) Algo útil  c) Poco útil  d) Nada útil

37. ¿Conoce usted la "Guía de Recomendaciones de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (SRE) para la Acción Internacional de Estados y Municipios de México?"

a) Si  b) No

a.1) En caso afirmativo, ¿qué tan útil la considera para la realización de sus actividades?

Muy útil  b) Algo útil  c) Poco útil  d) Nada útil

38. ¿Cómo calificaría la relación de la oficina o área de asuntos internacionales con la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (SRE)?

a) Muy buena  b) Buena  c) Regular  d) Mala  e) Muy mala

39. ¿Cómo calificaría la relación de la oficina o área de asuntos internacionales con la Asociación Mexicana de Oficinas de Asuntos Internacionales de los Estados (AMAIE)?

a) Muy buena  b) Buena  c) Regular  d) Mala  e) Muy mala

40. ¿Cómo calificaría las actividades internacionales de su entidad con respecto a la política exterior de México?

a) Autónomas  b) Complementarias  c) Competitivas  d) Otra  (especificar: \_\_\_\_\_)

41. ¿Cuáles considera que son las tres principales fortalezas de la oficina o área de asuntos internacionales?

1. \_\_\_\_\_
2. \_\_\_\_\_
3. \_\_\_\_\_

42. ¿Cuáles considera que son las tres principales áreas de oportunidad de la oficina o área de asuntos internacionales?

1. \_\_\_\_\_
2. \_\_\_\_\_
3. \_\_\_\_\_

43. ¿Qué necesidades de capacitación tiene actualmente la oficina o área de asuntos internacionales?

1. \_\_\_\_\_
2. \_\_\_\_\_
3. \_\_\_\_\_

44. ¿Qué acciones han llevado a cabo para institucionalizar y consolidar los avances realizados por la oficina o área de asuntos internacionales de su entidad hacia el futuro, ante eventuales cambios de administración?

1. \_\_\_\_\_
2. \_\_\_\_\_
3. \_\_\_\_\_

45. Idealmente, si no hubiera restricciones jurídicas y/o presupuestales, ¿qué haría para fortalecer o consolidar a la oficina o área de asuntos internacionales de su entidad?

1. \_\_\_\_\_
2. \_\_\_\_\_
3. \_\_\_\_\_

Comentarios o ideas adicionales:

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Muchas gracias por sus valiosas respuestas.